Amazone
Shermer Ruins the Book by Talking Too Much
I expected more of Shermer in this outing, given his excellent work in Why People Believe Weird Things. But then, in that book, Shermer took on and successfully skewered the easy targets, such as UFO nuts, believers in astrology and other New Age fantasies, revisionist Holocaust deniers and whatnot.
However, his latest effort basically amounts to little more than a barely intelligible rant than thoughtful scholarship.
Shermer begins with a bold objective, trying to lay down demarcation lines between generally accepted science (as is generally accepted by scientists themselves), iffy propositions which he calls borderlands science, and a large group of topics that he labels non-science and pseudo science.
I must say without hesitation that he fails miserably in his objective, partly due to his poor choice of content, but mostly because of his even poorer writing style.
Although the book starts out well, the writing steadily devolves, and by the fifth chapter, the reader must set his or her shoulders and hunker down for some very painful reading.
Like most PhD holders, Shermer has acquired an impressive amount of scholarly trivia over the course of his education, yet somehow did not the master the mechanics of good writing.
This actually is not hard to believe, as too many people finishing PhD programs in engineering, science and to the dishonor of all liberal arts traditions, English and history programs can not string together a few decent words of prose. Honestly, many of these programs think that they can make up for a lack of erudite soul with an overdose of abstract quantitation and esoteric facts.
And boy oh boy does this approach show in Mr. Shermer's stilted and constipated text.
Moreover, as someone who regards himself as a champion of the hypothesis test and the scientific method, he really should know when to appropriately use such methods, and when not to use them.
In reading his text, I got the feeling that in his graduate training he only attended the lectures in his Statistical Methods for the Social Sciences having to do with hypothesis testing, and studiously skipped all the other lectures, particularly those having to do with measurement, validity, operational definition and level of trust in results.
I say this because in his chapter on Psuedoscience and Race, he utterly fails to lay down an operational definition, and merely assumes that everyone shares the same common definition of race and knows what he is referring to.
He also fails to consider the history of race and the common knowledge that race is a social construct, not a biological phenomenon. Though he provides a context (U.S. race relations), he does not provide an operational definition. He also seems unaware of considerable population genetic and molecular genetic evidence which would make it impossible for most in America to claim, at least from a genetic standpoint, to be truly white or truly black.
Thus, from this one would have to assume, especially when reading Mr. Shermer's screed, that he defines race based on physical appearance pretty much like everybody else. However, scientists would take a different point of view, much as many a bigoted proponent of eugenics have on many occasions.
A second bone of contention that I have with Mr. Shermer's overly scientific and inappropriately quantitative approach to everything is his use in Part II Borderlands People, of quantitative methods to evaluate purely subjective things.
Some variables we measure are concrete and have meaning that is fixed, such as weight, temperature and volume, athough we can use metric or English units to evaluate them.
However, as I recall from one statistics text (the actual text is Richard M. Jaeger's Statistics A Spectator Sport), things like intelligence or neuroticism are totally subjective because their meaning and their measurement can change depending on who is evaluating and measuring them.
For such things, there can be no common agreement as to definition or even measurement.
Which I believe Shermer should have learned, thus invalidating the invocation of Sulloway's work in his exposition.
A good educational regimen in statistics (which I believe should begin with Moore's Statistics: Concepts and Controversies) would emphasize the importance of looking behind the numbers, using the appropriate measurement methods, and taking into account information other than that in the test when drawing conclusions. None of this was done within this text.
Still, I did learn a few things, being quite surprised to learn that there was actually a black champion cyclist, and Mr. Shermer did make a number of correct points. I also give him credit for (grudgingly) admitting, in his last chapter, that scientists are people too, and are motivated by the same concerns and issues like everyone else.
Yet, this does not make up for the overall bad writing and worse scholarship.
I expect, no, I insist on better from a self-respecting skeptic.
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A World of Glasshouses
I'm a scientist, an astronomer specifically, and I'm not really the target audience here I suspect (even though in the line of work I have had to respond to a number of Borderlands claims).
Objectively this is a 3-star book, but the sleight-of-hand marketing biases me against it.
This is a semi-scholarly work written by a science historian.
Most of the essays revolve around Darwin, Wallace, and evolution. With these essays, and a handful of others, Shermer takes a historical approach to the borderlands of science to look at the process of how scientific theories develop to acceptance.
He looks at very few cases of the current borderlands, and of those he does he makes generally weak arguments (and not scientific ones) with correspondingly weak conclusions.
An early chapter on remote viewing is the exception.
The wordcount here is limited, but I wanted to point out some specific problem points.
In the chapter asking if Sagan was "a great scientist," one questioning his rejection from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), Shermer compares his publications to "the creme de le creme" of scientists: Gould, E. O. Wilson, Jared Diamond, and Mayr.
The comparisons involve number of honorary degrees, popular articles, advisory groups, books, etc. There is NEVER a comparison of his scientific publication rate or citation rate versus NAS ASTRONOMERS, a primary criterion for the NAS membership who understands that publication practices vary from field to field.
Shermer sets up a straw man and knocks it down, the same thing he accuses pseudoscientists of doing.
He never comes close to making an argument about whether or not Sagan was a good scientist, merely that he was a well-known one who was highly regarded for his popularization.
I liked the idea of the chapter on the Amadeus Myth, which is a topic worthy of comment, but not the execution. We like to make myths of our heroes.
But here is another straw man, where Shermer's "genius" is equated to practicing math tricks and never very well characterized. Prodigies are not discussed.
Cosmology is noted as suffering from a bias against historical science.
This is far from true, I assure you.
Origins programs in astronomy get funding far ABOVE their non-historical competitors.
A whole chapter is spent discussing whether or not punctuated equilibrium represents a paradigm shift of evolution. This is the semantic playing field of a science historian, and of little interest to actual scientists.
Shermer indeed would seem to have such a bias against what he calls nonscience topics that he gives them almost no mention.
While he lumps, for instance, Bigfoot in with some poor company, he later quotes anthropologist Krantz in another chapter on another subject; Krantz is one of a number of credible scientists who take the topic seriously. The same cannot be said for his other "nonscience" topics, yet all get rated equally at 0.1 with no discussion.
Indeed, despite Shermer's interesting discussion about a spectrum of "science," his spectrum seems to correspond to his idea of the ideas' correctness, NOT their scientific validity.
What is validity (to play Shermer's word games)? All topics can be validly studied using the tools of science.
Some are routinely, and some are not. He should have used a different term. I found myself losing trust in Shermer.
When Shermer finds that SETI pioneers are primarily first-born rather than later siblings as in most other scientific revolutions, he finds a way to argue it away in terms of their religion.
I did not see this sort of multiple parameter analysis in the comparison sample, so should I believe it?
Or did he just invoke the same kind of wishful thinking he criticizes in others?
I had many more problem points that kept my "doubt-o-meter" ringing at regular intervals.
What my criticisms mostly boil down to is that Shermer writes and acts as a science historian much better than he does as a scientist.
He gives hints all too often that he doesn't think like a scientist, and this made me distrustful while reading.
This is a shame. I used to subscribe to the Skeptical Inquirer, but let that lapse since that magazine too often took lazy pot shots at the same easy targets again and again.
Shermer, and Shermer's magazine the Skeptic, for the most part shoot at more interesting targets, but I'm afraid not as well as they should.
Michael Brotherton
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A so-so attempt at drawing the lines
4/10
Michael Shermer is a one-man dynamo of what might be called the Radical Skepticism movement.
He has a talk show, an organization, a magazine and writes books, all dedicated to separating the wheat from the chaff in human belief. Or so he claims.
This book, like his magazine and his show, shows Shermer at his best (witty, reasonably well read and clever) and at his worst (narrow minded, inflexible and ignorant of philosophical stances beyond his own). Like the Positivists of the early part of the last century, Shermer believes he has an infallible metric that enables him to distinguish meaning from meninglessness, and he applies it ruthlessly.
He's at his best when picking the easy targets, like research into ESP, remote viewing and so forth. But he uses these examples as a springboard to justify more questionable criticisms of areas like SETI, which, while still very much in the speculative column, aren't by any reasonable researcher's definition bad science.
Unfortunately Shermer is unwilling or unable to admit there are vast gaps in his knowledge and that not all truths are easily sorted into one bin or another.
He seems unable to understand that sicentific truth is a product of the paradigm of a time.
Thus (for example) he rejects Freud completely, without understanding how Freud's theories were a product of his era, or how they helped change the way in which we talk about the mind. (After all, we know now that Newton's laws are only simplified approximations of the actual processes, but we don't decry him as [untruthful]!) Shermer lumps together the purely fantastic with the merely questionable or speculative; all things either pass Shermer's standard or they don't, period.
Skepticism is an important trait of the good researcher, but for Shermer it's a religion in itself, perhaps because his ego is so tied up in what he sees and the absolute truth of his assertions.
As a result, what begins as an interesting review of well-known [untruths] and delusions ends up being merely a demonstration of the limits of Shermer's knowledge.
Michael