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Failure in the Saddle: Nathan Bedford Forrest, Joe Wheeler, and the Confederate Cavalry in the Chickamauga Campaign
WINNER, 2010, RICHARD HARWELL AWARD, GIVEN BY THE CIVIL WAR ROUND TABLE OF ATLANTA
Confederate cavalry has a storied history in the Civil War. Tales of raids and daring exploits create a whiff of lingering romance about the horse soldiers of the Lost Cause. Sometimes, however, romance obscures history. In August 1863 William Rosecrans' Union Army of the Cumberland embarked on a campaign of maneuver to turn Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee out of Chattanooga, one of the most important industrial and logistical centers of the Confederacy. Despite the presence of two Southern cavalry corps (nearly 14,000 horsemen) under legendary commanders Nathan Bedford Forrest and Joe Wheeler, Union troops crossed the Tennessee River unopposed and unseen, slipped through the passes cutting across the knife-ridged mountains, moved into the narrow valleys, and turned Bragg's left flank. Threatened with the loss of the railroad that fed his army, Bragg had no choice but to retreat. He lost Chattanooga without a fight. After two more weeks of maneuvering, skirmishing, and botched attacks, Bragg struck back at Chickamauga, where he was once again surprised by the disposition of the Union army and the manner in which the fighting unfolded. Although the combat ended with a stunning Southern victory, Federal counter-blows that November reversed all that had been so dearly purchased. David A. Powell's Failure in the Saddle: Nathan Bedford Forrest, Joseph Wheeler, and the Confederate Cavalry in the Chickamauga Campaign is the first in-depth attempt to determine what role the Confederate cavalry played in both the loss of Chattanooga and the staggering miscues that followed up to, through, and beyond Chickamauga. Powell draws upon an array of primary accounts and his intimate knowledge of the battlefield to reach several startling conclusions: Bragg s experienced cavalry generals routinely fed him misleading information, failed to screen important passes and river crossings, allowed petty command politics to routinely influence their decision-making, and on more than one occasion, disobeyed specific and repeated orders that may have changed the course of the campaign. Richly detailed and elegantly written, Failure in the Saddle offers new perspectives on the role of the Rebel horsemen in every combat large and small waged during this long and bloody campaign and, by default, a fresh assessment of the generalship of Braxton Bragg. This judiciously reasoned account includes a guided tour of the cavalry operations, several appendices of important information, and original cartography. It is essential reading for students of the Western Theater.
Confederate cavalry has a storied history in the Civil War. Tales of raids and daring exploits create a whiff of lingering romance about the horse soldiers of the Lost Cause. Sometimes, however, romance obscures history. In August 1863 William Rosecrans' Union Army of the Cumberland embarked on a campaign of maneuver to turn Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee out of Chattanooga, one of the most important industrial and logistical centers of the Confederacy. Despite the presence of two Southern cavalry corps (nearly 14,000 horsemen) under legendary commanders Nathan Bedford Forrest and Joe Wheeler, Union troops crossed the Tennessee River unopposed and unseen, slipped through the passes cutting across the knife-ridged mountains, moved into the narrow valleys, and turned Bragg's left flank. Threatened with the loss of the railroad that fed his army, Bragg had no choice but to retreat. He lost Chattanooga without a fight. After two more weeks of maneuvering, skirmishing, and botched attacks, Bragg struck back at Chickamauga, where he was once again surprised by the disposition of the Union army and the manner in which the fighting unfolded. Although the combat ended with a stunning Southern victory, Federal counter-blows that November reversed all that had been so dearly purchased. David A. Powell's Failure in the Saddle: Nathan Bedford Forrest, Joseph Wheeler, and the Confederate Cavalry in the Chickamauga Campaign is the first in-depth attempt to determine what role the Confederate cavalry played in both the loss of Chattanooga and the staggering miscues that followed up to, through, and beyond Chickamauga. Powell draws upon an array of primary accounts and his intimate knowledge of the battlefield to reach several startling conclusions: Bragg s experienced cavalry generals routinely fed him misleading information, failed to screen important passes and river crossings, allowed petty command politics to routinely influence their decision-making, and on more than one occasion, disobeyed specific and repeated orders that may have changed the course of the campaign. Richly detailed and elegantly written, Failure in the Saddle offers new perspectives on the role of the Rebel horsemen in every combat large and small waged during this long and bloody campaign and, by default, a fresh assessment of the generalship of Braxton Bragg. This judiciously reasoned account includes a guided tour of the cavalry operations, several appendices of important information, and original cartography. It is essential reading for students of the Western Theater.
384 pages, Hardcover
First published September 1, 2008
36 people are currently reading
68 people want to read
About the author
David A. Powell
25 books27 followersGraduated from the Virginia Military Institute with a B.A. in history. He has spent years studying the Battle of Chickamauga and wrote several books on the campaign. His book Failure in the Saddle: Nathan Bedford Forrest, Joseph Wheeler, and the Confederate Cavalry in the Chickamauga Campaign won the 2011 Richard Harwell Award for the best book on a Civil War topic published in the last year. In addition to his books, he has written articles for the magazines North & South and Gettysburg Magazine.
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
May 25, 2011
A very interesting look at one of the most critical moments in the Civil War. The Confederate commander, Braxton Bragg has always been considered one of the chief architects in the South's eventual defeat, a man who was uniquely able to alienate and infuriate practically his entire command and who has drawn all but universal condemnation from his contemporaries and every Civil War historian since.
Bragg allowed his forces to be completely outmanuvered from the outset of this campaign, resulting in the all but bloodless loss of Chattenooga, a critical industrial city, and opening up Northern Georgia to further invasion threatening Atlanta. However, his forces were well placed to launch a devastating counterattack against the Northern forces and completely turn around the war in the West and perhaps for the entire South. He was determined to try and was reinforced by an entire corps from the Army of Northern Virginia led by Lee's Old Warhorse himself, Longstreet. Things fell apart from the beginning of the campaign, but even so Chickmauga still almost completely unhinged the Union forces, but not quite. And that not quite led inevitably to the fall of Atlanta, Sherman's March to the Sea, the capture of Savannah and Sherman's march north into South and North Carolina. It's hard not to throw rocks at Bragg.
The book goes a long way to explaining why Bragg's plans fell apart and for Powell, much of the blame falls on Bragg's two cavalry commanders, Nathan Bedford Forrest and most especially Joe Wheeler, and Powell makes a very persuasive case. Readers will be hard put to find any works critical of Forrest in particular, given his success and heroics from the beginning to the end of the war. But at this point, Forrest had never served as a corps commander and he spent this entire campaign getting on the job training. His penchant for personal observation and involvement in every battle worked against him as corps commander, making it difficult to impossible to direct and coordinate his forces, and as a result, his units failed repeatedly to provide Bragg with accurate and up to date intelligence on Union positions and strength. and at one critical moment, his information was simply and utterly wrong.
However, while Forrest comes in for serious criticism, Joe Wheeler comes in for round and endless condemnation. His forces were undisciplined and lax in follwing their orders, failing at almost every task given them, leading Bragg to micromanaging Wheeler's forces. As a result, Bragg was repeatedly misinformed and often unaware of Union positions and strength, all but blind at critical moments. Anyone familiar with Bragg will come to the conclusion that Bragg would have managed to mismanage everything even if he had been given perfect information by his commanders. But, in the end, after the battles, Bragg dismissed Forrest, took his forces and gave them to Wheeler, mostly because Wheeler remained loyal to Bragg, and Bragg had one heck of a time finding anyone who would be loyal to him.
The book is very well written with a surprising amount of information given the relatively short length of this book. No one will come to love Bragg after reading this, but perhaps they'll hate him a bit less. Any critical look at Forrest is worth reading for anyone seriously interested in Civil War military history and his problems with Bragg after the battle is given context almost entirely lacking elsewhere.
Bragg allowed his forces to be completely outmanuvered from the outset of this campaign, resulting in the all but bloodless loss of Chattenooga, a critical industrial city, and opening up Northern Georgia to further invasion threatening Atlanta. However, his forces were well placed to launch a devastating counterattack against the Northern forces and completely turn around the war in the West and perhaps for the entire South. He was determined to try and was reinforced by an entire corps from the Army of Northern Virginia led by Lee's Old Warhorse himself, Longstreet. Things fell apart from the beginning of the campaign, but even so Chickmauga still almost completely unhinged the Union forces, but not quite. And that not quite led inevitably to the fall of Atlanta, Sherman's March to the Sea, the capture of Savannah and Sherman's march north into South and North Carolina. It's hard not to throw rocks at Bragg.
The book goes a long way to explaining why Bragg's plans fell apart and for Powell, much of the blame falls on Bragg's two cavalry commanders, Nathan Bedford Forrest and most especially Joe Wheeler, and Powell makes a very persuasive case. Readers will be hard put to find any works critical of Forrest in particular, given his success and heroics from the beginning to the end of the war. But at this point, Forrest had never served as a corps commander and he spent this entire campaign getting on the job training. His penchant for personal observation and involvement in every battle worked against him as corps commander, making it difficult to impossible to direct and coordinate his forces, and as a result, his units failed repeatedly to provide Bragg with accurate and up to date intelligence on Union positions and strength. and at one critical moment, his information was simply and utterly wrong.
However, while Forrest comes in for serious criticism, Joe Wheeler comes in for round and endless condemnation. His forces were undisciplined and lax in follwing their orders, failing at almost every task given them, leading Bragg to micromanaging Wheeler's forces. As a result, Bragg was repeatedly misinformed and often unaware of Union positions and strength, all but blind at critical moments. Anyone familiar with Bragg will come to the conclusion that Bragg would have managed to mismanage everything even if he had been given perfect information by his commanders. But, in the end, after the battles, Bragg dismissed Forrest, took his forces and gave them to Wheeler, mostly because Wheeler remained loyal to Bragg, and Bragg had one heck of a time finding anyone who would be loyal to him.
The book is very well written with a surprising amount of information given the relatively short length of this book. No one will come to love Bragg after reading this, but perhaps they'll hate him a bit less. Any critical look at Forrest is worth reading for anyone seriously interested in Civil War military history and his problems with Bragg after the battle is given context almost entirely lacking elsewhere.
April 16, 2022
One of the most through studies of the campaign from the Confederate side. The hero worship of Forrest is thoroughly examined and he points out the warts as well as the plaudits for him. Bragg is not exonerated but he does point out some salient points about his conduct and why they happened. As for Wheeler, he rightly condemns his actions. The book also has an excellent tour guide of the battlefield if you plan to visit. His appendixes are top notch as well. Finally ends the book with an interview. He says it is time for a complete rework on the entire campaign. Extensive notes are included. Well worth the read.
August 31, 2020
I really thought a pandemic would be offer a great chance to catch up on my reading, but so far I have failed to capitalize on the world's woes. That is too bad.
One of the reasons for this failure is that I keep picking up books I have had lying around the house for years, sometimes decades. Failure in the Saddle, by David A. Powell, is one of these books. Powell has went to great lengths to research the Battle of Chickamauga, and in particular what he proposes are serious failures of the Confederate cavalry arm before, during and after that campaign. I am convinced that he is correct in the faults he found, but I was not usually engaged enough in the book to appreciate his depth of knowledge and detail. That may not have been his fault, but I do believe his writing did not help. It seemed more like a really long research paper than a history book.
Of course, my disappointment may be due to Covid. Everything else seems to be affected.
Note: there is a cavalry driving tour of the battlefield included in this book, which I plan to consult the next time I visit the Chickamauga & Chattanooga National Military Park.
One of the reasons for this failure is that I keep picking up books I have had lying around the house for years, sometimes decades. Failure in the Saddle, by David A. Powell, is one of these books. Powell has went to great lengths to research the Battle of Chickamauga, and in particular what he proposes are serious failures of the Confederate cavalry arm before, during and after that campaign. I am convinced that he is correct in the faults he found, but I was not usually engaged enough in the book to appreciate his depth of knowledge and detail. That may not have been his fault, but I do believe his writing did not help. It seemed more like a really long research paper than a history book.
Of course, my disappointment may be due to Covid. Everything else seems to be affected.
Note: there is a cavalry driving tour of the battlefield included in this book, which I plan to consult the next time I visit the Chickamauga & Chattanooga National Military Park.
November 30, 2016
Essential reading for students of the Chickamauga Campaign.
November 30, 2022
It's unusual to find new perspectives on a battle like Chickamauga, the subject of countless books and articles. The premise of David Powell's Failure in the Saddle: Nathan Bedford Forrest, Joe Wheeler, and the Confederate Cavalry in the Chickamauga Campaign is that neither Confederate leader followed orders or carried out basic assignments. Wheeler could be faulted for being asleep at the wheel, allowing his cavalry command to rest in camp while heavy Union columns crossed the Tennessee River and marched into north Alabama and Georgia unopposed. Bragg was obliged to rely on civilian reports to get information from the front.
Joe Wheeler is easier to understand. His performance in this campaign is just more of the same, before and after Chickamauga. Why Braxton Bragg didn't have him replaced or court-martialed is beyond me. Having no one more competent or capable (a frightening thought indeed), perhaps Bragg decided to deal with Wheeler's inadequacies as best he could and "let it ride."
Forrest is a little more complicated. Powell faults Forrest for personally wading into battle, leaving distant subordinates to fend for themselves while he reloaded his revolvers. The author's thesis makes sense because that was Forrest's style of fighting. An intuitive, impulsive leader, he was not one to think long or hard before throwing himself into action. As a result, reconnaissance suffered, and Bragg had to rely on other sources to understand what was happening on the battlefield.
I appreciate Powell's position on testimony by Dr. J. B. Cowan, Forrest's chief medical officer. Because Dr. Cowan's accounts are not supported by other witnesses and seem questionable due to subsequent events, Powell has chosen to treat them as fiction. Perhaps I'm beguiled by the way Dr. Cowan describes events and his dialogue with Forrest. At any rate, I'll characterize his words as honest, on-the-scene reports actually witnessed by this respected physician.
Joe Wheeler is easier to understand. His performance in this campaign is just more of the same, before and after Chickamauga. Why Braxton Bragg didn't have him replaced or court-martialed is beyond me. Having no one more competent or capable (a frightening thought indeed), perhaps Bragg decided to deal with Wheeler's inadequacies as best he could and "let it ride."
Forrest is a little more complicated. Powell faults Forrest for personally wading into battle, leaving distant subordinates to fend for themselves while he reloaded his revolvers. The author's thesis makes sense because that was Forrest's style of fighting. An intuitive, impulsive leader, he was not one to think long or hard before throwing himself into action. As a result, reconnaissance suffered, and Bragg had to rely on other sources to understand what was happening on the battlefield.
I appreciate Powell's position on testimony by Dr. J. B. Cowan, Forrest's chief medical officer. Because Dr. Cowan's accounts are not supported by other witnesses and seem questionable due to subsequent events, Powell has chosen to treat them as fiction. Perhaps I'm beguiled by the way Dr. Cowan describes events and his dialogue with Forrest. At any rate, I'll characterize his words as honest, on-the-scene reports actually witnessed by this respected physician.
May 7, 2021
Powell has provided an excellent appraisal of Confederate cavalry leadership during the Chickamauga Campaign. His well researched narrative of the operations provides an honest look at the various leaders involved in the operations. He pulls no punches in his evaluation of each leader during the campaign. A very good book on the topic.
December 28, 2014
Braxton Bragg has been heavily criticized for many failures in his campaigns against the Union Army in North Georgia and Tennessee. Among the criticisms has been his failure to seize a number critical moments to crush the Union Army.
David A Powell in "Failure in the Saddle" looks into this failure. He looks at the cavalry arm of Bragg's Army which was responsible for finding the location of the Union Army(Scouting) , fixing the Union Army (means preventing the Union Army from maneuvering) and providing what they learned (intelligence gathering and analysis) to Bragg's headquarters in a timely and useful fashion. The Calvary branch was also responsible for holding critical terrain until the infantry could come.
In theory, Bragg had two of the best Cavalry commanders available to the Confederacy, Wheeler and Forrest. Yet, in both cases, the author shows how they failed Bragg over and over again during the Chickamauga Campaign. These functions were so critical to Bragg's campaigning that they had to have had a major negative effect. After the campaign, Forrest was reassigned and a Confederate War Department investigation of Wheeler was very uncomplimentary. The only question I found the book did not address was why Bragg did not figure this out early on and did not do something about it.
I would recommend this book to anyone interested in Military History, The American Civil War, the role of Cavalry, Braxton Bragg, or the Chickamauga Campaign.
David A Powell in "Failure in the Saddle" looks into this failure. He looks at the cavalry arm of Bragg's Army which was responsible for finding the location of the Union Army(Scouting) , fixing the Union Army (means preventing the Union Army from maneuvering) and providing what they learned (intelligence gathering and analysis) to Bragg's headquarters in a timely and useful fashion. The Calvary branch was also responsible for holding critical terrain until the infantry could come.
In theory, Bragg had two of the best Cavalry commanders available to the Confederacy, Wheeler and Forrest. Yet, in both cases, the author shows how they failed Bragg over and over again during the Chickamauga Campaign. These functions were so critical to Bragg's campaigning that they had to have had a major negative effect. After the campaign, Forrest was reassigned and a Confederate War Department investigation of Wheeler was very uncomplimentary. The only question I found the book did not address was why Bragg did not figure this out early on and did not do something about it.
I would recommend this book to anyone interested in Military History, The American Civil War, the role of Cavalry, Braxton Bragg, or the Chickamauga Campaign.
April 30, 2015
Mr Powell wrote a well rounded book on the Confederate Cavalry during the Chickamuga Campaign. This book is not for the novice Civil War reader. I found it is more geared to those of us who have spent quality time studying the Civil War.
I do not agree with his assessment of Braxton Bragg at all. The author lays most of the blame for the failure of the Confederate cavalry at the feet of Nathan Bedford Forrest,Joe Wheeler(share more blame than Forrest) and John Pegram.
As I said the book is well rounded but some of the author's conclusions are hard to justify in my mind
I do not agree with his assessment of Braxton Bragg at all. The author lays most of the blame for the failure of the Confederate cavalry at the feet of Nathan Bedford Forrest,Joe Wheeler(share more blame than Forrest) and John Pegram.
As I said the book is well rounded but some of the author's conclusions are hard to justify in my mind
April 3, 2016
This is a book that is squarely for the expert since it deals with only one aspect of the Chickamauga operation. It is an enlightening book, in which Forrest is taken to task for his failures in scouting and command control. Yet Powell is no hatchet man. He recounts the points where Forrest did well and that he was still learning his trade, shifting from a partisan ranger to an efficient combat commander. Also like that various obscure figures are described. Except for C. C. Crews. He is still an unknown.
July 27, 2012
Excellent book. Together with "The Maps of Chickamauga", these two are essential reading for understanding the battle better. This is the most in-depth analysis of the campaign from the perspective of the Confederate cavalry & the author has really done the legwork & research to show what happened. I live about 20 minutes from the battlefield & have been visiting & guiding tours there for well over a dozen years. The OOB & driving maps are also extremely helpful.
September 26, 2015
Although my reading of this book predates my involvement on Goodreads, I remember liking the book and appreciating the author's frank appraisal of the performance of Bragg's cavalry during the Chickamauga. Not only did I keep my copy of the book but I like the author's work enough to seek out other books by him, wargames by him, and I expect I'll re-read the book one day.
May 30, 2012
Excellent
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews