La Russie entre deux mondes

by Hélène Carrère d'Encausse

1991 : liquidant de son propre chef l’Empire soviétique et le système communiste, Boris Eltsine croit avoir payé le prix de la modernité et attend que l’Europe l’accueille à bras ouverts. Vingt ans plus tard, que reste-t-il de cette illusion ?
Hélène Carrère d’Encausse montre ici la somme des malentendus, soupçons, épreuves de force, occasions manquées entre le pouvoir russe - auquel Poutine a rendu puissance extérieure et fierté intérieure - et les Occidentaux. Sa grande originalité est de ne pas se contenter de nous présenter la Russie « entre deux mondes », mais aussi « le monde vu de Russie ».
Une Russie confrontée à des problèmes immenses – démographie en chute, corruption galopante, terrorisme… – qui mise sur sa force extérieure. Mais elle rencontre partout la puissance américaine, acharnée à l’écarter du « grand jeu » énergétique et à la remplacer dans sa « zone d’intérêts ».
Quelle vision sous-tend aujourd’hui la stratégie russe ? Asiatique ? Démocratique et européenne ? Ou passerelle entre les deux mondes ?

Genres: France, Nonfiction, History

336 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2010

About the author

Hélène Carrère d'Encausse (born Hélène Zourabichvili) was the permanent secretary of the Académie Française and a historian specializing in Russian history. She was a graduate of the elite Paris Institute of Political Studies (better known as Sciences Po).

In 1991, Goudji created the academician's sword for her.

Her son, Emmanuel Carrère (born 1957), is an author, screenwriter and director.

(Wikipedia)

Reviews

[Nika]

At first, I did not plan to write a review of this book, thinking that the rating would be enough to express my opinion. I changed my mind and decided to jot down a few lines to explain why I would not recommend this work.

I believe that it would not be an exaggeration or an oversimplification to say that Hélène Carrère d'Encausse has chosen to view most of the events that she discusses in her book from a standpoint that is close to that of Vladimir Putin. I should also mention that this is not a recent publication. The book was published in 2010.

Here you will find some rather banal justifications for the policies of Putin's Russia, such as NATO's eastward expansion seen as a "broken promise" by Russia, Russian distrust of Western leaders who have often ignored Russian interests (as Putin sees them), or the so-called double standards that presumably work against Russia. Rather than seeing imperial and expansionist ambitions in Putin's words and actions, she points to a sense of injustice and wounded pride that the Russian ruling class and many Russians may have felt after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. They wanted a strong man at the helm of the country. Therefore, Putin, with his image of a 'strong' and 'resolute' man, was elected as a response to the aspirations of the majority of Russians. As for the aspirations of the people, I have to agree. But this does not negate the fact that Putin has been playing with the sentiments in Russian society, stirring them up for his own ends.

A considerable part of the book was about the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, when Russia invaded Georgia under the pretext of helping local minorities.
In addressing this issue, the author again highlights Putin's perspective on this military conflict.
She also claims that it was Nicolas Sarkozy whose prompt action 'saved' Georgia at the crucial juncture when President Mikhail Saakashvili was on the brink of total defeat and the Russian army threatened Georgia's capital Tbilisi.
Speaking of international law in the context of the Russian invasion of Georgia, the author refers to the case of Kosovo, almost echoing Russian propaganda. She notes that Western powers violated international law and set a precedent by recognizing Kosovo's independence. Regardless of what one thinks about Kosovo, how does this justify Russia's policies? This kind of rationalization seems to be flawed and aims at shifting and diluting responsibility. Resorting to 'whataboutism' is never a valid argument. As they say, two wrongs don't make a right. The fact that one actor committed a grave injustice (our world is not just and fair, far from it) and, say, attacked a sovereign country on a false pretext does not mean that another actor can do something similar or worse.
Hélène Carrère d'Encausse rightly mentions that the Georgian president was against the recognition of Kosovo, defending the principle of territorial integrity.


To make a long story short, the author does not always lay out her argument with facts. Her interpretations seemingly reveal certain sympathies and preconceptions.
If I were pressed to extract a positive from this book, I would probably say that it may help better understand the motivations of Putin and the people around him. Not sure about it though.

[Anne Lo]

À la recherche d'une synthèse de la diplomatie russe de 1991 à 2011 sans avoir à retenter Sciences Po ? Alors, n'attendez plus ! 350 pages qui feront de vous le Jean-Relou des soirées mondaines : « Saviez-vous que Poutine avait autorisé l'ouverture de bases militaires aux américains en Asie Centrale suite au 11 septembre ? ». Ou encore : « Le conflit du Haut-Karabakh illustre parfaitement le dilemme entre intégrité territoriale de l'Azerbaïdjan et droit des peuples à disposer d'eux même pour les Arméniens ». Des anecdotes qui feront bailler plus d'un de vos interlocuteurs. À défaut de nouveaux amis, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse vous livre une grille de lecture ô combien nécessaire par les temps qui courent. Chapeau bas au dernier chapitre consacré à la guerre de Géorgie !

[Aleksiel]

Surprising depth for such a sort book.

[Ana-Maria]

An interesting perspective on the recent history of Russia, with a good deal of explanations about its ambivalence and leanings forward and backward from different project and in relation to various countries.