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Fighting in the Dark: Naval Combat at Night, 1904-1944
Before the twentieth century ships when relied upon visual signaling, vessels beyond range of sight or a cannon shot, were blind, deaf, and dumb in the dark, making night battles at sea rare, and near always accidental. The introduction of certain technologies like the torpedo, the searchlight, radio and then radar, transformed naval warfare by making night combat feasible and, in some cases, desirable. The process by which navies integrated these new tools of war and turned the dark into a medium for effective combat, however, was long and difficult.
Fighting in the Dark tells the story of surface naval combat at night from the Russo-Japanese War through World War II. The book is about the process of confronting and mastering problems brought on by technological change during war. It does this by examining seven periods focusing on the Imperial Russian Navy in 1904–1905, the Imperial German Navy from 1914–1918, the Royal Navy from 1916–1939, the Regia Marina from 1940–1943, the Imperial Japanese Navy in 1942, the U.S. Navy in 1943–1944, and the Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy from 1943–1944.The chapters are written by authors hailing from Australia, Canada, Italy, and the United States, all recognized masters in their subject.
Fighting in the Dark tells the story of surface naval combat at night from the Russo-Japanese War through World War II. The book is about the process of confronting and mastering problems brought on by technological change during war. It does this by examining seven periods focusing on the Imperial Russian Navy in 1904–1905, the Imperial German Navy from 1914–1918, the Royal Navy from 1916–1939, the Regia Marina from 1940–1943, the Imperial Japanese Navy in 1942, the U.S. Navy in 1943–1944, and the Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy from 1943–1944.The chapters are written by authors hailing from Australia, Canada, Italy, and the United States, all recognized masters in their subject.
- GenresHistory
316 pages, Kindle Edition
Published April 15, 2023
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
December 28, 2023
As the sun set on the nineteenth century, only a handful of naval theorists gave serious consideration to the subject of night fighting at sea. Historically, naval combat was a daylight exercise; the risks of night battle were high, and success was a gamble most experienced captains weren’t willing to make. Failure was catastrophic and the darkness was an unforgiving environment. All of that changed during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The advent of rapid-fire guns, torpedoes, and searchlights changed the calculus of naval battle, and the culture and spirit of the Japanese navy led to the first night skirmish of the new century at Port Arthur in early March. While not a decisive victory by any measure, it heralded an historic sea change.
With their new book from the Naval Institute Press, Fighting in the Dark, editors—and contributors—Vincent O’Hara and Trent Hone present a series of essays that document the evolution of naval combat at night during the first half of the twentieth century. Beginning with the Japanese attack on Port Arthur, Fighting in the Dark offers detailed examinations of how navies prosecuted night combat, leveraged new technologies, and mastered the skills necessary to engage in sea battle under the cover of darkness. The book follows the natural evolution of night combat at sea, from the opening salvos of the Russo-Japanese War through World War I and the interwar years, before reaching a crescendo during World War II.
Fighting in the Dark is an incredible, captivating exploration of innovation and warfighting. The explosion of naval technology during those 50 years is fascinating, and each of the contributors takes care to examine emerging technology with a thoroughness that is as uncommon as it is necessary. In the same vein, the individual authors provide equally detailed analysis of the tactics and techniques in contemporary use at the time, identifying advantages (or shortfalls) in doctrine and procedures that foreshadowed each of the engagements discussed. But probably more interesting than any other aspect of the book is how each author offers a post-mortem on the impact of leadership on night combat. What we know today as command and control—especially within the context of combat information centers (CICs)—is revolutionized during this period, and the authors capture it in vivid detail.
Even as the navies of the world adapted to night fighting, they lacked the ability to exercise effective command and control in battle during the hours of darkness. Even as ship and weapons system designs evolved rapidly to accommodate modern sea battle, a captain’s ability to manage the chaos of fighting at night was slower to evolve. With experience and time, the use of radios, radar, and even plotting surged with each engagement. But the advent of the CIC—a relatively simple concept that allowed leaders to manage the overflow of available information—transformed how sea battle was waged at night. Fighting in the Dark weaves all of this seamlessly into the broader narrative, so subtly that it approaches the reader like a torpedo in the dark.
With their new book from the Naval Institute Press, Fighting in the Dark, editors—and contributors—Vincent O’Hara and Trent Hone present a series of essays that document the evolution of naval combat at night during the first half of the twentieth century. Beginning with the Japanese attack on Port Arthur, Fighting in the Dark offers detailed examinations of how navies prosecuted night combat, leveraged new technologies, and mastered the skills necessary to engage in sea battle under the cover of darkness. The book follows the natural evolution of night combat at sea, from the opening salvos of the Russo-Japanese War through World War I and the interwar years, before reaching a crescendo during World War II.
Fighting in the Dark is an incredible, captivating exploration of innovation and warfighting. The explosion of naval technology during those 50 years is fascinating, and each of the contributors takes care to examine emerging technology with a thoroughness that is as uncommon as it is necessary. In the same vein, the individual authors provide equally detailed analysis of the tactics and techniques in contemporary use at the time, identifying advantages (or shortfalls) in doctrine and procedures that foreshadowed each of the engagements discussed. But probably more interesting than any other aspect of the book is how each author offers a post-mortem on the impact of leadership on night combat. What we know today as command and control—especially within the context of combat information centers (CICs)—is revolutionized during this period, and the authors capture it in vivid detail.
Even as the navies of the world adapted to night fighting, they lacked the ability to exercise effective command and control in battle during the hours of darkness. Even as ship and weapons system designs evolved rapidly to accommodate modern sea battle, a captain’s ability to manage the chaos of fighting at night was slower to evolve. With experience and time, the use of radios, radar, and even plotting surged with each engagement. But the advent of the CIC—a relatively simple concept that allowed leaders to manage the overflow of available information—transformed how sea battle was waged at night. Fighting in the Dark weaves all of this seamlessly into the broader narrative, so subtly that it approaches the reader like a torpedo in the dark.
May 29, 2023
This is a compilation of seven chapters, each a different historical period and each written by a different author, that in aggregation describe the development and evolution of naval combat at night. The first chapter deals with the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, the second with the German experience in WWI, the third with the British night fighting progression between the wars, and the last four deal with four different aspects of World War II.
The early history of naval combat at night is better described as a history of the development of the torpedo and the tactics and doctrine for using torpedoes. Night fighting prior to World War II was really limited to two scenarios – either the continuation of combat that began in daylight, or the mere chance encounter at night devolving into combat. In both scenarios, issues involving weapons limitations (including early torpedoes), communications, target identification, fire control, and situational awareness created the stereotypical night time experience of chaos, confusion, and uncertain results. This began to slowly change between the wars, and drastically with the advent of WWII and better weapons, radio communications, radar, searchlights, training and tactical innovations. The leading innovators and practitioners going into the war were the Japanese who realized that night combat offered a way to reduce the disparities between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the significantly larger US Navy.
Much of the pre-WWII text is dry, arcane and similar despite the differing subjects of the chapters – navies of Russia, Japan, Germany, Italy and Britain. Lots of technical information about ships, early torpedo designs and developments, and rather anodyne descriptions of battles and consequences and subsequent developments and changes. However, Chapter Five by Jonathan Parshall about Japan and nighttime naval combat from 1922-1942 is alone worth the purchase price of the book... gripping, compelling history with penetrating insights derived from comprehensive knowledge and familiarity with the subject. Parshall is a gifted writer and superb historian. As an aside, he wrote Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway – the single most definitive history of the Battle of Midway and an absolute gem of WWII naval history – if you have not read it, you owe it to yourself to do so.
The subsequent two chapters dealing with the US Navy’s ascent to combat supremacy at night 1942-44 by Trent Hone (excellent) and night destroyer actions in the Channel by the British proximate to the D-Day landings (nearly as good). All in all, a worthwhile and interesting book... five stars for Parshall’s chapter and Hone’s – four stars for the rest.
The early history of naval combat at night is better described as a history of the development of the torpedo and the tactics and doctrine for using torpedoes. Night fighting prior to World War II was really limited to two scenarios – either the continuation of combat that began in daylight, or the mere chance encounter at night devolving into combat. In both scenarios, issues involving weapons limitations (including early torpedoes), communications, target identification, fire control, and situational awareness created the stereotypical night time experience of chaos, confusion, and uncertain results. This began to slowly change between the wars, and drastically with the advent of WWII and better weapons, radio communications, radar, searchlights, training and tactical innovations. The leading innovators and practitioners going into the war were the Japanese who realized that night combat offered a way to reduce the disparities between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the significantly larger US Navy.
Much of the pre-WWII text is dry, arcane and similar despite the differing subjects of the chapters – navies of Russia, Japan, Germany, Italy and Britain. Lots of technical information about ships, early torpedo designs and developments, and rather anodyne descriptions of battles and consequences and subsequent developments and changes. However, Chapter Five by Jonathan Parshall about Japan and nighttime naval combat from 1922-1942 is alone worth the purchase price of the book... gripping, compelling history with penetrating insights derived from comprehensive knowledge and familiarity with the subject. Parshall is a gifted writer and superb historian. As an aside, he wrote Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway – the single most definitive history of the Battle of Midway and an absolute gem of WWII naval history – if you have not read it, you owe it to yourself to do so.
The subsequent two chapters dealing with the US Navy’s ascent to combat supremacy at night 1942-44 by Trent Hone (excellent) and night destroyer actions in the Channel by the British proximate to the D-Day landings (nearly as good). All in all, a worthwhile and interesting book... five stars for Parshall’s chapter and Hone’s – four stars for the rest.
August 13, 2023
Certainly in the running for the best book I’ve read in 2023! While not usually a focus area of mine, this book about naval night fighting taught me a lot and kept my attention. Thought the chapter on the Russo-Japanese War in the early 1900s was very enlightening as I’ve not read much about that subject. Also, learning about the Japanese Type 93 torpedo in the late 1930s through WWII was fascinating in that was such a technological marvel for the time (range, size, and warhead size), and amazingly was kept a secret for so long after its introduction. Key excerpts below.
- In combat, whether on land or sea, the commander's greatest challenge is to maintain the cohesion of his or her forces, so that they work toward a common goal… In the dark it is much harder to grasp the situation and issue clear instructions. P1. PJK: So true. Moving a formation at night is incredibly challenging. Having done this via foot and mechanized units has burned many lessons into me.
- For Mahan, new technologies would always be secondary to the fundamental principles of naval warfare and the skilled officers who applied them… Mahan believed that because technology was evolving so rapidly in the late 19th century, those who overemphasized specific technologies, as the proponents of Jeune Ecole did, would soon be left behind. P11
- Foremost among Mahan's principles was command of the sea – “the great object of naval warfare” - which he argued was the key to national security and economic prosperity. P11.
- The Russo-Japanese War. Despite careful planning, extensive training, and an unprepared enemy, the attack had been a confused model that had achieved considerably less than had been hoped. Nor was this a fluke; future actions would soon demonstrate that night combat was far more difficult than prewar planners had anticipated. P27 PJK: Plans always must be adjusted to reality once the first shots are fired.
- Another factor to be borne in mind when trying to untangle the course of the action is that the after-action reports had to be compiled from memory, since destroyers had small crews and could not spare someone to record events as they happened. P31.
- The first days of the war forced the Kaiserliche Marine to acknowledge that its war plan had failed fundamentally… The British navy had instituted the strategy that prewar German planners had feared most – a distant blockade with its main forces in Scottish anchorages, well beyond the reach of German torpedo boats. P57. PJK: British strategy! Positioning naval forces at the optimal location to enhance UK strengths while also negating those of the enemy.
- The German torpedo boat force began the war with tactical and operational concepts necessarily shaped only by theory and peacetime exercise. The Navy saw night operations as essential to its strategy, but night fighting doctrine stalled as the battleship fleet grew and torpedo boats took up a roll in day battle… War revealed flaws. P75.
- Prodigious use of an expensive weapon was unpalatable but necessary. P76. PJK: Expensive weapons are usually in limited supply and thus oftentimes have a higher level of rank required to approve their use.
- Existing grand fleet doctrine already instructed that a challenge could not be issued until the unit concerned was ready to open fire at the first indication that a contact was hostile. P84.
- There were also political reasons that impeded Italy’s struggle to fight effectively at night. Capital for example, the axis partners did not routinely share lessons and material. P109. PJK: Intriguing. I guess the Axis powers were not fully integrated to enhance each other’s performance on the battlefields of land, air and sea.
- The U.S. Navy's experience with night combat in World War II demonstrates the challenge of integrating new technologies into tactics and doctrine. In the confused battles of Guadalcanal in 1942, Navy ships had radars, but the information that those radars provided was not used effectively. It took new practices, procedures, and organizational structures, the CIC and its information processing mechanisms, to capitalize on radar’s full potential. P215.
- A key innovation was action information organization. Over the winter of 1942 to 43 several destroyer captains complained of their difficulty processing the growing swell of tactical information from various sources. P229. PJK: I love this line. Modern commanders have even more information overload than commanders of the book’s era.
- A quote from Arleigh Burke… “The difference between a good officer and a poor one is about 10 seconds.” P251. PJK: Outstanding! In battle, quick and effective decision making rules.
- Success in night combat required making the most of Burke's fleeting 10 seconds. It required a means to process information effectively so that commanders and crews could penetrate the darkness, overcome the confusion, and as Captain Wayne Hughes, so eloquently framed it, “attack effectively first”. P254.
- It also reinforces the subtext of Burke’s council: it is not the 10 seconds themselves that matter, but what an officer does with those seconds before they tick away. Of all the factors in combat, human decision making is the most important. It is people that dominate battle. P255.
- In combat, whether on land or sea, the commander's greatest challenge is to maintain the cohesion of his or her forces, so that they work toward a common goal… In the dark it is much harder to grasp the situation and issue clear instructions. P1. PJK: So true. Moving a formation at night is incredibly challenging. Having done this via foot and mechanized units has burned many lessons into me.
- For Mahan, new technologies would always be secondary to the fundamental principles of naval warfare and the skilled officers who applied them… Mahan believed that because technology was evolving so rapidly in the late 19th century, those who overemphasized specific technologies, as the proponents of Jeune Ecole did, would soon be left behind. P11
- Foremost among Mahan's principles was command of the sea – “the great object of naval warfare” - which he argued was the key to national security and economic prosperity. P11.
- The Russo-Japanese War. Despite careful planning, extensive training, and an unprepared enemy, the attack had been a confused model that had achieved considerably less than had been hoped. Nor was this a fluke; future actions would soon demonstrate that night combat was far more difficult than prewar planners had anticipated. P27 PJK: Plans always must be adjusted to reality once the first shots are fired.
- Another factor to be borne in mind when trying to untangle the course of the action is that the after-action reports had to be compiled from memory, since destroyers had small crews and could not spare someone to record events as they happened. P31.
- The first days of the war forced the Kaiserliche Marine to acknowledge that its war plan had failed fundamentally… The British navy had instituted the strategy that prewar German planners had feared most – a distant blockade with its main forces in Scottish anchorages, well beyond the reach of German torpedo boats. P57. PJK: British strategy! Positioning naval forces at the optimal location to enhance UK strengths while also negating those of the enemy.
- The German torpedo boat force began the war with tactical and operational concepts necessarily shaped only by theory and peacetime exercise. The Navy saw night operations as essential to its strategy, but night fighting doctrine stalled as the battleship fleet grew and torpedo boats took up a roll in day battle… War revealed flaws. P75.
- Prodigious use of an expensive weapon was unpalatable but necessary. P76. PJK: Expensive weapons are usually in limited supply and thus oftentimes have a higher level of rank required to approve their use.
- Existing grand fleet doctrine already instructed that a challenge could not be issued until the unit concerned was ready to open fire at the first indication that a contact was hostile. P84.
- There were also political reasons that impeded Italy’s struggle to fight effectively at night. Capital for example, the axis partners did not routinely share lessons and material. P109. PJK: Intriguing. I guess the Axis powers were not fully integrated to enhance each other’s performance on the battlefields of land, air and sea.
- The U.S. Navy's experience with night combat in World War II demonstrates the challenge of integrating new technologies into tactics and doctrine. In the confused battles of Guadalcanal in 1942, Navy ships had radars, but the information that those radars provided was not used effectively. It took new practices, procedures, and organizational structures, the CIC and its information processing mechanisms, to capitalize on radar’s full potential. P215.
- A key innovation was action information organization. Over the winter of 1942 to 43 several destroyer captains complained of their difficulty processing the growing swell of tactical information from various sources. P229. PJK: I love this line. Modern commanders have even more information overload than commanders of the book’s era.
- A quote from Arleigh Burke… “The difference between a good officer and a poor one is about 10 seconds.” P251. PJK: Outstanding! In battle, quick and effective decision making rules.
- Success in night combat required making the most of Burke's fleeting 10 seconds. It required a means to process information effectively so that commanders and crews could penetrate the darkness, overcome the confusion, and as Captain Wayne Hughes, so eloquently framed it, “attack effectively first”. P254.
- It also reinforces the subtext of Burke’s council: it is not the 10 seconds themselves that matter, but what an officer does with those seconds before they tick away. Of all the factors in combat, human decision making is the most important. It is people that dominate battle. P255.
May 26, 2023
B: Fighting in the Dark-Naval Combat at Night, 1904-1944. As a Tactical Action Officer on a Frigate in 1984, I and the watch team spent a night maneuvering with two Soviet frigates off the coast of Tunisia as they worked to keep us out of an anchorage area where a badly damaged Victor class submarine was having its hull being assessed. It was close quarters and we were tracking the Krivak’s movements visually with an early night vision system. So I was very interested in reading this book. It is an excellent collection of essays, the editors have shown both the impact of increased technological capability and the constants of doctrine, training, as well as the need to learn. Well worth the time to read as we have moved from guns and torpedoes to missiles and lasers. The editors cite a quote attributed to Arleigh Burke that the difference between a good officer and a poor officer is about ten seconds. With the new weapons and sensors, that ten seconds today might be five.
April 17, 2023
An interesting look at how naval surface military encounters at night evolved from the beginning of the 20th century through WWII. Technology and different military tactics saw an increase of almost double the number of intentional engagements. It also proves the old adage that no battle plan survives the encounter, or something to that affect. Not matter what the technology, it requires training, quick actions and intelligence to make the best out of any situation. The lack of quick communication and some other factors continued to be a problem and lagged behind other aspects of the quickly evolving tactics and technology.
Thanks to the publisher and Netgalley for an ARC in exchange for an honest opinion.
Thanks to the publisher and Netgalley for an ARC in exchange for an honest opinion.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews