William Philpott joined KCL's department of War Studies in September 2001 as a lecturer in military history, becoming Professor of the History of Warfare in 2011.He was previously a member of the Department in 1991–2, when he was a research fellow working for a collaborative research project investigating British civil–military relations, 'Government and the Armed forces in Britain, 1856-1990'. Before returning to the department he held teaching appointments in European and international history at the University of North London, Bradford University, and London Guildhall University.
Philpott is Secretary General of the British Commission for Military History and served on the Council of the Army Records Society from 1998-2009, holding the office of Honorary Secretary, 2000–2005. He is currently chair of the University of London’s Military Education Committee, and sits on the council of the National Army Museum.
Philpott has published extensively in the fields of First World War history and twentieth century Anglo-French relations including monographs, textbooks, journal articles and book chapters. His recent international history of the battles of the Somme, Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme and the Making of the Twentieth Century (Little, Brown, 2009) won the 2009 Society for Army Historical Research Templer Medal and the US Western Front Association’s Norman B. Tomlinson Jr Book prize.
I am drawn to the Battle of Somme because of the scale of the conflict and the horrendous casualties, especially in the British Army, where in the first battle itself it lost a mind boggling more than a quarter of a million men without any appreciable results. The pathos and tragedy of this great loss is set in the backdrop of some of the best war poetry from any era. We have been brought up on the literature of 'lions led by donkeys,' where the heroism of the soldier is contrasted with the incompetence of the generals. Field Marshal John Haig and his staff come in for special calumny. The Author, on the other hand takes a holistic view of the strategy and tactics of all the protagonists who participated and sets the record straight in many ways. He clearly brings out that the French fought better, achieved better results with far fewer casualties. Their most outstanding general (and perhaps the most outstanding of the war on either side) was Marie-Emile Fayolle, whose soldiers excelled in trench warfare and achieved better results. The German themselves were tenacious defenders. It should be understood that this was the first instance of a static industrial war and lessons were being learnt on the fly. The British Army was learning as it fought and by 1918 was a fine fighting machine. The Author points out that our impressions of the Battle have been shaped by the flawed writings of Churchill and AJP Taylor, which remained unchallenged till lately. Haig has been handled with more understanding as he struggled to retain his Country's strategic relevance and still be a critical factor in the Entente struggles. His flaws have been well brought out, but one can now better understand, why the politicians, who detested him, could not find a replacement for him. It should also be noted that the Battles of Somme were dictated by the blood letting at Verdun. The French Army and the poilu were, perhaps at the apex of their professional capability, and the sacrifice and determination to win through only excites ones admiration. It's a pity that this great army's achievements were overlooked by their defeat in World War 2. Foch, the architect of the 1918 victories, gets his rightful place amongst military geniuses. By the time the battles were over, the overall casualties on the Somme were a million and a half. The Author's meticulous hard work is admirable and the book deserves to be read by all who want a more balanced view of that great conflict.
Thoroughly sourced, duly considered and well written reappraisal of war on the Western Front in the light of industrial warfare and its most cynical exponent, the war of attrition - or simply put, the country that can produce most materiel and men will eventually win the war. And since by 1915 it was clear that none of the opponents could win a swift victory with a war of movement, they aimed to bleed each other to death. By the time the Somme offensive was launched the Allies knew Germany could never be victorious. The only question was how long they would hold out - or how big the sacrifice would be. And it was big beyond all imagination.
An excellent and balanced account and analysis of the Somme battles of WWI. Broadly revisionist, it has a particularly good penultimate chapter on current remembrances of the Somme.
This book places the battle of the Somme in its full context, setting it not just as a battle in its own right, but part of the wider battle that encompasses the fighting from 1915 until the summer of 1918 on the western front. When viewed through this prism, Philpott argues that the success and significance of the Somme has been underplayed in history, with the focus being on the human tragedy (which is never denied), and the myths that have grown from interwar views, notably those of Churchill and Lloyd George, but also Liddell Hart and A.J.P Taylor. This view of the battle, and many heavy weight historians are taken to task here, the flaws and agendas in their arguments exposed.
The author also brings to the fore the role of France and the French army in the battle, restoring their rightful lace in its history, in a way that has not been done before, reminding the reader that France was not just involved in Verdun in 1916, but had an important role to play on the Somme too. This alone makes the book required reading for a serious scholar of the western front.
Certainly not a popular history, this weighty tome, the hard back version is in excess of 600 pages, has an impressive scope, focusing not just on the military tactics deployed but the wider geopolitical, entente politics, and historical context for the battle. The tragedy of the soldiers experience is alluded too, but this is not a bringing to life of the individual soldier's experience, and in fact argues how this focus has distorted our understanding of the battle.
Philpott lays out the events of the Battle of the Somme with clarity, and attempts to explain the logic of attritional warfare. His maps could be clearer/better-aligned with the text- I often had to flip back many pages in order to try to find a layout of the events described.
I read this book as a part of my project to read one book from every aisle in Olin Library. You can read more about the project, find reactions to other books, and (eventually) a fuller reaction to this one here: https://jacobklehman.com/library-read...
Fantastic book for anyone looking to study the Battle(s) of the Somme. Immense detail and thoroughly researched. The book tends to have a heavy pro-France focus during the War.
Frustrating. A well-researched and detained book, but Philpott constantly defends Haig without providing any supporting empirical evidence. He clearly believes the French were far more efficient and effective on the Somme (particularly Foch and La Fayolle), and had a better grasp of the strategy of attrition than the British and Commonwealth forces. He maintains that this was a 'learning experience' for the British Army, but as Paschendaele was to show a year later, the C-in-C was still wasting resources at an alarming rate. The Somme was two years into the War, so it seems disingenuous to say (at least of the generals) that the BEF were still learning; indeed the 'bite-and-hold' tactics of Rawlinson suggests more mature thinking than the ever shifting and unrealistic aims of Haig. Philpott also shows an unreasonable prejudice against the opinions of Churchill and Lloyd-George, ignoring that the latter in particular was far more directly accountable to Parliament and public opinion than Haig. The 'learning curve' of The Somme and thereafter appears to be more bottom-up than top-down (an opinion expressed by Hugh Sebastian-Montefiore when I spoke to him at Hay).
Interestingly Philpott proposes that The Somme was not just the turning-point of World War 1, but of C20th history: the latter viewpoint is very much up for grabs (for example, what about the 37 days leading from Sarajevo to the declaration of war?), but even within the Great War it could be said that Verdun was the first campaign which committed both sides full-bloodedly to a strategy of attrition. Whilst the Germans suffered 340,000 casualties at Verdun (which began almost 5 months before The Somme and ended after it), of their 500,000 casualties in the latter campaign only about half were inflicted by British and Commonwealth forces, which in turn suffered 482,000 casualties (the rest of the German casualties were inflicted by the French, at a significantly lower cost to themselves). In terms of fightIng a war of attrition, the Somme Campaign does not represent a good result for Haig.
A very long and hard read, I am very glad I decided to read this book. It has been a real eye-opener in regards to what I thought I knew about the Battle of the Somme and the Western Front of World World 1 in general.
The three arm perspective (French, German, and British Commonwealth) gave a really good overview of the entire battle beyond the British perspective that is most common in English language books (I presume). But what I really enjoyed was that the author took the book beyond the trenches and talked about the political climate at the time, as well as how civilians thought and felt about what they thought was going on. It gave military decisions a new understanding to know that the senior officers in charge had to have one eye on the battle and one on their governments, as they could be removed or demoted by their civilian political bosses. Hard to believe that civilian heads of governments would actually interfere in military planning.
The book didn't have a lot of Canadian content and I was a little surprise where Canada was left out, but I will be reading more Canadian-centric books now that I have a better understanding of the overall situation. What I did appreciate is the attention paid to the Australian Forces, who are often overlooked. Definitely a country you want to fight along side of, not against! Also, the author specifically mentioned the Newfoundland Regiment and some of the buddy regiments formed in the UK and the impact a war of attrition had on smaller units raised in very specific areas. The juxtaposition in Newfoundland of July 1 being a day of mourning with the rest of Canada celebrating Canada Day is one I don't think many Canadians are aware of. So it was nice to see that their sacrifice was acknowledged.
Philpott's monumental (700 odd pages) account of the Battle of the Somme describes one of the greatest of military dramas in great detail, yet it never loses your interest. The epitome of the new 'industrial war', the Somme saw bloodletting on an unprecedented scale as millions of men were thrown at each other in a maelstrom of artillery and machine gun fire. A battle of 'attrition', the objective was not so much to capture enemy territory as to deplete their men and materiel. On the first day of the battle, Britain suffered the highest casualty rate in its history with some 19000 dead and tens of thousands injured, many in the first hour of battle as they went 'over the top' following an inadequate artillery bombardment. Haig was to suffer sever criticism from, among others, Churchill and Lloyd George, for the loss of life. Their painting of Haig as a 'butcher' would ultimately become his popular legacy. But Philpott takes a different view, arguing that there was no alternative - other than surrender with its consequences - to Haig's attritional strategy, although he is critical of Haig's poor execution of the plan. He also brings to the fore the forgotten role of the French, who mastered the art of advancing behind an artillery barrage faster than the British and were much more successful in the early fighting on the Somme. With World War One's 100th anniversary coming up, this book is essential reading.
I reserved this book from my librarys online portal and was a little surprised to be handed this giant tome (although the last 100 or so pages are academic references.)
Perhaps it was my fault for not researching the book in advance as I found it very heavy to read, subject matter aside. The book focuses almost exclusively on the top rank, the politicians and the generals whereas I think I might have prefered something more relatable from the rank and file in the trenches. Because of this I did not enjoy it as much as some other history books I have read and so have given it 3 stars, not because of the quality of the book but it was not a good fit for me.
Philpot does an excellent job of explaining the dreadful attritional strategy of the Allies, pointing out how much ahead the French were in making best use of the new industrial techniques of warfare. The British killed a lot of people as they learnt how to follow best practice- sadly including my paternal grandfather on day 1.
Also an interesting chapter on current commemoration of the battle.
I have read a number of the books describing this particular battle and as time moves on so the retrospective view of the battle changes. And this book follows on from the recent publications in identiying and further discussing the successes as well as athe disastrous aspects of the battle over the period July to Nov 1916.
So comprehensive, so massive, and so exhaustively cited that Philpott may very well have done what so many historians strive to do: make their topic an academic no-man's land for the conceivable future.
It commendably combines absurd expansiveness with a novel thesis. A highly necessary (and welcome) antidote to the otherwise all-prevailing "absolute tragedy thesis" that seems to mark the rest of the major writings on this campaign.