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The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century
Since the end of the Cold War, America's national security establishment has been searching for a new operating theory to explain how this seemingly "chaotic" world actually works. Gone is the clash of blocs, but replaced by what? Thomas Barnett has the answers. A senior military analyst with the U.S. Naval War College, he has given a constant stream of briefings over the past few years, and particularly since 9/11, to the highest of high-level civilian and military policymakers-and now he gives it to you. The Pentagon's New Map is a cutting-edge approach to globalization that combines security, economic, political, and cultural factors to do no less than predict and explain the nature of war and peace in the twenty-first century. Building on the works of Friedman, Huntington, and Fukuyama, and then taking a leap beyond, Barnett crystallizes recent American military history and strategy, sets the parameters for where our forces will likely be headed in the future, outlines the unique role that America can and will play in establishing international stability-and provides much-needed hope at a crucial yet uncertain time in world history. For anyone seeking to understand the Iraqs, Afghanistans, and Liberias of the present and future, the intimate new links between foreign policy and national security, and the operational realities of the world as it exists today, The Pentagon's New Map is a template, a Rosetta stone. Agree with it, disagree with it, argue with it-there is no book more essential for 2004 and beyond.
460 pages, Kindle Edition
First published April 1, 2004
48 people are currently reading
832 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 78 reviews
April 11, 2008
Aside from being one of the most unjustifiably arrogant men who has ever lived, barnett is one of the most dangerous because moderately intelligent military officers everywhere think that he is a god. I listened to him speak. Wanted to throttle him. His book is filled with huge sweeping generalizations. The kind that Thomas Friedman makes, only much less interesting or well supported. This man is a travesty. I hope he has heart disease or something. Awful.
February 17, 2007
The most self-indulgent piece of crap I've read in a long time, it's 400+ pages of how this guy is supposedly reshaping the face of US national security strategy. Douchebag score is definitely 5 stars.
October 22, 2025
Too long. gave up halfway as there was too much water. There is gold here but its better to read a shorter summary of this book.
November 23, 2011
This book was a huge disappointment. The only thing this author and T Friedman have in common is that they both wrote and published a book.
People who have no experience in GEOINT, who are not educated in global affairs, who have no experience with GIS or remote sensing might find the book interesting.
Otherwise, the lack of primary sources makes this book a failure as a history book. There appears to be arrangement of topics chronologically or geographically. No attempt to organize a history of GEOINT. Just page after page of a rant.
The conversational, meandering tone made me feel like I was listening to a guy bloviating and bragging, sharing thoughts, feelings, and impressions, nothing substantive.
Not an academic work, more like a published diary. Boring and self-indulgent.
Pass this and read anything by Robert Baer, or read Ropes of Sand.
People who have no experience in GEOINT, who are not educated in global affairs, who have no experience with GIS or remote sensing might find the book interesting.
Otherwise, the lack of primary sources makes this book a failure as a history book. There appears to be arrangement of topics chronologically or geographically. No attempt to organize a history of GEOINT. Just page after page of a rant.
The conversational, meandering tone made me feel like I was listening to a guy bloviating and bragging, sharing thoughts, feelings, and impressions, nothing substantive.
Not an academic work, more like a published diary. Boring and self-indulgent.
Pass this and read anything by Robert Baer, or read Ropes of Sand.
May 7, 2008
Egomaniacal Harvard PhD and ex-Pentagon advisor lassoes different countries into his paradigm of world civilization structure.
November 3, 2007
I was dialing around cable at my parent’s house one day a couple of years ago and ran across the most incredible power point presentation being given by a dude from the Naval War College on CSPAN about how the U.S. should think about security threats in the future. Basically his point was that those alienated from global capitalism are those we need to be most worried about and that places like Central Africa will soon join Afghanistan as geographical locations from which threats will arise. That presentation became this book and it is seriously worth reading. Barnett makes his living predicting bad shit for the U.S. government (and now, I believe, also for big corporations) and he is very good at what he does. Obviously sites of threats to the U.S. are also sites for new modes of positive resistance (those these things are not interchangeable) and also sights for economic development, so this book struck really close to a lot of my interests.
Barnett also has a number of other predictions which may be hogwash, but may also lead to something really interesting. For instance, he toys with the idea that NAFTA will lead to a more EU style unification and the that the EU will soon be much more of a cohesive state. Interesting ideas and an interesting book. It’s a couple of years old now, but still worth picking up.
Barnett also has a number of other predictions which may be hogwash, but may also lead to something really interesting. For instance, he toys with the idea that NAFTA will lead to a more EU style unification and the that the EU will soon be much more of a cohesive state. Interesting ideas and an interesting book. It’s a couple of years old now, but still worth picking up.
February 28, 2009
It's a good book and does a good job of describing just how Byzantine our military services personnel have become (There's a long-running analogy between modern military types trying to deal with terrorists and how they can't think outside the box just like military types dealing with the Soviets couldn't think outside the box) but Barnett's non-integrating/core/gap methodology, wherein he breaks down the geo-political problems by subdividing the world into those willing to globally integrate (First World Nations) and those unwilling to integrate (Rogue states being the worst examples) doesn't hold water because he doesn't build a real ontology of what he's describing. If I wanted a systems approach to the world, I'd take Wallerstein over this. It seems like Burnett is acquainted with Wellersteinian World Systems Theory, but doesn't spend the intellectual effort necessary to develop his theory.
Read
August 4, 2011The Pentagon's New Map provides a compelling argument for a world that has to be approached in a new manner. The developed world "The Core" must actively seek to influence the destiny of the The Non-Integrating Gap to pave the path for a brighter future for both. While unlikely to make friends on either extreme side of the American political debate and somewhat biased by Barnett's own pet stances, the book provides a lot of good food for thought when trying to figure out how to approach conflicts of the future.
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August 22, 2008
Oh God, I'm not a "war buff", or even a "history buff". I picked this book up because I saw this guy give a speech on TED and it was one of the most compelling things I'd ever heard. Honestly, his ideas are so simple, that they must be too simple -right? I don't know. He seems like he's got a good paradigm for understanding geo/eco/politcal shite. I'd read more by him. I'm not republican.
August 16, 2008
An oversimplified view of the problems that beset the world, carried to the point of absurdity. And I thought Stephenie Meyer was vacuous. Anyone else bothered by the title?
September 15, 2014
Claptrap
July 20, 2016
The Pentagon's New Map by ThomasBarnett? [ISBN 0399151753 (amazon.com, search)]
Thomas Barnett here presents a framework in which to look at conflicts on the global stage, and a vision of a world that is a fulfillment of globalization where the Hobbesian world of life as 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.'
This work can be looked at in two parts. One is a description of the world as it is, and then a discription of a world that could be and a role for the United States in that world to be.
His mental model of the world in conflict is a world divided into the Core and the Gap. The states he includes in the 'Core' include North America, Argentina, Brazil and Chile (ABC) in South America, the states of the European Union, Rushia, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, India, Austrailia, and New Zealand. Then there is the 'Gap', the remainder of South and Central America, the Caribbean, Africa, the Balkans, the middle east including the Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Malay-Indonesian-Philippines Archipeligo. What distinguishes the Gap from the Core is connectivity, meaning its ability to handle flows of goods, capital, people and information going into and out of the country. In addition, the harmonizing its internal 'rule sets' with 'the global rule of democracy, rule of law, and free markets.' Not that this does not necessarily mean that its internal 'rule sets' are made identical to a given example, such as the United States, but it does mean that the internal rule sets are such that it is able to participate in this global flow. An alternative way of looking at the world that is noted by the author is the concept of civilizations, as exemplified by Samuel Huntington in The Clash Of Civilizations. Looking at the places this occurs, in particular looking at the flows of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI, or capital) leads us to the list of states in the Core and the Gap. There are a few places that look to be anomalies, such as Singapore and Israel, which the author identifies as being in the Gap. The authors defense is that when he gives presentations to leaders in Singapore and Israel and he describes what the Gap is, his audience readily recognizes the Gap as being the neighborhood in which they live in.
What does the identification of 'Core' and 'Gap' give you? In the midst of an autobiography, we find that the author has tracked conflicts in which the United States has participated in the Post-Cold War world, and almost all of them occur in the 'Gap.' The Gap, which was defined as being disconnected, is the location of the overwhelming majority of U.S. military activity. And the reason the U.S. intervenes here is that it causes the majority of the world's instability, including the adversaries in the Global War on Terror. So, it is in the best interests of the Core to bring members of the Gap into the Core, and to change the world of the Gap into one that less closely approximates Hobbesian world that is nasty, brutish and short. What does it entail? Ultimately, the members of the Gap need the connectivity that the Core has, and this will be done through private enterprise and foreign direct investment, as companies invest capital, resources and people in the Gap states. And for private enterprise to enter the Gap, they need the stability that can only be provided by rule sets that approximate those of the Core. The FDI that private enterprise can pore into a place overwhelmes any Foreign Aid that mere governments can contribute. But for private enterprise to enter, they require stability, and that stability is created by the intervention of the Core, as the institutions of the Gap are not strong enough in themselves to provide this. Barnett envisions two sets of institutions, the Leviathan and the SysAdmin?. Leviathan institutions are the traditional military, the ones whose function is to engage in organized violence. The SysAdmin? are the institutions that build up institutions in the Gap, such as the UN and the various foreign aid organizations and NGOs, supported by organizations that can provide security in an environment other than open warfare, in effect, nation building and operations other than war. The Leviathan duties will predominately fall on the United States, as the United States military with a few partners who are organized to work with it is the only institution capable of projecting power anywhere on the globe, and is also generally trusted as one that does not intend to take territory to own for itself. So he envisions a global SysAdmin force recruited from throughout the Core states working in the Gap to build institutions that can bring parts of the Gap in to the Core, and a Leviathan that is able to punch into the Gap where the Gap threatens to spread disconnectedness and violence into the Core.
So this work has to be evaluated in two respects, first in Barnett's description of the world as is, second in its hope of a world to be.
In his description of the world as is, he puts it against two alternatives. One is of a world that is divided between the western civilization (centered on the U.S. and Western Europe) and a world of competing powers (such as Al Queda, but more importantly a rising China). The other alternative that he mentions is that of SamuelHuntington?'s Clash of Civilizations, where the world is divided between civilizations, each with its own ideals and goals, sometimes in harmony, sometimes in conflict. Barnett's argument seems to be that the desire for the benefits of connectivity (i.e. economic considerations) overwhelm the apparent differences in cultural values. That the desire for economic growth and stability are more important than internally held values that are derived from culture or religion. To the extent that religion matters, Barnett's claim is that religion inside the Core is different than religion inside the Gap, in that religion inside the Gap is more fundamentalist and more about external networking, while in the Core religion is more about inner peace, and the social aspects of religion have been taken up by state institutions such as the welfare system (and education). Whether or not the Core/Gap construct is a more complete explanation of conflict than the Clash of Civilizations probably will have much to do with the truth of the claim that underlying cultural and religious beliefs while they may be real, are not all that significant.
The second is what the world should be. He has a vision of the world where the Core states such as the US, UK, Austrailia, NZ, Canada and the EC along with India and China and Japan and Taiwan join together in protecting each other from elements in the Gap that wish to cause disconnectedness and opt out of globalization as well as break down the barriers in the gap, through means such as nation building and investing in the gap. Not only would this imply US Department of State, and various countries foreign ministries and their foreign aid departments, but also the UN institutions, NGOs based in the Core, and even private companies such as GM, Exxon-Mobil, CNOOC, Seimens, Haier, Phillips, Thompsons, Mitsubishi, Citibank, HSBC, investing in Gap states that wish to become connected to the global core. It means investment in human resources in the Gap, as well as immigration of laborers from the Gap to the Core and emigration of work from the Core to the Gap. And in extreme cases, the willingness of the Core to intervene militarily into the Gap. And this last is the role of the Leviathan, who at its center, is the U.S. military.
Does this make sense? The arguments for the Leviathan make sense, that only the U.S. can do so. And Barnett makes the claim that the Core is fundamentally unified in their desire for the U.S. to succede, despite the apparent disagreements voiced in the media and in political venues. His justification are the economic flows, the continued flow of investments into the United States, and in particular the foreign buying of U.S. treasury bonds. In what was known as the developed world, private enterprise has always been in competition, but these same companies have also cooperated with each other in joint ventures when developing new markets. It may be possible. But Barnett assumes that proclaimed national interests are not important, or are superseded by these general core interests. It remains to be seen if he is correct.
Thomas Barnett here presents a framework in which to look at conflicts on the global stage, and a vision of a world that is a fulfillment of globalization where the Hobbesian world of life as 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.'
This work can be looked at in two parts. One is a description of the world as it is, and then a discription of a world that could be and a role for the United States in that world to be.
His mental model of the world in conflict is a world divided into the Core and the Gap. The states he includes in the 'Core' include North America, Argentina, Brazil and Chile (ABC) in South America, the states of the European Union, Rushia, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, India, Austrailia, and New Zealand. Then there is the 'Gap', the remainder of South and Central America, the Caribbean, Africa, the Balkans, the middle east including the Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Malay-Indonesian-Philippines Archipeligo. What distinguishes the Gap from the Core is connectivity, meaning its ability to handle flows of goods, capital, people and information going into and out of the country. In addition, the harmonizing its internal 'rule sets' with 'the global rule of democracy, rule of law, and free markets.' Not that this does not necessarily mean that its internal 'rule sets' are made identical to a given example, such as the United States, but it does mean that the internal rule sets are such that it is able to participate in this global flow. An alternative way of looking at the world that is noted by the author is the concept of civilizations, as exemplified by Samuel Huntington in The Clash Of Civilizations. Looking at the places this occurs, in particular looking at the flows of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI, or capital) leads us to the list of states in the Core and the Gap. There are a few places that look to be anomalies, such as Singapore and Israel, which the author identifies as being in the Gap. The authors defense is that when he gives presentations to leaders in Singapore and Israel and he describes what the Gap is, his audience readily recognizes the Gap as being the neighborhood in which they live in.
What does the identification of 'Core' and 'Gap' give you? In the midst of an autobiography, we find that the author has tracked conflicts in which the United States has participated in the Post-Cold War world, and almost all of them occur in the 'Gap.' The Gap, which was defined as being disconnected, is the location of the overwhelming majority of U.S. military activity. And the reason the U.S. intervenes here is that it causes the majority of the world's instability, including the adversaries in the Global War on Terror. So, it is in the best interests of the Core to bring members of the Gap into the Core, and to change the world of the Gap into one that less closely approximates Hobbesian world that is nasty, brutish and short. What does it entail? Ultimately, the members of the Gap need the connectivity that the Core has, and this will be done through private enterprise and foreign direct investment, as companies invest capital, resources and people in the Gap states. And for private enterprise to enter the Gap, they need the stability that can only be provided by rule sets that approximate those of the Core. The FDI that private enterprise can pore into a place overwhelmes any Foreign Aid that mere governments can contribute. But for private enterprise to enter, they require stability, and that stability is created by the intervention of the Core, as the institutions of the Gap are not strong enough in themselves to provide this. Barnett envisions two sets of institutions, the Leviathan and the SysAdmin?. Leviathan institutions are the traditional military, the ones whose function is to engage in organized violence. The SysAdmin? are the institutions that build up institutions in the Gap, such as the UN and the various foreign aid organizations and NGOs, supported by organizations that can provide security in an environment other than open warfare, in effect, nation building and operations other than war. The Leviathan duties will predominately fall on the United States, as the United States military with a few partners who are organized to work with it is the only institution capable of projecting power anywhere on the globe, and is also generally trusted as one that does not intend to take territory to own for itself. So he envisions a global SysAdmin force recruited from throughout the Core states working in the Gap to build institutions that can bring parts of the Gap in to the Core, and a Leviathan that is able to punch into the Gap where the Gap threatens to spread disconnectedness and violence into the Core.
So this work has to be evaluated in two respects, first in Barnett's description of the world as is, second in its hope of a world to be.
In his description of the world as is, he puts it against two alternatives. One is of a world that is divided between the western civilization (centered on the U.S. and Western Europe) and a world of competing powers (such as Al Queda, but more importantly a rising China). The other alternative that he mentions is that of SamuelHuntington?'s Clash of Civilizations, where the world is divided between civilizations, each with its own ideals and goals, sometimes in harmony, sometimes in conflict. Barnett's argument seems to be that the desire for the benefits of connectivity (i.e. economic considerations) overwhelm the apparent differences in cultural values. That the desire for economic growth and stability are more important than internally held values that are derived from culture or religion. To the extent that religion matters, Barnett's claim is that religion inside the Core is different than religion inside the Gap, in that religion inside the Gap is more fundamentalist and more about external networking, while in the Core religion is more about inner peace, and the social aspects of religion have been taken up by state institutions such as the welfare system (and education). Whether or not the Core/Gap construct is a more complete explanation of conflict than the Clash of Civilizations probably will have much to do with the truth of the claim that underlying cultural and religious beliefs while they may be real, are not all that significant.
The second is what the world should be. He has a vision of the world where the Core states such as the US, UK, Austrailia, NZ, Canada and the EC along with India and China and Japan and Taiwan join together in protecting each other from elements in the Gap that wish to cause disconnectedness and opt out of globalization as well as break down the barriers in the gap, through means such as nation building and investing in the gap. Not only would this imply US Department of State, and various countries foreign ministries and their foreign aid departments, but also the UN institutions, NGOs based in the Core, and even private companies such as GM, Exxon-Mobil, CNOOC, Seimens, Haier, Phillips, Thompsons, Mitsubishi, Citibank, HSBC, investing in Gap states that wish to become connected to the global core. It means investment in human resources in the Gap, as well as immigration of laborers from the Gap to the Core and emigration of work from the Core to the Gap. And in extreme cases, the willingness of the Core to intervene militarily into the Gap. And this last is the role of the Leviathan, who at its center, is the U.S. military.
Does this make sense? The arguments for the Leviathan make sense, that only the U.S. can do so. And Barnett makes the claim that the Core is fundamentally unified in their desire for the U.S. to succede, despite the apparent disagreements voiced in the media and in political venues. His justification are the economic flows, the continued flow of investments into the United States, and in particular the foreign buying of U.S. treasury bonds. In what was known as the developed world, private enterprise has always been in competition, but these same companies have also cooperated with each other in joint ventures when developing new markets. It may be possible. But Barnett assumes that proclaimed national interests are not important, or are superseded by these general core interests. It remains to be seen if he is correct.
November 28, 2021
TOTAL psychopath
March 5, 2008
Even though I only gave this book four stars, everyone should read it. It's a thoughtful analysis of the current world stage, written by an accomplished political analyst. Barnett proposes a vision of the world divided by global connectivity and access into the Core (the nations with high connectivity) and the Gap (the nations with low connectivity). He includes the US, Mexico, Canada, Europe, China, Japan, India, Brazil, etc. in the Core, and describes the Gap as containing most of Africa, the Middle East, and parts of South America (among others). His argument is that the goal of the United States in the 21st century should be to shrink the Gap by all means possible; providing economic support, extending financial, internet, and cultural support, and intervening militarily to remove obstacles to a nation's connectivity.
While I disagree with some of his analysis (and with China being in the Core and Israel being in the Gap!), he makes a lot of good points, and definitely provides a framework for further discussion through a common vocabulary, concise definitions, and concrete proposals. This is an excellent book to get people thinking, and though reading it is a slog at times, it's worth forging through the more repetitive bits to get to the more concrete proposals right at the end (which I imagine he expands in his next book, A Blueprint For Action). I'll note that he claims the UN veto will be gone by the end of the decade. We'll see.
While I disagree with some of his analysis (and with China being in the Core and Israel being in the Gap!), he makes a lot of good points, and definitely provides a framework for further discussion through a common vocabulary, concise definitions, and concrete proposals. This is an excellent book to get people thinking, and though reading it is a slog at times, it's worth forging through the more repetitive bits to get to the more concrete proposals right at the end (which I imagine he expands in his next book, A Blueprint For Action). I'll note that he claims the UN veto will be gone by the end of the decade. We'll see.
May 4, 2020
Hindsight's 20/20 and readers might be taken aback by how poorly aged many of his predictions came to be but he did offer real insights about how Neoconservative and Neoliberal global interventions serving the same end goal. His gap core interactions thesis is well thought out and worth considering.
In another of his work he mentions his love of blogs and Wikipedia, his questionable understanding of multiple non foreign policy topics makes me think those are his preferred learning mediums. Wikipedia's great but for certain subjects it can enable a purely horizontal mindset, which he boasts about having. There's nothing wrong with being wrong. It's an aged book that was dealing with the future and predictions don't pan out, the problem is his writing
It's so self indulgent, the name dropping, and the excessive dubiously related anecdotes. It can be a very cringe worthy read, it's often laborious. It reads like an autobiography and in the acknowledgements he admits it is one. Yet in the preceding chapters he treats the book as if it's a geostrategy primer.
It could have been a great book if it was edited to be 200 pages shorter, the author's voice shining through isn't always a good thing.
I do like the inclusion of his map, it's a nice map.
In another of his work he mentions his love of blogs and Wikipedia, his questionable understanding of multiple non foreign policy topics makes me think those are his preferred learning mediums. Wikipedia's great but for certain subjects it can enable a purely horizontal mindset, which he boasts about having. There's nothing wrong with being wrong. It's an aged book that was dealing with the future and predictions don't pan out, the problem is his writing
It's so self indulgent, the name dropping, and the excessive dubiously related anecdotes. It can be a very cringe worthy read, it's often laborious. It reads like an autobiography and in the acknowledgements he admits it is one. Yet in the preceding chapters he treats the book as if it's a geostrategy primer.
It could have been a great book if it was edited to be 200 pages shorter, the author's voice shining through isn't always a good thing.
I do like the inclusion of his map, it's a nice map.
May 18, 2012
An absolutely terrible strategy is advocated in this work, messianic nation building with no possibility of benefit except that the U.S. will live up to some meaningless values, ugh! Foreign policy should be like investing. Ask, "what do I gain and what do i risk" not what "values" do I appear to support. A selfless foreign policy is like a selfless prostitute, she will be taken advantage of. Furthermore, U.S. security never in all its history required the poor of the world to be wealthy. I could go on...
January 7, 2024
Well he certainly has vision, but it seems crazy and unachievable. The attempt seems to have seriously weakened America and caused massive political problems.
September 26, 2023
A fascinating work of geopolitical strategic thinking by an author whose star rose prominently in the Bush era, when the United States was a world-dominating sole superpower. Thomas P. M. Barnett outlined a new paradigm for the deployment of U.S. military power in the post-Cold War era. He was a strategist working for the Naval War College, and his geopolitical theory was radical, even – from the Pentagon’s perspective – apostate. Basically, Barnett took a look at the post-Cold War military conflicts in which the United States had engaged, from the invasion of Panama in the waning years of the Soviet Union, up to the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. His titular “New Map” divided the world into a “Functioning Core” of developed nations which were successfully integrated into the global economy, and a “Non-Integrated Gap” of failed nations where bad actors ran rampant and the U.S. was compelled to intervene militarily. From this simple concept a theory emerged of a new era of globalization in which the security threats to which the United States was responding arose from the disconnected status of the Gap nations – as he put it, “disconnectedness defines danger.” The primary strategic goal for this new age was integrating the Gap with the Core, and as sole superpower America had a natural role to play in this process. Her conventional military force with its overwhelming power was what Barnett deemed a “Leviathan” force, and in conventional warfare the U.S. had no equal, as the recent invasion of Iraq had demonstrated. But what was also needed was a “Sys Admin” force for post-conflict stabilization (winning the peace); this is where allies with strong traditions of peacekeeping might come into play. With the right rule set for military intervention in the Gap, the end result would be increased connectivity with the Core, and ultimately a more stable and peaceful world. Post-conflict stabilization was indeed a preoccupation of the Pentagon at the time. Barnett desciribed himself as a "cock-eyed optimist," and looking back at how U.S. wars eventually played out it seems his optimism was unwarranted, as the U.S. has lost its hegemonic power and the global order is disintegrating, as I write this review in the early 2020s. I don't think Barnett gets much traction as a strategist any more, but this book is still a good read for its insightful, out of the box thinking, and its unique vocabulary of original ideas. We should all allow ourselves such hope for the future.
July 3, 2021
This is a thought-provoking book, examining strategies for the US in the years following 9/11. It was written in 2004, and concludes with some predictions which are mostly off base, but the thought processes leading to those predictions remain valid. Worth reading to get some insight into what strategists were thinking back then.
The style is more than a little irksome at times. I began to wonder if Barnett was paid a wee bonus for using the word "Leviathan" in every paragraph. There are a bunch of other phrases (some of which he evidently coined as well) which are used more often than necessary. I could have done with a lot less humble-bragging too. But, leaving those things aside, Barnett still made an interesting case.
The style is more than a little irksome at times. I began to wonder if Barnett was paid a wee bonus for using the word "Leviathan" in every paragraph. There are a bunch of other phrases (some of which he evidently coined as well) which are used more often than necessary. I could have done with a lot less humble-bragging too. But, leaving those things aside, Barnett still made an interesting case.
May 12, 2025
This book lets the cat out of the bag
I give this book four stars, not because I agree with the author but because it is an insightful look into the warped, destructive thinking process that guides the idealistic think tank gurus that guide US foreign policy. As the author states again and again, the vision boils down to: 1) encouraging mass youth immigration from countries we are breaking into Europe and the U.S. 2) taking resources from countries we have broken, 3) controlling and intimidating these broken countries with our military might and 4) injecting democracy and rule of law (ie destroy their culture and traditions and replace it with western style liberal consumerism) into the countries we have broken.
I give this book four stars, not because I agree with the author but because it is an insightful look into the warped, destructive thinking process that guides the idealistic think tank gurus that guide US foreign policy. As the author states again and again, the vision boils down to: 1) encouraging mass youth immigration from countries we are breaking into Europe and the U.S. 2) taking resources from countries we have broken, 3) controlling and intimidating these broken countries with our military might and 4) injecting democracy and rule of law (ie destroy their culture and traditions and replace it with western style liberal consumerism) into the countries we have broken.
March 26, 2018
An interesting read now, since we can look back on the events Barnett predicts and evaluate his rule sets by his own measures.
A great read for anyone interested in understanding why the news looks the way it does.
At times overly optimistic, Barnett nonetheless proposes a vision of the world largely validated by the events of the years between this book’s publication (2003) and my reading of it.
A great read for anyone interested in understanding why the news looks the way it does.
At times overly optimistic, Barnett nonetheless proposes a vision of the world largely validated by the events of the years between this book’s publication (2003) and my reading of it.
May 25, 2018
I read this book to try and make sense of the events of 9/11. Was written around that time period, and with the benefit of time, it will likely serve as an accurate description of the transition from 20th to 21st century global politics, economics, and military strategy. From this book I took away a sense of the context for the international relations, national conflicts, and strategic interests that will define the next few decades at least.
July 25, 2019
This was a fascinating look at U.S. military strategy and how conflict has changed since the Cold War. Though the author's predictions haven't all come to pass, his determination of the major powers and influences of our world is still spot-on. It's not my usual type of reading, but I enjoyed it.
January 22, 2018
Not something I would normally read but I plowed through
May 1, 2018
I read this book long ago, and I'd like to read it again.
February 2, 2019
A very difficult read, but this book about "a future worth creating" discusses foreign policy strategy.
Want to read
May 10, 2021Recommend by Jack Carr USA
November 26, 2008
The best part of this book is finding out how decisions are made in Washington. None of this book is really a suprise, and if you are looking for some grand insight in to world security... look elsewhere.
I can sum this book up fairly quickly, bring the poor into the middle class where they have some security and something to loose and they will begin to take part in there own security and destiny. This in turn makes the place they live better and a part of the rest of society, which as a whole becomes a little safer. See no real revalation... the problem is we don't agree on how to do that within our own borders... how are we to be the ones to do it globally?
This book takes a few liberties with the realities of the world such as the Industreal powers care about anyone else but themselves (look at any trade deal, treaty or diplomatic mission with few exeptions), people will do the right thing because we are rational, resonable and charitable (French revolution, Bolshavik revolution, Rwanda, the Rodney King riots, teaching creationism instead of Darwinism in US schools anywhere), and wars don't happen when economies become intertwined (Pretty much any european war since the end of the first Crusade, and any interstate war since the seventeenth century with a few exeptions), none of these premises have been proven (infact the opposite seems to be the actual truth).
So though this book has an outline of obvious answers to age old problems, it would need a Star Trek like perfection of humanity to attain and a comming together of all the industrealised powers into a wonderful utopian collective who's primary goal is the worlds welfare, security and goodwill. It brings up visions of the Grand Ayatollah, wearing his fussy slippers to morning tea with the queen of England, as Putin and the and president Hu play Cricket with President Patil and Prime Minister Gilani and laugh about the days they all "had" Nuclear weapons.
It was fun to read about the myth of the "perfact brief" though.
I can sum this book up fairly quickly, bring the poor into the middle class where they have some security and something to loose and they will begin to take part in there own security and destiny. This in turn makes the place they live better and a part of the rest of society, which as a whole becomes a little safer. See no real revalation... the problem is we don't agree on how to do that within our own borders... how are we to be the ones to do it globally?
This book takes a few liberties with the realities of the world such as the Industreal powers care about anyone else but themselves (look at any trade deal, treaty or diplomatic mission with few exeptions), people will do the right thing because we are rational, resonable and charitable (French revolution, Bolshavik revolution, Rwanda, the Rodney King riots, teaching creationism instead of Darwinism in US schools anywhere), and wars don't happen when economies become intertwined (Pretty much any european war since the end of the first Crusade, and any interstate war since the seventeenth century with a few exeptions), none of these premises have been proven (infact the opposite seems to be the actual truth).
So though this book has an outline of obvious answers to age old problems, it would need a Star Trek like perfection of humanity to attain and a comming together of all the industrealised powers into a wonderful utopian collective who's primary goal is the worlds welfare, security and goodwill. It brings up visions of the Grand Ayatollah, wearing his fussy slippers to morning tea with the queen of England, as Putin and the and president Hu play Cricket with President Patil and Prime Minister Gilani and laugh about the days they all "had" Nuclear weapons.
It was fun to read about the myth of the "perfact brief" though.
January 15, 2014
At its core, Barnett's thesis is that global security is ultimately linked to connectivity. The more connected a country is to others, the lesser security threat it becomes, as its connectivity creates new areas of self-interest that are harmed by conflict with others.
The book is packed with thought-provoking facts that anyone in elective office should keep handy. We'd be well served if a copy of the book were on the shelves of everyone in leadership at the DoD, State Department, and Foreign Relations Committees.
The one area the book neglects is the economic impact of globalization on the "core" countries. For example, China's expanded connectivity has enabled their economy to grow dramatically. Much of the new wealth was used to buy U.S. sovereign debt, which in turn allowed the U.S. to expand its domestic credit markets so its citizens could...acquire more goods made in China. Barnett would argue this connectivity greatly reduces the risk of military conflict between the U.S. and China, and hopefully he is right. But connectivity means trade, and that will transfer wealth from countries with higher costs of [fill-in-the-blank] to countries with lower costs. While the result may be greater geopolitical stability in the long run, it will require keenly felt sacrifice from those countries transferring the wealth. I hope I can find a book that covers that topic next.
For anyone interested in making sense of an increasingly interconnected world, "The Pentagon's New Map" is definitely worth reading.
The book is packed with thought-provoking facts that anyone in elective office should keep handy. We'd be well served if a copy of the book were on the shelves of everyone in leadership at the DoD, State Department, and Foreign Relations Committees.
The one area the book neglects is the economic impact of globalization on the "core" countries. For example, China's expanded connectivity has enabled their economy to grow dramatically. Much of the new wealth was used to buy U.S. sovereign debt, which in turn allowed the U.S. to expand its domestic credit markets so its citizens could...acquire more goods made in China. Barnett would argue this connectivity greatly reduces the risk of military conflict between the U.S. and China, and hopefully he is right. But connectivity means trade, and that will transfer wealth from countries with higher costs of [fill-in-the-blank] to countries with lower costs. While the result may be greater geopolitical stability in the long run, it will require keenly felt sacrifice from those countries transferring the wealth. I hope I can find a book that covers that topic next.
For anyone interested in making sense of an increasingly interconnected world, "The Pentagon's New Map" is definitely worth reading.
June 17, 2012
A good book with many ideas worth thinking about. I disagreed with some of the main parts of his book, e.g., his penchant for preemptive self defense (especially as he describes it, as what he is really writing about is preventive self defense).
He seems to completely disregard Art 2(4) of the UN Charter (outlawing the use of force in international relations) and Art 51 of the same (providing exceptions for self defense). Instead, he seems to wish to divide the world into two rule sets--one for "core" developed nations (where war would still presumably be outlawed ... he just thinks it won't happen there) and another rule set for the "gap" where the US should act with force, unilaterally if it must. His ultimate goal is to eliminate the gap by integrating it with the core over time (perhaps a worthy goal).
The bad gap seeks to remain "disconnected" ... but he didn't really talk about the US desire to keep nations it dislikes disconnected--e.g., Cuba, Iran, N. Korea.
Lots of interesting smaller ideas as well: e.g., making all general/flag officers lose their service identity and becoming joint officers.
He seems to completely disregard Art 2(4) of the UN Charter (outlawing the use of force in international relations) and Art 51 of the same (providing exceptions for self defense). Instead, he seems to wish to divide the world into two rule sets--one for "core" developed nations (where war would still presumably be outlawed ... he just thinks it won't happen there) and another rule set for the "gap" where the US should act with force, unilaterally if it must. His ultimate goal is to eliminate the gap by integrating it with the core over time (perhaps a worthy goal).
The bad gap seeks to remain "disconnected" ... but he didn't really talk about the US desire to keep nations it dislikes disconnected--e.g., Cuba, Iran, N. Korea.
Lots of interesting smaller ideas as well: e.g., making all general/flag officers lose their service identity and becoming joint officers.
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