Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign

by Edward J. Erickson

The Ottoman Army won a historic victory over the Allied forces at Gallipoli in 1915. This was one of the most decisive and clear-cut campaigns of the Great War. Yet the performance of the Ottomans, the victors, has often received less attention than that of the Allied army they defeated.

Edward Erickson, in this perceptive new study, concentrates on the Ottoman side of the campaign. He looks in detail at the Ottoman Army - at its structure, tactics and deployment – and at the conduct of the commanders who served it so well. His pioneering work complements the extensive literature on other aspects of the Gallipoli battle, in particular those accounts that have focused on the experience of the British, Australians and New Zealanders. This highly original reassessment of the campaign will be essential reading for students of the Great War, especially the conflict in the Middle East.

Genres: History, World War I

288 pages, Hardcover

First published June 1, 2010

About the author

Edward J. Erickson is a retired regular U.S. Army officer at the Marine Corps University and is an authority on the Ottoman Army during World War I, a subject on which he has written widely. Erickson is also an associate of International Research Associates, Seattle, Washington.

Reviews

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Your understanding of the Gallipoli campaign is incomplete unless you've read Professor Erickson's fine operational study of the Ottoman Army's role. Tersely written, this book examines the importance of the Gallipoli area in the Balkan Wars, and then goes on to narrate how the Ottoman Army dealt with the Allied invasion of the area, which they did handily, by the way. Having adapted German command and staff procedures, and allowing for the fact that several of their large units were actually commanded by German officers - notably the 5th Army by Liman von Sanders - the Ottomans responded crisply and intelligently to the Allied attacks, which is more than one can say for the attacks themselves. The star of the initial Ottoman defense: Turkey's future leader Mustafa Kamal (“I don’t order you to attack, I order you to die.”), whose 19th Division showed up just in time to stymie the Anzacs. The Turks, their reputation as "slow-witted peasants" notwithstanding, were actually a modern and well-lead military, with plenty of recent combat experience from their role in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. The work concludes with a helpful chapter on the Ottoman logistical setup which, given that the campaign was fought in close proximity to the the center of the Empire, was superior to the British one. You have to conclude that, at Gallipoli, the better army won. The text is accompanied by reprints of the original operational maps printed in the official Turkish history of the campaign and are helpful, but they would have been even more so had the author translated them into English. Other than that, this is a useful and thought-provoking addition to the copious bibliography of the Dardanelles Campaign.

[Ozgur · Rating 4 out of 5]

Çanakkale Muharebesi politik motivasyonla üretilmiş bir çok efsaneye konu olmuştur. Belki de bunun nedeni hem Avustralya/Yeni Zelanda hem de Türk kolektif bilinç inşa süreçlerinde bolca kullanılmasıdır. Söz konusu inşa süreçlerine tepki olarak gelişen politik söylemler ise kendi mitlerini yaratmışlardır. Ülkemizde varolan ve birbirini üreten iki anlatıdan birincisi Çanakkaleyi yenilmesi neredeyse imkansız bir düşmana karşı mukaddes duygular ve kişisel kahramanlık hikayeleri ile kazanılan bir zafere indirgemektedir. Buna tepki olarak yaygınlaşan diğer anlatı ise Çanakkaledeki Osmanlı zaferini Entente güçlerinin hatalarına, gemilerin pre-drednot olmasına, Osmanlı ordusundaki alman subaylarla açıklayıp çubuğu diğer tarafa bükmektedir. İki yaklaşım da aslında muharebenin belirleyici unsurunun operasyonel kararlar, emir komuta ve koordinasyon olduğunu ve Osmanlı kurmay ve muharip kadrosunun bu açıdan ne kadar verimli ve etkili davrandığını gözden kaçırmaktadır. Bu konuda yazılmış birçok anı ve Genelkurmay etüdler dairesinin sunduğu detaylı analizleri toplayan Erickson Osmanlı Ordusunun operasyonel kabiliyeti ve emir komuta verimliliğini değerlendiren ilk İngilizce eseri sağlayarak literatürdeki önemli bir eksiği gidermektedir. Kitabın büyük bir kısmı askeri terimler ve haritalarla dolu olduğu için bu konuda az bilgisi olan okurlara büyük ihtimal sıkıcı gelecektir ancak Çanakkale Muharebeleri ile ilgili temel bilgisi zaten olanlar için kitabın önemli bir katkı olduğunu düşünüyorum.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A useful operational history of the campaign from the Ottoman side.

Erickson does a fine job showing how the Germans and Turks planned the defense, how courageous the Ottoman troops were, how aggressive their officers were , how the Turks had a better reporting system that led to better situational awareness, and how much more flexibility their force structure had. He also ably covers the logistics of the defense, as well as how many Turkish officers were relieved of command in the midst of battle. Erickson attributes many of the Turkish successes to lessons learned in the Balkan Wars.

The narrative is mostly engaging, but can at times be terse and heavy on statistics, troop movements, and casualty figures. The description of the battles can also get pretty bare-bones (attack, counterattack, etc.), with little on the soldiers’ personal experience. Also, the only maps are reprints from the Turkish Army’s official history, so they, unfortunately, aren’t translated.

A thorough, well-researched work.

[John Grinstead · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'm intrigued by the view provided in the description of this book that "This was one of the most decisive and clear-cut campaigns of the Great War.", particularly having read this account. Both the Allies and the Ottoman troops suffered enormous casualties and, but for poor decision making, poor leadership and a certain amount of happen chance, either side could have easily won or lost this campaign on a number of occasions.

I am currently researching the campaign and, from the wealth of available books on the subject, I was drawn to this as providing a very different perspective than that which is normally portrayed from either the Allied or German sources. Whilst a clearly well-researched and detailed account, it is, however, not a good starting point for someone without a basic understanding of the key features of the campaign. Erickson makes frequent reference to alternative views proffered by other authors and it would be clearly helpful if one had read at least one of the major accounts of the campaign as background and to provide a reference point for his narrative. I'm now reading Tim Travers' work, which seems to provide a reasonable stepping off point that provides both an Allied perspective interspersed with some relevant German and Turkish views on some of the key battles and issues that ultimately affected the outcome.

The work is nonetheless important in providing some balance and alternative interpretations of key events from previously untapped, primarily Turkish, sources, as well as insights to some of the influential personalities over and above the usual suspects.

So, a good, detailed read, capable of providing an interesting counter point to those more traditional accounts written from a British or ANZAC perspective. I suspect that I will be returning to read this after having researched the subject more extensively, when its real value will come to the fore.

[Tony · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not a stand-alone history, but a useful addition of Turkish sources to the existing literature. The middle and later portions are useful, unit-level recountings of Ottoman action that demonstrate command and control as well as agency. But the work as a whole (and particularly in early chapters) --because it was reacting to a perceived bias in Gallipoli historiography-- was at times tedius, tendentious, and teleological.

[George · Rating 4 out of 5]

A strong addition to the narrative on the Gallipoli campaign. Most of what we've seen in print and film on this campaign focuses on the Allies and the horrors of their experiences. The general opinion is that the Allies could have won had they been competently led. The Allies could have pressed the earlier naval campaign and avoided the ground campaign had they not withdrawn their ships after losing several major ships to mines. The author relies heavily on contemporary Turkish sources to cast serious doubts on the belief that Ottoman coastal defenses would have collapsed in short order based largely on ammunition shortages. The author spends most of his time refuting that the Allies lost the ground campaign primarily as a result of their mistakes, but rather as a result of the professional expertise of the Ottoman high command in the theater and the training and resolve of the Ottoman troops on the battlefield. A number of the leading Ottoman officers had been previously assigned to the area and were highly familiar with the terrain and their defenses. Plus, the Ottomans put the time between the outbreak of the war in Western Europe and the later Ottoman entry into the war to good use and put great emphasis on training their troops on the peninsula in the months prior to the Allied invasion. All in all, well worth reading.

[Edward A. Rock, Jr. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent Historical Description

This book is for the military historians interested in the command and control of the battle for Gallipoli. Highly recommended reading for military leaders.

[Atilla Gallipoli_1915 · Rating 5 out of 5]

Çanakkale Savaşları'nda Osmanli 5. Ordu harekatlari hakkinda bir başucu kitabı.

[Jeff J. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Unlike other histories of the battle for Gallipoli I’ve read this account focuses on Turkish decision-making.

[Aznable · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is both an exhaustive and engaging look at the Ottoman's 5th Army and its involvement in the Gallipoli campaign. It shed a detailed light on the readiness, actions, and results while remaining fair to the content. My only complaint, as someone who is just learning of the battle, is that it does not have the space for the other side. However, Erickson points out the wealth of information on Allies view at every point.