The Vocation of Man

by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Peter Preuss (Translator)

The Vocation of Man is the author's way of trying to explain the true purpose of all human beings.
Fichte divides the book into three parts: "Doubt," "Knowledge," and "Faith." In the first part, the author argues that human beings lie to themselves by thinking that they have free will; people act because they are subject to the laws of cause and effect. For the second part, "Knowledge," the author talks about natural existence and how human beings shape their reality through what they know. In the final and perhaps most important part, the author talks about faith.
Human beings are guided by a higher power beyond themselves, he argues. The spirit gives people hope. Therefore, serving God and doing everything according to God's will should be the ultimate purpose of every human being, even if they have to go through suffering when they do it.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, German Literature, Metaphysics, Germany, 19th Century, History

144 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1800

About the author

Johann Gottlieb Fichte was a German philosopher. He was one of the founding figures of the philosophical movement known as German idealism, a movement that developed from the theoretical and ethical writings of Immanuel Kant. Fichte is often perceived as a figure whose philosophy forms a bridge between the ideas of Kant and the German Idealist Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Recently, philosophers and scholars have begun to appreciate Fichte as an important philosopher in his own right due to his original insights into the nature of self-consciousness or self-awareness. Like Descartes and Kant before him, the problem of subjectivity and consciousness motivated much of his philosophical rumination. Fichte also wrote political philosophy, and is thought of by some as the father of German nationalism.
His son, Immanuel Hermann Fichte, was also a renowned philosopher.

Reviews

[Paradoxe · Rating 3 out of 5]

Αυτή τη στιγμή δε μπορώ να το τελειώσω. Το ξεκίνησα με καλή διάθεση και άπλετο χρόνο μέσα στην άδεια μου, αλλά ωστόσο δε μπόρεσα να προχωρήσω πολύ. Βρίσκω το Φίχτε ψυχαναγκαστικό. Κι άλλοι λένε και ξαναλένε τα ίδια, στην περίπτωση του δεν είναι επαναλαμβανόμενος για να είναι, ή γιατί δεν έχει τι να πει, αντιθέτως έχει, αλλά είναι εξαντλητικός χωρίς όμως να κατασταλάζει, ενώ διαρκώς μεταβαίνει απ' το ένα σημείο αναφοράς στο άλλο και διακλαδίζεται σε πάμπολλα ζητήματα με τα οποία δεν καταπιάνεται ακριβώς, περισσότερο τα αναφέρει γιατί πρέπει να το κάνει και λιγότερο γιατί θέλει να τα αναπτύξει. Ένιωθα πως διάβαζα ένα ποτ πουρί. Ίσως κάποια στιγμή επανέλθω στο βιβλίο, όχι όμως τώρα.

[Iohannes · Rating 3 out of 5]

this was the first Fichte I've read (prolly should've read science of knowledge before tbqh) so I didn't know what I was getting myself into and I can certainly say it was one hell of a ride. Fichte is an absolute madlad; his first meditation "doubt" leads him to conclusion that if the noumenal world exists and does so independently from us, then it follows that we must be determined by that exterior world and thus freedom is an illusion - Fichte's answers to this problem? he radically refutes the 'thing in itself', hell, he refutes basically everything untill he's left with mere representation - but ofc he isnt happy with that either, because wouldn't that mean life is basically meaningless? So in the last part "believe" (which, personally, I enjoyed the least) he develops this transcended moral world we are all connected to, in the process echoing a lot of Kants ideas about duty to obey the moral law/freedom etc., but also getting kind of esoteric at times. Difficult to rate tbh since I didn't think it was all that 'convincing' but, especially the second part ("knowing") was really fun to read nonetheless.

[Beansism · Rating 4 out of 5]

The first book—Doubt—begins with an analysis of fatalistic materialism and distresses at being absolutely determined externally, leading into the second book—Knowledge—formulated as a dialogue that goes down the opposite path, that of subjective idealism. For Fichte, the manner of subjective idealism expressed in the second book is as untenable as the first, as it is a world of dreams created by the mind. The third book—Faith—is much more explicitly Kantian than its predecessors, and following his ideological mentor who penned the Critique of Practical Reason (to which this book owes a great deal), Fichte may be praised in providing more solid proofs for Kant's maxims of practical reason, such as the existence of God and the afterlife.

The limitations of this book are not the popular method in which it was expressed, but the Kantian framework it stayed loyal to, although it boldly denies the thing-in-itself. A decade later, Fichte's student Schelling took the problem of fatalism and dealt with it much more lucidly in his Freiheitsschrift by uniting free will and necessity. Though destined to be only a moment of its era, within the Kantian ideological terrain it leaves a clear mark.

[Shulamith Farhi · Rating 5 out of 5]

J.G. Fichte is angry. Justifiably. He's also one of the most inspiring thinkers I've ever encountered. This is his most popular text, which is surprising since by most standards it is rather difficult. You have no idea how bad the Wissenschaftslehre is, be glad only dorks like me read it.

The book is divided into 3 parts.

The first part details his doubts about whether he can know anything. It is, to be honest, tedious.

The second part is dialogical, and contains the main argument of the text. It is a strange two person conversation between I and Spirit. Spirit sadistically convinces the dogmatic I that noumena are not known immediately. Unfortunately, she's right. We discover that Nature is driven by blind mechanisms, bound everywhere in the chains of cause and effect. Were the story to end now, Fichte would be indistinguishable from Schopenhauer's pessimism. However, Fichte knows that there's an additional fact in this situation: the moral law. What does the moral law tell me? She informs me that everything in Nature takes the form of things, except for persons. Persons act according to reasons, and are infinitely dignified. While there are no guarantees that I will achieve the goals I want, the moral law tells me that I should abandon my passivity, become sober and active, and fight to increase my freedom and the freedom of those I love.

In part 3, Fichte plays the role of a Shakespearean hero and delivers an amazing soliloquy. It's difficult to capture his fury, but I confess I find it beautiful. He ends up sounding a bit weird, and there are certainly infelicities. His missteps are ultimately reasonable, and can be easily vindicated. He is fighting a social order that is attempting to make him, effectively, a slave. This sounds alarming, but it's surprisingly close to Afro-Pessimism's concept of social death. We must not allow ourselves to be killed off, Fichte forcefully argues. Instead, we must find other beings that desire liberty, and coordinate with them to maximize our goals. If this sounds like communism, that's because it is.

Why should we care about Fichte, at the end of the day? His formal/mathematical works remain relevant to epistemology but I want to defend his politics. He was the first critical philosopher to construct a rigorous argument for the rationality of organizing, from first principles. There is something sublime about a mathematician providing a proof of the rationality of revolutionary activity. Ernst Bloch once described the October Revolution as the categorical imperative armed with a rifle; to this picture, Fichte would add that she is also armed with some mathematical notebooks.

[Griffin Wilson · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a great book overall and is a fairly simply introduction to transcendental idealism. Fichte divides the work into 3 parts:
I. Doubt
This section is an enquiry concerning the nature of human freedom. In our immediate consciousness it would seem like we are free; however, upon further reflection we realize that it seems like every act we do could also be fully predetermined -- just like a flower or tree. Either way, Fichte concludes, we cannot be sure. So, it is up to us to "choose" if we have absolute Necessity or absolute Possibility; both choices will inevitably incite misery in us, but Possibility is the more pleasant of the two -- according to Fichte. There seems no doubt that Kierkegaard had these ideas in mind when he wrote "The Sickness Unto Death."
II. Knowledge
Fichte lays out the transcendental idealist epistemology in the form of a dialogue between you and a spirit -- reading this reminded me of "Three Dialogues" by Berkeley. Basically he summarizes Kant's Critique in about 70 pages. What can we know about the external world (if it exists)? Nothing! Everything is a representation of sensations, which, through our intuitions are perceived and put through the process of the understanding and thus become judgements. "The world is my representation" as Arthur Schopenhauer said.
III. Faith
Fichte ties up the ramifications of part II and part I, and finally gets around to explaining the Vocation of Man. What is it? Well, it is difficult to explain in a short review. Read it yourself!

[Liam Creaser · Rating 4 out of 5]

If kant smoked loud

[Mark Burns · Rating 3 out of 5]

While it was tempting to just give this a higher rating because it is an actual available, readable, Fichte text, you still have to contend with it being Fichte. While this is slightly more readable even in english than his other texts are it still contains that random assumption method of philosophy and while his central point is enticing the use of practical reason alone and polemical ranting leads to un-grounded assumptions being taken as absolutes and a dearth of theoretical explanations which could have been added once he established consciousness and went for the unity of reason but they are not. Still a very important text and not to be ignored.

[Deniz · Rating 4 out of 5]

A speculation of conscience and how can we be sure of our own thinking. I appreciate it except for the Faith section.

[saml · Rating 4 out of 5]

so crazy. should be as widely prescribed as the meditations

[Myat Thura Aung · Rating 2 out of 5]

As a book not intended for professional philosophers, the quality suffers. It gets quite annoying especially in the third part where Fichte incessantly preaches about the greatness of the Almighty (the Infinite Will) and occasionally muses about the future life beyond this one as if he is trying so hard to ward off the accusations of atheism, and not helping much in presenting the unique features of his system. (Those passages on the Infinite Will doesn't add anything interesting to what Kant had to say about it.)
His treatment on the Will (infinite or otherwise) and the Moral Law is so much more sober and sophisticated in his earlier book the System of Ethics though this can be, surprise surprise, a bit obtuse.

[Xander · Rating 2 out of 5]

The Vocation of Man (1800) is Johann Gottlieb Fichte's popular account of his philosophical system. The book itself is rather short (about 120 pages long) and isn't hard to follow - that is, if one is familiar with Kant's epistemological and moral critiques. Fichte was a student, or rather a follower, of Kant and his philosophy. As such, he builds his own philosophy in interaction with the Kantian philosophy.

Already in the Preface, Fichte states that this form of presentation is aimed at a general public interested in philosophy, not the professors of the schools (he seems to dislike them - a lot). This leaves Fichte all the room to present his material to his readers in any way he deems best. The book speaks to the reader and invites her to follow in the steps the "I" takes. In general, The Vocation of Man consists of three parts and this triad contains a self-examination resulting in a world system that is real and governed by a universal Will.

Part I examines the main system of philosophy: naturalism, materialism, mechanism or however one likes to call it. We, as human beings, are intrinsic parts of the world system and as such are governed by the same laws as any piece of matter in the universe. Although this is a very consistent and convincing philosophy it leaves the "I" emotionally disturbed and in an existential crisis: there seems to be no place for freedom of the will.

As a matter of fact, Part II starts with the "I" who can't sleep due to the conclusions of his philosophical reflections. Possibly due to sleep deprivation, a spirit appears which starts a philosophical questioning along Socratic lines in which the "I" answers all sorts of questions and ends up, on his own account, at the opposite end of materialism: now he falls prey to subjective idealism. Suddenly, the world and everything in it is the product of one's own consciousness. All that exists is representations of one's own making - but then the "I" itself is an image as well. Ultimately, this philosophy brings the protagonist of the book no consolation.

Then, in Part III the spirit disappears and the "I" is on his own. He starts anew with his reflections and suddenly he stumbles on a third way: in me there seems to be a force directing me beyond my representations and my knowledge - a force which seems be an active one, spurring me on to action (as opposed to the passive one leading me to receive representations and knowledge). This marks the moment when Fichte releases all brakes: in the final third of The Vocation of Man we witness him building up the entire world (other human beings and all objects), the future, progress, universal peace, the spiritual world, the afterlife and even God from the notion of this internal will.

Through reflection I discover a will in me which spurs me to action. Acting (i.e. Kant's practical reason) presupposes purpose (other beings and things) and effects (future). Also, when acting I have the intrinsic notion that my actions shape the world, which brings to me the idea of good and bad - from this it's just a short leap to the notion of progress and universal human peace. But improving the world isn't the endpoint: I even grasp there's more to reality than just this physical world, hence the notion of the spiritual world. From this it's another short leap to the soul, the afterlife and an absolute, infinite Will as the foundation of all (i.e. God).

To rephrase all of the above: Fichte proves, or so he claims, the existence of objects, people, the future, etc. from the fact that my moral actions relate to purposes, effects, etc. For him, reality isn't a prerequisite of morality but rather vice versa: my conscious intuition of the moral law in me (cf. Kant) proves there's a reality for me to act in. Near the end of The Vocation of Man Fichte explicitly states that Nature is teleological: its purpose is to manifest and maintain Reason. And this should be read in absolute terms: this extends beyond death, it spans (literally) infinity, for I am eternally complete.

This is, of course, putting the horse behind the cart. And it's the fundamental problem of all forms of idealism: we obviously find ourselves in reality, we start doubting and raising questions about the world we find ourselves in. This is all fine. But the problems seem insoluble. Thus we start subverting reality to our own consciousness and then supposedly all is fixed. But this, of course, doesn't explain the existence of ourselves as thinking beings. A problem Descartes raised but neither he nor anyone after him convincingly solved. It's also the problem Fichte, ultimately, collapses on. He copies Kant's philosophy, cuts away the 'Welt an sich', inserts our consciousness and the moral law in it as the foundation of all of reality (and then some), and ends a satsisfied philosopher.

Of course this doesn't work. To show the problem, let me cite the final passages of The Vocation of Man:

"Everyone of my fellow-creatures, who leaves this earthly brotherhood, and whom my spirit cannot regard as annihilated, because he is my brother, draws my thoughts after him beyond the grave: he is still, and to him belongs a place. While we mourn for him here below, as in the dim realms of unconsciousness there might be mourning when a man bursts from them into the light of this world's sun, above there is rejoicing that a man is born into that world, as we citizens of the earth receive with joy those who are born unto us. When I shall one day follow, there will be but joy for me; sorrow shall remain behind in the sphere I shall have left.

The world, on which but now I gazed with wonder, passes away from before me, and sinks from my sight. With all the fullness of life, order and increase which I beheld in it, it is yet but the curtain by which one infinitely more perfect is concealed from me, and the germ from which that other shall develop itself. My faith looks behind this veil, and cherishes and animates this germ. It sees nothing definite, but it expects more than it can conceive here below, more than it will ever be able to conceive in all time.

Thus do I live, thus am I, and thus am I unchangeable, firm, and completed for all Eternity; - for this is no existence assumed from without, - it is my own, true, essential life and being." (pp. 124-125)

It is not that because we want the world, other people, God, the soul, afterlife, etc. to exist that they do exist. Substituting Kant's moral law for Kant's categories and then claiming you have proven the existence of all the above is simply ridiculous.

Before ending this review, I'll have to add the caveat that this is the only work of Fichte that I've read. Perhaps he has addressed many of the aforementioned points in his more professional writings - of this I can't say anything. So take this review with a grain of salt and simply use it to determine if you're interested in the subject matter or the author, and if so, after reading this book decide for yourself on which points I was right or not (and why).

[Josh · Rating 3 out of 5]

Although some of the most popular work of Fichte, I found this a little less enjoyable than his more theoretical work - but that is probably a result of my lack of interest in political philosophy etc. What I did find interesting is Fichte's account of intuition in general he provides here. It is really quite bizarre sounding (what does it mean for all intuition to be posited by the I?), but nonetheless important in understanding Fichte's break with Kant.

[Jacob Waller · Rating 4 out of 5]

Probably 3.5-4 stars, frustrating and annoying occasionally but the ending of the last book is pretty beautiful, even for non-religious people.

[Asher · Rating 3 out of 5]

If you eliminated the entire section on Faith it’d be a good book

[Leo46 · Rating 5 out of 5]

(4.5) This is an amazing culmination of Fichte’s project (mainly as the Science of Knowledge, or Wissenschaftslehre) in a concise, accessible piece. I only make the -.5 rating because of a ~10-page stretch in the last section on “Faith” which is an inexplicable tangent, which I believe omitting would make this book almost perfect. My own speculation is that this page was to cater to the critics who indicted Fichte with claims of atheism, which was potentially career-ending at the time, but I’ll digress.
The book is divided into 3 sections: “Doubt,” “Knowledge,” and “Faith.” The first section “Doubt" is basically the Cartesian exercise of searching within oneself a ‘knowledge' that is absolutely true— something that can't be doubted. However, the description from the 1st-person becomes confusing because Fichte gives the dogmatist (materialist) position first, which can be more easily understood as realism (that there is an external world of objects with categories of attributes in which you are a passive subject, which you have the choice to interact with and become active). He doesn’t preface this with any caveat and thus, it seems like he genuinely is arguing the dogmatic materialist point of view until a few pages before the end of the section. The ‘I’ in the book realizes such an acceptance of an external world of objects implies a givenness of those objects outside of your immediately perceived existence, but one cannot know anything unless it is IN their consciousness. This is essentially the Noumenal question in Kant, a world of ‘in-itself’ objects that we will never know but have to be asserted because ‘there must be a source for our appearances.’ The world of unknowable objects is painstaking to the ‘I’ because the noumenal authority asserts an overarching determinism if you are to believe the consistency in all objects--that the laws and theories of our world are correct and determine everything--including you (and your free will). Thus, the ‘I’ tries to go in the other direction of building a system of knowledge from free will first, instead of from objects first like the dogmatists. ‘Man’s desire to conquer nature’ manifests as free will but quickly is also dropped because external influences are clearly existent, the self is always limited by its perceptible capabilities, and the self can be restricted by others.
The second section “Knowledge” is written in the clearest way as a dialogue between ‘I’ (the finite individual subject) and ‘Spirit,’ who is an amorphous entity that speaks to you rhetorically to guide you through your internal reflection (‘you' means the ‘I’ in the book from now on in this review). Funnily enough, Fichte basically makes you think a certain way even if it isn't common sense, but the form of this method is ultimately great because it is written in conversational diction. The Spirit helps you in a new direction of finding a certain truth by essentially cutting the Cartesian cogito short--instead of “I think, therefore I am” it is just I am (= I think, simultaneously). “In all perception you only perceive your own condition,” says Spirit (29). All one knows is ‘I’—their finite subjectivity that is defined by its limits—in so far as one can only perceive their own generated perception and nothing else. Importantly, ‘nothing else’ means the external world does not exist— that the external world is structured and generated by our minds, by ‘I.’ There’s an always-already positing of the self (‘I’) in which the world is generated and generated FOR. Thus, the world is only for the self and the self is the construction of the world—of reality. Objects or an ‘in-itself’ do not exist as universally perceptible in an external world, rather the objects can only be constructed by the self and presupposed reciprocally to the ‘for-itself’ (i.e., consciousness, ‘I,’ self). Ironically, Fichte becomes more Kantian than Kant by departing from Kant, that is, by definitively making Noumena a LIMIT-CONCEPT rather than a truly external ‘in-itself’ AND authoritatively asserting a self-cogitative conception of perception for a true science of knowledge (some even see the Noumena as being discarded as the ‘limit’ is undoubtedly placed in the self, i.e., because everything is in the self). Critically, also, the positing of the self presupposes a ‘not-self.’ This is simply because any negating faculty that is the entirety of the structuring and categorizing of the world by the mind’s abilities of language, reason, concepts, abstractions, etc., IS necessary for the self to exist—to prove the positing of the self. If negation is true, the negation of the self is always-already possible. The Other is always-already possible. These are the upshots of the ‘knowledge’ section. (It is worth noting that Fichte doesn’t use the word ‘negation’ and thus, this is some Hegelian help to explain Fichte easier).
Lastly, in the third section “Faith,” the ‘I’ returns to itself without the company of Spirit. Since reality and the ‘world’ are only the generations within the self as the reciprocal presupposition of self and not-self, there is freedom of the self and the possibility of it being restricted by the not-self (or other rational beings). The ‘vocation’ of man is, thus, ACTIVITY according to Fichte. The only things one knows for certain is knowing that SOMETHING is happening, and that one can will a change to that something because one experiences that change’s accordance with one’s decision (will). Returning to Kant, this is clearly the realization of potentiality that is the transition from ‘possible’ to ‘actual’ in any event or occurrence in the universe. There is thus a ‘determination’ (not deterministic) of thought in which the possible is actualized as ‘real action.’ I call this the Maoist moment of Fichte--it is very close to the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge (one only ‘knows’ by ‘doing,’ by practice)--because action is the primary factor of knowledge. However, since one’s world is in the self for Fichte, action is even closer to thought--they are dialectically united as ‘activity.’ The only hole in this theory (which is arguably not a hole anymore, thanks to phenomenology and post-structuralism) is that activity must have a ‘drive.’ “I think this real power of mine to act, but I do not think it up. The immediate feeling of my drive to independent activity is behind this thought. Thought does nothing more than to represent this feeling and to take it up into its own form, the form of thought” (69). However, this is precisely what is answered by the Freudian ‘drive’ of the unconscious, which is a necessarily negative concept in that it is absolutely a limit, a negation, an abyss, a void, etc. that one cannot know. It is like the origin and death--both are NON-EXPERIENCES because they are neither spatial nor temporal, neither static nor dynamic (which are the defining factors of experience). If one cannot explain the origin of existence (of ‘why are we here?’ or ‘why are there things at all?’) or death (the negation of experience altogether), then one must have faith in either this world constructed by and in the self and/or origin (God) or death (afterlife, reincarnation, etc.). This explains the abhorrent tangent into God towards the end of the book that sounds unnecessarily preachy and non-rigorous, forcing an opportunistic equivalence between Fichtean God (that is like Lacan’s the Real) and Christian God. Nevertheless, his merit still stands, and he attempts a quick world-historical application of his novel idealism in which faith in the world and the other culminate for action’s purpose to be ethical. The ethical demand to progress the world in both reason and morality is Fichte’s loose takeaway that I call Fichtean communism as it is very reminiscent of the historical materialist description given of communism by Early Marx. However, Hegel will make this world-historical connection much stronger but with a lesser emphasis on action, I believe, but at least builds the bridge to Marx. One last thing is that the cool final upshot is that we can ‘never die’ in a sense because we can only know and experience life--death must be defined completely differently, i.e., it is not even a qualitative experience (even less so a conceivable phenomenon). “So I live and so I am, and I am unchangeable, firm and complete for all eternity” (123).
Ultimately, this is the most concise work to digest most of Fichte’s project without the rigorousness of The Science of Knowledge. It simultaneously shows how complex and thought-out German Idealism was from the beginning, and that (sorry Marxists) Marx and Engels essentially made a straw-man argument to be knocked down in the “German Ideology” (although that text has many different fruits for philosophy and the communist movement). Furthermore, Fichte essentially invents the vocabulary of the Hegelian dialectic and there is an immense amount of proto-Hegelian concepts (Geist even) already here, although it is not packaged as nicely as in Hegel, and that is why the latter is remembered and overshadows Fichte.

[Conner · Rating 5 out of 5]

Most impactful piece of philosophy I’ve ever encountered. Will elaborate soon.

[madelyn · Rating 1 out of 5]

cannot say enough negative things about this book. tormented me and ruined my life for two and half months. Johann Gotlieb Fichte is a bitch and I hate him. I would spend 12 hours a day going over the same ten or twelve pages, absconding with whatever level of understanding I possibly could from this disgusting text, just to realize I understood nothing. I would try to restart the same sentence so many times--this is one of those books that, though translated into english, feels like it needs a second level of translation, in english, to make sense of the first translation. I hate. this book. so much.

[Lara Cetkin · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a fundamental analysis of self-perception. It can be the beginning of particle physics.But the manipulative is to change God into the Great Will without changing its essence and principled operation.

[Chuck · Rating 4 out of 5]

Contains the greatest argument for idealism I've ever read.

[John A · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best things I've read in awhile. I have a strong passion for German Idealism now! These sort of ideas have flooded my own thoughts and perspectives of the world. Having someone break down the metaphysical reality of it all blew my mind away :D

"Man is not the mere product of the sensual world, and the whole aim of his existence cannot be attained in it. His high destiny is a lofty one, he must bee able to raise his thoughts above all sensual limits; where his true home is, thither must his thoughts necessarily fly, and his real humanity, in which his whole mental power is displayed, appears most when he raises himself above those limits, and all that belongs to the senses vanishes in a mere reflection to mortal eyes, of what is transcendent and immortal.

Many have raised themselves to this view without any course of intellectual inquiry, merely by nobleness of heart and pure moral instincts. They have denied in practice the reality of the sensual world, and made it of no account in their resolutions and their conduct, although they might never have entered the question of its real existence, far less have come to any conclusion in the negative."


"It is my duty to cultivate my understanding and to acquire knowledge, as much as I can, but purely with the intention of enlarging my sphere of duty; I shall desire to gain much, that much may be required of me. It is my duty to exercise my powers and talents in every direction, but merely in order to render myself a more convenient and better qualified instrument for the work I am called to do; for until the law of God in my heart shall have been fulfilled in practice, I am answerable for it to my conscience. It is my duty to represent in my person, as far as I am able, the most compete and perfect humanity; not for its own sake, but in order that in the form of humanity may be represented the highest perfection of virtue. I shall regard myself, and all that in me is, merely as the means to the fulfillment of duty; and shall have no other anxiety than that i may be able, as far as possible, to fulfill it. When, however, I shall have once resolutely obeyed the law of conscience, conscious of the purest intentions in doing so; when this law shall have been made manifest in practice, I have no further anxiety; for having once become a fact in the world, it has been placed in the hands of an eternal Providence. Further care or anxiety concerning the issue were but idle self-torment; would exhibit a want of faith and trust in that Infinite Power. I shall not dream of governing the world in His place; of listening to the voice of my own limited understanding, instead of His voice in my conscience, and substituting for His vast and comprehensive plans, those of a narrow and short-sighted individual. I know that to seek to do so, would be to seek to disturb the order of the spiritual world."

[Aung Sett Kyaw Min · Rating 2 out of 5]

In my opinion, Part 3 is unable to deliver on the promise of resolving the deadlock between the ideal (freedom) and the real (nature as system of objects) established at the conclusion of Part 1. The novelty of Fichte's 'ethics-first' approach that justifies the existence of the empirical world strictly as an arena for the realization of one's ethical summons to Others (simultaneously a Kantian gesture and a post-Kantian gesture of affirming the superiority of practical reason) is eclipsed by a dogmatic endorsement of the quasi deistic doctrine of the Infinite Will. In addition, Fichte invokes action to justify what theoretical contemplation alone cannot, only to later dismiss action as an element of the heteronomous world that can never fully actualize the intention viz Will.
Fitchte's meditation is a curious radicalisation of Cartesian skepticism, in which not only the existence of the material world and other minds, but also your own freedom and ipseity turns a strange dream without dreamers (part 2). How is it a 'curious' radicalistion? As it turns out, the apple of 'total skepticism' does not fall very far from the 'Idealist Self spinning in the void' tree. For this Idealist Self encounters everywhere only a product of its sublevel self-activity. So, if we wish to make room for absolute self-determination in a universe conceived as a system of objects which obey deterministic laws, we have to grant the realist intution that there has to be something genuinely external to the Self, or so the realization dawned in Fichte. This outside, this radical difference that splits us open but grants us access to the Kingdom of the Will, are Other Minds.
For Fichte, our intentions, having their source in our Will, are always pure, but we have to take it on faith that they discharge their effects frictionlessly and immediately in the transcendental realm. Meanwhile, things get messy when it comes to the realization of these intentions in the empirical world. We are compelled to act, to fulfill our ethical duties towards Others, yet we are only held accountable for the purity of the intention, not the consequences of our actions.

[Will Spohn · Rating 4 out of 5]

I think that of any book on philosophy that I have read, this may have been the hardest, yet I think I understood it quite well. I think that I understood it well because on the one hand it is written and laid out relatively accessibly, and on the other hand we are discussing it in a class I am taking. I think that this book should be read by anyone who is interested remotely in philosophy. The structure of the book is unique, in that it is narrated in first person. That being said, parts of it (specifically the second chapter) become extremely dense and difficult. The book also is on a fairly important topic, especially for someone my age: What is my purpose? It tackles this question from a very basic level, starting with reality first, and then proceeding from there. It also tackles the Spinoza Problem, in quite an interesting way, and comes to a very compelling conclusion. That being said, the final conclusion is quite strange, and I am not sure how tenable it is. Fichte seems to go off the deep end quite quickly, and in my (probably ill-founded) opinion over-extends himself. Despite my qualms with the book, it is certainly worth a close reading.

One point that I found interesting was that the eventual conclusion of Fichte's is that he places the ultimate "goal" of humanity beyond the current life, at least in a sense. While the basis for this may be sound, it reminded me of Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity and other religions, where by placing the aim of life beyond life, life itself becomes meaningless and even hated, which gives rise to a kind of Nihilism.

[Jesse · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book is mostly a rehash of Kantian morality, Fichte's Science of Knowledge (minus the proto-dialectics), and Fichte's Lectures on the Vocation of the Scholar. The final section elaborates on Fichte's Jacobin politics of the Scholar lectures - not only will the unity of Reason dominate the multiplicity of Nature, but the first country which truly overthrows its oppressive elites will become a "free state" that will be forced to spread freedom to the neighboring states as well as spread civilization to the "savages", after which freedom and peace will reign on earth. In contrast to the Scholar lectures, however, Fichte gives a much more Christian spin on his previous perfectionist conclusions, talking about the way our spiritual nature prepares us for a second, immaterial life where we will continue our infinite progress. This aspect was quite similar Mendelssohn's description of eternal life in "Jerusalem" (1783), and thus comes across as a regression compared to the increasingly radical and earthly understanding of religion that Schelling and Hegel will develop. To be fair, this heavenly emphasis may be a response to the charges of atheism and nihilism that were brought against Fichte in 1798, but I still found it tedious compared to the more vitalistic/pantheistic description of the force of nature which is hinted at throughout the book.

If you're familiar with Kant, I'd suggest just reading Fichte's Lectures on the Vocation of the Scholar instead.

[Karl Gilhespy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ich war erst etwas skeptisch, war dann aber stark von der angewendeten Logik und der schönen Sprache beeindruckt. Besonders die Dialoge zwischen dem Ich und dem Geist fand ich unglaublich inspirierend und aufschlussreich. Dieses Werk gliedert sich in drei Aspekte: Wissen, Glaube und Zweifel. Fichte erreicht so manche extrem scharfe Logik bei der Unterscheidung in diese drei Kategorien. Er stellt fest wie unvermögend und zweifelhaft das menschliche Urteilsvermögen überhaupt ist und wie schwach ausgeprägt es meistens von Natur aus ist. Wie viel können wir von dem Glauben was wir sagen?

"Alle Kraft des Menschen wird erworben durch Kampf mit sich selbst und Überwindung seiner selbst." Manch einer wird denken, ja klar, das weiß man doch. Aber solche Sätze werden dann noch viel genauer ausgeführt und schärft dadurch das Denken.

Ich will hier nicht zu viel schreiben, aber ich kann Fichte durchaus empfehlen. Natürlich nur jenen, die es wirklich lesen und nicht ihre Rezensionen aus Wikipedia-Artikeln zusammenbasteln.

[Brynhildr · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fichte got me in the second chapter, and lost me in the third. With the elimination of the thing-in-itself and 'reality' as the self/mind/ego simply positing itself, I think Fichte in a sense completed philosophy, reaching a point that is also seen often in Buddhism. Where Fichte lost me, however, is that he makes the turn, the same turn as much of philosophy and religion, of building upon this in a dogmatic way. Clinging to elaborations instead of embracing a true creative freedom. I think it is also in this that Novalis, who was a student of Fichte, is more interesting.

This is only one book, however, one which was intended for a wider audience. I might have misunderstood some things because I am not getting the entire picture. I will have to read more of Fichte.

[Gregory · Rating 3 out of 5]

Gdyby ktoś chciał się zapoznać z książką tego bardzo popularnego niegdyś filozofa, to może zachęci go ten cytat:
"Książka ta nie jest zatem przeznaczona dla zawodowych filozofów - oni nie znajdą w niej nic takiego, co by nie było wyłożone w innych pismach autora. Ma ona być natomiast zrozumiała dla wszystkich czytelników, którzy w ogóle są zdolni do zrozumienia jakiejś książki. Ci zaś, którzy pragną tylko wyuczone niegdyś zwroty powtarzać na pamięć w nieco odmiennym porządku i takie ćwiczenia uważają za rozmienie - ci, bez wątpienia, uznają tę książkę za niezrozumiałą."

Czy więc jesteś gotowy podjąć rękawice? ;)

Tylko dla koneserów filozofii :)

[Gav Smith]

I DNFed about 70% of the way through. I actually enjoyed and found value in the first two books, especially the Socratic formation of the second one, "Knowledge." You can see very well how the "I posits itself" comes about, and I appreciate how it's as if Fichte is personally inviting you to partake in his philosophy with him. The last chapter, though, just feels like a slog and covers the faith of German idealism, which I just don't have any interest in, and I feel my time could be put somewhere else in a more valuable way, especially considering the class I started reading this for has moved past discussing German Idealism.

[Dan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fichte and this book stand almost completely under the dominance of Kant's epistemology and ethics. Main topics are: doubt, freedom, determinism, conscience, knowledge, thing-in-itself, subject-object, representations, causality, sensations, reason, faith, God, duty, and similar. It is a good introduction to Kant and German Idealism; however, one may want to go directly to the master.

[Ruby Jusoh · Rating 3 out of 5]

I did not actually understand the earlier pages. Thankfully, the writing became a lot clearer afterwards. The conclusion is particularly impactful. The book discusses one's sense of purpose, one's many battles waged between spirit and mind and one's need to let go of certain things.

[Laura Frühwirth]

Nicht alle, er. Wie bilde ich meine Meinung, wie festige ich mein Sein, wie reflektiere ich über mich selbst? Fichte schreibt hier eine Selbstbetrachtung. Wie zieht man Schlüsse aus sich selbst und wie steht man in der Welt? Wie hängt alles zusammen? Wieder und wieder gleich formuliert.