“Patterns in the Mind: Language and Human Nature” by Ray Jackendoff is a generally clear and broad overview of one of the most controversial debates of our time in the field of linguistics: the debate surrounding the existence of a “Universal Grammar”, an innate knowledge which enables young children to acquire an unconscious understanding of grammar. Through the following chain of reasoning, which he terms the “Argument for Innate Knowledge”, Jackendoff argues for the existence of a genetically determined Universal Grammar:
1. He first notices that we are able to determine the grammaticality of (a potentially infinite number of) novel, unheard sentences.
2. This implies that our understanding of grammar is not based solely on what we have previously heard, but rather that we have a “mental grammar” consisting of rules that describe grammatical sentences in a language.
3. Then, if we consider the question of where this mental grammar comes from, we discover that it is not consciously taught by parents or teachers, as evidenced by, for example, immigrant children gaining full fluency of a language while their parents do not, or by our use of all sorts of linguistic phenomena which are not typically covered in school.
4. So, we must obtain this mental grammar unconsciously as children.
5. However, the fact that children are unconsciously able to accomplish this feat, which trained professionals have consciously struggled for decades to unravel, implies that they must have some innate knowledge of grammar rules. This innate knowledge is termed “Universal Grammar”.
6. Then, since it is taken for granted that our “knowledge” arises from the physical configuration of the brain, which in turn is determined at birth by genetics like the rest of the body, this implies that the human species has somehow evolutionarily determined a predisposition towards language that is encoded into our genetics.
Jackendoff also uses a variety of empirical data to support his claim, particularly in his treatment of language acquisition in Part III, in which he goes into examples such as ASL in appropriate depth to give the reader a firm understanding of what sign languages and natural languages share in common, which in turn supports the claim that the mind seems to tend to structure language in particular ways. The other examples in this section, including the cases of feral children or deaf children developing sign language, are also convincing and add to his central argument around the existence of innate knowledge.
However, in his search to “[compress] the mass of intricacy” (viii), Jackendoff also seems to give less credit to opposing arguments than is fairly due. Many of the “criticisms” of the theory posed by an imaginary skeptic in the book are quite benign, and do not address some of the deeper issues surrounding the existence of a Universal Grammar. For example, in his discussion of the question of what exactly a Universal Grammar should provide, he claims that “if certain aspects of all languages we have examined are alike, these aspects are likely to fall into the innate part” (34). While there is no fault in this statement itself, it feels as though the implications of this are not thoroughly dealt with, since, considering that new languages are continually being discovered and documented, we can never be fully certain of which patterns we observe are truly universal, which to some extent discredits the predictive power of Universal Grammar. (Of course, the same could be said of almost any modern empirically-based scientific theory — but this, I believe, should at least be mentioned as a footnote.)
Overall, “Patterns in the Mind” is a good overview of the current debate around innate knowledge in language acquisition and is an informative guide for academics in a variety of fields relating to cognitive science.