In September 1945, after the fall of the atomic bomb--and with it, the Japanese empire--Asia was dominated by the British. Governing a vast crescent of land that stretched from India through Burma and down to Singapore, and with troops occupying the French and Dutch colonies in southern Vietnam and Indonesia, Britain's imperial might had never seemed stronger.
Yet within a few violent years, British power in the region would crumble, and myriad independent nations would struggle into existence. Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper show how World War II never really ended in these ravaged Asian lands but instead continued in bloody civil wars, anti-colonial insurrections, and inter-communal massacres. These years became the most formative in modern Asian history, as Western imperialism vied with nascent nationalist and communist revolutionaries for political control.
Forgotten Wars, a sequel to the authors' acclaimed Forgotten Armies, is a panoramic account of the bitter wars of the end of empire, seen not only through the eyes of the fighters, but also through the personal stories of ordinary people: the poor and bewildered caught up in India's Hindu-Muslim massacres; the peasant farmers ravaged by warfare between British forces and revolutionaries in Malaya; the Burmese minorities devastated by separatist revolt. Throughout, we are given a stunning portrait of societies poised between the hope of independence and the fear of strife. Forgotten Wars vividly brings to life the inescapable conflicts and manifold dramas that shaped today's Asia.
Christopher Alan Bayly was a British historian specializing in British Imperial, Indian, and global history. A graduate of the University of Oxford, he was the Vere Harmsworth Professor of Imperial and Naval History at the University of Cambridge. He was knighted in 2007 for achievements as a historian.
Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper's mighty volume chronicles the forgotten, and not that forgotten, wars of Southeast Asia – the conflicts in Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, and Indochina.
Burma
After the assassination of the eminent Burmese revolutionary Aung San, who was instrumental in his country's independence from British rule, in July 1947, the newly independent Burma seemed to have been left vulnerable to Communist subversion or Chinese aggression. In 1949, the first year after independence, the Burmese leadership of U Nu faced resistance from the Communists, the People's Volunteer Organization, and, most importantly, from the Karens. The central government had made considerable progress in asserting its authority mainly because of the lack of understanding among the dissidents and the divisions within the Communist ranks, the government's effectiveness in preventing rebellious groups from receiving external assistance, which was especially important to the Karens, and the surprisingly effective leadership of the U Nu. Nevertheless, the government's forces controlled less than half of Burmese territory. The Karens, who sought to establish an independent state, were the major threat to the nation's integrity.
The continuing struggle between the Burmese and the Karens worried India, Britain, and the United States. America, having already assumed the role of global protector of democracy, could not allow the British to deal with its former colony on their own. The State Department quietly supported Jawaharlal Nehru in his idea to invite representatives from Britain, Australia, Pakistan, and Ceylon to a conference at New Delhi, where an offer of mediation was extended to Burma. Washington acted behind the scenes throughout the conference because it knew the Burmese government would not like any initiatives hinting of Western manipulation and unjustified interference in Burmese affairs. This turned out to be a well-founded apprehension, for Prime Minister U Nu refused the New Delhi offer. His government, he insisted, would soon bring the Karens under control.
As Mao Zedong came closer and closer to victory in China, the Burmese government worked to strengthen its position both externally and internally. In a meeting with American Ambassador J. Klahr Huddle in April 1949, Nu told him he now considered Communism to be a major threat to his country, and Burma was ready to cooperate with other anti-Communist countries, especially after the Chinese Communists denounced the Burmese government for their allying with the "imperialist-capitalist camp."
At that time, though, the American government decided not to pursue a closer relationship with Burma. It remained skeptical about the capability of the Burmese forces and encouraged Britain to step in and back Burma. As the U Na government agreed to relax regulations restricting private investment, Britain extended a $70 million loan. Nevertheless, because of its proximity to China and its internal politics – strong leftist criticisms of the current government's policies – and in December 1949, Burma extended diplomatic recognition to the Chinese People's Republic, becoming the first non-Communist country to do so.
At the time, Washington did not consider such a step to be detrimental to the eventual pursuit of closer relations with Burma. The Burmese continued to seek economic and military assistance and to speak of a possible alliance with the West, and in early 1950, American policy-makers, while yet wary of Burmese leadership and the prospects of long-term stability in the country, concluded, in distinctly Cold Warrior fashion, that American security required an investment of resources and prestige in Burma. Burma and Indochina, the State Department reasoned, stood as the keys to the future of mainland Southeast Asia. If these two countries were saved from falling to Communism, the region would be secure. If either was lost, Thailand would follow suit quickly.
Thailand
In Thailand, the American government's goal was to drive the Thai away from their historic tendency to find security through embracing the predominant political trends in Southeast Asia. From Bangkok's perspective, developments in China and Indochina portended the emergence of a strong Communist Vietnam allied with China. As the State Department observed, "It would be strange if during a period of Communist ascendancy in the Far East Thailand would not assume the popular political coloration in order to be inconspicuous among its neighbors. Many Siamese who do not believe in Communism per se will support a government which will assume the Communist political pattern out of expediency."
The current government, headed by Prime Minister Pibul Songgram, seemed especially vulnerable. While it was generally supported by the army, various elements in the military sought its overthrow. After an aborted coup in February 1949, Pibul purged numerous officials, further displeasing and increasing the support base of the anti-Pibul Democratic party and generally threatening the position of the military.
American Ambassador Edwin Stanton and officials from the Division of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs suggested America re-assured the Thai government of America's interest in preserving a strong, anti-Communist Thailand. Otherwise, Stanton warned, Pibul would fatalistically assume opposing Communism was futile. Immediate recognition of Thai requests for economic and military assistance, on the other hand, would boost the Thai government's morale by demonstrating that their country was of importance to American anti-Communist policy. That is why, by 1950, the American government moved toward a decisive association with Thailand.
Indonesia
Among the countries of Southeast Asia, Indonesia appeared at the time to be the most stable. The ending of the Dutch-Indonesian war with the attainment of independence for Indonesia was a significant achievement for American policy-makers. When Ambassador-designate H. Merle Cochan delivered Truman's congratulations to President Sukarno, signaling America's formal recognition of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, Sukarno replied that had it not been for Cochan's support of the Indonesian nationalist revolution, he might not have been president now. The Soviet Union had little influence in Indonesia, for it, while quickly extending recognition to the republic, chastised the Indonesians for trading Dutch colonialist rule for American.
However, its success notwithstanding, America came out of the Dutch-Indonesian war with a tarnished image in the eyes of the Indonesian government, which resented the American role in the resolution of differences with the Dutch over the status of Western New Guinea. At The Hague Conference, the State Department supported Dutch retention of the area because it was "not politically articulate" and its peoples were not ethnologically related to Indonesia. Ambassador Cochran suggested a compromise according to which New Guinea would remain under Dutch control for one year, and afterwards its status would be determined through further negotiation between the Netherlands and Indonesia. With the Dutch, backed by Cochran, insisting they could not make any more concessions to their former colony, the Indonesian government was forced to accept the compromise on the New Guinea issue. They were annoyed by America's reluctance to assure Indonesian control over New Guinea, though.
Nevertheless, the Republic formed a close relationship with the overseas superpower. It looked to America for economic assistance and made earnest endeavors to introduce effective democratic processes, while America regarded Indonesia, with its vast resources and strategic location, as a vital part of its efforts to maintain a non-Communist Southeast Asia. Two weeks after Indonesia freed itself from Dutch rule, Truman approved extending $5 million in military assistance to guard it from potential Communist invasions.
I decided against reviewing the chapters covering Indochina, the most popular of the four conflicts, for I believe the authors can offer nothing new and exciting to Vietnam buffs, who have already studied in-depth the First Indochina War. Otherwise, FORGOTTEN WARS is a truly impressive study that, uncharacteristically, focuses on lesser-known Southeast Asian wars and chronicles them in a highly detailed way. Most satisfying for a Cold War buff like me, Bayly and Harper go deep into the nuances of American involvement in the affairs of all of the aforementioned countries. With its engaging prose, this book is a delight to read.
I've read through many of the reviews here and yes the book is long, but it needs to be when you consider the vast geographic area and its attempt to do justice to a complex set of countries and situations. I don't think it is only for experts, but for anyone who wants to understand some of the history of this region and why things now may be as they are. We are all made by our pasts and Britain, for good or bad, has contributed to what is currently happening in many parts of Asiahis by its actions in the past. As an imperial power Britain must bear the responsibility for a good deal of the bad but then so all imperial powers. Britain may have done some good, at some time, in the course of its imperial history but one must remember that Britain did not acquire, or hang on to its empire in the teeth of resistance and condemnation, both at home or abroad, to do good. The Empire made Britain powerful and important, and really the country has never gotten over this. It still refuses to believe it does not have a role on the world stage which it must play. Britain doesn't want to be a former imperial power like Belgium, the Netherlands, or Sweden (although considering how prosperous and nice those countries are one might ask why?).
I think a lot more British people should read this (though I am sure they won't) because I (as an Irish man) am so often amused, but also a little surprised, when Britains, like Americans, wonder why so many people around the world hate them, or at least their country. They never think to ask how they would feel if for many years, if not centuries, they had been ruled by another country and had no control over their affairs and if they had fought against this foreign interloper they would be branded rebels and traitors and any fighting they did against the foreign power would be called mutiny. All the while the foreign power would govern the UK not with a view to what was best for the UK but for what was best for the ruling power. Once the foreign power relinquished control the British would have to be grateful for any 'improvements' made, like railways and government buildings, even though it was taxes paid by British people that paid for them. But that is the reality of life under imperial/colonial rule.
This is a truly excellent and readable book, like its predecessor.
This seemed like a fine introduction to the formal British Empire's final years in 'The Great Crescent' of Asia - comprising of what are now the states of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Malaysia and Singapore. The period covered in detail is relatively brief, between 1945 and (mostly) 1949. Most of what is narrated would probably fall under the rubric of social and political history. The scholarship, while not exhaustive by any means, seems nevertheless very wide-ranging, and strikes a nice balance between detailed description and incisive analysis. The bibliography is also very useful.
Style-wise the writing is mostly rather dry and understated, if somewhat sympathetic all round, and occasionally extremely lurid. I found parts of the narrative genuinely upsetting, so much so that I had to stop reading the book for awhile. Oral testimonies were especially appalling. Some allegations arose from those who were detained en masse during the British-led crackdown that literally ripped apart Chinese communities during the Malayan Emergency: "When I was giving birth to my girl, the British imperialists did not give me anything to eat for a whole day, and after the baby was born I was only given a small piece of bread every day. The most cruel thing was that many female prisoners had to give birth to babies in the corridor of the hospital, and the British imperialists even forced them to drown their own babies in a cess pit"(485). This was only one of the more heartrending mass tragedies that went hand-in-hand with war and state-making in post-WW2 Asia. To be read in conjunction with Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941-1945.
"Forgotten Wars" describes the efforts of Great Britain during the period from 1945 to 1955 to, first, restore its authority in its possessions along the coast of the Indian Ocean running from Calcutta to Singapore; and when this failed to hand over control in an orderly fashion to new regimes led by local ethnic groups in Burma (now Myanmar), Malaya and Singapore.
Prior to WWII, this territory known as the Great Crescent had been under the jurisdiction of the Viceroy of British India. During WWII, it was occupied by the Japanese Although the British Indian Army had liberated Burma by April 1945, Malaya and Singapore were still under Japanese Occupation when the unexpected atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 brought WWII to a sudden end. The British Indian Army then moved in to quickly accept the surrender of the Japanese armies in Britain's colonies in the Great Crescent and also in French Indo-China and in Dutch Indonesia. For a moment it appeared as if Great Britain had not only saved its own Empire but that it might take colonies from France and the Netherlands as well.
Bayly and Harper make it feel that Britain, France and England had lost so much credibility in allowing the Japanese to occupy their colonies, that they stood no real chance of permanently re-establishing their rule. For the British an equally serious problem was that Nehru and the Indian Congress strongly objected to Indian troops being used outside of Indian thus depriving Britain of a military force in the region. Consequently, the British withdrew from Indo-China and Indonesia before the end of 1946. Congress, however, did allow a small number of Indian troops to remain in Burma and the Malayan Peninsula to facilitate the transfer of power from Britain to the new republics.
In Burma, the British did not stay long. The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) which had begun as a resistance group under the Japanese Occupation had the organization and moral authority needed to rule. It acceded to power when the Republic of Burma was established in January 1948. Burma chose not to enter the British Commonwealth and the troops of the British Indian Army promptly departed. The US became Burma's prime Western ally. The Communists agreed initially to participate in the AFPFL government. Some Communist resistance groups were later formed but they never constituted a serious threat to the Burmese Republic.
To the south a Malayan Federation was created in 1948. In this region however there was however a very significant Communist insurgency with strong support in the Chinese community that lasted until 1960. The Malayans consequently were happy to have the British to stay on to provide police and military service. The British crushed the Communist revolt using the same technique that had employed during the Boer War. They evacuated all residents of any villages suspected of providing food to the Communist partisans and placed them in detention camps until the end of the struggle.
"Forgotten Wars" is a work of political history. There is no true attempt to examine any cultural, sociological or economic issues. Similarly it must be recognized that all events are regarded from a purely British point of view. Bayly and Harper's book is about Britain's withdrawal from one part of its empire . It is not about any of the new nations that emerged.
For the western reader, "Forgotten Wars" is tremendously entertaining. The authors discuss English language authors such as Anthony Burgess and Han Suyin who lived in the region during the period in question. They also make a vey diverting commentary on David Lean's movie "Bridge on the River Kwai' and on the novel by Pierre Boulle that it was based on.
"Forgotten Wars" is old-fashioned but very well done. I recommend it highly to anyone interested in the history of the British Empire.
A well-written account of how the British lost their Asian colonies after the Japanese retreated. Personally, as a Singaporean, I had learnt in school about the sense of dissatisfaction and betrayal we had had against the British for surrendering us to the Japanese and that had caused a tidal wave of resistance movements towards the Crown and subsequently, a resolve to never be beholden to another Colonial Master. This book traces the events and furher elaborates the little known decisions which led to the road to independence. What was most interesting was the pivotal role which Communism played in this region and how more than any other ideology, it created the means to be free of the Crown. The book tells some hard truths; some difficult to read. Reading this made me appreciate the difficulties our forefathers had.
This is an obscenely long book (>600 pages!!) that took me over a month to complete. At its heart is the question of how the British Empire processed issues related to decolonization along its 'Asian crescent.' The partition of India, Burma's rocky independence and the Malayan Spring and Emergency are weaved into a compelling, if somewhat messy narrative. A cool book nonetheless!
A comprehensive review of the power vacuum in India, Burma and Malaysia as Britain, drained by 5 years of war tried to resume control of its former empire. Perhaps a little too comprehensive in some areas but the subject matter is geographically large and the history fast-changing and fluid. It was a good eye-opener to the era.
Most countries in Asia were torn apart by violence in the decade after the Second World War. Different places experienced different types of conflict, though they often intersected. In some, communists fought anti-communists, as in China, Korea, Malaya, Indonesia, Indochina/Vietnam, and Burma. Colonial powers fought anti-colonial movements of national liberation in Malaya, Vietnam, Burma, Indonesia. In many cases violence that pitted different ethic or religious communities against each other, as in India, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia. Probably most easily forgotten of all was the violence that ensued when new governments sought to impose control over peoples who had hitherto lived beyond the control of those governments or their immediate predecessors (the Nationalist army massacres in Taiwan, Chinese invasion of Tibet and Xinjiang, and many of the conflicts in Burma).
This book focuses on episodes of violence in the British empire, in India, Burma, and Malaya, with some coverage of British deployment in Vietnam and Indonesia. Most of the sources used by the authors are from colonial archives, supplemented by English-language memoirs and other narrative accounts. Perhaps because Malaya produced a wider range of sources in English, the sections on Malaya are the longest and include the widest range of perspectives. Still, even on Malaya, the book tends to foreground the colonial government, and fills in the social history as a background.
One of the central question for a book on this topic with these sources is how much British administrations in India, Burma, and Malaya could have done to prevent or at least ameliorate the violence of the post-war decade. The general answer suggested by the authors is 'not very much'. Colonial administrators and military leaders, as well as opposition leaders, are presented as caught in a political and social maelstrom. These conditions were characterized by the weakness of post-war European states, economic collapse in Asia, and the presence of a multitude of armed groups left behind and energized by the fall of the Japanese empire.
The book does not absolve British leaders completely. The treatment of the war in Malaya is even-handed. The colonial state's drive to evict squatters from land they used to feed their families drove some among the rural poor into the arms of the Malayan Communist Party. The general brutality of the war did the same. The authors show how colonial administrators relied on stereotypes about the Chinese in Malaya and never really understood the communities from which the MCP drew its support. In Burma, some colonial officials were guilty of leading on minority groups. This hindered or delayed the compromises required for peaceful coexistence.
One of the strengths of a book based on a deep familiarity with the colonial archive is that it reveals how many individuals in the colonial state disagreed with or actively disliked each other. That's a useful corrective to the inclination that some historians have to present the colonial state as a unitary actor with a singular set of priorities and views.
There are drawbacks to relying on British sources. Sometimes the authors quote their descriptions of Asian individuals with little critical distance. They draw on Victor Purcell widely for the earlier sections on Malaya. Purcell was an engaging writer, and some of the people who wrote about might not have left many sources, but relying on his opinions of Asian opposition leaders, especially those he didn't like, such as Soong Kwang seems unfair. Some of the sources from Burma might have been handled more critically too.
Finally, the book seems unbalanced. There are many more pages on Malaya than India or Burma. On India there is a serious question about the extent to which British leaders' mistakes and/or long term practices of rule exacerbated the terrible violence of Partition. But, vague gestures towards long-standing divide and rule practices aside, the book doesn't really grasp the question in the way you might think a 550 page work should.
One important thing this book (plus its prequel, Forgotten Armies) does is that it places the end of British Raj in India in the broader context of developments in the Assam-Java crescent in the 1940's. For the uneducated me, this was an eye-opener.
Otherwise though, it was not such a great reading. The book takes a chronological approach to military and political history of a really large and really chaotic place and time, which means that the chaos finds its way into the pages of the book. To make matters worse, Bayly seems to revel in it. The net result is that whatever I now know about the topic is what I found in tangential reading motivated by repeated exasperation at the narrative style of the book.
For someone not really knowing what he was getting into I must say that this book was too detailed, a lot of names and politicians that means nothing to a, in my case, a Swede.
Overall I must say I found the book boring and I have a hard time remembering the history just a day after i read through it.
This seemed like a fine introduction to the formal British Empire's final years in 'The Great Crescent' of Asia - comprising of what are now the states of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Malaysia and Singapore. The period covered in detail is relatively brief, between 1945 and (mostly) 1949. Most of what is narrated would probably fall under the rubric of social and political history. The scholarship, while not exhaustive by any means, seems nevertheless very wide-ranging, and strikes a nice balance between detailed description and incisive analysis. The bibliography is also very useful.
Style-wise the writing is mostly rather dry and understated, if somewhat sympathetic all round, and occasionally extremely lurid. I found parts of the narrative genuinely upsetting, so much so that I had to stop reading the book for awhile. Oral testimonies were especially appalling. Some allegations arose from those who were detained en masse during the British-led crackdown that literally ripped apart Chinese communities during the Malayan Emergency: "When I was giving birth to my girl, the British imperialists did not give me anything to eat for a whole day, and after the baby was born I was only given a small piece of bread every day. The most cruel thing was that many female prisoners had to give birth to babies in the corridor of the hospital, and the British imperialists even forced them to drown their own babies in a cess pit"(485). This was only one of the more heartrending mass tragedies that went hand-in-hand with war and state-making in post-WW2 Asia. To be read in conjunction with Forgotten Armies
Very immersive and entertaining and informative book on Bengal, Burma/Myanmar, and Malaya/Malaysia in the five years following the end of World War 2, and the roots of collapse for the British Empire in south-east Asia. The book is basically a blow-by-blow account of how conflict, war, and insurgency broke out in Britain's Asian holdings in the few years following WW2, and takes a close look at how the different factions (nationalists, communists, liberal imperialists, conservative imperialists, etc.) jostled for power and control, and how and why certain factions rose or fell.
My only complaint would be that at times the book starts to ramble and it becomes hard to follow, jumping around and losing focus. Sometimes there seemed to be contradictions between chapters in how the authors describe the situation for a certain faction in a certain place and time. But being confused was more the exception than the rule, overall the writing was easy to follow and understand.
This is a good general introduction to the rather messy end of Britain's Asian empire, something that has traditionally got very little coverage, with the focus on Cyprus and particularly Palestine.
Given that it tries to cover India, Burma, Malaysia and Indonesia as chronologically as possible, it can get quite confusing at times. In addition, I feel it stopped rather abruptly and may have benefited for a little more on the final independence of Singapore. However, overall very informative.
Manages to be even more impressive than its prequel. In fact, it flows even better, and rewards those like myself who were unfamiliar with most 'characters' in the first book. Harper is no doubt our best historian on Malaysia and the Emergency in particular. With Bayly, this work becomes a must read. South-east Asian history has been ignored for too long. If I had to recommend only one work of history about the British Empire, this would be the one.
A very interesting history of Burma and Malaysia outlining the struggle during the world war and the fight to achieve freedom from colonial rule immediately after the world war. Gives a good grounding and historical perspective about the region which is typically not that well known .