The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power

by Sean McMeekin

The modern Middle East was forged in the crucible of the First World War, but few know the full story of how war actually came to the region. As Sean McMeekin reveals in this startling reinterpretation of the war, it was neither the British nor the French but rather a small clique of Germans and Turks who thrust the Islamic world into the conflict for their own political, economic, and military ends.

"The Berlin-Baghdad Express" tells the fascinating story of how Germany exploited Ottoman pan-Islamism in order to destroy the British Empire, then the largest Islamic power in the world. Meanwhile the Young Turks harnessed themselves to German military might to avenge Turkey s hereditary enemy, Russia. Told from the perspective of the key decision-makers on the Turco-German side, many of the most consequential events of World War I Turkey s entry into the war, Gallipoli, the Armenian massacres, the Arab revolt, and the Russian Revolution are illuminated as never before.

Drawing on a wealth of new sources, McMeekin forces us to re-examine Western interference in the Middle East and its lamentable results. It is an epic tragicomedy of unintended consequences, as Turkish nationalists give Russia the war it desperately wants, jihad begets an Islamic insurrection in Mecca, German sabotage plots upend the Tsar delivering Turkey from Russia s yoke, and German Zionism midwifes the Balfour Declaration. All along, the story is interwoven with the drama surrounding German efforts to complete the Berlin to Baghdad railway, the weapon designed to win the war and assure German hegemony over the Middle East.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Middle East, Germany, World War I, World History, European History

461 pages, Hardcover

First published June 1, 2010

About the author

Sean McMeekin is an American historian, focused on European history of the early 20th century. His main research interests include modern German history, Russian history, communism, and the origins of the First and Second World Wars and the roles of Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

He has authored eight books, along with scholarly articles which have appeared in journals such as Contemporary European History, Common Knowledge, Current History, Historically Speaking, The World Today, and Communisme. He is currently Francis Flournoy Professor of European History and Culture at Bard College.

Reviews

[Kaydon_the_dino · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ever feel like most of the geo-political, social and scientific situations that arise today are a product of Germany just messing everything up constantly? Do you find yourself giving Angela Merkel the side eye whenever you see her on tv because yup are pretty sure the Germans are up to something nefarious? Do you not know very much about WWI because you are American and Texas ensures your history textbooks are full of nothing substantial? Is the only thing you know about the Ottoman Empire is that they put the final nail in the coffin that was Rome (RIP Byzantines)?

If any of those apply to you, you might find this book of interest. Sure, it begins and ends with a railroad but it's really about how Germany, prior to and during WWI, pretty much created what we think of as modern day Jihad.

Basically, Germany was jealous of everybody else's colonial empires and the fact that the current political climate wouldn't let them build a railroad to their Ottoman friends. A bunch of Germans thought, "hey, what if we just convinced all these Muslims to kill Russians, English and French Christians? Then we could build our railroad and laugh at the rest of England and Russia."
Sensible Germans: "uh, I'm not sure if you are aware of this, but lots of Germans and Austrians are Christian or Jewish. How will we stop this from blowing back onto us?"
Crazy Germans: "bro, that won't happen. Here, help me print some propaganda about how it is the duty of every Muslim to kill people we don't like."

Spoiler alert: this great uprising pretty much didn't happen and the ottomans and Germany lost WWI and the ottomans lost their empire. But, it does have significant long range effects both on the region and the world.

[Steven Z. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sean McMeekin is a historian who specializes in the diplomacy of World War I and has written an interesting survey of Turkish-German relations leading up to and during the "Great War." The author concentrates on the role and construction of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway project that was designed to allow Germany to penetrate the Middle East and present the British with a diplomatic and economic defeat in the region. The railway was to counter the importance of the Suez Canal and was to be an integral part of Germany's strategy to upset the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East. The book is well researched and documented and provides useful insights into German and Ottoman policies apart from the railyway itself, ie; Armenian massacre, Gallipoli. The important characters of the period, ie; Mustafa Kamal, Winston Churchill are discussed in detail resulting in a very satisfying read.

[David Canford · Rating 4 out of 5]

The title is misleading because not much of this book is about the proposed railway line but more about Turkey’s involvement in WW1. Nonetheless, it is interesting. I had no idea that Kaiser Wilhelm had the aim of starting a ‘jihad’ to undermine the British Empire which had a large Muslim population, particularly in countries such as India and Egypt. Turkey’s rulers presented their joining the war on Germany’s side to their population as a holy war to stop Christian nations threatening Islam, with the difficult to enforce proviso that the order to kill infidels didn’t apply to Germans and Austrians. The Kaiser hoped this would cause Muslims beyond the Ottoman Empire also to rise up and assist his war effort.
I question the author’s claim that Turkey’s entry into the war and the blocking of shipments to Russia via the Bosphorus led to the Russian Revolution.
The epilogue considers the Kaiser’s support for Zionism and how that ended and he turned to blaming the Jews for Germany’s defeat which became part of Germany’s post WW1 narrative.
A good read if you are interested in the Middle East or this period of history.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fascinating look at the Ottoman-German alliance during the war and their use of pan-Islamism as a strategy. They did this with their railway project, and by launching a propaganda campaign against the Muslims of Britain’s empire. Neither of these projects ended up working. The Berlin-Baghdad railway project was difficult to build and expensive to maintain. The jihad project also floundered.

In retrospect,Turkey’s entry into the war proved to be its undoing. While both the Allies and the Central Powers desperately sought to win Turkey to their side or at least keep it neutral, their fears and hopes were unfounded. Turkey was a third-rate power on the brink of collapse, with a mutinous army of ill-trained and poorly armed soldiers. Even before the war broke out, the fringes of the Ottoman empire were being gobbled up by the Italians and the Balkan states. The empire was all but finished by 1913, and its decision to enter the war sealed its doom.

Before entering the war, Turkey, however, ran rings around both sides. They cornered the Germans and extracted an unconditional guarantee of its borders. At the same time, they cynically attempted to get Russia to abandon the Caucasus. When they did enter the war, the Ottomans attempted to use the Sherifiate of Mecca to legitimize a “jihad” against the Allied powers. The puppet sultan did so, but his fatwa had only a limited effect. The Sherifiate also resented the Ottomans’ attempt to tighten control.

The entire holy war idea was cooked by the amateur archaeologist-turned secret agent Max von Oppenheim, head of the “Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient”. The Kaiser backed the idea, and the Turks played along not because they agreed with it in an ideological sense, but because it offered an opportunity to harness German power to Ottoman interests. Pan-Islamic strategies did little to aid the Ottoman war effort. As Gallipoli demonstrated, a better strategy would probably have been to hunker down and guard its borders than to waste its limited strength in far-flung jihadist adventurism. The concept was also based on a notion of Islamic solidarity behind the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph, which was pure fantasy. Jihadi propaganda did not count for much in the Islamic world.

The British, of course, were more successful, employing T.E. Lawrence to enlist Hussein in what was more a jihad than a nationalist revolt. Far from being loyal to the cause of an Islamic holy war, Arab irregulars on both sides attacked whoever they felt like.

Meanwhile, the Germans employed several colorful Lawrence-type adventurers to stir up revolt against Britain. Many of them were pretty ridiculous, attempting to portray themselves as a disinterested third party that was solely seeking to “liberate” all Muslims from British rule. The Arabs were too hostile to the Ottoman empire for the Germans’ plans to work.

[Tim · Rating 2 out of 5]

Using the narrative conceit of the Berlin-Baghdad railway, McMeekin constructs an entertaining narrative of the romance between German and Austro-Hungarian Orientalists in the years leading up to and during WWI. Of greatest interest are the passages dealing with some of the lesser known/more obscure characters and events involved in the Germanic "Drang nach Osten", such as Alois Musil (the Austrian counterpart of Lawrence of Arabia), Kaiser Wilhelm's emmissary to Kabul, Oskar von Niedermeyer, and the curious figure of Wilhelm Wassmuss who attempted to lead a tribal insurgency against the British in the mountains of southern Persia.

However the book was somewhat spoiled for me by the author's insistence on equating the pan-Islamic dream of restoring the Ottoman Caliphate to the later horrors of the Nazi holocaust and Al-Qaeda. McMeekin concludes by writing off the German and Austro-Hungarian Orientalists of the early 1900s as "self-hating" scions of the (in many cases Ashkenazi Jewish) bourgeois, simply because they chose to make common cause with Islam instead of their Christian and Jewish co-religionists. In this McMeekin reveals an unfortunate adaptation to the political climate of Islamophobia which currently prevails in the United States and much of Western Europe, and detracts from what otherwise appears to be a well-researched and engagingly written piece of scholarship.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power, by Sean McMeekin, is an interesting look at Turco-German relations prior to, and during, WWI. McMeekin examines the German's bid for world power in the Middle East, utilizing Jihadist propoganda against British, French and Russian Muslim-majority areas to try and insight revolt and revolution. Germany spread propoganda throughout the Ottoman Empire, and into British Egypt and the French Maghreb to try and stock revolution and pull troops away from the Western front to quell unrest in the colonies. Germany also sent daring, Lawrence of Arabia style explorers and advisors to regions as far flung as Afghanistan and Northern Iran, to try and insight local tribes to revolt against Russian and British hegemony in Iran, and British India.

McMeekin does start with the Berlin-Baghdad Express, an engineering feat that was to improve German logistics and supply lines into Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and improve Turco-German trade routes, while also flouting the British controlled Suez Canal. Germany recieved mineral exploration rights alongside the tracks as well, making them valuable pseudo-colonial tools to exploit resources from Ottoman territory. The German's competed heavily with French and Austro-British firms for the right to construct these railways, and Ottoman politicians shrewdly exploited the competition for monetary and concessionary benefits. The German railway was not only good for the Hohenzollerns. The Turkish government coveted a railway to improve supply lines to restive regions in Mesopitama, the Levant and Arabia, and negotiated lines into far flung regions of the Empire to try and improve Ottoman security in restive provinces.

As the world heated up during the July Crisis of 1914, and the world marched to war, diplomatically isolated Germany was desperate to bring the Ottoman Empire into the war. This was no mean feat, as the Young Turk revolution replaced the die hard Germanophile regime with one more tolerant of Entente interests. The Young Turk regime pushed hard and smart in negotiations, gaining two battleships, loads of marks, guns, ammo and definsive equipment, a guarentee of territory after the war (at the expense of Britain and Russia, and possibly Greece and Bulgaria, if they entered the war on the Entente side), among other concessions. Germany gave all desperatly. The Turks eventually entered the war on the Central Power's side. One of the key issues in the war was the inability of Austria-Hungary to conquer Serbia, and thus reconnect the Berlin-Baghdad railway. Supplies were disrupted until 1915/1916, when Bulgaria and a newly reorganized Austro-Hungarian army marched on Belgrade.

German advisors and adventurers also plied the desert's of Arabia and the steppes of Afghanistan and Iran to encourage Muslim's everywhere to join the war on the side of the Ottoman Emporer, then the Caliph of Islam. Success was partially achieved in Libya, where tribesman led by German officers attacked British Egypt from the East, and came within 150m of Alexandria, before being reulsed. German-led tribesman also harried supply lines in the Russian and British spheres of Iran, attempted to incide mutiny in India, and engaged in a war of gifts with Britain to win the favour of powerful Arabian tribes. Indiana Jones-like swashbucklers cut supply lines, hunted for ruins and relics, and ran guns to tribesman into the farthest corners of these areas. Although Germany eventually lost the war, of course, German influence in the region reached a peak in 1916, where Iran was in turmoil, British troops were tied down in Egypt and Iraq, and tribesman were eating away at Entente territory throughout the region.

Although not entirely on the Berlin-Baghdad express, McMeekin has once again written a fascinating and insightful look at a little explored area of the WWI conflict. Germany's bid for regioanl power in the Middle East centred on their Ottoman strategy, and McMeekin has written an account full of diplomatic and political detail, and excellent historical sourcing. The book is highly readable, although it suffers from some bias and a few statements and sourcing issues that bugged me slightly. However, these are minor, and did not detract greatly from my enjoyment of the book. This was an excellent read, and is easily recomended to those interested in WWI history, geo-politics, and the Middle East in general.

[Graham · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting look at an underconsidered aspect to World War I: Germany's plans to foment a "pan-Islamic jihad" against British, French, and Russian forces throughout the greater Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucuses. The attempt mostly turned into farce, with the various German agents discovered, failing, or otherwise undercut by the Young Turks in charge of the Sublime Porte. The narrative is framed by way of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, an attempt to build train lines as far as Baghdad in Mesopotamia and down to the Sinai (another spur, the Hejaz Railway, ran from Damascus to Medina). But the nascent Turco-German alliance was perpetually undercut by infighting between Germans and Turks (relating mostly to the one-sided costs incurred by Berlin), Turkish-Arab discord, and the failure to complete the railway, meaning that German plans to supply Ottoman forces attacking Suez and into British India via Persia and Afghanistan never came to fruition.

World War I in the Middle East typically focuses on Lawrence's exploits and the British expeditions in and around the Persian Gulf, but this was a fascinating look at some of the other belligerents involved. The late war collapse of the Imperial Russian armies invading Turkey from the Caucuses and the subsequent race for Baku and its oilfields was particularly novel, as too was the imminent collapse of any genuine feelings between Kaiser and Sultan (or Grand Vizier, truthfully). One can see some of the seeds of the current relationship between Berlin and Ankara today.

McMeekin's politics are somewhat in evidence given the source of the back blurbs - Christopher Hitchens, Max Hastings, the Wall Street Journal, and Niall Ferguson. While most of the book manages to avoid some of the likeliest pitfalls of such a worldview, the epilogue devolves a little bit into a meditation on the innate nature of German anti-semitism following the war, and the "Nazi-Muslim" connection (less conspiratorial than that title implies, and yet...). His depiction of the Bolshevik revolution, too, is more or less what you might expect, though he awards full credit to Trotsky where it is due. Otherwise, though, McMeekin's writing is fairly even-handed and treats most of the Arab, Turkish, Persian, and Muslim supporting cast with all due respect.

This is a fairly good starting point for understanding the origins of German grand strategy, the truly global nature of World War I, and the seeds of Weimar foreign policy.

[!Tæmbuŝu]

KOBOBOOKS

Reviewed by Literary Review

[Doubledf99.99 · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very good read on the German intentions in the Middle East during the Great War, and of the consequences. Has a number of good maps and foot notes.

[Murtaza · Rating 2 out of 5]

A narrative of a covert campaign by German Arabists and secret agents to build popular support in the Muslim world for their cause during WW1, using the Berlin-Baghdad Railway started by the Kaiser and the Ottomans as its jumping-off point. The book is mostly threaded together by the reports of the German officials who had been tasked with this seditious undertaking, while moving chronologically along from the Kaiser's famous visit to the Arab world through to the war and its immediate aftermath. There seems to be relatively little given here from the Turkish perspective, let alone from the Arabs who are depicted almost entirely as the object of other parties machinations.

McMeekin does a real service by surfacing many obscure, and undoubtedly arcane, reports for the purpose of this story. In doing so he manages to fill in some of the blanks of a largely forgotten history. But he also clearly strains to overplay the significance and scope of what he is documenting. He repeatedly asserts what an abysmally unsuccessful endeavor the "German jihad" was and how completely it failed to rouse the Arab Muslim world to the cause of the Central Powers and the Ottoman Caliphate. But at the same time he credits the German propaganda effort with arousing extremely potent jihadist sentiments, which not only led to widespread violence but even planted the seedbed, as he literally claims in the epilogue, for Muslim support of the Nazis and contemporary Islamic terrorism. McMeekin seems to suggest that German propaganda, disseminated to an Arab population that he consistently describes as both unmoved and illiterate, was apparently both useless and superhumanly effective at the same time. All the ills of the German war effort in the Near East are attributed to the failure of the jihad effort and the chimeric nature of pan-Islamic sentiment, yet at the same time pan-Islamic sentiment was somehow inflamed to an extent that has never since abated. Needless to say his claims are equal parts grandiose, confusing and poorly substantiated. It seems that he came to a sensational conclusion and then tried retrofit his historical work towards that after the fact. Given that effectively nil is documented here from the perspective of the subjects of the propaganda, you have to take McMeekin at his word about the bafflingly contradictory effects of German propaganda efforts.

Despite all this, the book has its high points. Among these are the amusingly bitter blow-by-blow recounting of the effect of the Bolshevik Revolution on the Russian war effort, the attempts by Central European spies to recruit Muslim muftis and political leaders (almost exclusively through financial incentives), and the richly documented follies and observations of those Germans and Austrians who played a vital part in this period. The book also happens to be written in an endearing high-Orientalist fashion which can be quite entertaining when you take it for what it is.

The general consensus about the German-Turkish jihad seems to be that it was a curious sideshow to World War I and was nearly irrelevant to 20th century history as a whole. McMeekin tries to argue otherwise, suggesting that it was in reality a deeply meaningful and consequential endeavor. This is a tough case to make, but he also does so in a manner that appears to be both ideologically-driven and quite a bit forced. While this book is certainly worthwhile to late-Ottoman enthusiasts, I would not say that it dramatically overturns the prevailing perspective on this era. It provides some interesting insight into the political hopes and perspectives of Central European Arabists, including Max von Oppenheim, Curt Prufer and Alois Musil, but it doesn't deliver on much of its promise beyond that. The strangely sardonic depiction of most of its subjects also seems to undercut the confidence of the work as a whole. And finally the book's concluding claim, that it provides a first glimpse of the phenomenon of modern Islamic terrorism, is laughably unbefitting the useful historical work that does obtain here.

[Dobiasz · Rating 5 out of 5]

Dawno temu na lekcjach historii uczyłem się, że jedną z przyczyn wybuchu pierwszej wojny światowej była budowa przez Niemców linii kolejowej do Bagdadu. Wówczas wydawało mi się to dosyć głupie — linia kolejowa gdzieś na peryferiach cywilizowanego świata miałaby być aż tak ważna? A jednak. Ekspres Berlin-Bagdad doskonale i obszernie wyjaśnia niemieckie nadzieje na wywołanie dżihadu — świętej wojny mającej skierować swoje ostrze w mocarstwa Ententy.

Ten front Wielkiej Wojny z reguły traktowany jest marginalnie, a jeżeli już to z brytyjsko-francuskiego punktu widzenia. McMeekin odwraca perspektywę i to jeden z mocniejszych punktów tej książki. Ale nie najmocniejszy. Jej największym chyba atutem jest aktualność. Bo w gruncie rzeczy jest to opowieść o naszym — europejczyków — kolonialnym stosunku do Bliskiego Wschodu. O tym jak sami wyhodowaliśmy islamski radykalizm, w swoim zadufaniu licząc, że będziemy umieli się nim posłużyć jako narzędziem dla własnych celów. O tym jak próbowaliśmy mieszać w tym tyglu narodów, religii i kultur, w gruncie rzeczy gówno z niego rozumiejąc. O tym, że Al Kaida, ISIS, Czeczenia, Syria, Irak i cała reszta odbijająca się nam czkawką do dzisiaj, to nasze własne dzieło sprzed ponad stu lat. I przede wszystkim o tym, że przez te sto lat z okładem niczego, ale to absolutnie niczego, się w tym temacie nie nauczyliśmy.

[Neill Goltz · Rating 3 out of 5]

Ultimately an awkward book. I really appreciated the detailed presentation of people and places of the many German agents' secret missions to stir up trouble for (primarily) the British in the Ottoman Empire during World War I across the Middle East. Am reading this as part of a geo-time-period package I have set for myself, to include in sequence:

The Great Game
The Sleepwalkers
Berlin-Baghdad Express
Lawrence in Arabia (since read after reveiw of BBE - a tremendous book)
Seven Pillars of Wisdom

The research is impressive, but ultimately there are stylistic elements in the writing - a certain sardonic casualness - that diminishes the seriousness of the scholarship. In some places it almost seems as if it was written for a college student on Summer Break.

More troubling is the Epilogue, which has the feel of having been written first, and then the balance of the book put together to get to the end. The pace of the last several chapters before the eplilogue quickens perceptibly, and almost takes on a "breathless quality" as the author strains to support the desired conclusion.

[Darren · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you thought that Western countries making a mess in the Middle East was a new thing, you may find this book interesting. More than 100 years ago, the German Kaiser Wilhelm II was sold on the idea of building a railway from Berlin to Baghdad with the aim of doing an end run around the British controlled Suez Canal. While there was some reasonably economic rationale behind this decision, it led to the Germans being embroiled in the politics of the declining Ottoman Empire, the 'sick man of Europe.'

Much of this well written, engaging book is devoted to the German's attempts to stir up the Muslim subjects of the British and French Empires against their colonial rulers. Sections on the Armenian Genocide, Zionism and the aftermath of the Russian Revolution all add to the interest and anyone with even just a passing interest in international affairs will see the echoes of German actions in both World Wars.

[Mark Mortensen · Rating 3 out of 5]

Author Sean McMeekin has performed extensive research and put forth a multitude of details this historical book complete with a 30 page index, however at times I found it hard to process all the information. The book is not as much about the Berlin-Baghdad railway as it is about Germany forming a coalition with Muslim Ottomans to fight on the Eastern Front against allied British and Russians.

[Brian · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Berlin-Baghdad Express tells the history of the Orient Express being built and how this transformed into a German bid to launch a pan Arab Jihad under the caphalite of the Ottoman empire in Constantinople. Spurned by a handful of German agents in world war I this group sought to bring about a global jihad from north Africa to Afghanistan. While mostly unsuccessful in their efforts they awakened the flames of nationalism that would come to haunt the British and French and they tried to digest these territories after the world war and created the specter of a threat for the British empire in India with the possible unification of Persia and Afghanistan. Ultimately the Germans would be no more successful at unifying Shia, Sunni, Wahabis and other Muslim sects into a cohesive force. The majority of the Muslim leaders did not believe they were engaging in Jihad but instead receiving a bribe to not attack the Axis powers. The idea that a selective Jihad could occur where only one set of Christians were attacked was not considered possible as Jihad. This book moves around a large stretch of the world and involves a great many players in what was the early stages of the great game and addresses many topics from the Armenian genocide by the Turks to the rebellions against the Raj in India. It is very well written but one that you have to take your time with to keep all the players straight and keep track of who is what and where and when. A great read for those interested in world war I, the middle east or great power diplomacy. Although the orient express is the impetuous for the book it does drop off sometimes not being mentioned for chapters at a time but provides a neat bit of history to layer in with the broader play in the Middle East.

[Rati Kobakhidze · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well-researched and deep-going book about Germany's intentions in the Middle East in the context of the First World War. Even though it is mostly the British and French who are blamed for the mess in the Middle East, this book demonstrates that Germany also played its role in this region in the First World War, and its policies were as misguided and superficial as British and French designs for the region. The book is well-written and easy to read, it is pretty detailed and would be interesting for anyone who wants to get more insights into the WW1 and Middle East.

[Bill · Rating 4 out of 5]

Most of what I knew on this subject derives from the movie “Lawrence of Arabia.”
Tyrns out that story was so peripheral to the critical history it only merits a couple of sentences in this book. Darkly comic is probably too glib as a way of describing this story, but I was surprised at how similar the misadventures of the USA in Iraq and Afghanistan were to the German experience in this theater of WW1. The author does a giod job of presenting the facts in context. This is not a military history, but it is fascinating.

[Havane · Rating 2 out of 5]

*2.5. Unfortunately this was not what I was looking for. There was a lot focus on certain things that I did not care for. The book was not good at explaining many of the backstories required to understand the main story and therefore for someone who does not already have a thorough understanding of the politics of both Europe and the middle east at the time, the book can be difficult to understand.

[Ramil Kazımov]

Bu kitabı dün okudum bitirdim.. Gerçi bir şeye vurgu yapmayı çok isterim, o da kitabın aslında Berlin-Bağdat demiryolu konusuna nazaran Osmanlı (Devleti-Aliyye) ve Cihat çağrısı veyahut Birinci Dünya Savaşı ve Osmanlı cephesi konularına ağırlık vermesidir.

Kitap Kayzer II Wilhelm ve maiyetininOsmanlı Devletine seyaheti ile başlıyor. Kayzer Doğu yaşamına hayran kalıyor, gerçi yazarın Kayzer konusunda verdiği bilgilere bakılırsa Kayzerin etkilenmemesi için hiçbir sebep yok, zira II Wilhelm doğuştan sakat olduğu için kendisini her daim kanıtlama ihtiyacı duyduğu yüzünden kendisini etkilemek isteyen II Abdülhamide karşı arkadaşlık hissetmesi kabuledilebilir. Kayzerin Doğuya seferi ve kendisini 300 milyon müslümanın arkadaşı ilan etmesi, doğudan oldukça etkilenmesi ve yaptığı iyiliklerden ve söylediği sözlerden dolayı kendisine "Hacı Wilhelm" lakabı takılması - tüm bunlar Almanların Dünya Harbinde Müslüman Cihadından yararlanması planlarının ilk kıvılcımları olarak görülebilir, zira Fransa, İngiltere ve Rusyanın sömürgelerinde yaşayan kalabalık müslüman nüfusu baz aldığımızda Almanlar müslüman cihadı ilanının kendileri için rakiplerini zora sokacak bir avantaj görürler. Müslüman cihat fikrinin banisi Oppenheim Kayzerle çok defa görüşür ve Doğu yaşamı ve kendi gözlemleri hakkında Kayzeri bolca bilgilendirir. Berlin-Bağdat demiryolu konusunda Fransa, İngiltere ve Almanya rekabetini anlatan kitap neden almanların bu konuda daha avantajlı olduğunu da çok güzel bir şekilde anlatır.

Ardından Birinci Cihan Harbi gelir ve Osmanlılar Alman ve Avusturya-Macaristan safında yer alarak (Osmanlı sultanı V Mehmet Reşat ağzından) cihat ilan eder. Tüm diğer tehlikeleri konu dışı sayarsak - ki bu tehlikeleri kitabı okurken daha iyi anlamak mümkün - cihat ilanı Osmanlı ve mütefikleri istisna diğer tüm "kafir" kavimlere karşı ilan edilmiştir. Kitabın araştırdığı konu o kadar hayret uyandırıcı ki burada yer alan açıklayıcı bilgileri sunacak başka bir kitap bilmiyorum ben. Sadece gelirsek, cihat ilanı arapların korkaklığı, siyasete meyli ve dağınıklığı yüzünden ters tepki verir. Yani, almanlar küçük bir yatırımla büyük bir avantaj kazanmak isterken aslında kalabalık yatırım yaparlar ve hiçbir şey elde edemezler. Osmanlı türkleri ve araplar arasında mesafe o kadar geniş ki halife cihat ilan eder ama Mekke emiri ingilizlerle ilişkilerini tehlikeye atmamak için sultan-halifeyi desteklemez. Aslında konu sadece ilişkiler değil, para da bu olaylarda oldukça rol oynar. İngilizler ise sahaya Lawrence-i sürer ve cihada karşı sözde "arap ulusalcılığını" uyandırmaya gayret ederler.

Uzun sözün kısası, bu kitap başka kitaplarda okuyup da öğrenemediğim bir çok konuya aydınlık getirmiş olmaktadır. Mesela okuduğum diğer kitaplar Hüseyin-McMahon yazışmalarına o kadar çok odaklanır ki cihat ilanı konusu perde arkasında kalır ve birkaç sözcükle ifade edilir. Bu kitap ise öğrenmek istediğim olayları geniş araştırma konusu yapmış ve öğretmiştir. Ha bu arada siyonizmin aslında "Made in Germany" olduğunu ve nasıl "Assembled in Britain" haline geldiğini de öğreneceksiniz. Kitap harika. Konu anlatımı harika. "Trash" değil gerçek bilgi edineceksiniz. Konuya ilgi duyan herkese tavsiye edebileceğim bir kitap.

[Martin Koenigsberg · Rating 4 out of 5]

In America and Europe, we tend to look at WWI through the lens of the Western Front, the trenches in France. In the Berlin Baghdad Express, Sean McMeekin, a History Professor at Bilkent University in Turkey sets out to explain the Turkish part of the global Struggle. If you have ever wondered why Imperial Germany tied herself to two of the Sick men of Europe, not just the Austro Hungarian Empire, but the Ottoman one as well- you might like this book. Likewise if you wonder what the "Young Turk" movement was. McMeekin tells the tale well. Using a palette of amazing and varied characters from all sides, as Germans and German agents try to raise a Jihad against the Anglo-French in their Colonies, with India as the grand prize. A fantasy of the Kaiser's - of using his central position in Europe to threaten England and France's global possessions without need for a navy was turned into efforts all over the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Central Asia- and the expenditure of millions of Marks. From the Senussi in Libya- to Afghanistan-the very "Gates Of India" we follow all the trails.
For a while- it looked like the Germans might get real value out of propping up the Ottomans who were in a power struggle of their own. But as you read on- the shoe string nature of each agent's path and the cultural naivete of many of the missions begin to take their toll. As does the growing acuity of the Allies, and their more robust Colonial Intelligence countermoves. As the war goes on- and stresses the tottering Ottoman structure- the Turkish leadership frays- and then so does the alliance. Before we leave- McMeekin makes sure to show how all of today's Middle Eastern and Central Asian frictions were deeply impacted by the War. This is the "World" part of World War I you might not have read about- but probably should.
There are a lot of adult themes- and some graphic passages as you might expect discussing this period of ethnic cleansing so this is a book best read by the Junior Reader over 13/14 years. For the Gamer/Modeler/Military Enthusiast- this is a relative goldmine of ideas- none fully fleshed out- but a fertile area for beginning your research. The Gamer gets a lot of interesting campaign/scenario ideas- all using WWI era tactics- but not stalemated trenches. I should add that the RPG player/GameMaster/creator has a lot of quirky characters on quixotic quests to play with and enhance for fictional/game purposes. The modeler, too gets a lot of diorama/build ideas that are free of Western Front cliche, but use the same gear. The Military Enthusiast gets a good panoramic view of WWI from a totally new direction(well it was new to me), as well as keen insight into the post WWI wars that would continue to savage the regions. This is that rare book that I think the general reader will get just as much from the content as my niche audiences. Too many of our modern conflicts finds roots in this struggle to ignore this content. A good one to have on the shelf...

[Phoenix · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Game of Nations

I liked it!

McMeekin expands on a largely untapped wealth of historical material in both Turkish and German archives to paint an exciting and far reaching examination of German/Turkish relations at the decline of the Ottoman empire, an entirely complementary approach to the usual examination of WW I from the perspective of the European theatre. The writing is excellent bringing a sense of excitement and intrigue. It's also fast paced and richly descriptive creating immediacy and an understanding of connectedness between people, places, events and motivations. There is breadth and depth here and several of the chapters were so extensive that one feels that each of them could have been expanded into an entire book - a good starting point for further reading.

The central theme is that after the dismissal of Bismarck in 1888 the Kaiser had two goals - to expand German influence and to unseat British power. To do the first he proposes a railway network from Berlin to Hejaz in Arabia and through Turkey to Iraq. For the 19th century, railways (and telegraphs) were considered to be the economic engines of growth just as shipping was to the previous two hundred years, as they allowed the transport of goods for trade and materiel for war. To do the second, he used the observation that Britain's "soft underbelly" was that the Empire had over 100 million Muslim subjects (even more than the 20 million Muslims under Ottoman rule), mostly in SE Asia and in Egypt, and embarked on an explicit subversive propaganda campaign using the language of religious jihad and anti-colonialism - the latter being picked up much later by the Soviets.

Whereas both attempted goals were threatening, neither of them actually wound up working. The rail project proved to be far more technically difficult and financially ruinous to Germany than the politicians assumed. Crossing the Taurus Mountains took several years - at one point engineers had to bore through the Gavur Dagi (ironically: Infidel Mountain) made of solid quartz in the Amanus range (pp238) which took several years, and securing the Serbian portion of the route did not happen until later in the war so that using the rail for military transportation was less significant than it could have been. Long term the Turks were the ones who benefitted by gaining a rail link to bring the country together whereas Germany bore nearly all of the cost.

Notwithstanding the German interest, the British and French were also interested in bidding on the contract to build the rail, However the Germans both bid and promised more and so were able to maintain their Turkish alliance throughout the deposing of Sultan Hamid II and the rise of the Young Turks British diplomacy failed to seize on Anglophilia among elite members of the CUP and ultimately keep Turkey from siding with the Germans.

The results of the information war were mixed. The message of Dar Al Harb (war against the infidel) did not play that well in all markets, especially considering that that Germany was an infidel nation itself. When applied in Italian held Eritrea and Libya no doubt it pushed Italy onto the side of the Entente. In Arabia the Germans appealed to Sherifians (Guardians of Mecca) lead by Ali Abdullah (later King Hussain, father of Faisal) who were more interested in bribes than holy war and eventually sided with the British. McMeeken ponders that Germany would have found a more sympathetic ear from the tribe of ibn Saud who had a more fundamentalist understanding of the Prophet.

In Southern Libya through to Sudan it was sectarian Sanussi leader Ahmed Sharif who played both British and Germans off each other taking arms, munitions and gold (which was intercepted) from the Germans and demanding a bribe of £1 million (equivalent today to 1/2 billion $) in cash and materiel from the Brits as well.

The delegation to Iran consisted of a small 6 man team lead by Klein Fritz Klein. After sizing the Germans up the Shia Mufti of Karbala demanded and received 50,000 marks paid annually to replace the income he would have received from Shias in India via British banks and transport in return for his endorsement of holy war.

The German mission to Kabul (Ch 13) has all the thrill of a novel. German scholar/spy Niedermayer had spend most of 1912-14 gathering intelligence on British deployment and Shia customs in Iraq, India, Egypt and Palestine at one point crossing paths in 1913 (before hostilities had broken out) with his British counterpart Sir Percy Sykes in Meshed. Neither believes the other's cover story. On December 1 he sets out with a mixed team from the Constantinople in December 1914 first to Baghdad and then Tehran where, armed with £100,000 sterling he engages in covert activities and sets up spy rings getting his agents to take on bank heists and transport robberies as well as starting up presses to publish and distribute propaganda. In mid July he sets out overland to Kabul finally reaching it in mid October. There he is made to wait 24 days for an audience with the Emir Habibullah, but they come to an agreement as long as the Germans can replace the annual stipend of £400,000 from the British. Habibullah was being shrewd in backing the strong horse - if the Germans could deliver the money then British defences were weak, however Niedermayer received a documented endorsement of jihad.

Where propaganda did have an effect was in Turkey itself. Unfortunately it served to inspire an internal jihad against Christian Armenians and Greeks, contributing an impetus towards the Armenian and Greek Genocides of 1915/16. Another consequence was that large numbers of workers on the rail project were themselves Armenians who, along with their families were caught up in the net.

As well written as the Berlin-Baghdad Express is there are a couple of improvements the author could make in an updated release. There is a large cast of characters who weave in and out of the story. A list of 'dramatis personae' at the back would have helped, though the index certainly can be used for this purpose when needed. And in different chapters there are events that happen at the same time as in other chapters - a condensed time line reference could be added as well. The book is also missing references to a competing rail lines. One was built by the French with a different gauge that connected Suez to Jaffa and Jerusalem - the line reached Tripoli in 1920 and was extended to Haifa and Lebanon. The other was the Sinai military railway built by the British with the same terminating point at Suez but connecting to El Arish and BeerSheva.

The last two chapters examine the puzzle of the collapse of Imperial Russia and the relationship between Germany policy and, as a separate issue, with Zionism at the close of WW I. Here the author draws a connection between Lenin's return to St. Petersburg in 1917 from Switzerland and the sudden appearances of three broadsheet presses pushing for revolution. McMeekin hints at German financing. The Kaiser then plays the Jewish card (pp345) by initially air dropping 150,000 leaflets (urging the 4.5 million Jews in the Pale of Settlement, oppressed by the Czar to put aside any differences and join a revolt against him. However the head of the German Zionist movement, Max Bodenheimer, while as a German was initially enthusiastic for the German cause, refused to be sucked in and took measures to dissociate the Zionist movement with the propaganda campaign, feeling the insinuation would expose the Jews of Russia to yet more pogroms.

Overall I was greatly impressed with McMeeken's span of coverage. Whether or not the German strategy was effective, the laying of the rail line was an important positive factor for Turkey's emergence as a modern nation. A telling comment from CUP leader Djamel Pasha to an aid when asked why Turkey had joined the German side in the war was the following: "So we could pay your salary." (pp311). Even though there was (and still is) a popular base for fundamentalism it was far from united. Given a choice between money and jihad, money spoke louder to the leadership, both secular and religious. However, given the fate of the Armenians, this ultimately proved to be the most tragic of choices, setting the stage for the modern era.

[Charles · Rating 2 out of 5]

Political, and diplomatic history of Imperial Germany’s and the Ottoman Empire’s efforts to exploit pan-Islamism into a jihad strategy against the Entente during WWI.


Ottoman Fourth Army heads for Suez Canal. Military operations that leveraged German discipline, training and organization, with Turkish tenacity were many times successful. Arab regular and irregular troops were almost always a liability.

My dead tree, format, soft back was a moderate 460-pages which included footnotes, bibliography, an index, maps and photographs. It had a US 2010 copyright.

Sean McMeekin is an American historian of early 20th century European history concentrating on the origins of the First World War, and the role of Russia and the Ottoman Empire. He is the author of eight (8) non-fiction books on the period before, including and after WWI, and one on WWII. This was the first book I’ve read by the author.

Firstly, this is an advanced/intermediate-level text on WWI. It would be very helpful for a reader to have a firm background in early-20th Century Military and Diplomatic history and WWI to appreciate this book. In particular, the stretch of the Drang nach Osten that included the Central Powers in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. In addition, I recommend having a period atlas on-hand to reference the much-changed place names throughout.

I have a keen interest in fin de siècle infrastructure projects. I started this book under the mistaken impression it was about the Berlin–Baghdad railway. Silly me. What does a book’s title have to do with its contents? Instead, I received, what was mostly the description of, what was The New Great Game between Germany and mostly the Entente partners England and Imperial Russia in the Middle east during WWI. I have an interest in WWI and some familiarity with the topic—so I continued reading. Also, there were snippets regarding the Berlin–Baghdad railway in the narrative.

TL;DR Synopsis

McMeekin’s narrative follows a traditional chronological account of Imperial Germany and the Ottoman Empire’s conflict with the Entente on the Ottoman borders. Its primarily a political, and diplomatic history, with brief descriptions of military events.

The author’s approach is very much of the “men and their deeds” school of narrative. The narrative begins in 1898 with Kaiser Wilhelm II’s wresting control of the Empire from Otto von Bismarck and ends with Turkey’s signing the Armistice in late 1918. Note this book severely restricts itself to events within the Ottoman Empire and regions bordering it. With the exception of Germany, the other Central Powers, and Entente powers are only discussed to the extent they affected events in the Middle Eastern theatre.

The majority of the narrative was the German attempt to Set the Middle east aflame through a strategy of revolution and insurgency. By stoking the revolt of the Islamic populations in the Entente’s Middle Eastern, North African, and South Asian colonial possessions they would economically cripple the Entente. Meanwhile, they would keep the Ottoman Empire in the war with a minimum of direct military support. A parallel narrative was the political upheaval and revolution that occurred simultaneously within the Ottoman Empire, later Turkey, The sick man of Europe. The Empire attempted to maintain territorial integrity, while reforming enough to fend-off further Western depredations. Not only were the Germans and Turks struggling with their opponents of the Entente, but likewise they were struggling with each other and amongst themselves. Note that includes the Ottoman’s contending with insurgent populations within their borders.

The war was militarily lost by the Central powers in the Middle eastern theater. Germany eventually saw the failure of its attempt at a pan-Islamic revolution. This was due to false, Western assumptions of Islam and the diversity of the Middle eastern population. The Ottoman’s became as much a burden as the Austro-Hungarians to their war effort. The Turks saw the failure to maintain territorial integrity against the military resources of the Entente. The events of the war effected Middle eastern territories and populations of the ex-Ottoman Empire. The Entente’s dismemberment of that Empire and the formation of the new, imperfect states of the Middle east along with the Central Powers WWI strategies created the modern issues with those states today.

The Review

Frankly, this book was not the rail history I anticipated. I wanted to read a narrative history of the planning and construction of the Berlin to Baghdad railroad during the early 1900’s. Only a very small part of this strategic piece of infrastructure appeared in the book. What the book contained was a lengthy narrative of the fraught relationship between Imperial Germany and the Ottoman Empire Central Powers, and the German strategy to foment insurrection in their opponent Entente powers colonial possession on the borders of the Ottoman Empire. The book was very detailed. It introduced me to political, diplomatic and societal areas of the conflict I was unfamiliar with. However, I also found the content to be uneven. It felt like McMeekin didn’t end the book he started writing. The writing started very much in the new style with the author covering the Berlin to Baghdad railroad rail history with an interesting compare and contrast to its modern Turkish remnants. Then it jumps to the politics of developing German influence in the Ottoman Empire. Followed by the Young Turk’s revolutions which ended the Ottoman Caliphate. Followed by a lengthy description of the individual German insurgent actions throughout the Middle east. Sprinkled throughout are significant military actions in the Middle eastern theater. However, in order, the author’s historical focus was:

1. Political
2. Diplomatic
3. Islamic Insurgency
4. Military
5. Rail History

Generally, the sequence was in chronological, although it was not completely hinged on well-known key events in the conflict. For example, the pursuit of Goeben and Breslau, the Gallipoli campaign , the Collapse of Tsarist Russia, etc.. were covered, but significant naval actions and Turkish military actions in the Balkans were not. Those mentioned events were just pauses the action in-between discussion of the early 20th century, Middle eastern politics of ethnicity and religion, internal German politics, internal Turkish politics and German/Turkish politics. Few chapters described the Materialschlacht, the massive use of weapons and munitions (a word not used by the author) and how the lack of a rail network effected the Turks military fortunes.

In the end, the Turkish army, which had been fighting continuously on both its European and Asian borders since before the War was buried beneath the weight of the Entente's superior military capability. The evolving and devolving relationship between Germany and Turkey during the course of the war was well covered. The book’s narrative deeply delves into the description for the German strategy to create revolutions and insurgencies in Entente colonial possessions through a pan-Islamic jihad. That would have crippled the Entente’s Western Front by severing their overseas supply chain.

The effect of reading this book is that of a good, albeit uneven lecture course for a student who already had the right background.

McMeekin is a good writer. The narrative was clear and factual. It was also written in American English. The book was professionally edited. I found no mistakes in the text. The general tenor of the book was measured and generally academic.

I found McMeekin’s footnotes to be particularly good. However, I found peculiar his repeated references to John Buchan’s Greenmantle . That was a 1916 published wartime popular thriller involving uprisings in the Muslim world that included historical, geographical and then current tech references.

I was disappointed with the organization of the book. I was left with the impression that McMeekin changed direction more than once in the process of writing it? In addition, there were stylistic changes in the book as it progressed. For example, in the beginning when Rail History was the emphasis, the narrative contained the author’s anecdotes on Turkish rail travel. These disappeared as the emphasis of the narrative changed.

Use of maps was OK. Maps were located throughout the book. I prefer maps to be interleaved with the narrative. That’s where they provide immediate context. As always, I would have preferred more period maps. Following the narrative along with modern maps was difficult. Place names in the Middle east in Turkish and Arabic have mostly changed in the past 100-years. Use of tables and charts was non-existent. A picture is worth a thousand words. . The photographs provided was OK. Not all the principals in a very ‘historical figure’ oriented narrative were shown, while well-known figure who appeared only briefly were. For example, a picture of Oskar von Niedermayer (German Orientalist scholar and spy) should have occupied the space used for Otto von Bismarck.

The narrative was largely Imperial German and Turkish-centric. Turkish related narrative was in minority to the German. The Ottoman narrative was mostly Turkish, despite the Empire being multiethnic. The Empire was composed of: Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Arabs, Berbers, Kurds, Jews, Levant Christians, etc.. However, the Turks and their Islamic brethren dominated positions of authority. Christians and Jews had inferior legal status. Most of the Ottoman Arabic narrative appeared to be from British sources. I suspect this was due to the availability of German, British and sometimes Turkish archives vs. those of the post-war Middle eastern successor states?

I felt it was a problem with the book, that Germany and Turkey were the two, albeit the more important of the Central Powers in the narrative. There were very occasional references to Austro-Hungarian historical figures. There was almost no discussion of Bulgaria. It made the book feel very uneven. For example, it was the Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian allies along with the Germans that, crushed Serbia and opened-up the munitions supply chain from Germany to Constantinople supplying the Turks. Neither do I recall the mention of Ottoman IV Army participation of the Romanian campaign. (There’s no mention of it in the index either.)

Through the political history, it was clear the Germans and the Turks were uneasy allies. However, the political history was well done. Most folks picking up this book, will already be familiar with the German politics of the war. There have been a lot books written on them. This book was valuable because, I received missing insight into the Ottoman politics. The organizational problems of the Ottoman Empire were large. They were larger than Germany’s other weak ally the Austro-Hungarian empire. The Young Turks military coup on the cusp of the war that dissolved the Caliphate did not greatly improve the situation.

The enemy of my enemy, is my friend. is a Chinese saying, not Middle eastern. The Germans and the Turks were unlikely allies. Only a very few German diplomats and Orientalist scholars had an understanding of the Turkish and in an extended fashion Middle eastern culture. The German goal was to open a Southern front to relieve the pressure on the primary Western front. In particular, the Ottomans could relieve the pressure on the Austro-Hungarians by engaging the Tsarist Russians, a hereditary enemy. This was to involve the minimum of direct military support, while providing training and armaments. The Turks sought to guarantee their territorial integrity and regain lost territories, like Egypt. The Empire had been picked apart by the West for almost a century through supported insurgencies and direct annexations. Humiliating conditions were imposed on the empire, such as extraterritoriality for non-diplomats. The Germans guaranteed Ottoman territorial integrity, should they win the war. As the German involvement with the Turks grew, as the war progressed, there was a lot of culture shock to both sides. By the end of the war German officers were being lynched in remote areas of the theater.

A major component of the German strategy in the South was to Set the Middle east aflame through a strategy of revolution and insurgency. The plan was to inspire, fund and arm revolts of the Islamic populations in the Christian Entente’s Middle Eastern, North African, and South Asian colonial possessions. This would divert Entente resources from the Western front, and likely cripple their global supply chains. This strategy was the child of Max von Oppenheim with avid support from the Kaiser. This strategy fell afoul of German organizational disfunction, and a mistaken understanding of global pan-Islamism. This section of the book contained lengthy anecdotal descriptions of the German agent provocateurs adventures. Many of them I’d read before, although from the British perspective. The Armenian genocide was also covered. In addition, there was a lengthy Epilog on antisemitism in the modern Middle east being a product of the WWI.

The military history was mixed. Major Ottoman actions were adequately covered, but only on for the Asian part of the empire and Constantinople. There was no description of Ottoman European actions. There was very little mention of Ottoman naval actions, other than brief mention of the Goben and Breslau at the beginning of the war. Of interest was the success in of the combination of German training, planning, and organization with Turkish troops. Operations, like Gallipoli and the siege of Kut Al Amara where Germans were in high-level command and Turks were trained and armed with German weapons resulted in victories against British first-line naval and army units.

Finally, the rail history of the eponymous Berlin to Baghdad railway started-out promisingly, but dwindled too almost nothing as the book got long. Before and during WWI, railroads were strategic systems. They allowed for quick mobilization of armies, along with movement of troops and war materials. Unlike in European countries, the Ottoman Empire had no rail network, in the European sense. Transportation through most of the Empire once away from Constantinople was frankly medieval. In wartime, the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Red Sea and Persian Gulf were completely in control of the Entente preventing mass movement of men and material. Extending the rudimentary rail network east from Constantinople to Bagdad in Mesopotamia and on through to Basra on the Persian Gulf, and south into Palestine and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina was a strategic necessity. The railroad would allow for troop and material movement within the Empire, the flow of war material from the European allies and raw materials to the European allies. Politics, geography, funding and the exigencies of the war all contributed to the minimum planned rail net not being completed until almost the end of the war.

Summary

Political foolishness by the weak Ottomans drew them to the Germans into a conflict with the militarily superior Entente. As the Central Power’s were drawn into a long war, the Ottoman’s became another burden on the Germans as they consumed more men, material and treasure without substantial benefit. The pan-Islamic jihad strategy was a failure. The initial victories of the war petered-out into a string of defeats, in what had always been a sideshow for the Germans, albeit an increasingly costly one. The alliance soured as the Germans withdrew to concentrate on the Western front. The dependent Turks with their ethnically diverse population were eventually swept along with Germany’s surrender. McMeekin also makes the point that WWI contributed to endemic, toxic ethnic and religious strife in the region. The imperfect, successor states Entente carved from the Middle eastern Ottoman territories and results of the Russian Civil War are still problems.

I wanted this book to contain more rail history and military history, of which the author did only an OK job. The German efforts at insurgency somehow felt out-of-place, and consumed too many pages, while contributing too little for me. However, the political and diplomatic parts of the read may be valuable for an interested and prepared student of WWI. Germany and the western front of WWI traditionally get the most popular attention. This book’s most important contribution was in describing the war in the Middle east, but not just in military terms. WWI in the Middle east was not a sideshow for millions of folks. This book was a good adjunct to a study of WWI for a part of the world that is under represented in the literature.

Interested readers may want to read On Secret Service East of Constantinople: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire by Peter Hopkirk and The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East by Eugene Rogan (my reviews) before this.

[Eric · Rating 4 out of 5]

Book was loaned to me by Jackson Walls, a good friend, but more to the point, who is widely read in the diplomatic history of World War I, both before and during the war. Sean McMeekin addresses the efforts of Wilhelmine Germany to incite jihad against England, using the railroad effort only as a framework on which to build his argument. McMeekin details the efforts to enlist Ottoman religious fervor in the destruction of [certain] European nationalities, excepting Germans of course. The efforts as a whole were not successful, due to a variety or reasons, including a fundamental misunderstanding in Germany of the inner workings of Islam (a misunderstanding that continues, at least in part, today). But, in the long run, the German efforts to trigger jihad have born fruit, but not as anticipated [as evidenced by the fall of the Twin Towers].

McMeekin covers much of the same ground as Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, allowing the books together to give a better overall view of the positions of each. However, McMeekin is consistently dismissive of Lawrence himself.

In the closing pages, McMeekin makes a bald assertion of German war guilt based on reference to conduct in July 1914. This claim is unsupported and does not arise from the arguments in the book itself. Moreover, the issue of German war guilt remains a hotly contested issue even today, and should not be resolved in an ipse dixit pronouncement. But for this late in the game claim, I would have given the book five stars.

[Gavin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really excellent book about the German machinations during World War I in order to create a jihad against the Entente powers. Sadly, again, history proves that governments don't pay attention to experts, or else pay attention to only the experts that lead them down the primrose path to their goals. Germany was as much an infidel as England, France, and Russia.

Not only that, but the Ottoman's and various groups and sects, soaked Germany in particular for billions of marks in today's money. Not chump change even then. The Turks would continue to ask for more money and material in order to foment war against their enemies, and Germany would continue to ante up since their 'experts' said they needed this as well.

One major reminder here is that if Germany had got out of the war at the time of Russia's withdrawal after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, than Germany probably would have been the major hegemony of Europe, Middle East, and especially part of Russia.

That being said, Germany created a lot of millennial fervor in the world that didn't help in World War II and now, outside completely of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Between all of this the world has suffered.

Oh, and by the way, this book reinforces my thoughts that our political experts are always wrong, especially when dealing with other cultures and religions. Hard enough to get your own domestic issues correct.

Not an easy read unless you are somewhat familiar with the names of previous cities and countries. Use the maps, but you'll want to Google a lot. I did.

[Corey · Rating 4 out of 5]

McMeeken has a talent for shining light on the Great War on previously under covered aspects that changes the way you understand the totality of the war. Obviously, historically there has been an over focus on the West, Germany, France and Britain. My first McMeekan book was on Russia and the Great War, which forced me to completely reconsider my understanding of the July Crisis. Now this book details the Kaiser's plays for power in Western Asia in the 16 years prior to 1914. Germany's attempt to build a RR to Asia from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf short cutting Britain's Suez Canal and threatening India. And in the war itself Germany did all it could to incite global Jihad hoping to radicalize the 100 million Muslims living under British rule in Egypt and India. In the end of course it was the British who extended their power across Arabia, Iraq and Palestine. Germany lost. But the story is full of adventure, eccentricity, and romance that makes Lawrence of Arabia seem pedestrian.
McMeeken's epilogue though to me was astonishing making me want to further investigate. I was previously unaware of the many close alliances between Nazis and Muslims during WWII. I am unfamiliar with people like Al-Hussein and Mufti who worked closely with Hitler and especially Himmler. 100,000 Muslims Bosnians worked with the SS in WWII to kill Jews. This is all new to me and I want to learn more.
Once again, McMeekin has forced to to reconsider my understanding of WWI from a more global perspective and not just the Western Front in France.

[E. Kahn · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a (weak) five-star right up to its last couple of chapters. Informative, well-written (if somewhat breezy) and detailed. The interpretation is... debatable, at many points, but a history book that forces you to think about interpreting events can't be faulted for that, right?

Reading the last two chapters and epilogue are a bit like finding a fly in the soup, after you've eaten most of the soup. McMeekin's views on the meaning of jihad in Islam and the origins of anti-semitism in the Middle East are the sort of discredited Iraqi Freedom-era propaganda I expect to see in a Reddit thread, not a serious (if popular) book of history. The "Clash of Civilizations" nonsense would not be out of place here.

Weirdly, McMeekin does all the necessary discrediting himself, in the earlier chapters of the book. The abject failure of the German-backed jihad projects against the British and French Empires tell us all we need to know about the relative importance of "Islamic holy war" vs good old styled Nationalism.

I'm letting this one have four stars if read as a appendix to Fromkin's far, far better Peace to End All Peace, as the information presented here fleshes out and contextualizes Fromkin's book, which focuses largely on the Entente's role in shaping the post-war Middle East, while this one is largely about the pre-war and wartime German project for the same area.

[Liviu · Rating 4 out of 5]

Has a lot of great stuff about the Middle eastern contest between Germany and England/France that was started by the Kaiser and culminated in WW1; especially the background and first part about how science and engineering advanced with "pseudo" colonialism;

The problem is in the tone of the book which is pretty shrill in a "them vs us" kind that kept me "rewriting" passages from this book in my head in a what-if history where America stayed neutral and Germany crushed France and forced England to its knees in 1918 after their coup de diplomacy of bringing Lenin to Russia and keeping him lush in money until he took Russia out of the war succeeded.... Those passages would have sounded perfect as what we came to be conditioned to regard as ridiculous German propaganda too

So good information, good writing but annoying moralizing

[Liam Ostermann · Rating 5 out of 5]

I can't recommend this book highly enough - it provides comprehensive, vivid, thoughtful, and well written account of a subject, the genesis and building of the Berlin to Baghdad railway (though it was never actually completed or came near to Baghdad) that some of us interested in lead up to WWI may have heard of but which most of us know nothing about - as well as a look at Germany's relations with the Ottoman Empire both before and during the First World War. The variety and richness of this book and its subject is such that I can only encourage anyone interested in WWI or the middle east today to read this. You will gain much and certainly won't feel short changed or that you have wasted your time.

[Nick Harriss · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent book that covers an aspect of World War One that is rarely covered in other texts. While some of the the political machinations described can be rather hard work at times, the tensions between German and Turkish allies is something I was previously not aware of. An excellent read for anyone interested in history of this era.

[James McLeod · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fascinating and searingly critical outline of the problems of colonialist/expansionist 'empire building', human greed, selfishness, pride and the seemingly inescapable and eternal consequences of them. This book used a relatively simple idea as the motor of the story; that a railway can either connect countries and cultures, or destroy them.