Lenin’s Last Struggle

by Moshe Lewin

One of the great political strategists of his era, V. I. Lenin continues to attract historical interest, yet his complex personality eludes full understanding. This new edition of Moshe Lewin's classic political biography, including an afterword by the author, suggests new approaches for studying the Marxist visionary and founder of the Soviet state. Lenin's Last Struggle offers invaluable insights into the rise of the Bolshevik party and the Soviet Union, a saga complicated by complex strategic battles among the leaders of Lenin's leaders whose names are universally known, but whose personalities and motivations are even now not sufficiently understood.Moshe Lewin was a collective farm worker in the USSR and a soldier in the Soviet army. He later became director of studies at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris, a fellow of the Kennan Institute, a senior fellow of Columbia University's Russian Institute, and is now emeritus professor of history at The University of Pennsylvania.

Genres: History, Russia, Politics, Lenin, Russian History, Nonfiction, Biography

Paperback

First published January 1, 1967

Reviews

[CivilWar · Rating 5 out of 5]

An incredible book. The author, although not a Marxist, perfectly shows how Lenin, in his last works, struggled against the degeneration of the Russian State that arose out of the civil war, with the greatest thoroughness. He criticized where the revolution had gone and perfectly saw many of the issues that would become staples of criticisms of the Italian communist left: the relationship between Party and State, administrating the State for the sake of the State rather than the revolution, the possible solution of a Soviet Asia being the way out of the isolation of the country, the need for the European revolution to succeed if Russia was to become truly socialist, the danger of Great Russian chauvinism, etc. The way with which Lenin saw the erosion of the Party and State, the way he saw the danger that Stalin, not as an individual, but merely as an expression of a general opportunist, principleless tendency within the Party, that eventually won out.

Lenin was truly in line with the Marx quote: "proletarian revolutions, like those of the nineteenth century, constantly criticize themselves, constantly interrupt themselves in their own course, return to the apparently accomplished, in order to begin anew; they deride with cruel thoroughness the half-measures, weaknesses, and paltriness of their first attempts, seem to throw down their opponents only so the latter may draw new strength from the earth and rise before them again more gigantic than ever, recoil constantly from the indefinite colossalness of their own goals – until a situation is created which makes all turning back impossible".

[Helen · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book covers Lenin´s attempts to reform the Soviet government in the final two years of his life, and would be of interest to those looking for some new insight/slant into the life and work of the Bolshevik leader and founder of Soviet Union. Lenin was hobbled by his stroke but still worked until the end of his life, trying to straighten out various issues with regard to normalizing the division of power/responsibility among various state organs, committees etc., although the state was still in essence a dictatorship - there were of course numerous organizations, committees, etc., to which some power or responsibility was delegated. When the Bolsheviks seized power from the Provisional Government in October 1917, the new state had to be invented on the fly and in the face of a civil war started by those who did not agree with the coup that brought the Bolsheviks to power. The new regime could have collapsed at any time, or been overwhelmed militarily by their opponents (also backed by several Western powers who had invaded Russia) - no doubt the popularity of the Communists must have depended on the dream of a better future that communism seemed to promise, as well as the fact that the revolution had allowed the down-trodden peasants and proletariat to overthrow the exploiting class. The future of the country - collectivization, industrialization - still lay ahead, but for the moment even for those who did not quite understand what communism was all about, they would rather support Lenin/Bolsheviks than return to the old system of hereditary monarchy, the landed gentry/nobility, the stifling influence of religion instead of progress/science. Obviously, as the Soviet Union developed, the freedom that some thought would arrive with communism, never did, as the threats to the new state´s existence, internal and external, meant that Lenin early on started a secret police and so forth, organs of state control that eventually made a mockery of the original promise of communism as a liberation movement. The repression was underway almost from the beginning of the communist period of Russian history - and sadly, it was a continuation of repression under the monarchy, which also had to maintain its grip on power using secret police, while relying on a different mythos - based on religion - to offer suffering ordinary people some hope for the future, as well as justification for the rule of the hereditary monarch. In some ways, the communist regime simply switched myths and continued the prior repressive system. Still, it must be said that Russia was really going nowhere fast under the tsar - and some change was needed. There had been a recognition of the need for change since at least the middle of the 19th Century; despite the freeing of the serfs, their lot had not improved much. By the time of the Revolution in 1917, 80% of the country was still illiterate. The incredible effort needed to bring Russia into the 20th C might never have been accomplished by the ruling class had there not been a revolution, since the nobility/monarchy had not made much progress in this regard in the prior century. One of the reasons the revolution succeeded was probably the sense that if something wasn't done fast, Russia probably would have gone down the tubes as a country - it would have probably been overrun by some other power, and possibly partitioned and permanently obliterated as a state. It couldn't compete with the other great powers as it was constituted in the pre-revolutionary era. Had it not had a revolution, it might have ended up like the former Ottoman Empire - taken apart by England, France, the US etc - almost entirely destroyed, subject to national liberation movements by its colonial possessions - because of its disastrous performance in the First World War, which followed another defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. The country was so unequal in terms of development, there wasn't a large middle class that could have pushed for a bourgeois revolution. There were the oligarchic nobles, industrialists, landowners, and the mass of downtrodden people in cities and the countryside. The revolutionists ended up thinking that they had to use fire to fight fire - the same methods of the monarchy to extirpate traces of the past class structure. The process unfortunately was quite ugly, and even led to mass deaths as with the de-kulakization efforts, and it didn't lead to the ¨promised land¨ of ¨communist freedom.¨ Sadly, it led to paranoia and repression as the state used every means at its disposal to maintain its rule. The pluses - eliminating illiteracy, improving in general the life of the people (those that survived the process of ¨communist reform¨), implementing industrialization, and building up the military such that the country was able to finally win wars - notably, the Second World War - can´t be minimized 0r belittled, especially considering the backward state from which the country was starting in 1917. But the price paid to attain the country´s modernization was very steep indeed. Possibly still being paid in terms of a seeming apathy or passivity, a willingness to accept top-down rule rather than call out wrongs, such as corruption - perhaps because there always was top-down rule and corruption in Russia, no matter the political system in place. People in general may not care to complain because of the possibility they may be identified as a dissenter and suffer negative consequences one way or another. Perhaps the severe repression of the Stalin years ended with the death of Stalin in 1953, but the centralized system that looked to perpetuate itself - and these days, enrich itself - has left a scar on Russian society that probably will always persist. It is perhaps due to a weakness of independent institutions since way back that the country seems to keep falling into one abyss of unjust centralization after another. The monarchy retained all power once, and could not be challenged since it had co-opted any/all other possible power centers, such as the church, or the nobility. Under communism, opponents were generally smashed or repressed in the name of Soviet state communism. Since the fall of communism, centralization is subtler - Russia has the outward form of a modern society, but its institutions remain weak, which is why it is still vulnerable to strong-man rule, such as that of V. Putin. Perhaps Russians still feel that they are constantly under attack and therefore must support a strong ruler as they bet on him to protect them from ever-multiplying external threats. Still, it is no way to live: The sometimes violent tactics of repressing opponents sends a clear signal to the populace to obey or risk something negative happening. This is the opposite of a free society - and the example of what happened to previous centralized systems in Russia (each overthrown in revolutions) must give the current government some pause. If Russia can continue to win wars - mostly local/minor wars in the Caucasus or E. Europe - then Putin will probably continue to remain in power. The Russian state has always been about winning wars, expansionism, the militarized state - and sadly, this is still the case, it seems. Perhaps here in the USA, democracy developed to the extent that it did because we have the luxury of huge buffer zones of oceans protecting us from any power that might wish to invade. We didn't have to have a continual ¨siege mentality." And so government could afford to allow all sorts of viewpoints to develop - the fact that there is a regular, peaceful alternation of parties in power, and all sorts of viewpoints find listeners or adherents in a marketplace of ideas, without anyone getting in trouble for ascribing to one view or another - underlines the lack of a permanent ¨state of emergency¨ mindset, which would make a more unified viewpoint necessary or crucial for survival. It´s possible that given Russia´s geopolitical situation a Western style democracy can never be successfully imported into the country - since it has been invaded many times through history, and its heroes are mostly those who militarily saved the country one way or another. If you are under attack, of course you´ll support a competent military leader who might save your life, if not the country. This I think is the source of Russia´s tendency to centralize under any economic or political system. They may think it´s inevitable or necessary given the external threats they've always faced - a situation that is difficult for us to imagine. Rather than blab on about why Russia more or less remains a centralized society built on some degree of repression, I´ll just observe that I do not think Russia, as weak as it is economically since the fall of communism, should be counted out or dismissed as a second rate has-been, but nor do I think it will ever become a France or Germany. Putin probably is playing on revanchist tendencies in trying to control the former Soviet states to some extent - even annexing part of Ukraine and marching into E. Ukraine. Let´s just hope these moves don´t result in a new world war in Europe.

Here are the quotes from the book:

¨...however fragmentary the notes [of the secretaries caring for Lenin} of the ¨Journal¨ may be, they are enough to show the intense and passionate struggle that Lenin, paralyzed and no doubt aware of his approaching end, was waging not only against physical decline but also against the leadership of his party.¨

¨There is always a risk that men will become corrupted by power and privilege. The leaders and administrators of the state that has emerged from a revolution, even if they belong to the often courageous, idealistic and dedicated elite that made the revolution, are tempted to attach more value to their privileges than to the function that justifies them....¨

¨...it became ...obvious during the first months of the Revolution, and even before the destruction wrought by the civil war, that the working class alone was not capable of governing, or even of running the factories in which they worked. The works committees, the workers´ councils and the workers´ control--created spontaneously and authentically in the revolutionary enthusiasm that immediately followed the seizure of power as the result of a libertarian upsurge of anarcho-syndicalist inspiration--had been fully legitimized by Lenin in his ¨State and Revolution,¨ but they were characterized by a degree of confusion and inefficiency capable of paralyzing the country´s productive machinery.¨

¨In the face of large, well-equipped ¨White¨ armies supported by several Western countries, a strict centralism and absolutism became imperative.¨

¨...[authoritarian] methods, which were sanctioned in no way either by theory or by statute, but which had been practiced for three years, became a reality of Party life.¨

¨The protests that arose, with the launching of the NEP, against a procedure [of appointments from above for political reasons] regarded as anti-democratic and contrary to the elective principle enshrined in the Party statutes were ineffectual.¨

¨The Bolsheviks ... believed in the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The substitution of the Party for the proletariat ... had to be introduced ... into the theory; it was regarded as a temporary phenomenon that would disappear when the workers were reorganized in the large factories and when industry was strengthened by its future achievements. In fact, it initiated managerial rule in the factories and in the country a a whole, and the bureaucracy began its long reign.¨

¨The socioeconomic bases indispensable to the realization of the official aims of the state were cruelly lacking.¨

¨...the absence of a proletariat and ...an economic infrastructure [meant the dictatorship was at least initially hamstrung]. ... This was very far from the optimistic, Utopian and simplified notions expressed in Lenin´s ¨State and Revolution¨ in 1917, in which all problems seemed to have been solved in advance by the example of the Paris Commune.¨

¨There is nothing very surprising about such uncertainties [the shifting official revolutionary time-lines published by the Bolsheviks, such as when the tasks of a bourgeois-democratic revolution had been accomplished]; only the long-term results of the October Revolution could enable its true character to be determined.¨

¨Lenin used the term ¨state capitalism¨ [to describe the NEP] because he was counting on the cooperation of Russian capitalism and, even more so, of large foreign capitalist interests; he thought that Russia needed a long period of capitalist development in order to assimilate organizational methods and technical expertise, and to acquire the capital and the intellectual abilities that the Workers´ State did not yet possess.¨

¨But two years later, contradicted by the facts, [state capitalism] ... had to be abandoned. Having failed to obtain the cooperation of big capital, Lenin set out to win the cooperation of the peasantry.¨

¨The first evil to cure...was that of bureaucracy. Lenin admitted, ¨We do not know how to do this.¨"

¨...after three appalling years of war, struggle, work and anxiety, [Lenin] ... fell ill.¨

¨The shape of the future triumvirate of Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev, based only on hatred of Trotsky and a determination to bar him from power, began to appear during these days [toward the end of 1921].¨

¨These [high-handed, illegal, and brutal centralizing] practices were congealing into a system whose rationale did not stem from the aspirations of the October Revolution.¨

¨According to Lenin, the Party leaders had not even understood the first principle that should guide them in seeking, in an internationalist spirit, a solution to the national question. The proletariat must, in its own interests, win the confidence of the borderlands, which were profoundly mistrustful of the majority nation that had subjected them to so many insults and repeated acts of injustice. The situation was such that if the larger nation was content simply to proclaim a formal equality, its attitude could be described as bourgeois. In order to make amends for the wrongs committed against the small nations, the big nation must accept an inequality unfavorable to itself. It must practice a kind of discrimination against itself in order to compensate for the de facto inequality that continued to exist to the detriment of the small nations. There must be an increase in the concessions made to the small nations and in measures taken in their interest.¨

¨That day, March 7, [Lenin] ... suffered another serious attack. On March 10, half his body was paralyzed. He never recovered the power of speech. Lenin´s political life was now over. He was only fifty-three years old. He died eleven months later on January 21, 1924.¨

¨...the world situation was now developing in a very different way from that expected by the Bolsheviks after their seizure of power. No revolution had taken place in Western Europe. The only country where a revolution had very nearly taken place--Germany--had been crushed by the Allies. The victorious nations on the other hand, had acquired an unexpected stability and seemed to be in a position to offer their proletariats enough advantages to make the possibilities of revolution in the West recede for the moment.¨

¨The seizure of political power in the absence of an adequate infrastructure, the dictatorship of the proletariat almost without a proletariat, led by a party in which the proletariat was in the minority, the readmission of capitalism after a supposedly socialist revolution, almost unlimited power being invested in an enormous bureaucratic state machine--all these undeniable facts were in flagrant contradiction to both Marxist theory and common sense.¨

¨The whole of Lenin´s program for the peasants might be summed up by the slogan ¨cultural revolution.¨

¨Although this program was called a [cultural] ¨revolution,¨ it would take a long historical period to be carried out.¨

¨[Lenin] ... now believed that cooperation was the right method of guiding the peasant class towards socialist structures.¨

¨[Lenin:] ...given the class victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, the system of civilized cooperators is the system of socialism.¨

¨Lenin, who always claimed to be an orthodox Marxist, who no doubt did use the Marxist method in approaching social phenomena, and who saw the international question in class terms, approached the problem of government more like a chief executive of a strictly ¨elitist¨ turn of mind.¨

¨[Lenin´s conviction of the cultural under-development of workers and peasants] ... was why Lenin was strongly opposed to anything that savored, however remotely, of bourgeois democracy. He might have benefitted from further thought on this matter, but in the immediate situation, any recourse to democratic practice would have soon led to the eviction of the Bolsheviks from power.¨

¨A regime must find some other social basis than the apparatus of repression itself.¨

¨The Stalinist period might be defined...as the substitution of the bureaucracy for the original social basis of the regime, namely, the working class, a section of the poorest peasants and certain strata of the intelligentsia.¨

¨If in the end Lenin´s regime came to be based on a force, the bureaucracy, which he abhorred, it was only the result of a situation in which a program of development is imposed by a new regime on a backward country whose vital social forces are either weak, indifferent, or hostile. Lenin did not foresee this phenomenon because his social analysis was based on only three social classes--the workers, the peasants and the bourgeoisie---without taking any account of the state apparatus as a distinct social element in a country that had nationalized the main sectors of the economy.¨

¨...without Lenin wishing it, the authority of the [Party] Congress had become considerably reduced by his promulgations of March 1921 on the prohibition of factions. This turned out to be a considerable weapon in the hands of the Secretariat, which by branding all disagreement as factional successfully stifled all real discussion and criticism.¨

¨If the enlargement of the Central Committee had been carried out, it would have meant that the Secretariat and the entire Party executive would have been subject to the control of a wider, more representative body. With their entry into the highest organs of Party government, a new role would have been given to the specialists and scientists--and Lenin wanted it to be a dominant one.¨

[Dan Sharber · Rating 4 out of 5]

tragic. this is a very good book on trying to understand lenin's thinking in his last months and the moves he tried to make to prevent the complete bureaucratization of the party and the soviet government culminating in dictatorial control by stalin. it's tragic because we can never know what lenin may have done nor can we even adequately determine whether the plans he came up with in the last days of his political life would've helped at all since they were never seriously put into place. the entire socialist movement was thusly marred by the bureaucratic ascendance of stalin. this book is good for anyone who thinks stalin was merely carry to fruition the orignal plans of lenin. lenin fought to the very end the distortions of his (and all true communists) plans for a truly open and democratic socialist society and eventually a socialist world free of all forms of oppression and subjugation. his death was all the more tragic not simply because we lost a great fighter and theoretician but because of the mockery that stalin made of lenin's life and ideas and consequently the entire socialist movement. even today the spectre of stalin has not been fully purged from mainstream critiques of communism. that is part of the job of every serious socialist who today fights for a world where the best aspects of humanity and culture are the provence of all the people and not simply to bourgeois elite.

[Harry Revueltas · Rating 5 out of 5]

El último combate de Lenin es una breve biografía política que relata las situaciones que llevaron al líder bolchevique a emprender acciones contra la ascendente burocracia soviética.
Publicado por Moshe Lewin en 1967, se fundamenta en una serie de documentos que cobran mayor sentido a la luz de la 5ta edición de las obras y el Diario de las secretarias de Lenin publicadas en los años 60s.
Consta de 10 capítulos y 9 anexos. Los primeros capítulos (1 y 2) exponen el contexto del partido comunista ruso tras la guerra civil donde destaca el bajo nivel de infraestructura económica y del nivel cultural del proletariado, lo que llevó a un frágil equilibrio político basado en la alianza con el campesinado. Esta alianza a su vez llevó a la necesidad de la Nueva Política Económica que influiría en la desorientación ideológica de muchos cuadros dirigentes. Los siguientes capítulos (3 al 7) se centran en la génesis y desarrollo del último combate de Lenin. La enfermedad va disminuyendo su capacidad de maniobrar para mantener el equilibrio socioeconómico a la vez que intenta mantener unificado al partido como única fuerza. La defensa del monopolio del comercio exterior, el proyecto de unificación y desarrollo de las repúblicas socialistas y la reorganización del partido y el aparato estatal ponen a Lenin contra la burocracia encabezada por el secretario general (Stalin) y tiene que recurrir al único aliado político posible en tales circunstancias (Trotsky). Finalmente los últimos capítulos (8 al 10) contienen un análisis sobre la esencia del leninismo expuesto en la resolución de la toma del poder basada en el análisis de adversidades, el proyecto de reforma de las estructuras gubernamentales y su espíritu de lucha contra la burocratización.

El libro ofrece una interpretación bien fundamentada que sin embargo ha sido poco aceptada. A la muerte de Lenin, la burocracia soviética inventó un leninismo dogmático a conveniencia y prohibió el leninismo original llamándole por otros nombres. La herencia ideológica de la burocracia soviética ha permeado lo suficiente como para existan posturas negacionistas en torno a la validez de los documentos redactados por Lenin entre finales de 1922 y principios de 1923. No obstante, el último combate de Lenin seguirá siendo un texto fundamental para explicar no solamente la caída del bloque soviético, sino también, porque el leninismo político original sigue siendo válido para la estrategia revolucionaria del siglo xxi.

[Daniel Jones · Rating 2 out of 5]

Meh. This seemed like a graduate thesis that turned into a book somehow. The author obviously loves Lenin, so I hope you do too.

[Jonas · Rating 5 out of 5]

A great and readable overview of the last works of Lenin and his struggle against the bureaucracy that was emerging in the ussr

[James Rooney · Rating 5 out of 5]

This work is a groundbreaking tour-de-force in the historiography of the Soviet Union. Lewin was one of the first historians to promote the revisionist school of Lenin and to fight back against the Stalinist line that Stalinism was a genuine continuation of Leninist policy.

During the Cold War many Western historians accepted this thesis as well, believing that the horrors of the Stalinist totalitarian state were already inherent in Leninism and in the government Lenin created.

But this book makes it clear that Lenin was no dictator, certainly not in the mould of Stalin. He also provides striking proof that Stalin was an aberration, something that Trotsky had argued all along.

Lewin elucidates early on many of Lenin's final proposals, and notes that Stalin did not accept even one of them. Where is the continuity with Lenin, then?

While reading this book it is hard not bear in mind Churchill's quip that the worst thing that happened to Russia was Lenin's birth, and the second worst thing his death. Churchill argued that Lenin alone could have guided Russia along the path of socialism, and his early demise was a major victory for Stalin.

Another quote one frequently bears in mind is Krupskaya's rueful reflexion that had Lenin lived, Stalin would have had him shot.

The book is organised into thematic chapters, with some entries including the brutal quashing of Menshevik Georgia, Lenin's fight against Russian nationalism and growing bureaucratisation, and with Lenin's views on world revolution.

Essentially Lewin argues that Lenin was distressed by all of these developments. He was, eventually, greatly disturbed by the commission that inspected Ordzhonikidzhe in Georgia, he felt that the party had overstepped its authority and had acted out of order.

We see here already Lenin beginning to form an alliance with Trotsky against Stalin.

Lenin's realisation of the growing power of the bureaucracy and the unnaturally strong position of the General Secretary (Stalin) were additional causes of worry, and as it well known Lenin in his final testament recommended that Stalin be removed.

Contrary to Stalin's later claims, it appears that Lenin was never reconciled to the idea of socialism in one country, as he continued to hope in the spread of revolution to Asia, and from there back to Europe.

There are a bewildering amount of fresh perspectives in this work. Of particular interest to me were examples like Lenin's prohibition on factionalism, and the party's gradual evolution of ruling by decree that was considered necessary in the exigencies of the Russian Civil War.

Here we see that Stalin was to adopt some of Lenin's arguments about the need for unity, and the dangers of party infighting. Weapons he was to use against Trotsky during the War Scare of 1927.

We read that Lenin was veering into 'deviationism' in going against Marxist theory, believing that the party could advance Russia on the road to socialism without requiring a bourgeois interlude. We see that Lenin intended for the NEP to continue indefinitely, and that the Central Committee be made less dictatorial by its expansion to many more members.

We learn that Lenin began taking steps to limit the power and influence of the Cheka, presumably since its purpose during the Civil War no longer existed.

But while Lewin is in many ways positive about Lenin's proposals and ideas, he in fairness leaves the question of their efficacy open. He notes that Lenin would have had to face the Scissors Crisis, and the lack of capital. Lenin himself realised that there must come a showdown between the peasantry and the proletariat.

Lewin states that Stalin decided this in his own way, a point echoed by Olga Velikanova more recently, but that was not necessarily inevitable. He believes Lenin might have averted the brutality of Stalinism. But he acknowledges that it would have been very difficult, a realisation that Lenin himself had as he wrote in one of the articles included in the appendix.

Another fascinating critique is also made of Trotsky, who Lewin views as less clear-sighted than Lenin and less ruthless in the pursuit of objectives. Lewin concludes that Trotsky and Lenin together might well have beaten Stalin, for whom Lenin was preparing a 'bomb' and who Lenin hoped to 'crush politically.' But Trotsky alone could not achieve this.

We are left feeling sympathy for Churchill's view that Lenin lived long enough to plunge Russia into disarray but not long enough to put her house back in order. We lament to learn that Lenin's death meant the triumph of Stalin and the bureaucracy, the subjugation of the revolution, and the transformation into what (for lack of a better term) Trotsky called the degenerated worker's state.

It's nice to think that this could have gone differently, and Lewin makes a strong case for Lenin, but with his death we'll never really know.

Above all this book demonstrates that Stalin was no heir of Lenin in the wider sense, and that Lenin was strongly opposed to the direction the government was heading under Stalin's growing leadership.

[Saul Souto · Rating 2 out of 5]

Medianón, no le puso mucha emoción (tal vez no era su intención el emocionar, sino el describir).

[Isaac S. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Audio book. Every communist NEEDS to read this. If you’re analysis of the USSR ends with a book written by Stalin’s CC, you don’t have a Marxist analysis of the USSR

[Martin Jukovsky Jukovsky · Rating 5 out of 5]

Essential for understanding the fight taken up by Lenin and Trotsky before the former's death against the growth of the bureaucracy the young Soviet Union.

[Vanrik · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent analysis of what Lenin was up to before his passing. Long story short, the international revolution was doomed as soon as it failed to spread in Western Europe. Hijinks ensues. Lenin and Trotsky bromance? Also Stalin threatened Lenin's wife. Not a good look.

[tomsyak]

Summary of Argument:

This very dramatic and almost personal account describes the last months of Lenin's life and the struggle he was waging for the democratization of the Party. Using Lenin's writings and the log of his secretaries published after 1956, Lewin contends that shortly before his death Lenin began to see that after the end of the Civil War the leadership of the party came to consist of careerists, former Civil War soldiers, and tsarist bureaucrats and it therefore no longer represents the interest of the workers (in essence, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" became the "dictatorship of a socially diverse minority"). Moreover, the Georgian Affair (the conflict between Georgian communists fighting for political autonomy and Stalin, Dzerzhinsky and Ordzhonikidze arguing for centralization of power) demonstrated to Lenin that the oppression of national minorities continues even after the "prison of the peoples" is destroyed. In his "testament" written in December 1922 - January 1923, Lenin argued that bureaucracy and Russian nationalism have to be combated and Stalin has to be removed from power. Based on these prescriptions, Lewin contents that had Lenin lived, the Soviet system would have been more democratic, avoided many of the purges and the course of Soviet development would have been more true to socialism.

Lenin, according to Lewin and contrary to Daniels, had no interest in personal power and was not a dictator but a democratic leader of the Party. Lenin's illness, however, allowed Stalin to usurp power. Lewin shares several of Lenin's assumptions. For example, he believes in the "good dictatorship" established by Lenin in order to promote social justice. However, the "good dictatorship," according to Lewin and Lenin, was to be ended once its goal was achieved, and Stalin's purges were utterly foreign to Lenin's plans. Lewin is similarly in agreement with Lenin's "elitist" policies; he argues that because workers were not yet able to hold on to the achievements of the revolution and peasants "themselves had to be watched," the Bolshevik elite had to depend on itself to stay in power. The NEP was a "pact with the devil," since peasantry did not understand the benefits of socialism and could become too attracted to capitalism (Lewin doesn't see peasants as very bright and agrees with Lenin that they are the principal enemies of socialism). Nonetheless, Lewin believes that Lenin was looking for a middle ground between planned economy and free trade, and that the NEP was this exact ground. However, Stalin abolished it as soon as he came to power.

Comments/Critique:

This is a strange work because it claims that several months before his death Lenin supposedly realized that while heading toward communism, he somehow ended up leading a bureaucratic dictatorship. Why he did not see it sooner is unclear, perhaps because he never did, and Service's claim that Lenin's struggle with Stalin gained significance only because it was his last to me makes much more sense that Lewin's assertions of its decisiveness. I also believe that Lewin assigns too much value to Lenin's "testament" and assumes that Lenin has predicted the Stalinist purges, while in reality not only could he not predict 1937, even if he could it is not clear that he would have opposed it.

In his review, Parry noted the continuities between Lenin and Stalin, arguing that the latter was the only possible heir to the former due to their common hatred of liberals, prohibition of factionalism, and readiness to accelerate terror. Page interprets Lenin's "testament" simply as the latter's lust for power, even in the face of death. Monas doubts the political effectiveness of reforms proposed by Lenin, and Service echoes this view in his biography. Carr's review makes it seem that Lewin's account is very much in line with Trotsky's writings.

[Leonardo]

«El animal arranca el látigo al amo y se flagela a sí mismo para convertirse en amo, sin saber que es solo una fantasía producida por un nuevo nudo en la correa del látigo del amo.» ¿No es esta observación de Kafka la definición más sucinta de lo que se torció en los estados comunistas del siglo xx? ¿Era entonces necesario el paso de Lenin a Stalin? La única respuesta apropiada es la hegeliana, que evoca una necesidad retroactiva: una vez que este pasaje se produce, una vez que Stalin había vencido, se convirtió en necesario. La tarea de un historiador dialéctico es concebir «el llegar a ser» de este paso, poniendo de manifiesto toda la contingencia de la lucha que pudiera haber acabado de forma diferente; esto es lo que Moshe Lewin, por ejemplo, llevó a cabo en su Lenin’s Last Struggle.

Viviendo en el Final de los Tiempos Pág.443

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Organization of the book could have been handled better. I understand that this is revisionist in that it undermines some capitalist propaganda (and some ML at that as well) but Lenin's actions can't be absolved just because of historical circumstance or necessity, his whole regime building was a betrayal to socialism and we're supposed to absolve him of these sins because he woke up in the last month's of his life? Lenin's sins against socialism can not be that easily forgiven but the book does place those sins in context and it calls them for what they are. It is honest and revealing and for that I gave it four.