Philosophical Papers, Volume 3: Truth and Progress

Philosophical Papers

by Richard Rorty

This eagerly awaited book complements two highly successful previously published volumes of Richard Rorty's philosophical Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, and Essays on Heidegger and Others. In this new, provocative collection, Rorty continues to defend a pragmatist view of truth and deny that truth is a goal of inquiry. In these dynamic essays, Rorty also engages with the work of many of today's most innovative thinkers including Robert Brandom, Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, Jacques Derrida, JÜrgen Habermas, John McDowell, Hilary Putnam, John Searle, and Charles Taylor. The collection also touches on problems in contemporary feminism raised by Annette Baier, Marilyn Frye, and Catherine MacKinnon, and considers issues connected with human rights and cultural differences. Challenging, stimulating and controversial, this book will appeal to thoughtful readers around the world. Richard Rorty was an undergraduate at the University of Chicago, completed his graduate work at Yale, and taught at Princeton from 1961 until 1982. His first ground-breaking book, an attack on traditional epistemology, was Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979). His previous books with Cambridge have been Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), a book that sold over 46,000 copies since publication and has been translated into seventeen different languages, and two volumes of philosophical Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, and Essays on Heidegger and Others. A recipient of a MacArthur Foundation grant, Rorty has lectured throughout the world. Also available Objectivity, Relativism and Philosophical Volume 1 0-521-35877-9 Paperback Essays on Heidegger and Philosophical Volume 2 0-521-35878-7 Paperback

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Essays

364 pages, Paperback

First published March 13, 1998

About the author

Richard Rorty (1931–2007) developed a distinctive and controversial brand of pragmatism that expressed itself along two main axes. One is negative—a critical diagnosis of what Rorty takes to be defining projects of modern philosophy. The other is positive—an attempt to show what intellectual culture might look like, once we free ourselves from the governing metaphors of mind and knowledge in which the traditional problems of epistemology and metaphysics (and indeed, in Rorty's view, the self-conception of modern philosophy) are rooted. The centerpiece of Rorty's critique is the provocative account offered in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979, hereafter PMN). In this book, and in the closely related essays collected in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982, hereafter CP), Rorty's principal target is the philosophical idea of knowledge as representation, as a mental mirroring of a mind-external world. Providing a contrasting image of philosophy, Rorty has sought to integrate and apply the milestone achievements of Dewey, Hegel and Darwin in a pragmatist synthesis of historicism and naturalism. Characterizations and illustrations of a post-epistemological intellectual culture, present in both PMN (part III) and CP (xxxvii-xliv), are more richly developed in later works, such as Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989, hereafter CIS), in the popular essays and articles collected in Philosophy and Social Hope (1999), and in the four volumes of philosophical papers, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991, hereafter ORT); Essays on Heidegger and Others (1991, hereafter EHO); Truth and Progress (1998, hereafter TP); and Philosophy as Cultural Politics (2007, hereafter PCP). In these writings, ranging over an unusually wide intellectual territory, Rorty offers a highly integrated, multifaceted view of thought, culture, and politics, a view that has made him one of the most widely discussed philosophers in our time.

Reviews

[m · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book consist of 17 essays, plus an Introduction — 156,000 words en toto, available here:

https://archive.org/details/truthprog...

The first third consist of narrowly focused in-depth analyses/rejoinders to his fellow professional philosophers' claims/criticisms of Rorty's oeuvre. Although I know nothing about academic philosophical disputes, I still enjoyed reading Rorty's précis of them, felt like I learned something from trying to follow the disputes—a testament to Rorty's skill as a writer who can entice/teach lay readers like myself.

The middle third of the book is also good, especially chapter 10, "Rationality & Cultural Difference" (1992, 7200 words).

I was surprised that Rorty was not far more critical of Catherine McKinnon's theses, the subject of chapter 11, "Feminism & Pragmatism" (1990, 13,700 words). I thought he'd be much more hostile to her work than he proved to be. You can read that essay here:

https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_reso...

To cut to the quick: my favorite chapters were: Introduction, 2, 4, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, and 17.

The most intriguing essay in this book is the last one, chapter 17, "Derrida and the Philosophical Tradition" (1998, 11,300 words), which I thought so good it now ranks among my Top-Ten Favorite Rorty Essays.

This is a very good book, one that I'll almost certainly reread because I think it offers argumentative ammo for shooting-down contemporary justifications for Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, Intersectionality, and so much else (DEI) that derives from or is sustained by the followers of Derrida's deconstruction.

It's also a pleasure to read this book, to hang out with Rorty's mind.

Once again I want to reiterate criticism I've previously aimed at Cambridge University Press for publishing Rorty's footnotes in a font size that requires one to use a magnifying glass. Unsurprisingly, there are also a dozen typos scattered throughout these essays.

[Krishna Avendaño · Rating 1 out of 5]

Qué filosofía miserable la de Rorty.

[Bry Willis · Rating 3 out of 5]

I was hospitalised and my home was destroyed. This was among the books lost. I enjoyed what I read, but I won't replace it.

[Blair Hodges · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book wasn't crafted for amateurs, so my three-star rating should be taken with that in mind. Rorty is a pragmatist and an atheist, although his atheism is not militant or simplistic. He doesn't spend any time drawing up a straw man of religion, the subject of God is quite peripheral to the collection as a whole. My favorite essay was "The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres." He talks about the stories we tell of the history of philosophy, and discusses the benefits and problems of each approach. Some of the other essays had me feeling like I stumbled into a complex conversation that had been going on long before I came to the scene, there wasn;t always enough background information for me to stay up with the discussion. In some cases I looked to outside sources, in other cases I just kept reading the essay until I felt I was following the conversation well enough again. Overall I think it was a profitable book to read.