The time frame of this book covers approximately one and a half years, from late 1941 until May 1943, during which a cascading series of events, some of them catastrophic, tried the resolve of the British peoples and their Prime Minister. There were several bright spots early-on, including the recent thumping that the British Commonwealth armies had given to German General Rommel in the North African desert, and the long-hoped-for entry of the United States into the war.
This latter development certainly gave Winston Churchill and the British military leaders cause for rejoicing, because Great Britain would no longer be standing alone against the Germans, who had spent the last two years gobbling up most of Europe. The reason for the United States' sudden abandonment of its former neutrality, however, brought a whole new set of huge problems. The U.S. was attacked by Japan, not Germany, and Churchill would spend a good part of the time covered in this volume using his utmost diplomatic persuasion skills trying to keep American military planners focused on looking at Europe as the main theater of war. This was no small matter since many in the American government were at odds over the assigning of precedence; America's highest ranking military leaders, Admiral E.J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, and General George Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, were evenly divided in this matter. In this effort Churchill cultivated and received the friendship of his increasingly good friend and ally Franklin Roosevelt, who sided with him on this issue.
Not that anyone could ignore what was going on in the Pacific. The British were certainly relieved when Hitler declared war on the U.S. in the wake of Pearl Harbor, forcing attention toward the European theater of war, but this also meant that Great Britain would now be fighting Japan. The consequences of this widening of the war were felt in the pressure exerted in the Pacific by a rampaging Japanese military, which very shortly began the action which would cause huge losses to America in the Philippines, and would take over other Allied bases in the Pacific. By March of 1942, the Japanese would conquer the Dutch East Indies, taking many allied soldiers prisoner. Prior to that, the Japanese had steamrolled down the Malayan Peninsula and had conquered the British island fortress of Singapore. They also overran Siam and invaded Burma, capturing Rangoon.
The beauty of Churchill's books comes from the combination of his command of English in writing historical narrative, and his liberal insertions of the voluminous correspondence carried out between himself and all manner of government agencies and foreign allies. The unfolding of the Singapore disaster, from the government's frantic steps to reinforce its defense at all cost, to the realization that nothing could be done to prevent the loss of the island, was both fascinating and sickening to read about..
This calamity was followed by the news that General Rommel had counterattacked in the African desert. Tobruk fell back into German hands and Britain faced a grave situation, despite earlier overconfident assurances Churchill had received from his commanding general there.
There is no doubt that, in any other circumstances, heads should have rolled on the discovery that one of Britain's most valuable bases was lost in good measure because it was set up to be practically impregnable to a sea attack, but all of its defenses folded because no one thought far enough ahead to plan for a land-ward threat. Most of the blame for this fell upon Churchill, who was not in the government when the planning for Singapore's defense happened, but he had to face a Motion of Censure in Parliament. His political and oratorical skills met the challenge, and the result was a renewed vote of confidence in the National Government which he headed.
Fighting a two-ocean war was very difficult for the Allies. Churchill's job was not made easier by the fact that the Australian Prime Minister, fearing a Japanese invasion, made demands for the return of Australia's best army divisions, which were sorely needed in North Africa. They were especially panicked after the loss of Singapore, an installation which they believed to be critical to the defense of their island, and about the Japanese presence in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.
There was no way that England could provide any significant defense to Australia. The United States solved this predicament by making Australia an important base for garrisoning growing numbers of forces that would be used in numerous Pacific island campaigns. Campaigns in Guadalcanal and New Guinea as well as significant American sea victories at the Coral Sea and Midway would eventually, but slowly, remove the immediate Japanese threat to Australia.
One of the greatest challenges to the Allies at this time was the danger of getting supplies shipped across the Atlantic Ocean. Naval convoys were coming under increasingly deadly German attack, from submarines and from the air. The Battle of the Atlantic was one of the most fearful campaigns of the war, because Britain could simply not survive without the food and material shipped from America, and Russia, now an Allied power, sorely needed everything that could be sent there. The problem was exacerbated by the lack of forward planning by American Naval authorities, causing severe shortages of escort vessels to guard the convoys. Churchill provides data showing the loss of three and a quarter millions of tons of British and other allied shipping lost between December 1941 and August 1942, and another almost three and three quarter million tons sent to the bottom of the ocean between August 1942 and late-May 1943, representing huge loss of lives as well as ships and their cargoes.
All of these losses and military reversals made it difficult to envision a pro-active strike against Germany. America would be able to provide the human and manufacturing resources needed to make this happen, but the country would take time to overcome years of pre-war isolationist military neglect. Churchill was especially feeling the sting of not-so subtle prodding from Joseph Stalin, whose country had felt severe punishment from German invasion. Churchill had made it a point to send as much assistance to Russia as possible from the beginning, but Stalin criticized him for having to suspend arctic ship convoys due to high losses from German submarine wolf packs and for not opening a second front against Hitler in western Europe.
Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt, and their top military staffs, would work very hard to come to some kind of consensus on when that European invasion would begin. As 1942 began, it became very apparent that no kind of invasion could possibly be mounted in 1942, much to Stalin's chagrin. The planners decided that an all-out attempt should be made to send an invasion force to France to begin pushing the German forces back into Germany, and ultimately defeat, in 1943. The 1942 campaign, code-named "Sledgehammer," formerly named "Bolero" and aimed at an attack on Brest or Cherbourg, morphed into "Roundup" for the liberation of France, based on the capture of Antwerp in 1943.
Much attention is mentioned in the book about planning for numerous Anglo-British military campaigns. There is an almost bewildering array of code-names, some of which evolved into other names. Thus, the projected 1943 "Roundup" eventually became the 1944 "Overlord" invasion. Likewise, the late-1942 "Gymnast" invasion of French North-Africa (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia), begat "Torch."
Before Torch happened, the British forces under General H.R. Alexander, the new Commander in Chief of the North African Theater of Operations, and his deputy, General B.L. Montgomery, Commanding the British 8th Army, bolstered Allied morale when they won back Tobruk and then defeated Rommel at Alamein (November 1942). This is where Churchill marked the turning of the "Hinge of Fate", when he declared that the British never had a victory before Alamein; after Alamein, they never had a defeat (p. 1065 of 1782).
If Alamein was the beginning of the end for the Germans in North Africa, it would need to be followed by months of hard slogging in the Western deserts. One of the compelling reasons for Torch was that it would give the Americans a chance to finally get a sizable force in battle against the Germans, since it was becoming obvious, as mentioned above, that an American-British invasion of France would not be feasible for some time. This is one reason why Churchill deferred to the naming of an American general, Dwight Eisenhower, as the operation's supreme commander. Churchill's description of this operation is, as always, detailed and orderly.
The Allies would not become, as General Alexander wired to Churchill, "masters of the North African shores" (pp 1375, 1376 of 1782) until May 13, 1943. This news followed the final encirclement and defeat of the Germans at Tunis, which compared, according to Churchill, to the Russian victory at Stalingrad. As Churchill sums up the situation at the middle of 1943, then, there was light at the end of the tunnel. Over two years of destruction, involving loss of countless numbers of civilians and military people, would have to transpire until this war ended. Much friendly collaboration would have to transpire among the Allies to make victory happen, and Churchill would be the most energetic leader in traveling whenever needed to consult on important matters. Already, within the pages of this book, he had made three trips to Washington D.C. to meet with Roosevelt, had broken the ice with Stalin with a trip to Moscow, and had participated in the first "Big Three" conference with the other two leaders at Casablanca, in January 1943. This at a time when long-range air travel was both arduous and highly risky, even for a head of state.
However, if it was not immediately apparent at this time, Italy was almost out of the war as a military power, while Hitler's invasion of Russia was coming back to bite his ass, leaving Germany as an isolated combatant in Europe, and the Japanese juggernaut had peaked. If Alamein was Britain's hinge of fate, June 1943 was the turning point for the Allied cause.