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Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics
David Armstrong sets out his metaphysical system in a set of concise and lively chapters each dealing with one aspect of the world. He begins with the assumption that all that exists is the physical world of space-time. On this foundation he constructs a coherent metaphysical scheme that gives plausible answers to many of the great problems of metaphysics. He gives accounts of properties, relations, and particulars; laws of nature; modality; abstract objects such as numbers; and time and mind.
- GenresPhilosophyMetaphysics
138 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2010
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About the author
D.M. Armstrong
35 books13 followersDavid Malet Armstrong (born 8 July 1926), often D. M. Armstrong, is an Australian philosopher. He is well-known for his work on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, and for his defence of a factualist ontology, a functionalist theory of the mind, an externalist epistemology, and a necessitarian conception of the laws of nature. He was elected a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2008.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
November 30, 2010
As a non-professional interested in current analytic philosophy and metaphysics, this was a great book to read. Highly recommended!
September 5, 2022
This is a rich compact work.
Throughout the book he states his position, his reasons for it and a few alternative positions on the same topic.
Chapter 5, the longest chapter, is on laws of nature and requires a great deal of concentration. The chapter on states of affairs is also difficult.
He offers a theory of propositions in his chapter on truthmakers. He does not believe, like Frege, that there is a realm of prepositions. “I think that propositions are best understood as what appears after such phrases as “believes that“, “opposes that“, “entertains the thought that“, “doubts that“. There is something abstract about propositions but abstract in a more ordinary way than Quine’s “abstract objects“. I identify propositions as what is believed, what is supposed, entertained, doubted, etc. it is important to notice that propositions in this sense can include impossibilities. “
I like the use of limits. I do think his explanation of negative facts and absences is overly complicated and doesn’t work.
In his discussion of logic and mathematics he disagrees with Quine on the distinction between necessary and contingent truths. He agrees with Cantor that there are actual infinities in the world. I find that bizarre.
In the chapter on time, he disagrees with presentism and generally agrees with the growing block theory.
Of course, being a committed materialist, the mind poses a problem for Armstrong. He takes it up in the last chapter. He thinks he can partly explain away intentionality by linking perception to intentionality and then noticing the resemblance of intentionality to dispositions.
He does think that it is obvious that introspection developed because any acting system needs feedback.
In the end, he admits that he cannot refute the claims of quails and intentionality as an irreducible phenomenon.
And there the book ends. This a great refresher or introduction to the issues in contemporary metaphysics.
Throughout the book he states his position, his reasons for it and a few alternative positions on the same topic.
Chapter 5, the longest chapter, is on laws of nature and requires a great deal of concentration. The chapter on states of affairs is also difficult.
He offers a theory of propositions in his chapter on truthmakers. He does not believe, like Frege, that there is a realm of prepositions. “I think that propositions are best understood as what appears after such phrases as “believes that“, “opposes that“, “entertains the thought that“, “doubts that“. There is something abstract about propositions but abstract in a more ordinary way than Quine’s “abstract objects“. I identify propositions as what is believed, what is supposed, entertained, doubted, etc. it is important to notice that propositions in this sense can include impossibilities. “
I like the use of limits. I do think his explanation of negative facts and absences is overly complicated and doesn’t work.
In his discussion of logic and mathematics he disagrees with Quine on the distinction between necessary and contingent truths. He agrees with Cantor that there are actual infinities in the world. I find that bizarre.
In the chapter on time, he disagrees with presentism and generally agrees with the growing block theory.
Of course, being a committed materialist, the mind poses a problem for Armstrong. He takes it up in the last chapter. He thinks he can partly explain away intentionality by linking perception to intentionality and then noticing the resemblance of intentionality to dispositions.
He does think that it is obvious that introspection developed because any acting system needs feedback.
In the end, he admits that he cannot refute the claims of quails and intentionality as an irreducible phenomenon.
And there the book ends. This a great refresher or introduction to the issues in contemporary metaphysics.
September 17, 2013
This little book on Metaphysics was an absolute joy to read. D. M. Armstrong is without a doubt one of the most interesting philosophers. This book is, essentially, a simplified overview of the important claims of his metaphysical system. He begins by noting that he takes Naturalism as a basic assumption, and then proceeds to develop, as coherently as possible, a metaphysical system that is based upon this basic assumption. This is a enjoyable read that covers almost all of the basic subjects that are debated in contemporary metaphysics.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews