A study of nuclear warfare’s key role in triggering the post-World War II confrontation between the US and the USSR After a devastating world war, culminating in the obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was clear that the United States and the Soviet Union had to establish a cooperative order if the planet was to escape an atomic World War III. In this provocative study, Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko show how the atomic bomb pushed the United States and the Soviet Union not toward cooperation but toward deep bipolar confrontation. Joseph Stalin, sure that the Americans meant to deploy their new weapon against Russia and defeat socialism, would stop at nothing to build his own bomb. Harry Truman, initially willing to consider cooperation, discovered that its pursuit would mean political suicide, especially when news of Soviet atomic spies reached the public. Both superpowers, moreover, discerned a new reality of the atomic now, cooperation must be total. The dangers posed by the bomb meant that intermediate measures of international cooperation would protect no one. Yet no two nations in history were less prepared to pursue total cooperation than were the United States and the Soviet Union. The logic of the bomb pointed them toward immediate Cold War. “Sprightly and well-argued…. The complicated history of how the bomb influenced the start of the war has never been explored so well."—Lloyd Gardner, Rutgers University“An outstanding new interpretation of the origins of the Cold War that gives equal weight to American and Soviet perspectives on the conflict that shaped the contemporary world.”—Geoffrey Roberts, author of Stalin’s Wars
Campbell Craig is Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, where he teaches and writes about cold war and nuclear history, US foreign relations, and contemporary international politics.
He is currently working on Marxism and modern war in the twentieth century, classical realism, and a larger project on the nuclear revolution as theory.
The popularity of this summer’s Oppenheimer has made books like this more popular. This book explores the complex relationship between the development and use of atomic weapons and the emergence of the Cold War. Craig delves into the key events and decisions surrounding the atomic bomb, focusing on the period from the Manhattan Project to the dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He challenges conventional wisdom by arguing that the atomic bomb played a more central role in shaping the post-World War II international order than previously acknowledged. One strength of Craig's work lies in his meticulous research, drawing on a wide range of primary sources and archival materials. He weaves together diplomatic, political, and scientific threads to provide a comprehensive narrative that sheds light on the intricate connections between nuclear weapons and geopolitics. The book presents a nuanced view of the motivations behind the use of the atomic bomb, highlighting the interplay between military strategy, domestic politics, and the desire for post-war influence. Craig argues that the bomb was not only a means to end the war but also a tool for securing strategic advantages in the emerging Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. While some may find the book's detailed examination of policy debates and diplomatic maneuvering dense, it contributes to a thorough understanding of the complexities surrounding the atomic bomb's role in shaping the post-war world order. Craig skillfully navigates through the intricacies of international relations, providing readers with a deeper appreciation for the multifaceted dynamics at play during this critical period. However, the book's focus on the atomic bomb as a primary catalyst for the Cold War may be a point of contention for some scholars who emphasize broader geopolitical, economic, and ideological factors. Craig's argument invites readers to reconsider their understanding of the Cold War's origins, prompting critical engagement with existing historiographical perspectives. Its exploration of the intricate connections between nuclear weapons and international relations challenges conventional narratives, making it a valuable resource for scholars and readers interested in this pivotal period of history.
Excellent theories on the cold war and atomic spies. Among many excellent things in the book, I will write about one very significant one. Craig and Radchenko point out the dog that doesn't bark- in the Sherlock Holmes sense- the mysterious lack of recorded official response to the atomic spies on the part of numerous top administration figures- is suspicious. Surely not because the topic was unimportant- it represented a breach into a top security priority of America, and enabled the Soviets to build their own atomic bombs!
But rather, suspiciously, there is no record of Truman and his staff's response to secret reports given to them in late 1945 about the unraveling of the spy network. And the pages from Canadian PM Mackenzie King's diary are missing for the relevant months of November and December 1945 in his "otherwise complete diaries spanning the entire first half of the twentieth century. Perhaps it is an insignificant coincidence that this evidence is missing. Perhaps we are dealing with a very quiet dog." Hmmm hmmm, right?
A well thought out account of the effects of the atomic bomb on the beginning of the cold war. It contains numerous interesting points of view from major world leaders and sadly, suggests the inevitability of the cold war.