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The End of History?
Fukuyama argues that the advent of Western liberal democracy may signal the end point of humanity's sociocultural evolution and the final form of human government: "What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." Some see his thesis conflicting with Karl Marx's version of the "end of prehistory." Some scholars identify the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel as the source of Fukuyama's language, by way of Alexandre Kojève. Kojeve argued that the progress of history must lead toward the establishment of a "universal and homogenous" state, most likely incorporating elements of liberal or social democracy; but Kojeve's emphasis on the necessarily "post-political" character of such a state (and its citizens) makes such comparisons inadequate, and is irreducible to any mere "triumph" of capitalism.
16 pages, Unknown Binding
Published January 1, 1989
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About the author
Francis Fukuyama
108 books2,192 followersYoshihiro Francis Fukuyama (born 27 October 1952) is an American philosopher, political economist, and author.
Francis Fukuyama was born in the Hyde Park neighborhood of Chicago. His father, Yoshio Fukuyama, a second-generation Japanese-American, was trained as a minister in the Congregational Church and received a doctorate in sociology from the University of Chicago. His mother, Toshiko Kawata Fukuyama, was born in Kyoto, Japan, and was the daughter of Shiro Kawata, founder of the Economics Department of Kyoto University and first president of Osaka Municipal University in Osaka. Fukuyama's childhood years were spent in New York City. In 1967 his family moved to State College, Pennsylvania, where he attended high school.
Fukuyama received his Bachelor of Arts degree in classics from Cornell University, where he studied political philosophy under Allan Bloom. He earned his Ph.D. in government from Harvard University, studying with Samuel P. Huntington and Harvey C. Mansfield, among others. Fukuyama has been affiliated with the Telluride Association since his undergraduate years at Cornell, an educational enterprise that was home to other significant leaders and intellectuals, including Steven Weinberg and Paul Wolfowitz.
Fukuyama is currently the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy and Director of the International Development Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, located in Washington, DC.
Fukuyama is best known as the author of The End of History and the Last Man, in which he argued that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end, with the world settling on liberal democracy after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Fukuyama predicted the eventual global triumph of political and economic liberalism.
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such... That is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.
He has written a number of other books, among them Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity and Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. In the latter, he qualified his original 'end of history' thesis, arguing that since biotechnology increasingly allows humans to control their own evolution, it may allow humans to alter human nature, thereby putting liberal democracy at risk. One possible outcome could be that an altered human nature could end in radical inequality. He is a fierce enemy of transhumanism, an intellectual movement asserting that posthumanity is a highly desirable goal.
The current revolution in biological sciences leads him to theorize that in an environment where science and technology are by no means at an end, but rather opening new horizons, history itself cannot therefore be said to be, as he once thought, at an end.
In another work The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order, he explores the origins of social norms, and analyses the current disruptions in the fabric of our moral traditions, which he considers as arising from a shift from the manufacturing to the information age. This shift is, he thinks, normal and will prove self-correcting, given the intrinsic human need for social norms and rules.
Francis Fukuyama was born in the Hyde Park neighborhood of Chicago. His father, Yoshio Fukuyama, a second-generation Japanese-American, was trained as a minister in the Congregational Church and received a doctorate in sociology from the University of Chicago. His mother, Toshiko Kawata Fukuyama, was born in Kyoto, Japan, and was the daughter of Shiro Kawata, founder of the Economics Department of Kyoto University and first president of Osaka Municipal University in Osaka. Fukuyama's childhood years were spent in New York City. In 1967 his family moved to State College, Pennsylvania, where he attended high school.
Fukuyama received his Bachelor of Arts degree in classics from Cornell University, where he studied political philosophy under Allan Bloom. He earned his Ph.D. in government from Harvard University, studying with Samuel P. Huntington and Harvey C. Mansfield, among others. Fukuyama has been affiliated with the Telluride Association since his undergraduate years at Cornell, an educational enterprise that was home to other significant leaders and intellectuals, including Steven Weinberg and Paul Wolfowitz.
Fukuyama is currently the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy and Director of the International Development Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, located in Washington, DC.
Fukuyama is best known as the author of The End of History and the Last Man, in which he argued that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end, with the world settling on liberal democracy after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Fukuyama predicted the eventual global triumph of political and economic liberalism.
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such... That is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.
He has written a number of other books, among them Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity and Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. In the latter, he qualified his original 'end of history' thesis, arguing that since biotechnology increasingly allows humans to control their own evolution, it may allow humans to alter human nature, thereby putting liberal democracy at risk. One possible outcome could be that an altered human nature could end in radical inequality. He is a fierce enemy of transhumanism, an intellectual movement asserting that posthumanity is a highly desirable goal.
The current revolution in biological sciences leads him to theorize that in an environment where science and technology are by no means at an end, but rather opening new horizons, history itself cannot therefore be said to be, as he once thought, at an end.
In another work The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order, he explores the origins of social norms, and analyses the current disruptions in the fabric of our moral traditions, which he considers as arising from a shift from the manufacturing to the information age. This shift is, he thinks, normal and will prove self-correcting, given the intrinsic human need for social norms and rules.
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
March 19, 2020
Not much to add to this overly-optimistic and naive thesis put forward by Fukuyama some 30 years ago, except that Fukuyama has himself already denied the plausibility of his argument due to the advances in biotechnology and the coming climate collapse (just to name a few), which clearly show the fundamental contradictions and the unsustainability of the existing socio-economic order. We can finally declare, and we are indeed, compelled to declare, the END of "the end of history" claim.
Two stars given mainly for the intellectual honesty of Fukuyama.
Two stars given mainly for the intellectual honesty of Fukuyama.
August 10, 2023
ადამიანის იდეოლოგიური ევოლუციის შედეგად შექმნილი დასავლური ლიბერალური დემოკრატია. ფუკუიამას აზრით, ეს გახლავთ მმართველობის უნივერსალური ფორმა, რომელმაც სრულ ტრიუმფს მიაღწია ალტერნატიული პოლიტიკური იდეოლოგიების "დამარცხებით" და ჩამოყალიბდა ადამიანთა მმართველობის საბოლოო ფორმად. ხოდა მორჩა! ისტორიაც აი აქ დასრულდაო.
სვამს კითხვას: იმ ფონზე, რომ ფაშიზმისა და კომუნიზმის იდეოლოგიური გამოწვევები დაძლეული და გადალახულია, არსებობს თუ არა სხვა იდეოლოგიური მეტოქე?
-რელიგია;
-ნაციონალიზმი.
თუმცა, იქვე აღნიშნავს, რომ მსოფლიოს იმ ნაწილის საერთაშორისო ცზოვრება, რომელმაც იატორიის დასასრულს მიაღწია, ბევრად მეტადაა დაინტერესებული ეკონომიკით, ვიდრე პოლიტიკითა და სტრატეგიით. ეს არ ნიშნავს რომ კონფლიქტები აღარ იქნება. იქნება, ოღონდ შედარებით მცირე მასშტაბების.
მსოფლიო იდეოლოგიური დაპირისპირება, რომელიც სიმამაცეს, გამბედაობას და იდეალიზმს მოითხოვდა, ჩანაცვლდება ეკონომიკური გამოთვლებით, ტექნიკური პრობლემების გადაჭრით და მომხმარებელთა დახვეწილი მოთხოვნების დაკმაყოფილებით.
მოკლწდ ვნახოთ...
სვამს კითხვას: იმ ფონზე, რომ ფაშიზმისა და კომუნიზმის იდეოლოგიური გამოწვევები დაძლეული და გადალახულია, არსებობს თუ არა სხვა იდეოლოგიური მეტოქე?
-რელიგია;
-ნაციონალიზმი.
თუმცა, იქვე აღნიშნავს, რომ მსოფლიოს იმ ნაწილის საერთაშორისო ცზოვრება, რომელმაც იატორიის დასასრულს მიაღწია, ბევრად მეტადაა დაინტერესებული ეკონომიკით, ვიდრე პოლიტიკითა და სტრატეგიით. ეს არ ნიშნავს რომ კონფლიქტები აღარ იქნება. იქნება, ოღონდ შედარებით მცირე მასშტაბების.
მსოფლიო იდეოლოგიური დაპირისპირება, რომელიც სიმამაცეს, გამბედაობას და იდეალიზმს მოითხოვდა, ჩანაცვლდება ეკონომიკური გამოთვლებით, ტექნიკური პრობლემების გადაჭრით და მომხმარებელთა დახვეწილი მოთხოვნების დაკმაყოფილებით.
მოკლწდ ვნახოთ...
February 18, 2017
„The Soviet Union, then, is at a fork in the road: it can start down the path that was staked out by Western Europe forty-five years ago, a path that most of Asia has followed, or it can realize its own uniqueness and remain stuck in history.
The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history"
The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history"
February 14, 2018
It brings you to the furthest edge of the thinking around human progress. Re-reading it to gear me up for the follow on book.
October 6, 2025
Fukuyama’s thesis obviously aged like milk, and that was my preconceived notions coming into this essay, especially after having indirectly exposed myself to the both amateur and professional ridicule directed at this thesis over the decades. But to my surprise, it was unexpectedly well-argued and well-qualified. Maybe this is just my 1st reading of this essay speaking, but I found in it none of the popular strawman that Fukuyama whole-heartedly believed and declared that the end of history had truly arrived, and liberal democracy would universally supplant all other forms of government, and great power politics would come to an end and we would permanently live in a liberal, abundant world.
None of that at all.
And in fact, the biggest takeaway from this piece for me was serendipitous. I’m fully aware that Fukuyama’s exposition here is cursory, but I finally understood a bit more of the intuition of what Hegel was trying to say.
My boy Francis finally explained in terms that made sense to me, WHY the world can be conceived as pure idealist. Keeping in mind that the Hegelian view of the relationship between the ideal and the material is extremely complicated, Hegel didn’t imply that the real world conformed to pure consciousness. Instead, the key lies in the idea (pun not intended) that ALL human behaviour in the material world, hence all human history (which is the topic that we’ve been wrestling with for so long), is rooted in a prior state of consciousness. And Fukuyama gave me another piece of core intuition – that all economics and politics presuppose an autonomous PRIOR state of consciousness that makes them possible in the 1st place: hence, ‘materialist determinism’ (the sort of thinking that holds that liberal economics inevitably produces liberal politics (and I note here that Friedman famously held that economic freedom is a necessary condition for political freedom. This statement, to me, is also a form of ‘materialist determinism’) ) must be avoided as much as possible.
And consciousness will ultimately remake the material world in its own image. I think, to oversimplify this concept extremely crudely (to the point where I might rightfully need to be arrested to rot in philosophy jail), many people already understand this intuitively, because our thoughts ultimately shape our actions and circumstances. It’s just that leap from individual consciousness, to the collective, that fascinates me. Even if I stop thinking in terms of the Hegelian dialectic for the time being, the casual observation that ideology often sweeps entire governments and helps them organize and sell policies to the people, is very striking.
Hence the famous aphorism, ‘Everything that is rational is real, and everything that is real is rational’.
And sure, I now understand a bit better what the whole dialectic is all about, and why it even is necessary in the 1st place. The prior state of consciousness is key once more – without this prior state there would not even be any dialectic, I suppose, and I’d say I’ve started to think of the realm of ideas as the ‘primary’ world, and the realm of materials just the secondary world that flows from it as a necessary byproduct. The dialectic obviously fights, struggles and contradicts solely in the ideal – and that drives all human history: a humongous, bloody, perpetual war of ideologies.
Although the practical intuition is simple enough, I obviously have much to learn about how Hegel argued that 2 disagreements will push both parties closer to the truth, and why there inevitably must, given enough time, be an end of history.
But I must linger on it a bit longer.
Fukuyama’s arguments here concerning the almost universal merits of liberal democracy are lucid enough, and I think many will accept them freely (politicians can vary all they want on the ideological spectrum, but it seems like impinging on democracy is an undisputedly ‘bad’). I guess my central question is: If liberal democracy is NOT the end of history, then, what is? And what could be?
(And now I’m reminded of the short book that I have not yet read, ‘Capitalist realism’. Although it’s not directly related to the discussion of liberal democracy, I cannot help but make the tenuous mental association that it’s not even possible for me to imagine a coherent political-economic alternative to liberal democracy. And I think I am justified, as Fukuyama agrees! What COULD be the alternative? Nationalism? Fascism? Communism? Absolutely not – especially since these failed ideologies have been THE root causes of the miseries of the 20th century.)
It’s now time for me to address the elephant in the room: realism in IR theory, especially since Fukuyama himself passingly responds to this school of thought in this essay. I’ve been a realist myself for a number of years, courtesy to Mearsheimer’s excellent books (honorary mentions to Machiavelli and Waltz). The basic intuition that I’d like to touch on is – realism basically holds that there is NO end of history. How is this possible, from a Hegelian point of view? Why does the dialectic not push both parties closer to the ‘truth’? I wonder.
Some further thoughts gained from this essay include the intellectual thread – that liberalism leaves us with an empty vacuum – that I detected in Fukuyama’s writing, consistent across the decades. That is something that Fukuyama taught me. Indeed, he even calls the ‘emptiness at the core of liberalism’ most certainly a ‘defect in the ideology’. I suspect from this essay that Fukuyama had underestimated this ‘core defect’ in liberalism, so it was interesting to see Fukuyama having to write a short book, decades later, to return to DEFEND liberalism as it crumbles from within due to this very ‘core defect’ itself. Indeed, this underestimation was Fukuyama’s blind spot!
Finally, I should note that Fukuyama explicitly hedges in this essay by stating that ‘this does not by any means imply the end of international conflict per se’. Indeed, another of the key ideas I gained from this essay is that liberal democracy had (according to Fukuyama!) ONLY won within the realm of IDEAS – so the world would still be divided between that part that is historical and that part that is post-historical. So, conflict between these 2 parts, or conflict within the historical part, is certainly possible. This is why I could easily jump on the bandwagon that clowns Fukuyama for being naïve, but I choose not to, because this essay, in my perhaps naïve opinion anyway, still considered both sides of the argument quite fairly, and, given the time which it was written, is probably as fair a prediction as any other.
Hegel himself thought that 1806 was the end of history!
None of that at all.
And in fact, the biggest takeaway from this piece for me was serendipitous. I’m fully aware that Fukuyama’s exposition here is cursory, but I finally understood a bit more of the intuition of what Hegel was trying to say.
My boy Francis finally explained in terms that made sense to me, WHY the world can be conceived as pure idealist. Keeping in mind that the Hegelian view of the relationship between the ideal and the material is extremely complicated, Hegel didn’t imply that the real world conformed to pure consciousness. Instead, the key lies in the idea (pun not intended) that ALL human behaviour in the material world, hence all human history (which is the topic that we’ve been wrestling with for so long), is rooted in a prior state of consciousness. And Fukuyama gave me another piece of core intuition – that all economics and politics presuppose an autonomous PRIOR state of consciousness that makes them possible in the 1st place: hence, ‘materialist determinism’ (the sort of thinking that holds that liberal economics inevitably produces liberal politics (and I note here that Friedman famously held that economic freedom is a necessary condition for political freedom. This statement, to me, is also a form of ‘materialist determinism’) ) must be avoided as much as possible.
And consciousness will ultimately remake the material world in its own image. I think, to oversimplify this concept extremely crudely (to the point where I might rightfully need to be arrested to rot in philosophy jail), many people already understand this intuitively, because our thoughts ultimately shape our actions and circumstances. It’s just that leap from individual consciousness, to the collective, that fascinates me. Even if I stop thinking in terms of the Hegelian dialectic for the time being, the casual observation that ideology often sweeps entire governments and helps them organize and sell policies to the people, is very striking.
Hence the famous aphorism, ‘Everything that is rational is real, and everything that is real is rational’.
And sure, I now understand a bit better what the whole dialectic is all about, and why it even is necessary in the 1st place. The prior state of consciousness is key once more – without this prior state there would not even be any dialectic, I suppose, and I’d say I’ve started to think of the realm of ideas as the ‘primary’ world, and the realm of materials just the secondary world that flows from it as a necessary byproduct. The dialectic obviously fights, struggles and contradicts solely in the ideal – and that drives all human history: a humongous, bloody, perpetual war of ideologies.
Although the practical intuition is simple enough, I obviously have much to learn about how Hegel argued that 2 disagreements will push both parties closer to the truth, and why there inevitably must, given enough time, be an end of history.
But I must linger on it a bit longer.
Fukuyama’s arguments here concerning the almost universal merits of liberal democracy are lucid enough, and I think many will accept them freely (politicians can vary all they want on the ideological spectrum, but it seems like impinging on democracy is an undisputedly ‘bad’). I guess my central question is: If liberal democracy is NOT the end of history, then, what is? And what could be?
(And now I’m reminded of the short book that I have not yet read, ‘Capitalist realism’. Although it’s not directly related to the discussion of liberal democracy, I cannot help but make the tenuous mental association that it’s not even possible for me to imagine a coherent political-economic alternative to liberal democracy. And I think I am justified, as Fukuyama agrees! What COULD be the alternative? Nationalism? Fascism? Communism? Absolutely not – especially since these failed ideologies have been THE root causes of the miseries of the 20th century.)
It’s now time for me to address the elephant in the room: realism in IR theory, especially since Fukuyama himself passingly responds to this school of thought in this essay. I’ve been a realist myself for a number of years, courtesy to Mearsheimer’s excellent books (honorary mentions to Machiavelli and Waltz). The basic intuition that I’d like to touch on is – realism basically holds that there is NO end of history. How is this possible, from a Hegelian point of view? Why does the dialectic not push both parties closer to the ‘truth’? I wonder.
Some further thoughts gained from this essay include the intellectual thread – that liberalism leaves us with an empty vacuum – that I detected in Fukuyama’s writing, consistent across the decades. That is something that Fukuyama taught me. Indeed, he even calls the ‘emptiness at the core of liberalism’ most certainly a ‘defect in the ideology’. I suspect from this essay that Fukuyama had underestimated this ‘core defect’ in liberalism, so it was interesting to see Fukuyama having to write a short book, decades later, to return to DEFEND liberalism as it crumbles from within due to this very ‘core defect’ itself. Indeed, this underestimation was Fukuyama’s blind spot!
Finally, I should note that Fukuyama explicitly hedges in this essay by stating that ‘this does not by any means imply the end of international conflict per se’. Indeed, another of the key ideas I gained from this essay is that liberal democracy had (according to Fukuyama!) ONLY won within the realm of IDEAS – so the world would still be divided between that part that is historical and that part that is post-historical. So, conflict between these 2 parts, or conflict within the historical part, is certainly possible. This is why I could easily jump on the bandwagon that clowns Fukuyama for being naïve, but I choose not to, because this essay, in my perhaps naïve opinion anyway, still considered both sides of the argument quite fairly, and, given the time which it was written, is probably as fair a prediction as any other.
Hegel himself thought that 1806 was the end of history!
January 3, 2016
An informative article that was later expanded into a book titled The End of History and the Last Man.
April 12, 2021
Hmmmm.......
June 11, 2024
An overly optimistic application of liberalism
December 2, 2023
Nobody could have possibly bought this. Not even when it was written. It's just 15 pages of regime story spinning. Even the state propaganda of the time disagreed, because it was known that the wheels were coming off back then and impressions needed to be managed.
If you'd read Disuniting of America, you'd see that Schlesinger admitted that the cracks were showing. People knew. Admissions were made and widely circulated. How could permanent peace have been established by Liberalism when the US was falling apart?
What a bunch of purposeful nonsense.
If you'd read Disuniting of America, you'd see that Schlesinger admitted that the cracks were showing. People knew. Admissions were made and widely circulated. How could permanent peace have been established by Liberalism when the US was falling apart?
What a bunch of purposeful nonsense.
April 2, 2022
I didn’t like this paper. Fukuyama is a good author but the poet was quite boring, and in fact, I didn’t manage reading it entirely but I know I won’t read every word.
I understand his ideas and I find them interesting, and I recognize the his ideas in the real world. I just didn’t enjoy reading about it. Felt like the longest thing I ever read, but it’s only 18 pages and I couldn’t even finish it.
I understand his ideas and I find them interesting, and I recognize the his ideas in the real world. I just didn’t enjoy reading about it. Felt like the longest thing I ever read, but it’s only 18 pages and I couldn’t even finish it.
April 24, 2017
Quite interesting to read in 2017.
September 19, 2022
Such an L.
Had some interesting bits on Hegel though.
Had some interesting bits on Hegel though.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews