Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven—who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team—pinpoints six essential principles of “spec ops” simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid “the best modern example of a successful spec op [which] should be considered textbook material for future missions.” His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by students of the military arts. Maps, photos.
Admiral William H. McRaven (U.S. Navy Retired) served with great distinction in the Navy. In his thirty-seven years as a Navy SEAL, he commanded at every level. As a Four-Star Admiral, his final assignment was as Commander of all U.S. Special Operations Forces. He is now Chancellor of the University of Texas System.
I've had the pleasure of meeting Adm McRaven on several occasions and have heard him speak,Knowing this I was not surprised in the least on what a great case study he has written here.Here is a man who has been there and done that so I respect his judgement on the 8 operations detailed.I won't get into details, pick up this book and make up your own mind,you won't be disappointed.
"Spec Ops--Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice" by William H. McRaven.
Quite often, books about special forces are heavily based on anecdote and action. They still explain and illuminate the tasks and missions of special forces, if the reader pays attention to the details and connects all the dots. William R. McRaven eschews that approach and makes the case for special forces in his book "Spec Ops", a book he penned while commander of Seal Team 3 in the 1990s.
By applying analysis to eight case studies, McRaven explains how special forces are used to achieve outsized results relative to their size. It always comes down to the smaller force beating out the larger one, but it takes speed, simplicity and "relative superiority"--the ability to maintain the initiative until mission completion.
McRaven relies on two conceptual graphics to explain how he takes the measure of each mission.
First, every special forces mission looks like an inverted pyramid resting on an narrow apex, top-heavy and easy to topple. At the bottom is planning, which requires simplicity. Preparation occupies the middle tier, relying on security (to keep the mission secret) and repetition (practice makes perfect). At the top are surprise, speed and purpose. The "friction" of war presses against the top-heavy side of the pyramid, as things going wrong threaten to upset the raid, which is reinforced by "moral factors"--the determination of the raiders to complete the mission.
Second, he also graphs the mission profile, ascending from a point of vulnerability (where detection by the enemy can kill the mission), up past a line of "relative superiority," where the raiders seize and hold the initiative. This line climbs sharply to the point where relative superiority can be achieved and maintained until mission completion. The longer the mission takes to reach relative superiority, McRaven marks as the "area of vulnerability". The larger it is, the greater the chance for mission failure.
McRaven applies his metric to take the measure of eight different missions: the German raid on Eben Emael, the Italian attack on the battleships Valiant and Queen Elizabeth, the british commando raid on St. Nazaire, the British midget sub attack on the battleship Tirpitz, the US Ranger raid on Cabanatuan, the US raid on Son Tay, and the Israeli raid on Entebbe.
In each instance, the raiding force rapidly gathered deep pre-raid intelligence on the target, spotted the weakpoints, then designed a plan to exploit those enemy weaknesses. Plans depended on swift and certain attack, and speed is of the essence. Raiders can only take what weapons they can carry, so if they do encounter heavier forces, their ability to fight with advantage will be negated.
The book is especially significant today, as Vice-Admiral McRaven now is in charge of Special Operations Command, whose Navy SEALs just recently took out Osama bin Laden. McRaven penned his analysis back in the 1990s, when he commanded SEAL Team 3. Yet the factors and "lessons learned" are clearly seen in the broad profile bin Laden raid: a simple plan with a simple goal, accomplished in five minutes and completed in less than an hour.
First of all, this book is part narrative and part instruction manual for professional soldiers and their civilian counterparts. Raven set out to develop a methodology for evaluating special operations missions with an eye towards teaching planners of future operations.
So, the narratives are interesting but the application of the methodology to each historical mission can be a bit dry and repetitive to the lay reader.
I was certainly aware of each chapter's mission although not to the level of detail in Raven's book (although there are book length treatments by others of each operation). So, the stories were interesting - for me, the midget submarine attack on the Tirpitz, the Italian undersea attack on Alexandria, and the Son Tay POW rescue raid in 1970 were the best but other readers could easily choose different stories as their favorites.
Curiously, Raven selected historical raids that were all successful in one or more ways (though not always 100% successful) to use as his examples for application to the spec ops methodology. Raven did not choose raids that were failures -- for which his methodology would be equally instructive to future spec ops planners (Desert One comes to mind, or the Russian storming of the Grozny school full of hostages is another).
So - if you are interested in specific raids, find the book length treatments of each one. If you are a military planner, this book will be helpful .
I knew nothing of this book or William H. McRaven. Earlier this year, I had been talking to a distant cousin who is on the faculty of the University of Michigan College of Medicine. I don't remember how the subject came up but my cousin asked me if I had heard of Bill McRaven. I said no. She told me I really should get a copy of this book and felt like I would enjoy reading it. I wondered why she thought to recommend it to me but I went ahead and ordered the book.
When the book arrived, I could see I was only somewhat familiar with only 2 or 3 of the special operation missions. Although it is very detailed in the analysis of each special mission, I think most people will find the preparation and execution of the very different missions very interesting.
A solid analysis and documentation of how-to-conduct special operations based on 8 casestudies. Perhaps an analysis of one failed operation like Desert One in 1980 would have additionally strengthened the argument
Overall an interesting depiction of what special operations should mean and why it is important. I am not completely sold on the theory promulgated by Adm. McRaven, nor do I believe that the 8 case studies were the best to demonstrate it. He makes a claim that his theory cuts across times and wars, so that it is broadly applicable to warfare in general. However, he includes 6 case studies from World War II, 1 from Vietnam, and 1 hostage rescue from the 70s. This does not appear to be a very broad collection of actions from a variety of time frames. I am not really sure what the biography of the leader of each raid is meant to convey. If the theory is more important that who the individual leader is, then a biography of the operational leader is irrelevant to the review of the operation. If the leader is essential because he has certain characteristics, then it would be more helpful to explain how those characteristics were essential. Either way, a history of the operational leaders' military resume did not seem at all relevant to the operational review. More notably, it does not appear the Adm. McRaven has internalized all of the lessons from his own study. One of the first questions he uses to critique each action is "Was the objective worth the risk?" However, his own actions as a leader in the special operations in the Middle East demonstrate that he has either failed to ask this question concerning his own operations, or that he refuses to make the answer known to policy makers. Plenty of ink has been spilled on the counter-productivity of drone strikes (especially "signature" strikes) and raids based on incomplete or inaccurate intelligence. Yet, it does not appear that Adm. McRaven has made much effort to control the collateral damage which has helped fuel the recruitment efforts of our enemies. If Adm. McRaven cannot or will not put the critical lens of his own theory into practice with regard to the operations he oversees, then why should any one assume that it is a valid and useful theory?
If You have studies Special Operations then this book will not likely bring you too much new information but it is worth a read. If you are a student of warfare and have little frame of reference for special ops in history, then I would suggest this book. There are certain principles of war and these principles can be used to advantage. Special Ops applies these certain principles in order to reduce what Clausewitz calls friction. The author explores and analyzes eight combat operations to determine the principles of special operations. I wont provide any spoilers but the author outlines six principles of Special Ops. Much of these are the same ones Clausewitz speaks to in his tome - On War.
I rated this book 2 stars, but to be honest I only read the first 100 pages and then the last chapter 'Conclusions'. In my opinion the writing is not great, and the content is not as focused as I would like in a book of this type. The author gives a great deal of detail in the first 3 cases which I read, but not all of that detail is useful or even interesting.
Perhaps I am the wrong reader for a book of this type, perhaps the intended audience is the group of people actively engaged in special operations or in service. I was a bit disappointed with this book...
I've been a fan of military stories since I was a kid, and this book is among the best I've ever read. Not only are each of the stories interesting, but McRaven's analysis is enlightening and instructive. One can clearly see the influence of these Principles in the Abbottabad raid where bin Laden was finally put down.
I enjoyed this summary and analysis of select special operations. My favorite chapter was the Israeli rescue of hostages in Operation Entebbe. Adm McRaven did some excellent research for the book. The analysis seemed a bit repetitive to me, but his point was to compare these operations with the same principles of special operations. Overall, I would recommend to any military history buff.
Never would I have thought that special operations forces (SOF) activities could be turned into a quasi-scientific work, and that such a work could be even remotely interesting. Admiral William H. McRaven, whose life has been dedicated to SOF service, and whose autobiography “Sea Stories: My Life in Special Operations” made a compulsive reading, again managed to put his storytelling prowess to the test, and yet again succeeded in delivering a book that flows and conveys a set of worthwhile messages. Even though the book was probably written with aspiring SOF commanders in mind, it can just as well be enjoyed by a non-military reader, whose interest in SOF is purely platonic.
The book dissects 8 mostly very well-known cases of SOF raids and tests a theory that achievement of relative superiority in these, but also more generally in all SOF raids, critical to them delivering on their stated objectives, is based on adherence to 6 key principles. The author analyses each raid against these 6 principles: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose; and demonstrates how their relative application increased, or decreased, the raid’s chances of success. In each case study a graph demonstrates the achievement of relative superiority on the axis of time.
Overall, a very interesting book, written with flair, and thus relatively easy to read. Clearly, however, who wrote it is just as important, if not much more important, than what was written. Having the analysis delivered by such a well-known SOF persona increases its credibility immensely.
Kokkuvõttes võib õelda, et sakslaste plaanid viidi paremini ellu kui brittide omad. Raamatus lahatakse kaheksat sündmust. Ükski nendest ei ole nö päris SF poolt täide viidud ülesanne. Küll aga on nad oma loomu poolest SF ülesanded. Eben Emael 1940 - sakslsed ründavad edukalt belglasi Alexandria sadama rünnak 1941 - itaallased uputavad edukalt brittide laevad, mehed langevad küll vangi Saint-Nazaire sadama rünnak brittide poolt 1942 - täielik kaos, hukub väga palju britte. Õnnestub siiski laevaremondi bassein sõja lõpuni kõlbmatuks teha Mussolini päästmine sakslaste poolt 1943 - taaskord eeskujulik ettevõtmine sakslaste poolt Tirpitz ründamine Norras brittide poolt 1943 - brittidel jälle suured kaotused ja Tirpitzi uputamine samuti ebaõnnestus. Ründajad võeti vangi. Cabanatuan pantvangide päästmine usakate poolt 1945 - perfektne sooritus ja ca 500 pantvangi japside käest päästetud Son Tay pantvangide päästmine usakate poolt 1970 - luureandmed valetasid ja pantvange objektil polnud Entebbe lennujaamas pantvangide vabastamine juutide poolt 1976 - edukas päästmine, küll aga mitmed pantvangid hukkusid juutide käe läbi. Palju Uganda sõdureid notiti maha ja juutide rünnaku juht lasti terroristi poolt maha.
I mean McRaven is no slouch when it comes to special forces and the like, but the book could have been a little less boring. Not that the content was bad (it wasn't), but I think that it should be a bit more exciting. But you know when you get to be an admiral you can write boring books like this. As said the book is chock full of analysis and whatnot, and it's very informative given the vignettes that are brought up, to WW2 actions to the "latest" being the raid on Entebbe by the Israelis. All go with the briefing on the mission, and then after that story is told, he analyses the situations with the same standards that he rates any of the vignettes. All are real life vignettes, to Son Tay to attacking German battleships at Saint Nazaire. I mean I read a book about Afghanistan that put me to sleep almost, but this admittedly was better. So while the book is kinda boring and not flashy like some other books about special forces, it is worth reading in your spare time, or you'd like a famous person putting out a decent book.
Admiral McRaven can speak with authority on special operations and not so special operations. His metric for analyzing the missions completed, he outlined in his case studies is very informative. It puts real information behind the questions of how and why did they do that? The logistics, planning, intelligence, timing, security and support of these missions cannot be understated. I was most impressed by the operations at sea which is hard to imagine the balls these guys had to brave the cold deep and execute their mission with odds stacked completely in favor of the enemy. He is a skilled writer, his commentary does not drag or become boring. He sticks to his analysis and does not go chasing rabbits. This is a very interesting read and a must read for those that think special operations is all about cool training and street credit. These brave men had something truly special and that was the intestinal fortitude to complete the mission no matter the cost to them.
Thoroughly researched and documented. This is an excellent series of case-studies of special operations from world war 2, vietnam and israeli hostage rescue. The author lays out 8 cases of well planned, practiced, and executed operations covering different venues of war and terrain. Through the different actions, he gives great analysis of the operations, how they came to be, the training and planning, the execution, then the analysis of the ops. We go through the ops with the personnel that planned and carried out the assaults.
More could have been done to show how the operations could have been better executed for better results. I would have liked to have seen the author's ability to take an a failed assault and shown how better planning / execution / decision making would have turned around a poor operation.
Publicado en 1996 "Spec Ops" fue la tesis doctoral del almirante McRaven, en la que analizó de una manera científica y detallada, ejemplos de éxito de operaciones realizadas por fuerzas especiales. La mayoría son casos de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y también hay de la Guerra de Vietnam (Son Tay), y de la operación de rescate de rehenes en Entebbe.
No es un libro emocional. McRaven narra de manera muy descriptiva y detallada, explicando el contexto de la operación, la razón de la misma, los principales protagonistas, etc. No busca emocionar al lector sino buscar un método para realizar una operación especial con éxito. Y vaya si funcionó. McRaven fue el arquitecto de la operación que eliminó a Bin Laden en Pakistán.
Un libro para aquell@s a l@s que les guste la historia militar y que no les importe que no haya un componente emocional en el libro.
Spec Ops is essentially an academic paper presented in a book format. Through 8 historical case studies, McRaven explores his theory of what makes modern special operations succeed. It is designed purely for the student of warfare as a discipline. A casual reader more interested in in-depth accounts of the historical events outlined would be better served with other books on the events in question that have more of a narrative focus. That said, McRaven achieves his stated goal of quantifying the factors that contribute to the success of special operations and he does so in an easy to follow and informative manner.
Lays out case studies on special operations missions from various spec ops communities and what made them fail or succeed. There are absolute gems of insight for military leaders to pull from in this book. Specifically for JMO’s, I think this book should be a must read for PME. However, it is a technical book that can very considered dry. It also contains some stream of consciousness which makes it less palatable, so it earns a 3 star review from me. But a 4 and 1/2 to 5 star if you’re a military officer who should be uniquely interested in small unit leadership and why special forces succeeds or fails.
Being a case study, it can be wordy and slow at times but the stories within tell of the bravery and ingenuity of Special Operations Forces through some of the world’s most famous modern battles. Against overwhelming odds, often using relatively untested concepts, these men were not always successful. Each battle provides vital insight into what makes a numerically inferior group of fighting men can accomplish.
Unlike his more recent books, this one does not intend to motivate or inspire the reader to become a better human being. This book is a theoretical “manual” for evaluating risk and for planning successful Spec Ops missions. It analyzes 8 missions spanning from WWII to Vietnam to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 70’s. This book does not read like a manual, it reads more like a history book—something I very much appreciated.
Excellent Analysis of Special Operations throughout history. Highly recommended!!!
An excellent analysis of what actually makes Special Forces so Special! Admiral McRaven has taken a deep dive into a series of notable Special Operations and analyzed what made them so successful or not. Any student of Warfare will be more than happy to include this book in their library. Highly recommended!!!!
Read as research for a writing project; this is one of the best military theory books I have read. I found myself reading it simply to enjoy the clarity of McRaven's writing and the history of the operations. I have no idea how it ranks as a book on its subject matter, but as a book in general it's phenomenal.
This is a series of case studies on special operations. It is an academic text whose main message is how speed and surprise contribute to success. For the general reader, the book's value is in its narratives of the missions depicted. Daring and close run things.
A little dry for the casual reader, but an excellent source for anyone wanting to study and understand what a special operation is, who conducts them, and what makes them so special.