“[Matlock’s] account of Reagan’s achievement as the nation’s diplomat in chief is a public service.”—The New York Times Book Review“Engrossing . . . authoritative . . . a detailed and reliable narrative that future historians will be able to draw on to illuminate one of the most dramatic periods in modern history.”—Los Angeles Times Book ReviewIn Reagan and Gorbachev, Jack F. Matlock, Jr., a former U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and principal adviser to Ronald Reagan on Soviet and European affairs, gives an eyewitness account of how the Cold War ended. Working from his own papers, recent interviews with major figures, and unparalleled access to the best and latest sources, Matlock offers an insider’s perspective on a diplomatic campaign far more sophisticated than previously thought, waged by two leaders of surpassing vision. Matlock details how Reagan privately pursued improved U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations even while engaging in public saber rattling. When Gorbachev assumed leadership, however, Reagan and his advisers found a willing partner in peace. Matlock shows how both leaders took risks that yielded great rewards and offers unprecedented insight into the often cordial working relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev. Both epic and intimate, Reagan and Gorbachev will be the standard reference on the end of the Cold War, a work that is critical to our understanding of the present and the past.
I came to this book after seeing videos of Matlock recently talking about the reasons for the current situation in Ukraine. I found it to be a very interesting account of Reagan’s dealings with Gorbachev, written from the unique perspective of an insider who was intimately involved in drafting some of the agreements concerned. Since I was involved in the campaign against Cruise and Pershing missiles and later against Reagan’s SDI there was a lot here that interested me. One of the surprising things about that period was that after denouncing the Soviet Union as the “evil empire” Reagan went on to make an arms control treaty with them, and Matlock’s account explains in some detail how this happened, and which forces were pitted against them in the pursuit of it (Caspar Weinberger etc.)
Although the book functions well as a blow by blow historical record, Matlock’s general “we are the good guys” attitude is a bit naive. He complains that the Russians refused to accept SDI in spite of the fact that Reagan’s intentions were entirely benign, but Reagan’s intentions were really beside the point once such a system was put in place, similarly when he talks about the Euromissiles he talks about counting systems in the Soviet Union and Europe as though those systems were equivalent, and he doesn’t seem to realize that what brought the European people out on the streets was not the number of systems but the fact that systems in Europe remained under US control and could be used to fight a limited nuclear war in Europe. Reagan probably was well intentioned, and probably did want to usher in a new era of peace for the world, but after he went he was replaced by what GH Bush (the elder) called in his memoirs the “iron assed” faction of Cheney and Rumsfeld whose policies led to the second Gulf War and the eastward expansion of NATO which scuppered any hopes of a lasting peace in Europe.
So I definitely recommend this book as an account of the history involved, but the reader should bear in mind that it’s not about the intention, in geopolitics as in chess you’re not playing the man you’re playing the board.