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Johns Hopkins Jewish Studies
Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism
Contributes to a growing debate about the significance of religion—particularly Judaism and Jewish spiritualism—in European philosophy. Jean Paul Sartre hailed him as the philosopher who introduced France to Husserl and Heidegger. Derrida has paid him homage as "master." An original philosopher who combines the insights of phenomenological analysis with those of Jewish spirituality, Emmanuel Levinas has proven to be of extraordinary importance in the history of modern thought. Collecting Levinas's important writings on religion, Difficult Freedom contributes to a growing debate about the significance of religion—particularly Judaism and Jewish spiritualism—in European philosophy. Topics include ethics, aesthetics, politics, messianism, Judaism and women, and Jewish-Christian relations, as well as the work of Spinoza, Hegel, Heidegger, Franz Rosenzweig, Simone Weil, and Jules Issac.
320 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1976
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About the author
Emmanuel Levinas
148 books402 followersEmanuelis Levinas (later adapted to French orthography as Emmanuel Levinas) received a traditional Jewish education in Lithuania. After WWII, he studied the Talmud under the enigmatic "Monsieur Chouchani", whose influence he acknowledged only late in his life.
Levinas began his philosophical studies at Strasbourg University in 1924, where he began his lifelong friendship with the French philosopher Maurice Blanchot. In 1928, he went to Freiburg University to study phenomenology under Edmund Husserl. At Freiburg he also met Martin Heidegger. Levinas became one of the very first French intellectuals to draw attention to Heidegger and Husserl, by translating Husserl's Cartesian Meditations and by drawing on their ideas in his own philosophy, in works such as his The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, De l'Existence à l'Existant, and En Découvrant l’Existence avec Husserl et Heidegger.
According to his obituary in New York Times,[1] Levinas came to regret his enthusiasm for Heidegger, because of the latter's affinity for the Nazis. During a lecture on forgiveness, Levinas stated "One can forgive many Germans, but there are some Germans it is difficult to forgive. It is difficult to forgive Heidegger."[2]
After earning his doctorate Levinas taught at a private Jewish High School in Paris, the École Normale Israélite Orientale, eventually becoming its director. He began teaching at the University of Poitiers in 1961, at the Nanterre campus of the University of Paris in 1967, and at the Sorbonne in 1973, from which he retired in 1979. He was also a Professor at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. In 1989 he was awarded the Balzan Prize for Philosophy.
Among his most famous students is Rabbi Baruch Garzon from Tetouan (Morocco), who learnt Philosophy with Levinas at the Sorbonne and later went on to become one of the most important Rabbis of the Spanish-speaking world.
In the 1950s, Levinas emerged from the circle of intellectuals surrounding Jean Wahl as a leading French thinker. His work is based on the ethics of the Other or, in Levinas' terms, on "ethics as first philosophy". For Levinas, the Other is not knowable and cannot be made into an object of the self, as is done by traditional metaphysics (which Lévinas called "ontology"). Lévinas prefers to think of philosophy as the "wisdom of love" rather than the love of wisdom (the literal Greek meaning of the word "philosophy"). By his lights, ethics becomes an entity independent of subjectivity to the point where ethical responsibility is integral to the subject; hence an ethics of responsibility precedes any "objective searching after truth".
Levinas derives the primacy of his ethics from the experience of the encounter with the Other. For Levinas, the irreducible relation, the epiphany, of the face-to-face, the encounter with another, is a privileged phenomenon in which the other person's proximity and distance are both strongly felt. "The Other precisely reveals himself in his alterity not in a shock negating the I, but as the primordial phenomenon of gentleness."[3]. At the same time, the revelation of the face makes a demand, this demand is before one can express, or know one's freedom, to affirm or deny.[4] One instantly recognizes the transcendence and heteronomy of the Other. Even murder fails as an attempt to take hold of this otherness.
In Levinas's later thought following "Totality and Infinity", he argued that our responsibility for the other was already rooted within our subjective constitution. It should be noted that the first line of the preface of this book is "everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality."[5] This can be seen most clearly in his later account of recurrence (chapter 4 in "Otherwise Than Being"), where Levinas maintai
Levinas began his philosophical studies at Strasbourg University in 1924, where he began his lifelong friendship with the French philosopher Maurice Blanchot. In 1928, he went to Freiburg University to study phenomenology under Edmund Husserl. At Freiburg he also met Martin Heidegger. Levinas became one of the very first French intellectuals to draw attention to Heidegger and Husserl, by translating Husserl's Cartesian Meditations and by drawing on their ideas in his own philosophy, in works such as his The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, De l'Existence à l'Existant, and En Découvrant l’Existence avec Husserl et Heidegger.
According to his obituary in New York Times,[1] Levinas came to regret his enthusiasm for Heidegger, because of the latter's affinity for the Nazis. During a lecture on forgiveness, Levinas stated "One can forgive many Germans, but there are some Germans it is difficult to forgive. It is difficult to forgive Heidegger."[2]
After earning his doctorate Levinas taught at a private Jewish High School in Paris, the École Normale Israélite Orientale, eventually becoming its director. He began teaching at the University of Poitiers in 1961, at the Nanterre campus of the University of Paris in 1967, and at the Sorbonne in 1973, from which he retired in 1979. He was also a Professor at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. In 1989 he was awarded the Balzan Prize for Philosophy.
Among his most famous students is Rabbi Baruch Garzon from Tetouan (Morocco), who learnt Philosophy with Levinas at the Sorbonne and later went on to become one of the most important Rabbis of the Spanish-speaking world.
In the 1950s, Levinas emerged from the circle of intellectuals surrounding Jean Wahl as a leading French thinker. His work is based on the ethics of the Other or, in Levinas' terms, on "ethics as first philosophy". For Levinas, the Other is not knowable and cannot be made into an object of the self, as is done by traditional metaphysics (which Lévinas called "ontology"). Lévinas prefers to think of philosophy as the "wisdom of love" rather than the love of wisdom (the literal Greek meaning of the word "philosophy"). By his lights, ethics becomes an entity independent of subjectivity to the point where ethical responsibility is integral to the subject; hence an ethics of responsibility precedes any "objective searching after truth".
Levinas derives the primacy of his ethics from the experience of the encounter with the Other. For Levinas, the irreducible relation, the epiphany, of the face-to-face, the encounter with another, is a privileged phenomenon in which the other person's proximity and distance are both strongly felt. "The Other precisely reveals himself in his alterity not in a shock negating the I, but as the primordial phenomenon of gentleness."[3]. At the same time, the revelation of the face makes a demand, this demand is before one can express, or know one's freedom, to affirm or deny.[4] One instantly recognizes the transcendence and heteronomy of the Other. Even murder fails as an attempt to take hold of this otherness.
In Levinas's later thought following "Totality and Infinity", he argued that our responsibility for the other was already rooted within our subjective constitution. It should be noted that the first line of the preface of this book is "everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality."[5] This can be seen most clearly in his later account of recurrence (chapter 4 in "Otherwise Than Being"), where Levinas maintai
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August 16, 2022
Emmanuel Levinasel, kuulsal prantsuse-juudi filosoofil, on huvitavad mõtted vägivallast ja kuuendast käsust: “Vägivaldne on igasugune tegevus, mida tehes inimene toimib, nagu oleks ta ainus toimija: nagu oleks ülejäänud maailm olemas ainult selleks, et tema tegutsemist vastu võtta. /…/ Selles mõttes on peaaegu igasugune põhjuslikkus vägivaldne: mingi asja tootmine, mingi vajaduse rahuldamine, millegi ihaldamine või isegi tundmaõppimine. /…/ Vägivald ei välju enesest. Ta anastab, ta omastab. /…/ Omada tähendab eitada olemist. Vägivald on suveräänsus, aga üksindus. /…/ Kui “Õpi tundma iseennast” võis saada kogu läänemaise filosoofia juhtnööriks, siis tähendab see, et lõppkokkuvõttes leiab Lääs universumi iseendas. /…/ Niikaua kuni Gide ülistab elutäiust ja jõuliste kogemuste mitmekesisust kui vabaduse teostamist, otsib ta vabaduses vabaduse kogemist, ja isegi mitte püüdlemist enesest väljumise poole. See on nautimine, enese tajumine imelise kiirguskoldena, aga mitte kiirgamine”(lk. 146 ja 148).
Vägivalla vastand on kõne(discours). “Rääkida tähendab teise tundmaõppimisega samaaegselt talle ennast tutvustada. Teist mitte lihtsalt ei õpita tundma, vaid teda tervitatakse. /…/ Ma ei mõtle mitte lihtsalt sellele, mis tema minule on, vaid samuti ja samal ajal, ning koguni enne seda, ma olen temale. /…/ Ma mitte lihtsalt ei õpi tundma, vaid ma seltsin. /…/ Rääkimine ja kuulamine ei ole lahutatavad, need ei järgne teineteisele. Rääkimine kehtestab niisiis moraalse võrdsussuhte ja tunnistab järelikult õiglust. Isegi kui keegi räägib orjaga, räägib ta võrdsega. See, mida öeldakse, edasiantava sisu, on võimalik ainult tänu niisugusele palgest-palgesse suhtele, milles teist käsitatakse kaasvestlejana juba enne, kui teda tundma õpitakse. Me vaatame silmavaadet. Silmavaadet vaadata tähendab vaadata seda, mis ei allu ega andu, vaid mis teid näeb, see tähendab vaadata nägu”(lk. 147).
“Nägu näha tähendab mõista: “Sina ei tohi tappa.” Ja mõista: “Sina ei tohi tappa” tähendab mõista: “Ühiskondlik õiglus”. /…/ “Sina ei tohi tappa” pole niisiis mitte lihtne käitumisjuhis. Tuleb välja, et see on kõnelemise enda ja vaimuelu printsiip. /…/ Ainult siis, kui me suudame näha nägu, millelt on välja loetav “Sina ei tohi tappa”, ei saa me enam pöörduda niisugusest vabadusest[Gide] võrsuvasse rahulollu ega kogeda mõnd takistust, mis käiks meile üle jõu. Sest tegelikult on mõrv võimalik. See on võimalik, kui me pole vaadanud teisele otsa. /…/ Moraalne pilk adub näos ületamatut lõpmatust, milles mõrtsukalik kavatsus tajub ohtu ja variseb kokku”(lk. 147-148).
Vägivalla vastand on kõne(discours). “Rääkida tähendab teise tundmaõppimisega samaaegselt talle ennast tutvustada. Teist mitte lihtsalt ei õpita tundma, vaid teda tervitatakse. /…/ Ma ei mõtle mitte lihtsalt sellele, mis tema minule on, vaid samuti ja samal ajal, ning koguni enne seda, ma olen temale. /…/ Ma mitte lihtsalt ei õpi tundma, vaid ma seltsin. /…/ Rääkimine ja kuulamine ei ole lahutatavad, need ei järgne teineteisele. Rääkimine kehtestab niisiis moraalse võrdsussuhte ja tunnistab järelikult õiglust. Isegi kui keegi räägib orjaga, räägib ta võrdsega. See, mida öeldakse, edasiantava sisu, on võimalik ainult tänu niisugusele palgest-palgesse suhtele, milles teist käsitatakse kaasvestlejana juba enne, kui teda tundma õpitakse. Me vaatame silmavaadet. Silmavaadet vaadata tähendab vaadata seda, mis ei allu ega andu, vaid mis teid näeb, see tähendab vaadata nägu”(lk. 147).
“Nägu näha tähendab mõista: “Sina ei tohi tappa.” Ja mõista: “Sina ei tohi tappa” tähendab mõista: “Ühiskondlik õiglus”. /…/ “Sina ei tohi tappa” pole niisiis mitte lihtne käitumisjuhis. Tuleb välja, et see on kõnelemise enda ja vaimuelu printsiip. /…/ Ainult siis, kui me suudame näha nägu, millelt on välja loetav “Sina ei tohi tappa”, ei saa me enam pöörduda niisugusest vabadusest[Gide] võrsuvasse rahulollu ega kogeda mõnd takistust, mis käiks meile üle jõu. Sest tegelikult on mõrv võimalik. See on võimalik, kui me pole vaadanud teisele otsa. /…/ Moraalne pilk adub näos ületamatut lõpmatust, milles mõrtsukalik kavatsus tajub ohtu ja variseb kokku”(lk. 147-148).
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