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Preemptive Strike: The Secret Plan That Would Have Prevented The Attack on Pearl Harbor
285 pages The Lyons Press; First edition (2006) English
285 pages, Hardcover
First published June 1, 2006
17 people want to read
About the author
Alan Armstrong
56 books23 followersAlan Armstrong started volunteering in a friend's bookshop when he was eight. At 14, he was selling books at Brentano's. As an adult, every so often, he takes to the road in a VW bus named Zora to peddle used books. He is the editor of Forget Not Mee & My Garden, a collection of the letters of Peter Collinson, the 18th-century mercer and amateur botanist. He lives with his wife, Martha, a painter, in Massachusetts.
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
January 5, 2017
Surprisingly good for something that at first sight could have been written off as conspiracy theory fodder.
There are lacunae in the case presented that are inexplicable except that they would tend to undercut the thesis:
1. Marshall shot down the initial plan in December 1940 - surely that decision had to be supported by a War Dept staff study giving the reasons for infeasibility?
2. Stark (particularly, as Chief of Naval Operations) and Marshall on morning of 7 Dec failed to re-alert Pearl Harbour in a timely manner after receiving latest Purple decrypts - was that not covered in the Pearl hearings carried out subsequently?
3. MacArthur was 'unavailable' when subordinate requested to send Philippine B-17s to bomb Japanese, resulting in their destruction on the ground - was the reason not uncovered in subsequent investigation?
4. Chennault's credibility is oversold - he had a ridiculous plan in 1942/43 to bring Japan to its knees in 6 months if he could only get 150 bombers - ignoring logistics (1 ton of bombs dropped required 18 tons carried over the 'Hump' at a time when capacity was 2000 tons/month). Rightly opposed by Stillwell on the grounds that the Chinese could not defend the airfields from a resulting Japanese ground attack, as was subsequently shown in 1944, he went to Roosevelt undercutting the chain of command.
It is also lacking some context on the decision-making bureaucracy and personnel operative in D.C. at this time ( e.g. Admiral Towers is mentioned but not his role).
Annoyed by one thing: the attempt to use (patently false) allegations of Iraq involvement in 9/11 in concluding chapter's discussion of justification for retaliatory versus preventative strikes.
Otherwise, it is well written, fascinating and worthwhile for those interested in this time. Lots of interestingly bad afterlife for some of these characters (William Pawley, General Mow).
There are lacunae in the case presented that are inexplicable except that they would tend to undercut the thesis:
1. Marshall shot down the initial plan in December 1940 - surely that decision had to be supported by a War Dept staff study giving the reasons for infeasibility?
2. Stark (particularly, as Chief of Naval Operations) and Marshall on morning of 7 Dec failed to re-alert Pearl Harbour in a timely manner after receiving latest Purple decrypts - was that not covered in the Pearl hearings carried out subsequently?
3. MacArthur was 'unavailable' when subordinate requested to send Philippine B-17s to bomb Japanese, resulting in their destruction on the ground - was the reason not uncovered in subsequent investigation?
4. Chennault's credibility is oversold - he had a ridiculous plan in 1942/43 to bring Japan to its knees in 6 months if he could only get 150 bombers - ignoring logistics (1 ton of bombs dropped required 18 tons carried over the 'Hump' at a time when capacity was 2000 tons/month). Rightly opposed by Stillwell on the grounds that the Chinese could not defend the airfields from a resulting Japanese ground attack, as was subsequently shown in 1944, he went to Roosevelt undercutting the chain of command.
It is also lacking some context on the decision-making bureaucracy and personnel operative in D.C. at this time ( e.g. Admiral Towers is mentioned but not his role).
Annoyed by one thing: the attempt to use (patently false) allegations of Iraq involvement in 9/11 in concluding chapter's discussion of justification for retaliatory versus preventative strikes.
Otherwise, it is well written, fascinating and worthwhile for those interested in this time. Lots of interestingly bad afterlife for some of these characters (William Pawley, General Mow).
Displaying 1 of 1 review