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New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era
Since 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet Union, both the threat of nuclear war and the threat of large-scale, interstate conventional war have receded. Yet, during the 1990s millions have died in wars in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia, and millions more have become refugees from war-torn regions.
In this pathbreaking book, the author argues that, in the context of globalization, what we think of as war—war between states in which the aim is to inflict maximum violence—is becoming an anachronism. In its place is a new type of organized violence, which she calls “new wars,” a mixture of war, organized crime, and massive violations of human rights. The actors are both global and local, public and private. These wars are fought for particular political goals using tactics of terror and destabilization that are theoretically outlawed by the rules of modern warfare; an informal criminalized economy is built into the functioning of these new wars.
The author asserts that political leaders and international institutions have been unable to deal with the spread of these wars mainly because they have not come to terms with their logic; wars are treated either as old wars or as anarchy. Her analysis offers a basis for a cosmopolitan political response to these wars in which the monopoly of legitimate organized violence is reconstructed on a transnational basis, and international peacekeeping is reconceptualized as cosmopolitan law enforcement. The author shows how this approach has profound implications for the reconstruction of civil society, political institutions, and economic and social relations.
In this pathbreaking book, the author argues that, in the context of globalization, what we think of as war—war between states in which the aim is to inflict maximum violence—is becoming an anachronism. In its place is a new type of organized violence, which she calls “new wars,” a mixture of war, organized crime, and massive violations of human rights. The actors are both global and local, public and private. These wars are fought for particular political goals using tactics of terror and destabilization that are theoretically outlawed by the rules of modern warfare; an informal criminalized economy is built into the functioning of these new wars.
The author asserts that political leaders and international institutions have been unable to deal with the spread of these wars mainly because they have not come to terms with their logic; wars are treated either as old wars or as anarchy. Her analysis offers a basis for a cosmopolitan political response to these wars in which the monopoly of legitimate organized violence is reconstructed on a transnational basis, and international peacekeeping is reconceptualized as cosmopolitan law enforcement. The author shows how this approach has profound implications for the reconstruction of civil society, political institutions, and economic and social relations.
216 pages, Paperback
First published February 1, 1999
40 people are currently reading
657 people want to read
About the author
Mary Kaldor
72 books27 followersMary Kaldor (born 16 March 1946) is a British academic, currently Professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, where she is also the Director of its Centre for the Study of Global Governance. She has been a key figure in the development of cosmopolitan democracy. She writes on globalisation, international relations and humanitarian intervention, global civil society and global governance, as well as what she calls New Wars.
Before the LSE, Kaldor worked at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and now serves on its governing board. She also worked at the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex, where she worked closely with English economist Christopher Freeman. She was a founding member of European Nuclear Disarmament, editing its European Nuclear Disarmament Journal (1983–88). She was the founder and Co-Chair of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly,and a founding member of the European Council on Foreign Relations. She also writes for OpenDemocracy.net, and belongs to the Board of Trustees of the Hertie School of Governance.
She began her career with a B.A. in Politics, Philosophy and Economics from Oxford University. She is the daughter of the economist Nicholas Kaldor. She is also the sister of Frances Stewart, Professor at the University of Oxford.
On 8 April 1993 the Guardian published a letter from Kaldor and Jeanette Buirski that read
We are holding a demonstration in London on May 9 in support of extensive UN intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We call on all who support our coalition for peace in Bosnia to add your name to our appeal.
In a 2008 interview Kaldor said "The international community makes a terrible mess wherever it goes":
It is hard to find a single example of humanitarian intervention during the 1990s that can be unequivocally declared a success. Especially after Kosovo, the debate about whether human rights can be enforced through military means is ever more intense. Moreover, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have been justified in humanitarian terms, have further called into question the case for intervention.
Before the LSE, Kaldor worked at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and now serves on its governing board. She also worked at the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex, where she worked closely with English economist Christopher Freeman. She was a founding member of European Nuclear Disarmament, editing its European Nuclear Disarmament Journal (1983–88). She was the founder and Co-Chair of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly,and a founding member of the European Council on Foreign Relations. She also writes for OpenDemocracy.net, and belongs to the Board of Trustees of the Hertie School of Governance.
She began her career with a B.A. in Politics, Philosophy and Economics from Oxford University. She is the daughter of the economist Nicholas Kaldor. She is also the sister of Frances Stewart, Professor at the University of Oxford.
On 8 April 1993 the Guardian published a letter from Kaldor and Jeanette Buirski that read
We are holding a demonstration in London on May 9 in support of extensive UN intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We call on all who support our coalition for peace in Bosnia to add your name to our appeal.
In a 2008 interview Kaldor said "The international community makes a terrible mess wherever it goes":
It is hard to find a single example of humanitarian intervention during the 1990s that can be unequivocally declared a success. Especially after Kosovo, the debate about whether human rights can be enforced through military means is ever more intense. Moreover, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have been justified in humanitarian terms, have further called into question the case for intervention.
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Displaying 1 - 27 of 27 reviews
March 16, 2019
OMG why is it when a book becomes a "textbook" it's harder to read and it's takes much longer to finish!?
The way the book was written also doesn't help in my case, the author has the tendency go around the bush rather than just laid out her arguments simply. I don't entirely agree with the "new" war label but mostly agree with her premises that differentiate the "new" in comparison to he old war. I appreciate her observation on the role of globalization and technology shape--for better or worse--the way wars are fought in 21st century. The author's proposal on Cosmopolitan Approach have some merit; if the old ways of doing things no longer effective, new ways ought to be consider; my reservation of this approach is that it's still open for abuse by those who-know-how and the author's hasn't offers a water-tight manuals to ensure that check and balance is in place that would pacified even its strongest critiques.
For some time now, the UN has credibility issues, time and time again, the UN involvements were more the problem than the solution to a problem, so to put so much faith in the UN is rather naive. In theory, the UN is a brilliant platform as international governance body, however its lack check and balance, prone to corruption, prone to abuse of power and positions, there are competing interests from the representatives therefore partiality seems hard to come by. These existing problems is like the elephant in the room that no one dare to acknowledge let alone do something about it. So to come down to this: in order for the UN to function with efficiency and deliver its mandates accordingly that inspire trust, the UN needs to put its house in order.
And then there's the NGOs. And whose making the NGOs accountable for their actions, may I ask? By being in the war-torn areas in droves, are they there as part of the solution to a problem or their present only making things worse or dare I say, their present only creating a situation that isn't there to begin with just to stay relevant?
The way the book was written also doesn't help in my case, the author has the tendency go around the bush rather than just laid out her arguments simply. I don't entirely agree with the "new" war label but mostly agree with her premises that differentiate the "new" in comparison to he old war. I appreciate her observation on the role of globalization and technology shape--for better or worse--the way wars are fought in 21st century. The author's proposal on Cosmopolitan Approach have some merit; if the old ways of doing things no longer effective, new ways ought to be consider; my reservation of this approach is that it's still open for abuse by those who-know-how and the author's hasn't offers a water-tight manuals to ensure that check and balance is in place that would pacified even its strongest critiques.
For some time now, the UN has credibility issues, time and time again, the UN involvements were more the problem than the solution to a problem, so to put so much faith in the UN is rather naive. In theory, the UN is a brilliant platform as international governance body, however its lack check and balance, prone to corruption, prone to abuse of power and positions, there are competing interests from the representatives therefore partiality seems hard to come by. These existing problems is like the elephant in the room that no one dare to acknowledge let alone do something about it. So to come down to this: in order for the UN to function with efficiency and deliver its mandates accordingly that inspire trust, the UN needs to put its house in order.
And then there's the NGOs. And whose making the NGOs accountable for their actions, may I ask? By being in the war-torn areas in droves, are they there as part of the solution to a problem or their present only making things worse or dare I say, their present only creating a situation that isn't there to begin with just to stay relevant?
February 9, 2015
There is a reason that disregarding this book in the introduction of every reputable IR scholar's work is now as par for the course as disavowing Fukuyama's hilarious 90s euphoria. They are like two slightly different peas in a pod. Kaldor's work centered around this topic is kind of like what would happen if Francis Fukuyama and Thomas Friedman had a baby with each other and then had Bono raise it.
'New Wars' are really old wars, the wars fought before widespread agriculture, or the wars which were fought in peripheral frontiers. There is nothing new about them. Claiming a kind of bizarre presentism for a very old phenomenon is total and complete historical illiteracy. The entire reason I got a doctorate in IR (besides that I thought it would help my life prospects) was to carry the flag of history as a (if not *the*) primary bedrock of good scholarship in this field.
Kaldor fails to show how present day media techniques, particularity given the light presence of any media in most of her examples, is different from good ole fashioned propaganda and storytelling as would have been practiced, as been recorded for millenia. Furthermore, the use of such things as terror and child soldiers has occurred in many of the most established civilizations of their eras, from the Napoleonic Wars to the An Lushan Rebellion. Furthermore, anyone who has studied tribal warfare would know many of the things she brings up here are only new for the technology being used, and even then, barely.
I know many people who tutor. Our program was at one of the most prestigious universities in the UK-and they made us teach a session on this in the intro to IR course. Thankfully, everyone I know taught it from an extremely critical standpoint, to show how faddish ideas without historical basis can be taken seriously. It came across as a cautionary tale. That is in general how this work should be viewed.
'New Wars' are really old wars, the wars fought before widespread agriculture, or the wars which were fought in peripheral frontiers. There is nothing new about them. Claiming a kind of bizarre presentism for a very old phenomenon is total and complete historical illiteracy. The entire reason I got a doctorate in IR (besides that I thought it would help my life prospects) was to carry the flag of history as a (if not *the*) primary bedrock of good scholarship in this field.
Kaldor fails to show how present day media techniques, particularity given the light presence of any media in most of her examples, is different from good ole fashioned propaganda and storytelling as would have been practiced, as been recorded for millenia. Furthermore, the use of such things as terror and child soldiers has occurred in many of the most established civilizations of their eras, from the Napoleonic Wars to the An Lushan Rebellion. Furthermore, anyone who has studied tribal warfare would know many of the things she brings up here are only new for the technology being used, and even then, barely.
I know many people who tutor. Our program was at one of the most prestigious universities in the UK-and they made us teach a session on this in the intro to IR course. Thankfully, everyone I know taught it from an extremely critical standpoint, to show how faddish ideas without historical basis can be taken seriously. It came across as a cautionary tale. That is in general how this work should be viewed.
May 2, 2022
Обязательно к прочтению для понимания текущей ситуации.
Можно читать как учебник войны, можно читать как западное понимание войны в Югославии, а можно - как попытку прогноза на 21 век. Страшно будет в любом случае
Можно читать как учебник войны, можно читать как западное понимание войны в Югославии, а можно - как попытку прогноза на 21 век. Страшно будет в любом случае
March 16, 2022
Säger inte att det är något fel på den, säger bara att jag tyckte den var tråkig
June 16, 2018
Whenever you hear the word war, you probably imagine tanks and aircraft, bombs and bullets, human suffering and deaths. However, one never really sit back and think about who fight these wars or for what purpose.
Mary Kaldor points to new type of organized violence that have risen in the globalized era. One that is characterized by the diminished role of centralized war fighting and identity politics. The author gave the example of the Bosnia-Herzegovina war as the typical "new war". She also discussed the economy of this new type of warfare, one that is possible due to globalization. Kaldor argued that the solution to this type of war is from an approach she called the cosmopolitan approach, grounded in inclusivity, civility, and humanism. She also dedicated at the end of her book for criticism and debate.
The purpose of the book was not so much to argue for right or wrong but to raise awareness for the distinctive nature of these new wars and how existing policies have failed to address these insecurity. In this sense, the book did a wonderful job in both its expansive arguments and addressing counter-argument.
This book is a good read for anyone looking to understand the nature of the old wars, wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And how globalization has transformed the new nature of war.
Mary Kaldor points to new type of organized violence that have risen in the globalized era. One that is characterized by the diminished role of centralized war fighting and identity politics. The author gave the example of the Bosnia-Herzegovina war as the typical "new war". She also discussed the economy of this new type of warfare, one that is possible due to globalization. Kaldor argued that the solution to this type of war is from an approach she called the cosmopolitan approach, grounded in inclusivity, civility, and humanism. She also dedicated at the end of her book for criticism and debate.
The purpose of the book was not so much to argue for right or wrong but to raise awareness for the distinctive nature of these new wars and how existing policies have failed to address these insecurity. In this sense, the book did a wonderful job in both its expansive arguments and addressing counter-argument.
This book is a good read for anyone looking to understand the nature of the old wars, wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And how globalization has transformed the new nature of war.
November 4, 2009
The chapter on cosmopolitanism gets a little pie-in-the-sky for my tastes, but that aside, this is a fascinating examination of the global and local mechanisms behind new trends in modern warfare, and what they could mean for our understandings of war in the future.
May 21, 2008
there are no angels in the politics of war. and the people always suffer for the shortcomings of our leaders.
April 20, 2021
fails to make a strong argument. ahistorical. meh.
March 8, 2025
Coming at the end of the 90s, which saw the revolution in political science thinking, New and Old Wars effectively digests the outlines of world order expressed by the likes of Huntington and Kaplan and provides a more workable framework of conflict management.
Whereas Kaplan spoke of pockets of authority and Huntington spoke of civilizatonal faultiness, Kaldor creates a solution, Cosmopolitan Governance, wherein enforcement of peace keeping and conflict resolution is managed multinationally by parties with an interest in preserving the peace.
New and Old Wars is not just a policy prescription, rather, it's an earth shattering examination of the collapse of the standard model of war toward a decentralised, privatised form of warfare. Kaldor speaks of "the privatisation of violence" and illustrates this in the case of Bosnia & Herzegovina while also alluding to Abkhazia and Nagorno Kharabakh.
New and Old Wars is not just an examination of Guerrilla Warfare, Kaldor also illustrates the centrality of Ethnic Cleansing to the new mode of warfare and illustrating the various methods under which it is implemented.
In all, New and Old Wars is an essential book in the field of international relations and definitely co-equal to the works of Huntington, Kaplan or Mearsheimer.
Whereas Kaplan spoke of pockets of authority and Huntington spoke of civilizatonal faultiness, Kaldor creates a solution, Cosmopolitan Governance, wherein enforcement of peace keeping and conflict resolution is managed multinationally by parties with an interest in preserving the peace.
New and Old Wars is not just a policy prescription, rather, it's an earth shattering examination of the collapse of the standard model of war toward a decentralised, privatised form of warfare. Kaldor speaks of "the privatisation of violence" and illustrates this in the case of Bosnia & Herzegovina while also alluding to Abkhazia and Nagorno Kharabakh.
New and Old Wars is not just an examination of Guerrilla Warfare, Kaldor also illustrates the centrality of Ethnic Cleansing to the new mode of warfare and illustrating the various methods under which it is implemented.
In all, New and Old Wars is an essential book in the field of international relations and definitely co-equal to the works of Huntington, Kaplan or Mearsheimer.
May 19, 2023
Kaldor offers a valuable contribution to our understanding of how armed conflict and war looks outside of the narrow definition of modern, total war. It is obvious that a lot of work has gone into this updated edition, and it has certainly improved it. This is particularly true for the chapter on Afghanistan and Iraq.
However, just as in the first edition the value is somewhat lessened by the authors insistence on having discovered something new. 'Old Wars' are framed in a narrow state centric, total and rational model. Historic conflicts that don't fit the 'Old Wars' are ignored apart from a brief mention.
As the book stands, it is an interesting and thought provoking series of case studies. But as an academic defence of a theory it suffers from a lack of study of historic civil wars, drawn out conflicts. How for example do 'New Wars' compare to the Spanish Civil War? Lebanon? Or Vietnam?
'New and Old Wars' is a good starting point to revisit how we define and research war. Seen as a provocation it should not be underrated. But, even in this edition, it fails to convince on its basic premise.
However, just as in the first edition the value is somewhat lessened by the authors insistence on having discovered something new. 'Old Wars' are framed in a narrow state centric, total and rational model. Historic conflicts that don't fit the 'Old Wars' are ignored apart from a brief mention.
As the book stands, it is an interesting and thought provoking series of case studies. But as an academic defence of a theory it suffers from a lack of study of historic civil wars, drawn out conflicts. How for example do 'New Wars' compare to the Spanish Civil War? Lebanon? Or Vietnam?
'New and Old Wars' is a good starting point to revisit how we define and research war. Seen as a provocation it should not be underrated. But, even in this edition, it fails to convince on its basic premise.
August 11, 2017
Inzwischen ein Klassiker, hat dieses Buch den Begriff der "neuen Kriege" entscheidend geprägt. Mary Kaldor bietet einen interessanten Überblick über die Charakteristike "alter" vs "neuer" Kriege und legt dabei besonderen Fokus auf die Mechanismen der Kriegsökonomie in den neuen Kriegen. Die Fallstudie zum Konflikt in Bosnien-Herzegowina ist auf Grund der gebotenen Details und ihrer gekonnten Verknüpfung mit den Hintergründen besonders lesenswert und interessant. Leider hat das Jahrzehnt seit dem Erscheinen der Neuauflage von Kaldors Buch gezeigt, dass die Hoffnungen der Autorin in Bezug auf das Anbrechen eines neuen "kosmopolitischen" Zeitalters von Intervention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Umstellung der friedensschaffenden Einsätze auf verstärkte polizeiliche Maßnahmen und nachhaltigen Aufbau von Friedensökonomien sich so (nicht) bewahrheitet haben. Trotzdem bieten Kaldors Beobachtungen besonders zu den "Inseln der Zivilität" in Kriegs- und Nachkriegsgebieten wertvolle Denkanstöße für alle, die sich für Konfliktnachsorge und Wiederaufbau interessieren.
May 29, 2020
Lots of data, but the cases are cherry-picked to fit into the hypothesis of the author. She addmitedly says the "new" wars term is only coined to get some public recognition of her idea.
It is not original, and does not explain much about wars other than established things like new technology and role of the internet.
It is not original, and does not explain much about wars other than established things like new technology and role of the internet.
June 25, 2021
the universal cosmopolitanism that kaldor uses is too idealistic in the highly polarized time we live in. she does however provide a thesis that absolutely needs to be considered when restructuring the conventional approach to war. definitely some good tidbits in here and extremely helpful
April 3, 2019
Reviewing this book as consumer of ‘regular’ literature: fantasy, fiction, biographies etc. After The crisis caravam
July 29, 2020
Are new wars “new”?
Are new wars “war”?
How will the future be organized?
1. The clash of civilizations?
2. The coming anarchy?
3. The islands of cosmopolitan governance?
Are new wars “war”?
How will the future be organized?
1. The clash of civilizations?
2. The coming anarchy?
3. The islands of cosmopolitan governance?
Read
January 6, 2022300 pagine di cagate è così purtroppo
February 20, 2024
read this for class. not my fav book i've read on the topic but had some interesting points about the Bosnian war
April 30, 2021
A very interesting book on contemporary conflicts and how to answer them.
June 8, 2014
Wars as mutual enterprises against civil society
[Through my ratings, reviews and edits I'm providing intellectual property and labor to Amazon.com Inc., listed on Nasdaq, which fully owns Goodreads.com and in 2013 posted revenues for $74 billion and $274 million profits. Intellectual property and labor require compensation. Amazon.com Inc. is also requested to provide assurance that its employees and contractors' work conditions meet the highest health and safety standards at all the company's sites.]
New wars are here what happens when the modern nation-state crumbles and everything, including the use of legitimate violence, gets privatized, paving the way for and under pressure from the high-speed movements of money, people and commodities typical of globalization.
The heart of this extremely serious book is the analysis of the conflict that swept Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995. At the time that war was mainly understood as a throwback: medieval tensions that had been dormant during the communist era had broken out and run away. It was instead a close to home case of friction between the class of the 'globalists' and the under-class of the 'globalized', between those who could take advantage of the sudden breakdown of state legitimacy and worked to topple it (deliberately or unwittingly), and those who bore the negative consequences. Globalists included war lords, mercenaries, mujahidin, NGOs, private armies, UN officials, international journalists, economic criminals and arm dealers, whereas the globalized or victims were the non-combatant citizens (94% of the population) as a class per se. The reading of the war along the horizontal line of this cleavage, rather than through the lens of ethnicity, is the breakthrough finding of this book.
New wars are post-clausewitzean conflicts where all the combatant parties are in reality co-operating at the expense of non-combatant civil society to achieve their private goals. Along these lines the author understands the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan as "a mutual enterprise, whatever the antagonists believe, in which the US administration shores up its image as the protector of the American people and the defender of democracy and those with a vested interest in a high military budget are rewarded, and in which extremist Islamists are able to substantiate the idea of a global jihad and to mobilize young Muslims behind the cause". It is clear then that "action and counterreaction merely contribute to 'long war' which benefits both sides" (p. 219). The 2003 Iraq invasion was therefore not a war for oil (even if the ensuing post-war 'long-war' disorders were fueled by an illegal oil economy). As it is the case with all new wars, the Iraq war ended with partition, i.e. with the consolidation of identity politics into the off-the-shelf "nation building" effort (which turned out to be a nation-destroying exercise). Separate development, with the consequent permanent instability and the need for international protection (still ongoing in Bosnia, or Cyprus) is the intended outcome. Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq are new Israels, i.e. areas of manufactured instability calling for long-term oversight by the 'international community'.
Another feature of the new wars explored here is their focus on developing 'hate and fear' in civil society, to force non involved citizens to take sides. This resonates with the 'shock and awe' strategy described by Naomi Klein in "The Shock Doctrine", and would date new wars back twenty years before Bosnia (Klein is not cited though). In sum, "war itself can be understood as a form of political mobilization, constructing an environment of insecurity, in which particularist groups thrive" (p. 93).
The least convincing contribution of the book is the proposal of kantian 'cosmopolitanism' as the solution and antidote to the spreading of this new type of wars. I agree instead when the author says that "civil society needs a state" (p. 129). If sticking to the Westphalian or modern state is anachronistic, the state that is needed is maybe a non-combatant manufacturer of public goods, including its own legitimacy, with zero tolerance for the private grabbing thereof.
[Through my ratings, reviews and edits I'm providing intellectual property and labor to Amazon.com Inc., listed on Nasdaq, which fully owns Goodreads.com and in 2013 posted revenues for $74 billion and $274 million profits. Intellectual property and labor require compensation. Amazon.com Inc. is also requested to provide assurance that its employees and contractors' work conditions meet the highest health and safety standards at all the company's sites.]
New wars are here what happens when the modern nation-state crumbles and everything, including the use of legitimate violence, gets privatized, paving the way for and under pressure from the high-speed movements of money, people and commodities typical of globalization.
The heart of this extremely serious book is the analysis of the conflict that swept Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995. At the time that war was mainly understood as a throwback: medieval tensions that had been dormant during the communist era had broken out and run away. It was instead a close to home case of friction between the class of the 'globalists' and the under-class of the 'globalized', between those who could take advantage of the sudden breakdown of state legitimacy and worked to topple it (deliberately or unwittingly), and those who bore the negative consequences. Globalists included war lords, mercenaries, mujahidin, NGOs, private armies, UN officials, international journalists, economic criminals and arm dealers, whereas the globalized or victims were the non-combatant citizens (94% of the population) as a class per se. The reading of the war along the horizontal line of this cleavage, rather than through the lens of ethnicity, is the breakthrough finding of this book.
New wars are post-clausewitzean conflicts where all the combatant parties are in reality co-operating at the expense of non-combatant civil society to achieve their private goals. Along these lines the author understands the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan as "a mutual enterprise, whatever the antagonists believe, in which the US administration shores up its image as the protector of the American people and the defender of democracy and those with a vested interest in a high military budget are rewarded, and in which extremist Islamists are able to substantiate the idea of a global jihad and to mobilize young Muslims behind the cause". It is clear then that "action and counterreaction merely contribute to 'long war' which benefits both sides" (p. 219). The 2003 Iraq invasion was therefore not a war for oil (even if the ensuing post-war 'long-war' disorders were fueled by an illegal oil economy). As it is the case with all new wars, the Iraq war ended with partition, i.e. with the consolidation of identity politics into the off-the-shelf "nation building" effort (which turned out to be a nation-destroying exercise). Separate development, with the consequent permanent instability and the need for international protection (still ongoing in Bosnia, or Cyprus) is the intended outcome. Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq are new Israels, i.e. areas of manufactured instability calling for long-term oversight by the 'international community'.
Another feature of the new wars explored here is their focus on developing 'hate and fear' in civil society, to force non involved citizens to take sides. This resonates with the 'shock and awe' strategy described by Naomi Klein in "The Shock Doctrine", and would date new wars back twenty years before Bosnia (Klein is not cited though). In sum, "war itself can be understood as a form of political mobilization, constructing an environment of insecurity, in which particularist groups thrive" (p. 93).
The least convincing contribution of the book is the proposal of kantian 'cosmopolitanism' as the solution and antidote to the spreading of this new type of wars. I agree instead when the author says that "civil society needs a state" (p. 129). If sticking to the Westphalian or modern state is anachronistic, the state that is needed is maybe a non-combatant manufacturer of public goods, including its own legitimacy, with zero tolerance for the private grabbing thereof.
October 25, 2023
For a course (Senioruniversitet).
An interesting book ro read if your are interested in international politics. But it taher dated as it was first published in 1999. Two or more years ago it would have been extremely interesting. But considering the war in Ukraine and the current conflict in Gaza, it seems old.
Many similar books are written covering the entire field, offering the reader a spread with all (or most) of the current theories. This does so to a lesser degree. Mary Kaldor has a specific line that she is pushing, much of it based by her expereinces around the earlier conflict in Yugoslavia.
There are also later editions! (Just found out today.)
An interesting book ro read if your are interested in international politics. But it taher dated as it was first published in 1999. Two or more years ago it would have been extremely interesting. But considering the war in Ukraine and the current conflict in Gaza, it seems old.
Many similar books are written covering the entire field, offering the reader a spread with all (or most) of the current theories. This does so to a lesser degree. Mary Kaldor has a specific line that she is pushing, much of it based by her expereinces around the earlier conflict in Yugoslavia.
There are also later editions! (Just found out today.)
August 12, 2025
I first met Mary Kaldor—well, not the woman herself, but her ideas—in the cramped corner of our JNU campus library, where her New and Old Wars sat on a shelf wedged between well-worn tomes on Clausewitz and the Cold War.
I’d heard the book described as “field-defining” by colleagues who toss around that kind of praise like confetti, but this time it wasn’t an exaggeration. When I cracked it open, it felt less like reading a theory text and more like having a sharply observant friend explain why the world’s conflicts no longer behave like the history books said they should.
Then 2022 came. The news was full of drone footage, hybrid warfare, and the muddled geopolitics of fractured states. In that moment, Kaldor’s thesis—that war had morphed into something both ancient and unsettlingly modern—hit harder than I expected.
She makes a deceptively simple distinction: old wars were fought by states, with formal armies, over political control; new wars are fragmented, networked, and often driven by identity politics, criminal profiteering, and the manipulation of civilians as both targets and participants. She wasn’t just theorizing from an ivory tower—her arguments were grounded in the brutal mess of the Balkans, Somalia, and beyond.
Reading it, I found myself remembering my own first encounters with post-Cold War news footage. I was used to thinking of war in World War II terms—front lines, clear uniforms, victory days. Instead, there were militias wearing jeans, politicians giving peace talks in the morning and arming factions in the afternoon, and refugees who were pawns in a geopolitical chess game. Kaldor had taken all that confusion and given it a structure I could finally name.
Her writing doesn’t sugarcoat. She unpacks how these conflicts survive by blurring the lines between war, crime, and politics. The funding often comes from smuggling, looting, or foreign sponsors—war as a self-perpetuating economy.
It was sobering to see how the supposed chaos often has its own grim logic. And unlike the sanitised maps in military briefings, her descriptions give weight to the civilian experience—the displacement, the targeting of communities, the way violence is used as a performance to control narratives as much as territory.
The memoir part of my experience with the book is tied to when I read it: deep into the pandemic, in a time when the world already felt destabilized. Kaldor’s diagnosis of “new wars” felt like a parallel to the shifting nature of global crises—less about armies facing off, more about diffuse, prolonged struggles with no clean resolution. It made me rethink what “security” even means in the 21st century.
Of course, she doesn’t just lay out the problem and leave you adrift. Kaldor is an advocate of what she calls the “cosmopolitan approach” to security—solutions rooted in international law, human rights, and civilian protection rather than the blunt instrument of military victory. That part felt idealistic, but in a way that refuses cynicism. It’s the kind of thinking that dares to imagine politics catching up with reality.
By the time I closed the book, I felt like someone had taken the static noise of post-Cold War conflict and tuned it into a frequency I could actually hear. It didn’t make the world any less dangerous, but it made it more comprehensible.
Looking back, New and Old Wars is the rare academic work that didn’t just stay in the realm of theory for me—it changed how I watch the news, how I frame discussions about intervention, and how I understand the grim creativity of violence in our time.
It’s unsettling, yes, but also empowering: a reminder that to address the world we live in, we first have to name it for what it has become.
I’d heard the book described as “field-defining” by colleagues who toss around that kind of praise like confetti, but this time it wasn’t an exaggeration. When I cracked it open, it felt less like reading a theory text and more like having a sharply observant friend explain why the world’s conflicts no longer behave like the history books said they should.
Then 2022 came. The news was full of drone footage, hybrid warfare, and the muddled geopolitics of fractured states. In that moment, Kaldor’s thesis—that war had morphed into something both ancient and unsettlingly modern—hit harder than I expected.
She makes a deceptively simple distinction: old wars were fought by states, with formal armies, over political control; new wars are fragmented, networked, and often driven by identity politics, criminal profiteering, and the manipulation of civilians as both targets and participants. She wasn’t just theorizing from an ivory tower—her arguments were grounded in the brutal mess of the Balkans, Somalia, and beyond.
Reading it, I found myself remembering my own first encounters with post-Cold War news footage. I was used to thinking of war in World War II terms—front lines, clear uniforms, victory days. Instead, there were militias wearing jeans, politicians giving peace talks in the morning and arming factions in the afternoon, and refugees who were pawns in a geopolitical chess game. Kaldor had taken all that confusion and given it a structure I could finally name.
Her writing doesn’t sugarcoat. She unpacks how these conflicts survive by blurring the lines between war, crime, and politics. The funding often comes from smuggling, looting, or foreign sponsors—war as a self-perpetuating economy.
It was sobering to see how the supposed chaos often has its own grim logic. And unlike the sanitised maps in military briefings, her descriptions give weight to the civilian experience—the displacement, the targeting of communities, the way violence is used as a performance to control narratives as much as territory.
The memoir part of my experience with the book is tied to when I read it: deep into the pandemic, in a time when the world already felt destabilized. Kaldor’s diagnosis of “new wars” felt like a parallel to the shifting nature of global crises—less about armies facing off, more about diffuse, prolonged struggles with no clean resolution. It made me rethink what “security” even means in the 21st century.
Of course, she doesn’t just lay out the problem and leave you adrift. Kaldor is an advocate of what she calls the “cosmopolitan approach” to security—solutions rooted in international law, human rights, and civilian protection rather than the blunt instrument of military victory. That part felt idealistic, but in a way that refuses cynicism. It’s the kind of thinking that dares to imagine politics catching up with reality.
By the time I closed the book, I felt like someone had taken the static noise of post-Cold War conflict and tuned it into a frequency I could actually hear. It didn’t make the world any less dangerous, but it made it more comprehensible.
Looking back, New and Old Wars is the rare academic work that didn’t just stay in the realm of theory for me—it changed how I watch the news, how I frame discussions about intervention, and how I understand the grim creativity of violence in our time.
It’s unsettling, yes, but also empowering: a reminder that to address the world we live in, we first have to name it for what it has become.
October 8, 2011
Kaldor does a good job of setting up her argument as to how she views New War. I had some problems with it. For one, many of the New War tactics such as guerrilla warfare, asymmetric conflict, and technology have been implemented for hundreds of years. Secondly, she uses civilians death as a major show of how New War affects the inhabitants of a nation in "New War." Civilian deaths have been widespread throughout conflict (Sherman's March, WWI, Indian wars). Basically, genocide isn't new.
In essence, Kaldor has a nice argument, but some of her evidence is flawed. I like where she's going with the New War idea, but sometimes it's best to judge every war individually. Don't put any more than two or three into a group. Also, her "solution," more or less, to New War is cosmopolitanism, which for me is almost as unrealistic as stopping War.
Overall a good book, especially if one is wanting explanation about the Bosnian war(s) in the 90s.
"Every war is different, every war is the same." - Jarhead
In essence, Kaldor has a nice argument, but some of her evidence is flawed. I like where she's going with the New War idea, but sometimes it's best to judge every war individually. Don't put any more than two or three into a group. Also, her "solution," more or less, to New War is cosmopolitanism, which for me is almost as unrealistic as stopping War.
Overall a good book, especially if one is wanting explanation about the Bosnian war(s) in the 90s.
"Every war is different, every war is the same." - Jarhead
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
August 10, 2020
Kaldor's key thesis, the 'new wars' and manner in which they are dominated by complex interplay of civilian violence, decentralized command, small weapons proliferation, gratuitous violence, etc. Would be pointless to try to summarize more; easy to read, fascinating, and even when disagreeing with its thesis, the book is incredibly thought provoking.
September 1, 2023
Worth reading again after all these years. Interesting to have the war in Ukraine as a backdrop for her thesis.
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May 30, 2013Unsubstantiated bollocks.
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February 14, 2017This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 5, 2023
This type of ahistorical, over-theorized work seems to do well in International Relations spaces.
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