Signaling games--the subject of this book--was a new topic to me. The book has less than 200 pages but the rate of how much you learn per page is impressively high (given that you knew very little in the beginning). The presentation is very accessible, so it is not that you need to consult Wikipedia or spend hours with pen and paper to make sense of it. The book starts with the simplest game possible which is gradually modified to illustrate different phenomena like deception, category formation, synonymy and ambiguity, emergence of logic and compositionality. Every chapter discusses how signaling evolves in different games, how signals can be learned, what are the equilibria in those games, etc. Skyrms style reminded me of simple Wikipedia: most sentences are shorter than ten words.
The reason for why I cannot give the book five stars is very poor editing, an embarrassment for Oxford UP. There are typos, unreferenced figures, wrong order in the index (check letter 'p'), very ugly, inconsistent formula formatting. For example, conditional probability, like p(x|s), is expressed as pr_s(x) in one place, pr(x given s) in another. Probability of x, p(x) is sometimes p_pr(x) and sometimes Probability(x). A times B is sometimes A*B and sometimes AB. This is annoying, clearly the fault of the editor. Finally, I was puzzled by the picture on the cover until I checked the title. Perhaps not the best choice for a book on signaling.