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Pulling Up The Ladder: The Metaphysical Roots of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
"Pulling up the Ladder" discusses how Wittgenstein's early philosophy became widely known largely through the efforts of Russell and other empirically-minded British philosophers, and to a lesser extent, the scientifically-oriented German-speaking philosophers of the Vienna Circle. However, Wittgenstein's primary philosophical concerns arose in a far different context, and failure to grasp this has led to many misunderstandings of the "Tractatus". From Brockhaus' investigation of that context and its problems emerges this new interpretation of Wittgenstein's early thought, which also affords fresh insights into the later Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's first philosophy was a Schopenhauerian neo-Kantianism, and although he soon rejected much of the substance of Schopenhauer's work, his problems remained closely connected with Schopenhauer's view of the world and man's relation to it. Wittgenstein's early philosophy is a departure from Schopenhauer - a rigorously purified form, so to speak, of Schopenhauer's "World as Will and Representation". In "Pulling up the Ladder", Brockhaus explains Schopenhauer's system of the world as Will and Representation, then proceeds to investigate Frege's realism and Hertz's conventionalistic philosophy of science - two of the elements which fuelled Wittgenstein's purification of Schopenhauer.
- GenresPhilosophy
340 pages, Paperback
First published December 1, 1990
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January 20, 2019
This is a stellar explication of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Brockhaus's writing is very lucid and well-structured; he lays out Wittgenstein's key claims and walks you through his abstruse arguments. Brockhaus provides explanations of the philosophical problems that motivated Wittgenstein, and of the preceding theories to which he responded. This philosophical background is essential to understanding any of Wittgenstein's own claims and arguments. I've read G. E. M. Anscombe's book on the Tractatus; comparatively, she does not provide this background comprehensively, and when she provides bits and pieces, she does so without the clarity Brockhaus offers.
Brockhaus does justice to the semantical, metaphysical, and ethico-aesthetic views alike offered in the Tractatus. In fact, he shows how these views are tightly interconnected — the “mystical” parts of the Tractatus that many interpreters of Wittgenstein either ignore or explain away are essential to providing a full explanation of the celebrated parts of this work (e.g., the picture theory of propositions). It is very rare to find such a unified account of the Tractatus; or such lucid explication of Wittgenstein’s views on “mystical topics” like God, solipsism, and the metaphysical self.
Most philosophers know that Wittgenstein responds to Russell and Frege in the Tractatus. Brockhaus shows that he responds to Schopenhauer just as much. We are introduced to Kant and Schopenhauer (transcendental idealism), Mill and Boole (psychologism), and Mach and Hertz (philosophy of science), in addition to Russell and Frege. We learn about the problems that preoccupied all of these thinkers — understanding their problems is crucial to grasping to essence and impact of Wittgenstein’s thought.
After presenting this philosophical background, Brockhaus explicates the various facets of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. We first learn about Wittgenstein’s metaphysics and picture theory of propositions. Many people have explicated this theory, and it is easy to read about it through any internet search. But Brockhaus’s explanation has unique features. He very clearly explains the differences between facts, states of affairs, and objects; and correspondingly, compound propositions, elementary propositions, and names. Brockhaus clearly shows how with these ontological categories Wittgenstein can solve some baffling problems in philosophy of language, which preoccupied Russell and Frege.
Brockhaus dedicates a chapter to Wittgenstein’s distinction between “saying” and “showing”. Out of any explanation of this distinction I have read so far, Brockhaus provides the clearest one. This distinction is the keystone to Wittgenstein’s views of language, logic, and metaphysics, and Brockhaus makes that evident.
Another chapter is dedicated to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of science, which is briefly mentioned in the Tractatus. Many interpreters of Wittgenstein neglect this aspect of his work altogether. Brockhaus’s account shows how Wittgenstein can explain laws in science (e.g., Newton’s law of universal gravitation); this exercise guides us in seeing how radical Wittgenstein’s theories are, and also how naturalistically plausible they are!
The last three chapters in the book are about Wittgenstein’s views on intentional attitudes; the lack of distinction between realism, idealism, solipsism; and the metaphysical self. All the preceding chapters seem to culminate in the last two, which deal with the infamous premises in the Tractatus that gain Wittgenstein the reputation as mystical or unhinged. Brockhaus shows that Wittgenstein’s views on solipsism and the soul are consistent with any commonsense, naturalistic stance. He also shows that these views are foundational to his overall philosophy of language. The metaphysical self, or soul, is the original source of all value, and thus the possibility of aesthetics and ethics. We must distinguish this self from the empirical self, which is studied by the sciences as is often confused as the origin of intentionality and value. The metaphysical self and ethics are as “unsayable” as logic and the logical forms of propositions. The metaphysical self is also necessary for basic intentionality, which allows “names” to latch onto “objects”; this in turn lets propositions have sense.
This is one of those rare books that leave you bewildered and aware that what you've just learned can transform your relationship to thinking. I can't wait to read the Tractatus itself again, now equipped with Brockhaus's explanations. One form of this bewilderment springs from the distinction between saying/showing. I think it is a radically new and powerful response to a problem in Kant's first Critique, to which philosophers including Schopenhauer responded. This problem is that while Kant argues that all possible thought and experienced is necessarily constrained by a priori structures (transcendental conditions), he also posits the particular transcendental conditions he identified (e.g., the categories; space and time) as absolute and unconditioned. But according to his theory, these conditions he identified should depend on, or be constrained by, further a priori conditions. Schopenhauer responded by positing further a priori conditions. Wittgenstein takes a wholly other route. He argues that we simply cannot speak about transcendental matters. Any possible thought we formulate about transcendental conditions is simply another token of thought, which is constrained by those conditions.
Hence, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."
...and, "My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it."
This is a lot to think about. This distinction between saying and showing can be applied to transcendental matters other than the logical structures of our thought. We also cannot speak about what the world might be in itself, apart from our observations or scientific theories. We cannot speak about the exact role of the brain, for example, in being part of our cognitive system. We cannot speak about how emotions "color" our experience; we can point to a bodily feeling, and say that it is an emotion. But that wouldn't be the true emotion at play. Since emotions underlay experiences and holistically transform their character, we cannot speak about them.
I strongly recommend this book for anyone interested in seriously understanding Wittgenstein. Although it is not a quick read (about 350 pages), it is so lucidly written that it is not burdensome and rather rewarding to read. I would say it is necessary to read this book, or one comparable to it, for anyone new to Wittgenstein who wishes to understand him. The Tractatus is too opaque for anyone unacquainted with him to access the profound conclusions and implications of this work; and reading any brief summary article about the Tractatus is too shallow to provide such access either.
Brockhaus does justice to the semantical, metaphysical, and ethico-aesthetic views alike offered in the Tractatus. In fact, he shows how these views are tightly interconnected — the “mystical” parts of the Tractatus that many interpreters of Wittgenstein either ignore or explain away are essential to providing a full explanation of the celebrated parts of this work (e.g., the picture theory of propositions). It is very rare to find such a unified account of the Tractatus; or such lucid explication of Wittgenstein’s views on “mystical topics” like God, solipsism, and the metaphysical self.
Most philosophers know that Wittgenstein responds to Russell and Frege in the Tractatus. Brockhaus shows that he responds to Schopenhauer just as much. We are introduced to Kant and Schopenhauer (transcendental idealism), Mill and Boole (psychologism), and Mach and Hertz (philosophy of science), in addition to Russell and Frege. We learn about the problems that preoccupied all of these thinkers — understanding their problems is crucial to grasping to essence and impact of Wittgenstein’s thought.
After presenting this philosophical background, Brockhaus explicates the various facets of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. We first learn about Wittgenstein’s metaphysics and picture theory of propositions. Many people have explicated this theory, and it is easy to read about it through any internet search. But Brockhaus’s explanation has unique features. He very clearly explains the differences between facts, states of affairs, and objects; and correspondingly, compound propositions, elementary propositions, and names. Brockhaus clearly shows how with these ontological categories Wittgenstein can solve some baffling problems in philosophy of language, which preoccupied Russell and Frege.
Brockhaus dedicates a chapter to Wittgenstein’s distinction between “saying” and “showing”. Out of any explanation of this distinction I have read so far, Brockhaus provides the clearest one. This distinction is the keystone to Wittgenstein’s views of language, logic, and metaphysics, and Brockhaus makes that evident.
Another chapter is dedicated to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of science, which is briefly mentioned in the Tractatus. Many interpreters of Wittgenstein neglect this aspect of his work altogether. Brockhaus’s account shows how Wittgenstein can explain laws in science (e.g., Newton’s law of universal gravitation); this exercise guides us in seeing how radical Wittgenstein’s theories are, and also how naturalistically plausible they are!
The last three chapters in the book are about Wittgenstein’s views on intentional attitudes; the lack of distinction between realism, idealism, solipsism; and the metaphysical self. All the preceding chapters seem to culminate in the last two, which deal with the infamous premises in the Tractatus that gain Wittgenstein the reputation as mystical or unhinged. Brockhaus shows that Wittgenstein’s views on solipsism and the soul are consistent with any commonsense, naturalistic stance. He also shows that these views are foundational to his overall philosophy of language. The metaphysical self, or soul, is the original source of all value, and thus the possibility of aesthetics and ethics. We must distinguish this self from the empirical self, which is studied by the sciences as is often confused as the origin of intentionality and value. The metaphysical self and ethics are as “unsayable” as logic and the logical forms of propositions. The metaphysical self is also necessary for basic intentionality, which allows “names” to latch onto “objects”; this in turn lets propositions have sense.
This is one of those rare books that leave you bewildered and aware that what you've just learned can transform your relationship to thinking. I can't wait to read the Tractatus itself again, now equipped with Brockhaus's explanations. One form of this bewilderment springs from the distinction between saying/showing. I think it is a radically new and powerful response to a problem in Kant's first Critique, to which philosophers including Schopenhauer responded. This problem is that while Kant argues that all possible thought and experienced is necessarily constrained by a priori structures (transcendental conditions), he also posits the particular transcendental conditions he identified (e.g., the categories; space and time) as absolute and unconditioned. But according to his theory, these conditions he identified should depend on, or be constrained by, further a priori conditions. Schopenhauer responded by positing further a priori conditions. Wittgenstein takes a wholly other route. He argues that we simply cannot speak about transcendental matters. Any possible thought we formulate about transcendental conditions is simply another token of thought, which is constrained by those conditions.
Hence, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."
...and, "My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it."
This is a lot to think about. This distinction between saying and showing can be applied to transcendental matters other than the logical structures of our thought. We also cannot speak about what the world might be in itself, apart from our observations or scientific theories. We cannot speak about the exact role of the brain, for example, in being part of our cognitive system. We cannot speak about how emotions "color" our experience; we can point to a bodily feeling, and say that it is an emotion. But that wouldn't be the true emotion at play. Since emotions underlay experiences and holistically transform their character, we cannot speak about them.
I strongly recommend this book for anyone interested in seriously understanding Wittgenstein. Although it is not a quick read (about 350 pages), it is so lucidly written that it is not burdensome and rather rewarding to read. I would say it is necessary to read this book, or one comparable to it, for anyone new to Wittgenstein who wishes to understand him. The Tractatus is too opaque for anyone unacquainted with him to access the profound conclusions and implications of this work; and reading any brief summary article about the Tractatus is too shallow to provide such access either.
December 31, 2024
I have written my master thesis on the Tractatus in the mid-1980s and knew the literature on the book fairly well at the time. I tried to stay in touch but for some reason I missed this book which appeared in 1991. And judging from the number of reviews here on Goodreads it is not very popular. Which is, to say it outright, a shame. Although there are some (quite obvious) mistakes it is the best work to on the Tractatus I know, both as an introduction to the main theses and as a contribution to the question what the book is really about.
Brockhaus argues that Wittgenstein held “an extremely rarefied version the Schopenhauerian view that there is an irreducible human world.” (p. 14) That Wittgenstein had read Schopenhauer in his youth was known but I had dismissed all claims that this had some real influence on his philosophy as a kind of wishful thinking. The influences of Frege and Russell were too obvious (and admitted by Wittgenstein) to make an influence by a thinker like Schopenhauer to be very likely.
On the other hand, I never took the parts of the book that talk about “das Mystische” very seriously and that included the claim that what solipsism means is quite right but cannot be talked about. To me it was clear that ethics must lie outside the world as there can be no Sachverhalt that would represent an ethical proposition. But what the talk of “my world” was supposed to mean or what he could possibly mean when he says that the world of the happy man is different from that of the unhappy I just was not interested in. To Brockhaus it is the essence of the book. And although I am not finally convinced that he is completely right he certainly convinced me of the impact Schopenhauer must have had on Wittgenstein, especially in view of the notebook entries from the 11th of June 1916.
That does not mean that he is not interested in the ontological part of the book or on the problems Wittgenstein inherited from Frege and Russell. On the contrary. There is a thorough discussion on the views of Russell and always with the question in the background what Wittgenstein adopted and where he chose a different route. For example it is clear that Wittgenstein took the pluralistic principle of Russell for granted – there must be facts independent from other facts, but he radicalised it, for him every elementary proposition must be independent of all others. Like Russell he thought that it must be possible to analyse sentences (but for logical reasons alone, whereas Russell always had epistemological reasons as well), he believed like Russell that the apparent form of a sentence could differ from its analysed true form. On the other hand he did not follow Russell with his theory of types. For Wittgenstein there was no hierarchy of (meta)languages. There was just what could be said and what can only be shown.
From Frege he adopted anti-psycholigism and the sense-reference distinction, although he came up with a unique way of guaranteeing that we can talk about things that do not exist.
There is also an excellent chapter on the influences of Mach and Hertz on the philosophy of Wittgenstein.
Where do I think Brockhaus is wrong? For one thing he says that Tatsachen are facts that have no other facts as constituents. (p. 139) In other words there are molecular facts consisting out of atomic facts. But Wittgenstein is quite clear about this. A Tatsache (fact) is the existence of atomic facts (Sachverhalt). Which is something quite different. (Molecular Sachverhalte would be Sachlagen - translated as Situations.) He also says that a false elementary proposition does not correspond to a “false fact”, but no fact at all. But there are negative facts in the terminology of Wittgenstein. And every elementary proposition must correspond to a possible fact. And “false fact” is not precise but better than no fact at all. But these are minor issues.
One of the mysteries of the Tractatus to me is the connection between name and object. I always thought that it was a kind of happy accident that whatever we say (on the elementary level) there is a unique reference to an object. Brockhaus thinks that there is a primitive intentional relation between them.
Well, maybe this comes out as the same thing as a happy accident.
“But there must be some connection between the self and the world. The knowing subject, the psycho-physical ego, is simultaneously non-simple and part of the world.” (p. 277)
And there is a puzzle.
If the will is the bearer of good and evil, as Wittgenstein says (in the Notebooks), how can it have influence of the world of facts? Brockhaus has a solution to this puzzle: “Athough the world – the world of facts – is independent of my will my will, my world is permeated by that will just as it is permeated by its other necessary condition, logic.” The bearer of good and evil is a metaphysical will.
I am not sure, if I really understand this. But I will think about it.
9/10
Brockhaus argues that Wittgenstein held “an extremely rarefied version the Schopenhauerian view that there is an irreducible human world.” (p. 14) That Wittgenstein had read Schopenhauer in his youth was known but I had dismissed all claims that this had some real influence on his philosophy as a kind of wishful thinking. The influences of Frege and Russell were too obvious (and admitted by Wittgenstein) to make an influence by a thinker like Schopenhauer to be very likely.
On the other hand, I never took the parts of the book that talk about “das Mystische” very seriously and that included the claim that what solipsism means is quite right but cannot be talked about. To me it was clear that ethics must lie outside the world as there can be no Sachverhalt that would represent an ethical proposition. But what the talk of “my world” was supposed to mean or what he could possibly mean when he says that the world of the happy man is different from that of the unhappy I just was not interested in. To Brockhaus it is the essence of the book. And although I am not finally convinced that he is completely right he certainly convinced me of the impact Schopenhauer must have had on Wittgenstein, especially in view of the notebook entries from the 11th of June 1916.
That does not mean that he is not interested in the ontological part of the book or on the problems Wittgenstein inherited from Frege and Russell. On the contrary. There is a thorough discussion on the views of Russell and always with the question in the background what Wittgenstein adopted and where he chose a different route. For example it is clear that Wittgenstein took the pluralistic principle of Russell for granted – there must be facts independent from other facts, but he radicalised it, for him every elementary proposition must be independent of all others. Like Russell he thought that it must be possible to analyse sentences (but for logical reasons alone, whereas Russell always had epistemological reasons as well), he believed like Russell that the apparent form of a sentence could differ from its analysed true form. On the other hand he did not follow Russell with his theory of types. For Wittgenstein there was no hierarchy of (meta)languages. There was just what could be said and what can only be shown.
From Frege he adopted anti-psycholigism and the sense-reference distinction, although he came up with a unique way of guaranteeing that we can talk about things that do not exist.
There is also an excellent chapter on the influences of Mach and Hertz on the philosophy of Wittgenstein.
Where do I think Brockhaus is wrong? For one thing he says that Tatsachen are facts that have no other facts as constituents. (p. 139) In other words there are molecular facts consisting out of atomic facts. But Wittgenstein is quite clear about this. A Tatsache (fact) is the existence of atomic facts (Sachverhalt). Which is something quite different. (Molecular Sachverhalte would be Sachlagen - translated as Situations.) He also says that a false elementary proposition does not correspond to a “false fact”, but no fact at all. But there are negative facts in the terminology of Wittgenstein. And every elementary proposition must correspond to a possible fact. And “false fact” is not precise but better than no fact at all. But these are minor issues.
One of the mysteries of the Tractatus to me is the connection between name and object. I always thought that it was a kind of happy accident that whatever we say (on the elementary level) there is a unique reference to an object. Brockhaus thinks that there is a primitive intentional relation between them.
Thus, although names are complete symbols in so far as they do not vanish under analysis, it is still true that only in the “context of a proposition does a name have a meaning”.
Since the intentional relation involves no interpretation, no recognition of common properties there's no risk of mistake, and then intending thus foolproof. If I use ‘A’ as a name for A, then it isthe name of A. (p. 173)
Well, maybe this comes out as the same thing as a happy accident.
“But there must be some connection between the self and the world. The knowing subject, the psycho-physical ego, is simultaneously non-simple and part of the world.” (p. 277)
And there is a puzzle.
The world is independent of my will, since there is no entailment between I will that ‘p’ and p, if p pictures some Sachverhalt. But […] will must have some connection with life, some impact on the world or else it could be pointless unimportant. (p. 308)
If the will is the bearer of good and evil, as Wittgenstein says (in the Notebooks), how can it have influence of the world of facts? Brockhaus has a solution to this puzzle: “Athough the world – the world of facts – is independent of my will my will, my world is permeated by that will just as it is permeated by its other necessary condition, logic.” The bearer of good and evil is a metaphysical will.
I am not sure, if I really understand this. But I will think about it.
9/10
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