Presenting a selection of thirteen essays on various topics at the foundations of philosophy--one previously unpublished and eight accompanied by substantial new postscripts--this book offers outstanding insight on truth, meaning, and propositional attitudes; semantic indeterminacy and other kinds of "factual defectiveness;" and issues concerning objectivity, especially in mathematics and in epistemology. It will reward the attention of any philosopher interested in language, epistemology, or mathematics.
HARTRY FIELD (B.A., Wisconsin; M.A., Ph. D. Harvard), Silver Professor of Philosophy, specializes in metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of science. He has had fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Guggenheim Foundation. He is the author of Science Without Numbers (Blackwell 1980), which won the Lakatos Prize, of Realism, Mathematics and Modality (Blackwell 1989), and of Truth and the Absence of Fact (Oxford 2001). Current interests include objectivity and indeterminacy, a priori knowledge, causation, and the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes.
The book provides a thought-provoking exploration of truth, particularly focusing on its manifestations within mathematics and epistemology. Field challenges the traditional idea of universal objectivity, suggesting instead that truth is dependent on context. His critique extends to the uncertainties and paradoxes inherent in mathematical reasoning, questioning the assumption of absolute objectivity in our pursuit of knowledge. I found the book's presentation to be compelling, with meticulously crafted arguments that adeptly navigate complex ideas. Field's clear writing makes intricate philosophical concepts accessible, rendering this work a valuable contribution to ongoing discussions in philosophy.