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Philosophy and Social Hope
Richard Rorty is one of the most provocative figures in recent philosophical, literary and cultural debate. This collection brings together those of his writings aimed at a wider audience, many published in book form for the first time. In these eloquent essays, articles and lectures, Rorty gives a stimulating summary of his central philosophical beliefs and how they relate to his political hopes; he also offers some challenging insights into contemporary America, justice, education and love.
288 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1999
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About the author
Richard Rorty
66 books415 followersRichard Rorty (1931–2007) developed a distinctive and controversial brand of pragmatism that expressed itself along two main axes. One is negative—a critical diagnosis of what Rorty takes to be defining projects of modern philosophy. The other is positive—an attempt to show what intellectual culture might look like, once we free ourselves from the governing metaphors of mind and knowledge in which the traditional problems of epistemology and metaphysics (and indeed, in Rorty's view, the self-conception of modern philosophy) are rooted. The centerpiece of Rorty's critique is the provocative account offered in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979, hereafter PMN). In this book, and in the closely related essays collected in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982, hereafter CP), Rorty's principal target is the philosophical idea of knowledge as representation, as a mental mirroring of a mind-external world. Providing a contrasting image of philosophy, Rorty has sought to integrate and apply the milestone achievements of Dewey, Hegel and Darwin in a pragmatist synthesis of historicism and naturalism. Characterizations and illustrations of a post-epistemological intellectual culture, present in both PMN (part III) and CP (xxxvii-xliv), are more richly developed in later works, such as Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989, hereafter CIS), in the popular essays and articles collected in Philosophy and Social Hope (1999), and in the four volumes of philosophical papers, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991, hereafter ORT); Essays on Heidegger and Others (1991, hereafter EHO); Truth and Progress (1998, hereafter TP); and Philosophy as Cultural Politics (2007, hereafter PCP). In these writings, ranging over an unusually wide intellectual territory, Rorty offers a highly integrated, multifaceted view of thought, culture, and politics, a view that has made him one of the most widely discussed philosophers in our time.
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August 23, 2022I guess I picked this book up wanting to dip my toes into analytic philosophy – a school of philosophy to which literary scholars (as well as the broader field of humanities) seems to have turned their backs, in favour of the so-called "continental" approach. Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida are all familiar names for us literature students, as we often apply their theories in our study of literary texts, whereas the work of pragmatists is very seldom (if ever!) included in literary studies curricula, or even deemed useful to literary criticism.
So what I've been asking myself is whether there can really be no reconciliation between the two approaches. Is the analytic tradition in philosophy actually incompatible with the (academic) study of literature? Well, Rorty is considered one of those philosophers who have actively tried to bridge the analytic-continental divide, turning to continental authors for inspiration while writing within the analytic tradition, and this book is a great introduction to his central philosophical beliefs. However, I'll admit I was expecting this book to also be centered around about possible applications of pragmatism and its political transformative power, but this was the case only for a few of its chapters.
“We pragmatists cannot make sense of the idea that we should pursue truth for its own sake. We cannot regard truth as a goal of inquiry. The purpose of inquiry is to achieve agreement among human beings about what to do, to bring about consensus on the ends to be achieved and the means to be used to achieve those ends. Inquiry that does not achieve coordination of behaviour is not inquiry but simply wordplay. To argue for a certain theory about the microstructure of material bodies, or about the proper balance of powers between branches of government, is to argue about what we should do: how we should use the tools at our disposal in order to make technological, or political, progress. So, for pragmatists there is no sharp break between natural science and social science, nor between social science and politics, nor between politics, philosophy and literature. All areas of culture are parts of the same endeavour to make life better. There is no deep split between theory and practice, because on a pragmatist view all so-called ‘theory’ which is not wordplay is always already practice.”
So what I've been asking myself is whether there can really be no reconciliation between the two approaches. Is the analytic tradition in philosophy actually incompatible with the (academic) study of literature? Well, Rorty is considered one of those philosophers who have actively tried to bridge the analytic-continental divide, turning to continental authors for inspiration while writing within the analytic tradition, and this book is a great introduction to his central philosophical beliefs. However, I'll admit I was expecting this book to also be centered around about possible applications of pragmatism and its political transformative power, but this was the case only for a few of its chapters.
“We pragmatists cannot make sense of the idea that we should pursue truth for its own sake. We cannot regard truth as a goal of inquiry. The purpose of inquiry is to achieve agreement among human beings about what to do, to bring about consensus on the ends to be achieved and the means to be used to achieve those ends. Inquiry that does not achieve coordination of behaviour is not inquiry but simply wordplay. To argue for a certain theory about the microstructure of material bodies, or about the proper balance of powers between branches of government, is to argue about what we should do: how we should use the tools at our disposal in order to make technological, or political, progress. So, for pragmatists there is no sharp break between natural science and social science, nor between social science and politics, nor between politics, philosophy and literature. All areas of culture are parts of the same endeavour to make life better. There is no deep split between theory and practice, because on a pragmatist view all so-called ‘theory’ which is not wordplay is always already practice.”
April 22, 2021
I am not sure if it is Rorty or me who has matured but I got even more from this book than I took from his major works. The "relativistic" way he views the world is probably terrifying to many but absolutely inspiring to me. He is just too good at playing this game, at understanding what his views entail and at pre-emptively incorporating potential criticisms to his philosophy as features. His trick is to say that even the more obvious admissions are actually just presuppositions and if someone disagrees with them, there is almost always no neutral ground that they can be resolved, so each side can only beg the question. The question then becomes which option is the more useful one for our ends. And while epistemologically we can always play this game, when it comes to the way we should form our societies we can always appeal to human happiness.
I think that a good starting point for understanding him is the question of whether our beliefs represent the world or are caused by the world and used as a tool for coping with it. Rorty chooses the latter and following Davidson, he sees our beliefs always close to reality because of the causal pressures that surround us but never able to provide us with certainty. We can never escape language; to make sense of every act, like picking a stone, is to form beliefs about it. We can never check a belief against the causal stimuli that formed it. This lack of certainty applies not just for what we used to call subjective, like colour, but also with the objective, like "hardness". Neither is more intrinsic than the other; there is no point of retaining the appearance - reality distinction. There are better and worse descriptions but not of how the world is but of what we want to do with the world. For example, science is better at controlling and predicting the world, religion is better at providing meaning and there is no clash between them. There is also no reason for reconciling those two beliefs. The ideal of a coherent worldview is just another inherited one without any epistemic superiority. Humans are great at compartmentalizing their beliefs and that's a good thing.
We are used to thinking that truth will somehow save us, that something outside of us like Nature or Reason or Truth will provide guidance but now we realize that we are alone and responsible for our own future. Our ideal should be imagination because it enables us to come up with new redescriptions that will provide agreement on what to do with our future. As Rorty writes he wants us to replace certainty for hope. We have no reassurance that liberalism is the best doctrine, neither that talking is better than using violence but we don't need to have it. The fact that it is impossible to discuss with a philosophically competent Nazi to prove to him that democracy is better (because there is no common ground and each side will beg the question) doesn't mean that we have no reason to get rid of those undesirable doctrines or cultures. As one can see, his views are a blend of pragmatism and utilitarianism. The goal is human happiness and the means are basically "whatever works". There is little interest on "what's there" unless it is useful for some specific purpose.
Our children in primary and secondary schools should learn to socialize and become familiar with our values once they are old enough, by reading the classics. This is to provide continuity between generations. And then they should learn to question those values, to see the historical background that made them appear and to see how we failed to live according to them so that they can start imagining how they can be improved and to come up with new solutions for self-creation. Professors should teach whatever inspired them. Rorty then, on the one hand places much value in a connection with tradition and even pride for one's country so that its goods and its bads are owned by its citizens but at the same time he hopes for a change, for a utopia. He even hopes for some kind of global agreement that will be able to regain economic control from the corporations. He wants us to see the struggle as one between the rich and the poor, the oligarchs and the starving. He even reminds us that the 40 hour week was achieved with great sacrifice and using violence, not by following the laws.
But what is the epistemic status of Rorty's words? He certainly can't claim that he is describing how things are. His formulation of reality is only one of many possible ones and most of the others don't have enough common ground between them to discuss without each begging the question of the other. Once again, it is not about how things are but how useful this or another description is. Rorty appeals foremost to the future, believing that this way of viewing things will allow us to be more responsible for the societies we form and increase solidarity. He also thinks that this re-description is easier to be reconciled with Darwinism. It's now too strange to think that humans have a difference in kind with animals. That all the other creatures cope with reality but we understand and describe it, that our language is more than a tool of coping with the world like all the others.
I think that a good starting point for understanding him is the question of whether our beliefs represent the world or are caused by the world and used as a tool for coping with it. Rorty chooses the latter and following Davidson, he sees our beliefs always close to reality because of the causal pressures that surround us but never able to provide us with certainty. We can never escape language; to make sense of every act, like picking a stone, is to form beliefs about it. We can never check a belief against the causal stimuli that formed it. This lack of certainty applies not just for what we used to call subjective, like colour, but also with the objective, like "hardness". Neither is more intrinsic than the other; there is no point of retaining the appearance - reality distinction. There are better and worse descriptions but not of how the world is but of what we want to do with the world. For example, science is better at controlling and predicting the world, religion is better at providing meaning and there is no clash between them. There is also no reason for reconciling those two beliefs. The ideal of a coherent worldview is just another inherited one without any epistemic superiority. Humans are great at compartmentalizing their beliefs and that's a good thing.
We are used to thinking that truth will somehow save us, that something outside of us like Nature or Reason or Truth will provide guidance but now we realize that we are alone and responsible for our own future. Our ideal should be imagination because it enables us to come up with new redescriptions that will provide agreement on what to do with our future. As Rorty writes he wants us to replace certainty for hope. We have no reassurance that liberalism is the best doctrine, neither that talking is better than using violence but we don't need to have it. The fact that it is impossible to discuss with a philosophically competent Nazi to prove to him that democracy is better (because there is no common ground and each side will beg the question) doesn't mean that we have no reason to get rid of those undesirable doctrines or cultures. As one can see, his views are a blend of pragmatism and utilitarianism. The goal is human happiness and the means are basically "whatever works". There is little interest on "what's there" unless it is useful for some specific purpose.
Our children in primary and secondary schools should learn to socialize and become familiar with our values once they are old enough, by reading the classics. This is to provide continuity between generations. And then they should learn to question those values, to see the historical background that made them appear and to see how we failed to live according to them so that they can start imagining how they can be improved and to come up with new solutions for self-creation. Professors should teach whatever inspired them. Rorty then, on the one hand places much value in a connection with tradition and even pride for one's country so that its goods and its bads are owned by its citizens but at the same time he hopes for a change, for a utopia. He even hopes for some kind of global agreement that will be able to regain economic control from the corporations. He wants us to see the struggle as one between the rich and the poor, the oligarchs and the starving. He even reminds us that the 40 hour week was achieved with great sacrifice and using violence, not by following the laws.
But what is the epistemic status of Rorty's words? He certainly can't claim that he is describing how things are. His formulation of reality is only one of many possible ones and most of the others don't have enough common ground between them to discuss without each begging the question of the other. Once again, it is not about how things are but how useful this or another description is. Rorty appeals foremost to the future, believing that this way of viewing things will allow us to be more responsible for the societies we form and increase solidarity. He also thinks that this re-description is easier to be reconciled with Darwinism. It's now too strange to think that humans have a difference in kind with animals. That all the other creatures cope with reality but we understand and describe it, that our language is more than a tool of coping with the world like all the others.
July 15, 2008
This is what I read when the malaise hits. Perks me back up every time.
July 9, 2020
I did not expect to be bowled over by this late essay collection any more than I expected it to be the best possible introduction to Rorty; so much is clear from the mustard yellow of the second hand paperback I left baking on a windowsill for months. But here I can confirm you do not need to have read The Big One, and this is probably better for an accessible and broader overview of everything Rorty cares about.
I like that the first thing this collection gives you is Rorty’s personal intellectual etiology narrative, which in philosophy is often a gem relegated to a surprise paragraph or two. I like how he appeals to my newfound coherentist prejudices. I like how syncretic Rorty is in engaging between the so termed analytic and continental traditions, including a surprise paper involving lit crit. He seems irrevocably touched by the analytic tradition however, which I also like. Part of that is evidenced in the startling clarity of his writing, which here translates into greater readability rather than doing so only as a way of showing your work. I like Rorty’s milquetoast liberalism which spins great yarns about hope and inclusion, while still for example coming down strongly about civil disobedience being far more emancipatory than the ballot, or of inequality being the issue of our time. I like how Rorty talks of Dewey, Kuhn, Davidson, Goodman, Habermas, and even Derrida among others in a way that makes me excited to read them rather than let them languish on my shelf.
Ultimately, though, what enthused me so much was seeing him working at the kind of project I like to see: that of using an epistemology as a base for an educational or personal growth ethic from which to launch a collaborative social philosophy. And the appealing thing about his pragmatism is it is built to come to terms with the kind of essentialism and abstraction a project like that is typically pockmarked by. I am not a convert, Rorty might be further up the garden path than I might be willing to follow, and there are likely better defenses of his stronger claims elsewhere. The thing that surprised me was just how much did work on me.
I like that the first thing this collection gives you is Rorty’s personal intellectual etiology narrative, which in philosophy is often a gem relegated to a surprise paragraph or two. I like how he appeals to my newfound coherentist prejudices. I like how syncretic Rorty is in engaging between the so termed analytic and continental traditions, including a surprise paper involving lit crit. He seems irrevocably touched by the analytic tradition however, which I also like. Part of that is evidenced in the startling clarity of his writing, which here translates into greater readability rather than doing so only as a way of showing your work. I like Rorty’s milquetoast liberalism which spins great yarns about hope and inclusion, while still for example coming down strongly about civil disobedience being far more emancipatory than the ballot, or of inequality being the issue of our time. I like how Rorty talks of Dewey, Kuhn, Davidson, Goodman, Habermas, and even Derrida among others in a way that makes me excited to read them rather than let them languish on my shelf.
Ultimately, though, what enthused me so much was seeing him working at the kind of project I like to see: that of using an epistemology as a base for an educational or personal growth ethic from which to launch a collaborative social philosophy. And the appealing thing about his pragmatism is it is built to come to terms with the kind of essentialism and abstraction a project like that is typically pockmarked by. I am not a convert, Rorty might be further up the garden path than I might be willing to follow, and there are likely better defenses of his stronger claims elsewhere. The thing that surprised me was just how much did work on me.
April 2, 2009
This book is a great introduction to Rorty. I've read one of his more technical books - 'Contingency, Irony and Solidarity' - and this one was much easier to get through. The structure of the book is a set of short vignettes that had been previously published plus one new piece at the very end. The articles have only a loose association with one another, so it's possible to jump around or just skip one altogether and not feel as if you're missing the point of the book.
To me, Rorty is an always surprising thinker who defies easy classification. He wholeheartedly believes in the liberal utopia, but brooks no talk of the "postmodern" and actually berates the academy for their lack of patriotism. He believes in the dream, but thinks it has been squandered by identify politics and endless deconstruction. I guess I enjoy his belief in America (and the world) to constantly re-invent itself. And I like that he follows that belief to it's logically conclusion - that truth is essentially invention.
He seems a sensible individual, and for better or worse, I'm sucker for sensible arguments.
To me, Rorty is an always surprising thinker who defies easy classification. He wholeheartedly believes in the liberal utopia, but brooks no talk of the "postmodern" and actually berates the academy for their lack of patriotism. He believes in the dream, but thinks it has been squandered by identify politics and endless deconstruction. I guess I enjoy his belief in America (and the world) to constantly re-invent itself. And I like that he follows that belief to it's logically conclusion - that truth is essentially invention.
He seems a sensible individual, and for better or worse, I'm sucker for sensible arguments.
September 1, 2020
Richard Rorty's Philosophy and Social Hope is a collection of essays that focus on an essential difference between his school of philosophy, pragmatism, and most other schools. Traditional philosophy has a strong tendency to advance by looking backward, marking progress by building on--or breaking with-- previous philosophical insights. In Western philosophy, this tendency generally leads back to Plato. Without overlooking traditional philosophical antecedents, pragmatism in Rorty's view defines its meaning by looking forward, to the future, not the past, to outcomes, not precedents.
Another primary feature of pragmatism is that it is not "system" oriented. It does not attempt to achieve an inclusive worldview, an explanation of everything. It is not ideological. It is open rather than closed. It is more an exercise in philosophical investigation than conclusion. Rorty emphasizes that pragmatism departs from the Platonic thesis that existence is an experience in dualism, i.e., the world in which we live and the world of the forms, or, in Christian terms, this world and God's world. Pragmatism eschews metaphysics. It does not reserve for itself a reference to something higher, deeper, more perfect, a north star of thought or belief.
Rorty's pragmatism is one of human beings settling on goals--however each human being may define that goal--and then exploring ways to achieve it. Christians and atheists, for example, could agree on the desirability of eliminating poverty. The question would be how to do that. So far, of course, no one has come up with an answer, and Christianity does have a handicap, asserting both that the poor will always be with us and maintaining that holiness (or wholeness) lies in heaven anyway.
Politically, Rorty was a social democrat. He strongly favored unions. But he also tended to believe that advancing projects of social importance does not also imply scorn for patriotism. Why? For the practical reason that pride in country can be a motivational and instrumental factor in achieving social progress. He argues that in overlooking the bloody battles that the union movement fought to achieve fair wages and worker protections--and it's true, union history has become a minor element in the national narrative--Americans overlook some of their greatest heroes.
By rejecting "essentialism," the notion that a higher truth lies out there somewhere...beyond our grasp or ken...pragmatism probably limits its reach in one essential way: it has no frame, neither a great beginning nor an ideal end. It is a philosophy without a story because it is open-ended. Things don't "turn out" one way or another. Pragmatism is a philosophy that is inherently social, not the work of one genius, rather the ongoing agenda of entire societies.
Another primary feature of pragmatism is that it is not "system" oriented. It does not attempt to achieve an inclusive worldview, an explanation of everything. It is not ideological. It is open rather than closed. It is more an exercise in philosophical investigation than conclusion. Rorty emphasizes that pragmatism departs from the Platonic thesis that existence is an experience in dualism, i.e., the world in which we live and the world of the forms, or, in Christian terms, this world and God's world. Pragmatism eschews metaphysics. It does not reserve for itself a reference to something higher, deeper, more perfect, a north star of thought or belief.
Rorty's pragmatism is one of human beings settling on goals--however each human being may define that goal--and then exploring ways to achieve it. Christians and atheists, for example, could agree on the desirability of eliminating poverty. The question would be how to do that. So far, of course, no one has come up with an answer, and Christianity does have a handicap, asserting both that the poor will always be with us and maintaining that holiness (or wholeness) lies in heaven anyway.
Politically, Rorty was a social democrat. He strongly favored unions. But he also tended to believe that advancing projects of social importance does not also imply scorn for patriotism. Why? For the practical reason that pride in country can be a motivational and instrumental factor in achieving social progress. He argues that in overlooking the bloody battles that the union movement fought to achieve fair wages and worker protections--and it's true, union history has become a minor element in the national narrative--Americans overlook some of their greatest heroes.
By rejecting "essentialism," the notion that a higher truth lies out there somewhere...beyond our grasp or ken...pragmatism probably limits its reach in one essential way: it has no frame, neither a great beginning nor an ideal end. It is a philosophy without a story because it is open-ended. Things don't "turn out" one way or another. Pragmatism is a philosophy that is inherently social, not the work of one genius, rather the ongoing agenda of entire societies.
October 2, 2007
wonderful wonderful insights, at the nexus of ethics and everything else-- theories of politics, social systems, cognition, human evolution, language. a lot of these are reworked versions of lectures, aimed at a general audience. i would give almost anything to have attended them.
we lost a great mind this year when richard rorty passed away. read this book. it's full of all sorts of ideas worth thinking and talking about.
we lost a great mind this year when richard rorty passed away. read this book. it's full of all sorts of ideas worth thinking and talking about.
July 12, 2009
For me,a general reading,this book is provocative thinking.I interesting in,Rorty's offering on new philosophy of Hope and relate with lit and cul.
I skim the book during last four years.
Various aspect I still can't understand him better.
This book require me to read it again.
so Sorrow for his life, I just know him on his last time.
Hope will come true .
I skim the book during last four years.
Various aspect I still can't understand him better.
This book require me to read it again.
so Sorrow for his life, I just know him on his last time.
Hope will come true .
April 13, 2024
Rorty's epistemology is intriguing but his politics are so goofy, just liberalism taken for granted. Not at all surprised he was raised Trotskyite lol
May 6, 2022
This is a Richard Rorty compliment sandwich.
I really enjoy Rorty's explanation of pragmatism. As far as I'm concerned, replacing the old Platonic distinctions (appearance-reality, subjective-objective etc.) with an understanding of beliefs as tools that help us meditate and use reality rather than representing it seems like a good way to break through the often fruitless debate about whether a belief is true or not. It then allows us to recenter the debate to the goal of beliefs, the usefulness of beliefs etc. I'm very interested in reading more of what Rorty has to say.
However, the essays that follow this quite brilliant explanation are very hit or miss, with one of the worst being On Heidegger's Nazism, in which Rorty explains that Martin Heidegger's philosophy is not in any way informed by his anti-sematic and authoritarian outlook. He does this by describing an alternate universe where Heidegger falls in love with a Jewish woman and is thus not a nazi, Rorty then declare that non of Heidegger's philosophy would be different in this alternate universe. Rorty also describes people criticizing Heidegger's philosophy by pointing to his nazism as "[claiming] that his Nazism was not just one facet of his thought, just as one of his various projects, but rather a vital clue to the underlying essence of his though... They think that there is an underlying reality beneath the diverse appearances, that he really was following a single star – a dark, evil star." This is just really weird to me because, from my admittedly limited knowledge of criticisms of Heidegger, the point of criticizing his nazism is not so much to identify "en evil essence" in order to discard all of his works, but rather to simply recognize that his biases inform his philosophical thought, the same way the Enlightenment thinkers' racism informed their works and T.S. Eliot's borderline fascist conservatism his. (Even assuming people are actually cancelling Heidegger by making up an evil essence, I don't see how writing weird AU Heidegger fanfics would change anyone's mind.)
Still, some essays in this book are really enjoyable, with Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility and Romance being my favourite. In this essay, Rorty argues for the possibility of science and religion's coexistence. Starting from his understanding of beliefs as a way of coping and using reality to achieve goals, Rorty contends that religion and science are compatible as they are working toward unrelated goals rather than warring to be the correct representation of reality. The problem only arises when either claims the monopoly of Truth, thus delegitimizing the other. This can be seen in religious fundamentalism, as well as the marginalization of any form of religious beliefs common in the new atheist discourse.
I really enjoy Rorty's explanation of pragmatism. As far as I'm concerned, replacing the old Platonic distinctions (appearance-reality, subjective-objective etc.) with an understanding of beliefs as tools that help us meditate and use reality rather than representing it seems like a good way to break through the often fruitless debate about whether a belief is true or not. It then allows us to recenter the debate to the goal of beliefs, the usefulness of beliefs etc. I'm very interested in reading more of what Rorty has to say.
However, the essays that follow this quite brilliant explanation are very hit or miss, with one of the worst being On Heidegger's Nazism, in which Rorty explains that Martin Heidegger's philosophy is not in any way informed by his anti-sematic and authoritarian outlook. He does this by describing an alternate universe where Heidegger falls in love with a Jewish woman and is thus not a nazi, Rorty then declare that non of Heidegger's philosophy would be different in this alternate universe. Rorty also describes people criticizing Heidegger's philosophy by pointing to his nazism as "[claiming] that his Nazism was not just one facet of his thought, just as one of his various projects, but rather a vital clue to the underlying essence of his though... They think that there is an underlying reality beneath the diverse appearances, that he really was following a single star – a dark, evil star." This is just really weird to me because, from my admittedly limited knowledge of criticisms of Heidegger, the point of criticizing his nazism is not so much to identify "en evil essence" in order to discard all of his works, but rather to simply recognize that his biases inform his philosophical thought, the same way the Enlightenment thinkers' racism informed their works and T.S. Eliot's borderline fascist conservatism his. (Even assuming people are actually cancelling Heidegger by making up an evil essence, I don't see how writing weird AU Heidegger fanfics would change anyone's mind.)
Still, some essays in this book are really enjoyable, with Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility and Romance being my favourite. In this essay, Rorty argues for the possibility of science and religion's coexistence. Starting from his understanding of beliefs as a way of coping and using reality to achieve goals, Rorty contends that religion and science are compatible as they are working toward unrelated goals rather than warring to be the correct representation of reality. The problem only arises when either claims the monopoly of Truth, thus delegitimizing the other. This can be seen in religious fundamentalism, as well as the marginalization of any form of religious beliefs common in the new atheist discourse.
March 13, 2011
In this series (early 1990s) of essays, Rorty outlines his alliance with the pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey. The first few essays outline the pragmatist theoretical viewpoint. This is the best part of the book. The later essays apply the pragmatist theory to specific issues. These are much less interesting.
Pragmatism's main task is to steer philosophy away from truth for truth's sake and move it toward solving real problems to benefit humankind. Both are laudable goals. In the first instance, Rorty is reacting to Plato and "quasi-divine" reason that has had a solid hold over much of our contemporary worldview. This has led to futile attempts to resolve philosophical disputes and to a true-believer need for absolute and eternal truth to validate doing good in the world. In the second instance, this emphasis on truth for truth's sake sidetracks us from the real task which is to promote a simple and open-ended agenda dedicated toward creating ourselves and toward a free and better future.
The pragmatist walk too easily away from truth. When truth is mere agreement rather than congruence with what constitutes objective reality (as much as this can be determined), pragmatism rightly encounters charges of relativism, a charge that Rorty is particular sensitive to. His concern about the futility of landing an agreement on metaphysical questions is understandable, but he does not stop there. When the emphasis of his pragmatist approach is "to make our beliefs cohere with one another, and to our fellow humans to make them cohere with theirs," philosophy ends up with such problems as equating thoughtless mob views with thoughtful voices, supporting public policy preferences that override higher-order minority rights, and making an equivalence between "intelligent design" and evolutionary theory.
The pragmatists tolerance here, however, gives way to some truth making of its own when it argues that we should promote the betterment of humankind. With a good amount of historical and biological evidence that suggests the contrary (e.g., might is right; biological competition for survival), it will take more than this feel good position to convince one to stand down one's interests out of deference to the interests of the other. Moreover, Hitler, the Pope, the Christian right, and numerous other belief systems have substantially different perspectives as to what constitutes the betterment of humankind. As Rorty acknowledges, in fairness, rational debate over ultimate truths can only take you so far in resolving differences, but the pragmatist approach that lacks any ultimate grounding or foundation ends up with a default position that simply seeks to have belief differences "cohere". That is the problem with this philosophy.
Rather than give up on truth, the pragmatist might look for it deeper within our biology where our need to be free requires that we respect the freedom of others. Respect for the self's interest is balanced against the respect for the interests of others. This is the only rule that works in a socially diverse context. This means that it is in one's self-interest to respect the interests of others. That respect is the requirement for order and order is the requirement for our own needs to be met. In this way, we've moved beyond mere assertion to do good vis-a-vis others and toward a self-interested basis for respecting others. This position is now credible because it is anchored in one's self interest.
In keeping true to his pragmatist philosophy, Rorty says that "there's no reason why a fascist could not be a pragmatist." That eye-opening statement is the problem with the pragmatist methodology that is void of ultimate value. A fascist cannot be compatible with our biological need for freedom as a he or she fascist would impose on the freedoms of others. To effectively resist such imposition means not to employ reason and argument about the betterment of humankind, but the willingness to use force to resist those who would impose their will on our own. This perspective is consistent with what Darwin and Darwinian experts have said all along, which is that evolution has both cooperative and competitive poles. We must not ignore the latter because we prefer the former. Rorty, however, does exactly that when he writes that "The reason to try persuasion rather than force, to do our best to come to terms with people whose convictions are archaic and ingenerate, is simply that using force, or mockery, or insult, is likely to decrease human happiness." While Rorty gratuitously links force with mockery and insult, the use of force to defend one's self-interest is a different species of action than mockery or insult. As our history shows, sometimes we have to actually fight for our (biological) Good and our need to be free.
Rorty's version of pragmatism has a good aim, but it lacks a strong and convincing theoretical underpinning.
Pragmatism's main task is to steer philosophy away from truth for truth's sake and move it toward solving real problems to benefit humankind. Both are laudable goals. In the first instance, Rorty is reacting to Plato and "quasi-divine" reason that has had a solid hold over much of our contemporary worldview. This has led to futile attempts to resolve philosophical disputes and to a true-believer need for absolute and eternal truth to validate doing good in the world. In the second instance, this emphasis on truth for truth's sake sidetracks us from the real task which is to promote a simple and open-ended agenda dedicated toward creating ourselves and toward a free and better future.
The pragmatist walk too easily away from truth. When truth is mere agreement rather than congruence with what constitutes objective reality (as much as this can be determined), pragmatism rightly encounters charges of relativism, a charge that Rorty is particular sensitive to. His concern about the futility of landing an agreement on metaphysical questions is understandable, but he does not stop there. When the emphasis of his pragmatist approach is "to make our beliefs cohere with one another, and to our fellow humans to make them cohere with theirs," philosophy ends up with such problems as equating thoughtless mob views with thoughtful voices, supporting public policy preferences that override higher-order minority rights, and making an equivalence between "intelligent design" and evolutionary theory.
The pragmatists tolerance here, however, gives way to some truth making of its own when it argues that we should promote the betterment of humankind. With a good amount of historical and biological evidence that suggests the contrary (e.g., might is right; biological competition for survival), it will take more than this feel good position to convince one to stand down one's interests out of deference to the interests of the other. Moreover, Hitler, the Pope, the Christian right, and numerous other belief systems have substantially different perspectives as to what constitutes the betterment of humankind. As Rorty acknowledges, in fairness, rational debate over ultimate truths can only take you so far in resolving differences, but the pragmatist approach that lacks any ultimate grounding or foundation ends up with a default position that simply seeks to have belief differences "cohere". That is the problem with this philosophy.
Rather than give up on truth, the pragmatist might look for it deeper within our biology where our need to be free requires that we respect the freedom of others. Respect for the self's interest is balanced against the respect for the interests of others. This is the only rule that works in a socially diverse context. This means that it is in one's self-interest to respect the interests of others. That respect is the requirement for order and order is the requirement for our own needs to be met. In this way, we've moved beyond mere assertion to do good vis-a-vis others and toward a self-interested basis for respecting others. This position is now credible because it is anchored in one's self interest.
In keeping true to his pragmatist philosophy, Rorty says that "there's no reason why a fascist could not be a pragmatist." That eye-opening statement is the problem with the pragmatist methodology that is void of ultimate value. A fascist cannot be compatible with our biological need for freedom as a he or she fascist would impose on the freedoms of others. To effectively resist such imposition means not to employ reason and argument about the betterment of humankind, but the willingness to use force to resist those who would impose their will on our own. This perspective is consistent with what Darwin and Darwinian experts have said all along, which is that evolution has both cooperative and competitive poles. We must not ignore the latter because we prefer the former. Rorty, however, does exactly that when he writes that "The reason to try persuasion rather than force, to do our best to come to terms with people whose convictions are archaic and ingenerate, is simply that using force, or mockery, or insult, is likely to decrease human happiness." While Rorty gratuitously links force with mockery and insult, the use of force to defend one's self-interest is a different species of action than mockery or insult. As our history shows, sometimes we have to actually fight for our (biological) Good and our need to be free.
Rorty's version of pragmatism has a good aim, but it lacks a strong and convincing theoretical underpinning.
March 21, 2021
Rorty, clear as ever, with some hidden gems that should be required reading for any philosophy/literature student.
I especially liked his essay on Kuhn, which in turn was a great critique of analytic philosophy's supposed "clarity, rigour, and logical reasoning".
I especially liked his essay on Kuhn, which in turn was a great critique of analytic philosophy's supposed "clarity, rigour, and logical reasoning".
October 30, 2025
There's at least one idea from this which I think will stay with me the rest of my life. And that's that we, as a society, should not "bow down" to anything non-human. This can, most obviously, be applied to an almighty god. But it can also be applied to a Truth that is Out There to Find. Pragmatists like Rorty reject truth as some sort of correspondence with reality, and instead argue that the truth is what is useful. The term "useful", then, brings us back to thinking about what improves the lives of other humans. Religion and science can both be useful (probably one more than the other though).
In some of the later essays of the book it's clear that this guy would have been a huge Bernie bro if he'd lived to see 2016.
In some of the later essays of the book it's clear that this guy would have been a huge Bernie bro if he'd lived to see 2016.
July 16, 2017
"As our presidents, political parties and legislators become ever more corrupt and frivolous, we turn to the judiciary as the only political institution for which we can still feel something like awe. This awe is not reverence for the Euclid-like immutability of Law. It is respect for the ability of decent men and women to sit down around tables, argue things out and arrive at a reasonable consensus."
"To say that one should replace knowledge by hope is to say much the same thing: that one should stop worrying about whether what one believes is well grounded and start worrying about whether one has been imaginative enough to think up interesting alternatives to one's present beliefs."
"My hunch is that the twentieth century will be seen by historians of philos0phy as the period in which a kind of neo-Leibnizian panrelationalism was developed in various different idioms --a panrelationism which restates Leibniz's point that each monad is nothing but all the other monads seen from a certain perspective, each substance nothing but its relations to all the other substances."
"Moral development in the individual, and moral progress in the human species as a whole, is a matter of re-marking human selves so as to enlarge the variety of the relationships which constitute those selves. The ideal limit of this process of enlargement is the self envisaged by Christian and Buddhist accounts of sainthood -- an ideal self to whom the hunger and suffering of any human being (and, perhaps, that of any other animal) is intensely painful. Should this progress ever be completed, the term 'morality' would drop out of the language. For there would no longer be any way, nor any need, to contrast doing what comes naturally with doing what is moral."
"The trouble with aiming at truth is that you would not know when you had reached it, even if you had in fact reached it. But you can aim at ever more justification, the assuagement of ever more doubt. Analogously, you cannot aim at 'doing what is right,' because you will never know whether you have hit the mark. Long after you are dead, better informed and more sophisticated people may judge your action to have been a tragic mistake, just as they may judge your scientific beliefs as intelligible only by reference to an obsolete paradigm. But you can aim at ever more sensitivity to pain, and ever greater satisfaction of ever more various needs. Pragmatists think that the idea of something nonhuman luring us human beings on should be replaced with the idea of getting more and more human beings into our community -- of taking the needs and interests and views of more and more diverse human beings into account."
"You cannot aim at being at the end of inquiry, in either physics or ethics. That would be like aiming at being at the end of biological evolution -- at being not merely the latest heir of all the ages but the creature in which all the ages were destined to culminate. Analogously, you cannot aim at moral perfection, but you can aim at taking more people's needs into account than you did previously."
"It might be objected that this phrase is inapplicable in Roe v Wade since women are included int he relevant community. I am not sure they are, both on Ely-like grounds of under-representation and on the vaguer but more powerful ground that (as banners at a pro-choice demonstration recently put it) 'if men got pregnant, they would have made abortion a sacrament.'"
"The notion of a species of animals gradually taking control of its own evolution by changing its environmental conditions leads Dewey to say, in good Darwinian language, that 'growth itself is the moral end' and that to 'protect, sustain and direct growth is the chief ideal of education.' Dewey's conservative critics denounced him for fuzziness, for not giving us a criterion of growth. But Dewey rightly saw that any such criterion would cut the future down to the size of the present. Asking for such a criterion is like asking a dinosaur to specify what would make for a good mammal or asking a fourth-century Athenian to propose forms of life for the citizens of twentieth-century industrial democracy."
"We should raise our children to find it intolerable that we who sit behind desks and punch keyboards are paid ten times as much as people who get their hands dirty cleaning our toilets, and a hundred times as much as those who fabricate our keyboards in the Third World. We should ensure that they worry about the fact that the countries which industrialized first have a hundred times the wealth of those which have not yet industrialized. Our children need to learn, early on, to see the inequalities between their own fortunes and those of other children as neither the Will of God nor the necessary price for economic efficiency, but as an evitable tragedy"
"Justice in other words is what the metaphysics of presence keeps trying and failing to identify with some set of institutions or principles. Such identification is impossible, because every institution or principle will produce new, unexpected injustices of its own. Ever imaginable utopia will need a social protest movement. Justice is a ghost that can never be laid."
"To say that one should replace knowledge by hope is to say much the same thing: that one should stop worrying about whether what one believes is well grounded and start worrying about whether one has been imaginative enough to think up interesting alternatives to one's present beliefs."
"My hunch is that the twentieth century will be seen by historians of philos0phy as the period in which a kind of neo-Leibnizian panrelationalism was developed in various different idioms --a panrelationism which restates Leibniz's point that each monad is nothing but all the other monads seen from a certain perspective, each substance nothing but its relations to all the other substances."
"Moral development in the individual, and moral progress in the human species as a whole, is a matter of re-marking human selves so as to enlarge the variety of the relationships which constitute those selves. The ideal limit of this process of enlargement is the self envisaged by Christian and Buddhist accounts of sainthood -- an ideal self to whom the hunger and suffering of any human being (and, perhaps, that of any other animal) is intensely painful. Should this progress ever be completed, the term 'morality' would drop out of the language. For there would no longer be any way, nor any need, to contrast doing what comes naturally with doing what is moral."
"The trouble with aiming at truth is that you would not know when you had reached it, even if you had in fact reached it. But you can aim at ever more justification, the assuagement of ever more doubt. Analogously, you cannot aim at 'doing what is right,' because you will never know whether you have hit the mark. Long after you are dead, better informed and more sophisticated people may judge your action to have been a tragic mistake, just as they may judge your scientific beliefs as intelligible only by reference to an obsolete paradigm. But you can aim at ever more sensitivity to pain, and ever greater satisfaction of ever more various needs. Pragmatists think that the idea of something nonhuman luring us human beings on should be replaced with the idea of getting more and more human beings into our community -- of taking the needs and interests and views of more and more diverse human beings into account."
"You cannot aim at being at the end of inquiry, in either physics or ethics. That would be like aiming at being at the end of biological evolution -- at being not merely the latest heir of all the ages but the creature in which all the ages were destined to culminate. Analogously, you cannot aim at moral perfection, but you can aim at taking more people's needs into account than you did previously."
"It might be objected that this phrase is inapplicable in Roe v Wade since women are included int he relevant community. I am not sure they are, both on Ely-like grounds of under-representation and on the vaguer but more powerful ground that (as banners at a pro-choice demonstration recently put it) 'if men got pregnant, they would have made abortion a sacrament.'"
"The notion of a species of animals gradually taking control of its own evolution by changing its environmental conditions leads Dewey to say, in good Darwinian language, that 'growth itself is the moral end' and that to 'protect, sustain and direct growth is the chief ideal of education.' Dewey's conservative critics denounced him for fuzziness, for not giving us a criterion of growth. But Dewey rightly saw that any such criterion would cut the future down to the size of the present. Asking for such a criterion is like asking a dinosaur to specify what would make for a good mammal or asking a fourth-century Athenian to propose forms of life for the citizens of twentieth-century industrial democracy."
"We should raise our children to find it intolerable that we who sit behind desks and punch keyboards are paid ten times as much as people who get their hands dirty cleaning our toilets, and a hundred times as much as those who fabricate our keyboards in the Third World. We should ensure that they worry about the fact that the countries which industrialized first have a hundred times the wealth of those which have not yet industrialized. Our children need to learn, early on, to see the inequalities between their own fortunes and those of other children as neither the Will of God nor the necessary price for economic efficiency, but as an evitable tragedy"
"Justice in other words is what the metaphysics of presence keeps trying and failing to identify with some set of institutions or principles. Such identification is impossible, because every institution or principle will produce new, unexpected injustices of its own. Ever imaginable utopia will need a social protest movement. Justice is a ghost that can never be laid."
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 23, 2017
This book has killed me then brought me back to life
September 3, 2023
This collection includes three general essays, previously unpublished in English, purporting to summarize Rorty's views on truth, metaphysics, and ethics. I started on the first of these, "Truth without Correspondence to Reality", and read the historical throat-clearing until I reached the sentence,
As I read Dewey, what he somewhat awkwardly called 'a new metaphysic of man's relation to nature', was a generalization of the moral of Darwinian biology. The only justification of a mutation, biological or cultural, is its contribution to the existence of a more complex and interesting species somewhere in the future. (p. 27).This is so ludicrous and obviously pretextual, but nevertheless pronounced with such an air of portentous authority, that Rorty has permanently forfeited the right to any further claim on my time or attention.
August 14, 2020
It was a somewhat difficult read considering I am not an academic and my knowledge of some of the referred writers is limited. Early in the reading I was inspired to set out to research and become informed about individuals raised and the historic implications of philosophy and its impact on social thinking. It was very worthwhile, perhaps one of the most worthwhile and deeply contemplated reads I have undertaken. Ultimately Rorty makes it clear, especially in the last few chapters that life is about “fraternity”. He illustrates how America has been torn apart by intellectual notions of individual and concepts of rights and ownership and how that has contributed to identity politics and conflict.
March 6, 2018
extrapolates some implications of his earlier philosophical work. of the three i've read so far, this had the most unconvincing sections. also his cold war trotskyism-cum-anticommunism is dated and weird, he doesn't seem to understand anything about the economy besides some loose JK Galbraith-era pop-institutionalism despite veblen, ayres and common being part and parcel of the pragmatist tradition. I would say that the first third of the book is fantastic, top flight rorty, middle third is okay, and last third tedious. come to think of it though, this might just be the product of him writing for a more pop audience here. anyway, still good. rorty is good imo.
February 12, 2018
Conflicted about this one. The philosophy in the first half is so compelling, but when he turns to politics in the second, he mostly becomes pretty boring. Does he really carry through on the task he sets himself as a pragmatist, to “worry[] about whether [he] has been imaginative enough to think up interesting alternatives to [his] present beliefs”?
June 21, 2020
A well-structured collection. A hard start in epistemology lays the foundation for treatments in turn of ethics, law, and politics. Pragmatism is presented here as a vision of pluralism, made possible by the development of an alternative to external authority. A tempting option, and the 1990s commentary on existing trends is well worth reviewing.
Read
November 16, 2021Probably Rorty's most thorough engagement with the philosophical implications of Darwinism. A restatement of many of his older ideas but with different foci. This serves as a good prelude to the more developed and ripe "Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism".
February 22, 2021
Clear and concise collection of essays on pragmatism.
September 27, 2021
Richard Rorty is one of the best American philosophers. His writing style is some of the best there is for philosophy and he is grounded in practical questions and hope.
November 25, 2022
A very accessible survey of Richard Rorty's thought. I'm excited to continue onto 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' and 'Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism'!
February 22, 2023
nice, but lacking some energy for change. while the emphasis on justice is important and approached pragmatically, how social democracy can be maintained and striven for remains a bit vague.
October 7, 2024
Inspiring. I recall tearing up at the last chapter of Russell’s ‘The problems of philosophy’. This book evinced that from me just as strongly if not stronger, and on quite a few of its ‘chapters’.
March 14, 2025
Would've been a 5/5 if not for the latter sections on politics.
Want to read
May 15, 2023The autobiographical essay is amazing. It was excellent at revealing the problems he wants to solve, why he wants to solve them, and what they mean to him. It is just technical enough to learn something real from it, but not too technical as to become a drag to read. He makes it clear how human inquiry is - this point is quite inspiring.
October 13, 2020
One of the few books Rorty (or any other philosopher) could even partly understand. But if still start with William James if you’re thinking of diving into pragmatism without a life vest.
November 30, 2023
Rorty's account of philosophy here was profoundly exciting to read, and I think his approach of Pragmatism here is almost unassailable. It just nulls out so many of the tricky problems in philosophy, gives it a place with the other disciplines, and accords much more with how persuasion actually functions in the real world.
There are complaints that he "misrepresents" Dewey, James, etc. by only borrowing the parts he likes—but that's literally his philosophical criterion for everything, to characterize things by how useful they are instead of some nebulous idea of representation! And as we see from his writing in this book, Rorty is very generous in spirit to each of these writers, examining their works as situated in their time and place and particulars and subject to the constraints thereof.
And that point, that you can't lift something out of its web of relations, ends up biting Rorty a bit here because I think his account of US history is wrong and unduly whiggish, sanding down American Exceptionalism down to just Emersonian hope and insisting on building his political program around it. He's writing here in the mid-90s, when you could still plausibly tell that account using the popular understanding of our history without bending things too much. But then the Bush years happened, bringing the War on Terror and all the ensuing invasions and sadism.
One would hope that if Rorty had survived until today, he would have a more plausible political account to give—one that doesn't prop up the same hopelessly-violent patriotism as pre-game flyovers and post-9/11 flag-fucking.
There are complaints that he "misrepresents" Dewey, James, etc. by only borrowing the parts he likes—but that's literally his philosophical criterion for everything, to characterize things by how useful they are instead of some nebulous idea of representation! And as we see from his writing in this book, Rorty is very generous in spirit to each of these writers, examining their works as situated in their time and place and particulars and subject to the constraints thereof.
And that point, that you can't lift something out of its web of relations, ends up biting Rorty a bit here because I think his account of US history is wrong and unduly whiggish, sanding down American Exceptionalism down to just Emersonian hope and insisting on building his political program around it. He's writing here in the mid-90s, when you could still plausibly tell that account using the popular understanding of our history without bending things too much. But then the Bush years happened, bringing the War on Terror and all the ensuing invasions and sadism.
One would hope that if Rorty had survived until today, he would have a more plausible political account to give—one that doesn't prop up the same hopelessly-violent patriotism as pre-game flyovers and post-9/11 flag-fucking.
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