The closest we've ever come to the end of the world ""DEFCON-2 is the best single volume on the Cuban Missile Crisis published and is an important contribution to the history of the Cold War. Beyond the military and political facts of the crisis, Polmar and Gresham sketch the personalities that created and coped with the crisis. They also show us how close we came to the edge without becoming sensationalistic."" —Larry Bond, bestselling author of Dangerous Ground Spy-satellite and aerial-reconnaissance photos reveal that one of the United States's bitterest enemies may be acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the means to use them against the American homeland. Administration officials refuse to accept intelligence professionals' interpretation of these images and order an end to spy missions over the offending nation. More than a month later, after vicious infighting, the president orders the spy missions to resume. The new photos reveal an array of ballistic missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads and striking deep within U.S. territory. It appears that the missiles will be fully operational within one week. This is not a plot setup for a suspense novel; it is the true story of the most terrifying moment in the 45-year Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union: the Cuban Missile Crisis. DEFCON-2 tells this tale as it has never been told before—from both sides, with the help of hundreds of recently declassified U.S. and Soviet documents, as well as interviews with numerous former spies, military figures, and government officials who speak out here for the first time.
Norman Polmar is an author specializing in the naval, aviation, and intelligence areas. He has led major projects for the United States Department of Defense and the United States Navy, and foreign governments. His professional expertise has served three Secretaries of the U.S. Navy and two Chiefs of Naval Operations. He is credited with 50 published books, including nine previous editions of Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet and four editions of Guide to the Soviet Navy. Polmar writes a column for Proceedings and was editor of the United States and several other sections of the annual publications of Janes Fighting Ships. In 2019, the Naval Historical Foundation awarded Polmar the Commodore Dudley W. Knox Naval History Lifetime Achievement Award.
Mark Twain said "Sometimes truth is stranger than fiction". One such event is the Cuban Missile Crisis and this non-fiction book about that crisis just reads like Tom Clancy's fiction. A fantastic book to know the non political side of the Cuban Missile crisis. A very good overview of the sequence of events , key military players and machines from both sides. A must read along with JFK's "Thirteen Days" and "Memoir's of Nikita Khrushchev -by Sergei Khrushchev (His Son) to get the complete story (Both political and Military sides). My only problem with the book was repetitiveness of several passages all through the book.
Very interesting book covering the Cuban Missile crisis. Did not fully grasp the severity of the situation before reading this account of the events. I also was unaware of the following: that twice we were on the brink of a nuclear weapon exchange (had a lost U2, and a submarine hunting operation gone maybe too succesfully), that a U2 was shot down over Cuba, and that the Russians had placed nuclear capable bombers on the island in addition to missiles. So much new information was presented that the book was hard to put down. Lastly, there was a great review of nuclear weapon controls and nuclear weapon types (ie – tactical) during the early 1960s that was a bit shocking. Key excerpts are below:
- By the end of 1961, American defense leaders were openly announcing that the United States had nuclear supremacy over the Soviet Union…. Within the Soviet government by early 1962, there was a view that unless Khrushchev could find a way to get more Soviet nuclear weapons within range of the American homeland, there might be no future at all for their nation. - … the CIA began to keep an eye on any country showing signs of socialist or communist leanings. In the event of a such a turn, the CIA was prepared to support opposition elements that would overthrow the offending government or leaders. This had the benefit of also protecting Western business interests from nationalization or takeovers by governments unhappy with capitalist exploitation, real or perceived. - There was a day’s delay between the president’s speech and the establishment of the blockade to give the Soviet’s time to communicate with their ships. - McNamara felt it “extremely important” that the first intercept be of a ship carrying missiles or other offensive weapons: “It would be an unfortunate incident if we hailed a ship that refused to stop; we then disable it and found it didn’t have offensive weapons on it. That would be a poor way to start.” - One thing was true, however, the physical and mental strain of the around-the-clock nature of the crisis was beginning to show on various members of the president’s inner circle…. Like many others on both sides of the crisis, McNamara had taken to sleeping on a couch in his office, something sure to guarantee a poor night’s sleep. - Suddenly the deployment of the 4 Project 641/Foxtrots had become deadly serious, with a nuclear weapon assembled, armed, and loaded into a launch tube. All that stood between tense peace and a small nuclear war in the Carribean Sea was a rattled, exhausted, dehydrated, and desperate submarine captain. - In the heart of Moscow, its massive red walls jutting from the bank of the Moscow River stood the somber medieval citadel of Russian power, the Kremlin. Not a single building but an entire walled city…. this blend of advanced civilization and archaic barbarism. - General Pliyev reported on the morning of the 27th to Moscow that all 24 SS-4 launchers and their 36 missiles would be ready to launch against the United States within a few hours. - In 1962, SAC was one of a small group of commands that had a level of independent authority to adjust readiness levels. - In effect, this policy meant that if the United States were attacked with nuclear weapons, and the commander of SAC had made a good faith but unsuccessful effort to contact the president and been unable to reach him because of communications problems, the Commander-in-Chief of SAC was authorized to launch a full-scale retaliation upon the attacker. - One more crucial intelligence lesson can be learned from the 1962 Cuban crisis: technology is not the entire answer to the problem of timely and useful intelligence collection. People on the ground in Cuba gave the first indications that the United States had reasons to be concerned in the summer of 1962.
This book is a formidable history lesson, incorporating copious Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) along with a little nuclear command and control lesson thrown in for good measure. Had Gen Patton gotten his wish to conquer the soviets after WWII, the Cuban Missile Crisis would never have happened. C'est la guerre! Very well referenced and written, Defcon-2 is a fantastic book!
Authors Norman Polmar and John D Gresham take you back to one of the most volatile times in recent history. October 1962; the world on the edge of an abyss. The Cold War is going full tilt with no end in sight. Two mighty super powers, the US and the USSR, are locked in a deadly game of chess: the nuclear arms race. While the US is the clear leader with its huge stockpile of nuclear weapons, the USSR is running a distant second place and neither side is in the mood to back down. Now add a third player to the game, an expendable player at that, and the stage is set for a global confrontation that could end it all. That third player was Castro and his island nation of Cuba. Castro was still leery of the US since the Bay of Pigs fiasco and he was sure the US had plans to remove him from power--one way or another. Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, the USSR also felt threatened by its neighbors and, in particular, the presence of of US nuclear missiles so close to its own borders. Cuba, in search of a strong ally, somehow got together with the USSR and a deal was struck. Each side would get something of value: the USSR would get a foothold in the Western Hemisphere just 90 miles from US soil. Cuba, for its part would get Soviet arms and munitions, including long range nuclear missiles and the manpower from Russia to supply training and technical support. The "manpower" that Khrushchev would supply was, of course, the Soviet army and in one fell swoop he would have the means to keep the US in line. All these arrangements were carried out in Top Secret but it wasn't long till the US got wind of the plan. DEFCON-2 reads like a political spy thriller, it is a well written effort by two first rate authors. Not only does it cover the Cuban Missile Crisis but it goes into historical events that led up to 1962. Although Khrushchev and Kennedy came from vastly different backgrounds they had some things in common. Both men would do whatever is necessary to protect their countries from harm while, at the same time, increasing their political clout. How this crisis was resolved is known, in a general way, to most readers but the details make for fascinating reading. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the world history of the Atomic Age. In the end its the little things that make the difference: the timing of two letters from Khrushchev and how the fate of the world would "ride in the message bags of minimum-wage Western Union delivery boys" on bicycles. Last Ranger
As something of a dabbler in Cold War and nuclear war studies, I've read a number of books and seen a number of videos on nuclear strife between the USSR and the US. One of the most comprehensive recent books on the subject that most people know was Eric Schlosser's "Command and Control", a detailed and interesting book on nuclear security (and lack thereof) in the United States during the Cold War.
But while that book was more of a catalog of details, "DEFCON-2" gave a more real-world description of the psychology that went into fighting the Cold War, both in the Soviet Union and the US. Its scope is surprisingly large, too, ranging from specific details about the "offensive weapons" placed in Cuba by Khrushchev to recollections of the spies and journalists who were serving as a 'backchannel' contact between Kennedy and Khrushchev as both men and their governments labored intensely to simultaneously prevent and prepare for a massive worldwide thermonuclear holocaust.
I rate this book so highly because I don't think I've read or seen anything about the Cuban Missile Crisis that made me feel like I really was there as this book did. I feel that anyone who reads this will get a near-firsthand perspective of the terror of the 'thirteen days in October' and will not forget it.
If you like details about missiles, fighter jets, and other military equipment, the books is probably four stars. I skipped much of this detail and still found the book to be a thorough and frightening account of the Cuban Missile Crisis. I especially appreciated the information about Khrushchev and what he was facing in the USSR at the time of the crisis. Looking at the facts from a 40 year perspective, there is much that we, as US citizens, did not know about the USSR and the status of the arms race in 1962. We certainly knew that we were close to WWIII, but we did not know just how close. A very sobering read.
Interesting to read this somewhat sensational view and compare it with Russian accounts that claim that nuclear war was not nearly as imminent as the Americans thought it was. Like many aspects of the Cold War, a case of poor communication.
One of my favourite lines from the book:
While Kennedy is in session with his advisors (EXCOMM) discussing the implications of Soviet nuclear warheads in Cuba, 90 miles off the Florida coast, he exclaims "How can they do that, it would be like if we had nukes in Turkey!", General Taylor replies "Sir, we do have nukes in Turkey"
Extremely informational and thorough book covering all aspects of the Cuban Missile Crisis in detail. Definitely dry but excellent for academic purposes