Preemptive War

by Erick Labara, Christopher Bellamy (Preface), Richard Holmes (Foreword)

Individuals and nations who now continue to think and plan on the basis of security policies and strategies of the 1990s have not understood the message of September 11th 2001. The subsequent war against the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan called Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’, started on October 7th 2001 and was the beginning of a long lasting, world-wide mission involving several states’ means for combating newly emerging threats. Thus, it was for certain that the twelve-year holiday of history (1990 - 2001) had come to an end. The reform of strategic deterrence has gone through the alleged new doctrine of preemptive. It has been the cause of major controversy and virulent debates in the international community, in the media and public especially at the end of 2002 and beginning of 2003, when the USA and the UK were threatening to wage a ‘preemptive’ war against Iraq. This issue came to its peak on March 20th 2003 when the US led armed forces launched military operations against the so-called rogue state of Iraq. Both the Bush administration and 10 Downing Street received considerable international condemnation. Understandably, and perhaps deliberately, the distinction between preemptive, which has long been accepted in international law, and prevention, became confused. The distinction between preemptive and prevention is cardinal. The former could be perceived as an aggressive sword and the latter as a defensive shield, but such an approach is wrong. Indeed, preemptive implies the imminence of a threat whereas prevention deals with a hostile danger, though not imminent. So prevention, of itself, is more aggressive than preemptive. Preemptive can be considered as a natural reflex, prevention as a response to a distant danger, a matter of foresight and free choice. This distinction, which contains elements of paradox, has not been understood and this had added to the confusion surrounding the casus belli for the recent war against Iraq manifested by quizzical ignoramuses. In the light of the new emphasis on ‘preemptive’, in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, this distinction must be properly understood. If, in the future, democratic governments are to convince their peoples that they are going to war for the right reasons, they need to be honest and not to try to pass prevention as ‘preemptive.’

200 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2004