In this study, Larry May examines the normative and conceptual problems concerning the crime of genocide. Genocide arises out of the worst of horrors. Legally, however, the unique character of genocide is reduced to a technical requirement, that the perpetrator’s act manifest an intention to destroy a protected group. From this definition, many puzzles arise. How are groups to be identified and why are only four groups subject to genocide? What is the harm of destroying a group and why is this harm thought to be independent of killing many people? How can a person in the dock, as an individual, be responsible for a collective crime like genocide? How should we understand the specific crimes associated with genocide, especially instigation, incitement, and complicity? Are criminal trials in the aftermath of genocide the best strategy for achieving reconciliation and the return to the rule of law? Paying special attention to the recent case law concerning the Rwanda genocide, May offers the first philosophical exploration of the crime of genocide in international criminal law.
May's account is interesting for those who are interested in some of the theoretical underpinnings of international law. I actually found the book fascinating, despite it not being quite what I was looking for in terms of my own reading. There is some good material that can be generalized into broader discussions of group action and mens rea.
The book doesn't require too heavy a technical knowledge base; May does a pretty good job at talking through all of his terms. Some of the writing gets a little too simplistic when it really needs to be more challenging and dense for the purposes of the discussion, because he is trying to offer those simple terms and appropriately qualify them.
I do think that there are a number of philosophical problems that May sort of glosses over after he gets through the first few chapters, exploring some of his metaphysics of group existence. He sort of calls in his nominalism as this important philosophical concept that undermines, or at least challenges, a lot of the contemporary thought on how we understand group identity, but then notes that it can be grounded in a sort of social ontology, and then leaves it alone. If you're not familiar with some of the social ontology literature, particularly John Searle's Mind, Language and Society the move can give you some minor whiplash.
Despite my concerns about the regimentation of May's writing, he really is an incredible expert on the field and has done a lot of great legwork in his previous work, according to his descriptions in the book. It may be best to actually read some of his earlier stuff before jumping into this one. (Further down the road, I may revisit that writing; that's a little ways off, though.) At any rate, he's a solid thinker, if a bit of a redundant writer.