Confession: I like this because it doesn't conform to the sterility that I assumed alot of philosophy on the whole has. I'm pretty sure that expectation did indeed come from taking the works of rationalist philosophers as, uh, the obvious.
(I may understand the murky origins of 'common sense', but that's not all there is to that assumption. I think it's also fair to note that the first few philosophy books I read were about mathematics, which um, can be a bit impassionate sometimes.)
I'm not claiming to fully understand everything Heidegger has talked about, or that I think everything he wrote that I understood was new to me, but really only that it was a breath of fresh air.
The work being fundamental, it's literally mostly about 'Being', I do understand it primarily more as a framework than much else. The changes brought by that, minus the metaphysical question you see first in many textbooks, are pretty subtle, which does well in reflecting the vocabulary he introduces (that even the author here wonders if he could sometimes give a rest).
Said metaphysical question? Why is there something other than nothing. When the author started an attempt to deal with this question, at first I was tempted to wonder if he would just give me a non-answer. Mostly because he started immediately talking about the experience of Being and how wondrous it is, and to be witness to it, and all. I realize soon enough though, despite the author doing more than hinting, that that's Heidegger's whole métier. I mean from what I comprehend, to Dubito ergo cogito, cogito ergo sum Heidegger's would just say mmm no, realizing you exist precedes that.
"Belief and knowledge are founded upon this primordial Being-in-the-world."
Or
"knowing presupposes dwelling" (referring to the, subtle I think, difference between the existence of Dasein (roughly the self) instead of existence of Being)
But sure, say you can understand the world does exist to you? Does it really exist though?
Here is where I thought it actually got interesting. The cartesian assumption here is that there's an inside and outside, that there is you and then there are others. The assumption that there could still be a 'you' (as you understand it) even if there weren't others, or anything else.
" 'World', in quotation marks, refers to "the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand" (93/64): stars, atoms, oceans and so on. Often enough, when we are theorizing, we think only in terms of the "world": we view reality as a collection of objects. We disregard the world, that is, our own involvement in a significant whole."
Referring to great extent to the social existence of humans, and how it quite literally is part of our 'world'.
Another point I liked was that even given your conventional understanding of subjectivity and objectivity, that is, analogously the difference between what is quantitative and what isn't. Objective qualities mean nothing without context; the context tends to just be the significance given to it, which you can't have without a Dasein. Consider that you won't do anything that doesn't hold some level of significance, which is to some extent already there. But aside from the significance your cultural or social contexts have already given, you can't really place values on meaningless objects. And so
"even the 'objective' features of things, their present-at-hand attributes, reveal themselves only within a larger, significant context that cannot itself be explained in terms of what is present-at-hand."
Every mention of Heidegger I've seen mentions the concept of technology, which is fucking brilliant personally, and probably why I picked him up, or uh, an intro to him. The concept feels thematically like how he does philosophy generally, though I wonder if I should even say this only having read an introduction and one or two other resources.
[I wrote the review halfway through, so I didn't know the author actually mentions that by the end anyways]
For example, his phenomenological approach to uh, seemingly most things, but say understanding Being, tries to find the essence of it by looking at it's functions, noting its obfuscation if understood more ontically, more or less scientifically. How you are mostly made aware of it's existence when it 'stops working well', analogously, discrete moments of anxiety through your life (which he apparently encourages to embrace, and you can see the rationale, though I would also add when you're sad lmao, and you start questioning, but the feeling isnt of angst, though it has similar results). And, this is a tad more far fetched, but internalizing the object's 'way of seeing' (how your behaviour changes in possession of the technology), for Being that would be referring to the paranoia in the state of anxiety that simply is not present when you're engaged in your life otherwise.
I'm a bit averse to using Heidegger's own terminology to talk about this stuff. Their awkwardness is an obstacle to actually contemplating all this. There are benefits to using them ofcourse, and I can imagine why he did when there were words he could've used instead, that is, commonly used words would invite commonly understood concepts making it entirely unlikely that the reader actually goes away with understanding the subtlety of his work. Another benefit includes, for people probably more curious than me, a desire to understand those words more deeply, leading to a better understanding of what he's talking about. For example, according to my favourite podcast host ever, Stephen West from Philosophize This says literally everyone he's ever talked to had a different understanding of what Heidegger meant by fallenness (or was it falling?). Which I presumed meant something akin to engagement or involvement, but I wouldn't be surprised if someone pointed out what a primitive understanding that is of the word because I started questioning it after a few more pages myself.
On that note, his poetic use of language was addressed, and I found it to be insightful, probably because I wondered why he doesn't say things more, well, concretely.
Essentially by wanting it to be concrete, I want it to be more succinct, less 'wordy' or 'flowery'. My preference shows how I think poetic language to be a derivative, rewordings of language more practical. Poetry as a function of prosaic language basically.
(Which is the norm, but I dont think is the case often. Consider how feelings you're well acquainted with tend to find certain wordy and metaphorical formulations much more in line with it than, say, "I'm sad". Or how certain more obscure feelings have their most faithful translation in similar formulations, but still seem to ring true if you were to use some umbrella term for them like "uncanny", which is definitely more practical)
Another assumption is that the point of language is to most efficiently convey information. Like how it's done best with, say, symbolic logic. And though there are certain assumptions about certain symbols and for other concepts you could philosophize to great extent (validity say), the idea is still to point to something unambiguously, to the extent that the symbol is exactly what it represents.
From what I understand, Heidegger apparently disliked both those assumptions. Instead of believing in a big T truth, he believed in the evolving interpretations of it due to differences in culture. Translations of experience to information will always have to be flexible to be worth using by people, which divides the line between artificial and dead languages from what we do usually use.
That's not to mention that understanding for a great part is owing to language itself. I'm not sure we can really do much in the way of controlling it to be more efficient without restricting expression to a great extent.
How you interact with the world changes by how you understand it, assuming you let yourself change your interactions. And your understanding is greatly affected by how you use language. Knowing how Heidegger thinks of truth as unconcealment, and so revelatory in nature, you realize language has the power to do just that.
"Language is the house of Being because language, as Saying, is the mode of Appropriation."
Pretty sure you can gauge how clear this book really was, if you consider I didn't even read this well in any capacity (maybe properly read 60%? Or less), and this was my primary source to understanding Heidegger. I basically skipped whatever I thought was obvious to me, or whatever bored me, or whenever the author started getting into Heidegger's history. Uhhhh not a good look on me I imagine.
I appreciate how conclusively this book ends, even though I only read what could've been fun:
"Is Heidegger's philosophy, in the final analysis, a success or a failure? - one wants to ask. But maybe the categories of this "final analysis" are always inadequate for understanding a philosopher. When it comes to philosophy, no analysis is final: every analysis of a philosophy is the continuation of that philosophy, an exploration of its ongoing possibilities. And if success means establishing an unassailable and total truth, then no philosopher has succeeded."