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State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration
With relentless media coverage, breathtaking events, and extraordinary congressional and independent investigations, it is hard to believe that we still might not know some of the most significant facts about the presidency of George W. Bush. Yet beneath the surface events of the Bush presidency lies a secret history -- a series of hidden events that makes a mockery of current debate.
This hidden history involves domestic spying, abuses of power, and outrageous operations. It includes a CIA that became caught in a political cross fire that it could not withstand, and what it did to respond. It includes a Defense Department that made its own foreign policy, even against the wishes of the commander in chief. It features a president who created a sphere of deniability in which his top aides were briefed on matters of the utmost sensitivity -- but the president was carefully kept in ignorance. State of War reveals this hidden history for the first time, including scandals that will redefine the Bush presidency.
James Risen has covered national security for The New York Times for years. Based on extraordinary sources from top to bottom in Washington and around the world, drawn from dozens of interviews with key figures in the national security community, this book exposes an explosive chain of
These are just a few of the stories told in State of War. Beyond these shocking specifics, Risen describes troubling Truth-seekers within the CIA were fired or ignored. Long-standing rules were trampled. Assassination squads were trained; war crimes were proposed. Yet for all the aggressiveness of America's spies, a blind eye was turned toward crucial links between al Qaeda and Saudi Arabia, among other sensitive topics.
Not since the revelations of CIA and FBI abuses in the 1970s have so many scandals in the intelligence community come to light. More broadly, Risen's secret history shows how power really works in George W. Bush's presidency.
This hidden history involves domestic spying, abuses of power, and outrageous operations. It includes a CIA that became caught in a political cross fire that it could not withstand, and what it did to respond. It includes a Defense Department that made its own foreign policy, even against the wishes of the commander in chief. It features a president who created a sphere of deniability in which his top aides were briefed on matters of the utmost sensitivity -- but the president was carefully kept in ignorance. State of War reveals this hidden history for the first time, including scandals that will redefine the Bush presidency.
James Risen has covered national security for The New York Times for years. Based on extraordinary sources from top to bottom in Washington and around the world, drawn from dozens of interviews with key figures in the national security community, this book exposes an explosive chain of
These are just a few of the stories told in State of War. Beyond these shocking specifics, Risen describes troubling Truth-seekers within the CIA were fired or ignored. Long-standing rules were trampled. Assassination squads were trained; war crimes were proposed. Yet for all the aggressiveness of America's spies, a blind eye was turned toward crucial links between al Qaeda and Saudi Arabia, among other sensitive topics.
Not since the revelations of CIA and FBI abuses in the 1970s have so many scandals in the intelligence community come to light. More broadly, Risen's secret history shows how power really works in George W. Bush's presidency.
256 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2006
63 people are currently reading
1653 people want to read
About the author
James Risen
7 books116 followersJames Risen covers national security for The New York Times.
He was a member of the team that won the Pulitzer Prize for explanatory reporting in 2002 for coverage of September 11 and terrorism, and he is the coauthor of Wrath of Angels and The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB.
He lives outside Washington, D.C., with his wife and three sons.
He was a member of the team that won the Pulitzer Prize for explanatory reporting in 2002 for coverage of September 11 and terrorism, and he is the coauthor of Wrath of Angels and The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB.
He lives outside Washington, D.C., with his wife and three sons.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 77 reviews
June 26, 2024
Bush yönetimindeki siyasi faaliyetlerin arka planını anlatmaya çalışan bir kitap. CIA etkinlikleri ile başlıyor. CIA’in dış istihbarat toplama yöntemlerinin insanlık dışı bir aktiviteye evrildiğini söylüyor. CIA hapishanesi gibi bir birimi ülkenin üst makamlardaki siyasetçileri dahi istemiyor. Ama istihbarat için gerekli olduğunu söyleyerek hepsinin üstü örtülüyor. Irak başta olmak üzere Amerika’nın Ortadoğu’daki varlığının meşrutiyeti üzerine tartışıyor yazar. Kitap arka planı anlatmaya çalışıyor ama birkaç konu dışında herkesçe bilinen bilgiler arasında gidip geliyor. Pulitzer Ödüllü olması da yazarın çok da ilginç bir yerden konuşmadığını gösteriyor. Dönemi hatırlamak adına okunabilir.
September 16, 2022
NYT national security expert James Risen's book traces the disastrous U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq through 2005 and the destructive roles played by neoconservatives and the Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld.
February 22, 2012
A hastily written,breezy, and somewhat opinionated analysis of the CIA's role in the Bush administration's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but evenhanded for the most part, even though it paints the administration as naive, overly hawkish neocons. He also briefly sums up Clinton's counterterrorism policies and their failures. Very easy, snarky read. Also includes an interesting, very detailed account of Abu Zubaydah's capture. He also writes about the CIA-sponsored Iraqi paramilitary "Scorpions". He describes in detail an interesting CIA "bait" operation that apparently gave Iran some flawed blueprints for a nuke,but some Russian scientist pointed the flaws out to the Iranians.
However, Risen misinterpreted one of Doug Feith's comments. Feith had asserted that Rumsfeld would have thrown out anyone who pretended to know before the Iraq war what postwar Iraq would look like. Risen cites this as evidence that the administration convinced themselves that postwar planning was not required. BS.
Risen complains a lot about the NSA's warrantless wiretapping of US phones and makes a lot of stuff up. See No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington for a better and more objective account of that program.
This is pitifully brief, and reads like a bunch of op-ed articles stapled together with Post-It notes all over them; lots of ranting and little analysis.
If you read the book, read it carefully and note where and how the author presents situations and describes context. He'll take one sentence to state that a certain situation is speculation and inconclusive... but carry on for 10 pages afterwards on the same topic as if it were known FACT.
A case in point: the book's epilogue ends with the poetic conclusion: "Dreams die hard, but the dreams of the Bush administration died in places like Fallujah, Ramadi, and Tal Afar." Fine, but those geographical/military references aren't explained anywhere in the book. Clearly you have to know something about Iraq going in; "State of War" is not a definitive history. That's not a problem today in the heat of the moment, but it does indicate that "State of War" is something of a quickie meant to cash in on a story now, and lay forgotten in 20 years when more information comes to light. To make a Watergate reference out of this (because everything comes back to Watergate) this is more likely to be remembered as H.R. Haldeman's "The Ends of Power", rather than "The Haldeman Diaries". He said on page 2 that the voters voting for George W. Bush expected George W. Bush to repeat what George H. W. Bush did. What is the basis for this conclusion?
He talks about checks and balances in the executive branch. Please tell me where in the constitution it says that the executive power is invested in the president, the State Department and the Department of Defense, and they are to balance the power out
However, Risen misinterpreted one of Doug Feith's comments. Feith had asserted that Rumsfeld would have thrown out anyone who pretended to know before the Iraq war what postwar Iraq would look like. Risen cites this as evidence that the administration convinced themselves that postwar planning was not required. BS.
Risen complains a lot about the NSA's warrantless wiretapping of US phones and makes a lot of stuff up. See No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington for a better and more objective account of that program.
This is pitifully brief, and reads like a bunch of op-ed articles stapled together with Post-It notes all over them; lots of ranting and little analysis.
If you read the book, read it carefully and note where and how the author presents situations and describes context. He'll take one sentence to state that a certain situation is speculation and inconclusive... but carry on for 10 pages afterwards on the same topic as if it were known FACT.
A case in point: the book's epilogue ends with the poetic conclusion: "Dreams die hard, but the dreams of the Bush administration died in places like Fallujah, Ramadi, and Tal Afar." Fine, but those geographical/military references aren't explained anywhere in the book. Clearly you have to know something about Iraq going in; "State of War" is not a definitive history. That's not a problem today in the heat of the moment, but it does indicate that "State of War" is something of a quickie meant to cash in on a story now, and lay forgotten in 20 years when more information comes to light. To make a Watergate reference out of this (because everything comes back to Watergate) this is more likely to be remembered as H.R. Haldeman's "The Ends of Power", rather than "The Haldeman Diaries". He said on page 2 that the voters voting for George W. Bush expected George W. Bush to repeat what George H. W. Bush did. What is the basis for this conclusion?
He talks about checks and balances in the executive branch. Please tell me where in the constitution it says that the executive power is invested in the president, the State Department and the Department of Defense, and they are to balance the power out
October 9, 2008
Risen writes what he calls “a secret history of the CIA and the Bush administration, both before and after 9/11” (p 10)
P 3
The absence of effective management has been the defining characteristic of the Bush administration’s foreign policy and has allowed radical decisions to take effect rapidly with minimal review
Risen’s obvious sympathies cloud his judgment on occasion. In talking about Louis Freeh and his hostility towards Bill Clinton he takes Freeh’s self-justifying word for it that what he (Freeh) saw as Clinton playing down the role of Iran in the felling of the Khobar Towers was “at the heart of his long-running dispute with the White House.” This is blindness of a high order. Freeh was an incompetent and an ideologue, who was after Clinton from the moment he took office. Khobar may have played a role in that antipathy but partisan politics played a much larger role.
On page 3 Risen claims that Clinton showed almost no interest in intelligence matters. “His first CIA director, James Woolsey, felt so isolated from the president and the rest of the administration that he lasted barely two years.” Let’s just say I am a bit skeptical of this and would be very interested to hear from others with an inside view. Risen also seems eager to lay at Clinton’s feet the demise of the CIA, when it was Bush-1 and a very eager Congress who were the primary forces involved in slashing those budgets.
Another shows up on page 17. “Bush decided to resume the daily intelligence briefings that Clinton had abandoned.” He makes no mention here of the likelihood that Bush was not up to reading the PDB’s that Clinton consumed every morning, but instead wanted to have it spoon fed to him by a willing lackey.
Another on page 24, where he writes about the Abu Ghraib revelations. “The Abu Ghraib scandal eventually ebbed, in part because of the lack of proof that the president had ordered the mistreatment of prisoners.” Yet he can find no ink available to point out that a Republican controlled congress was unwilling to pursue the matter and that the White House willfully refused to provide all the materials they should have presented to the weak investigations that did take place.
P 37
…the technical wizards of the National Security Agency have been engaged in a program of domestic data mining that is so vast, and so unprecedented, that it makes a mockery of long-standing privacy rules.
The PROGRAM
Risen details the expansion of NSA domestic intelligence activities. He claims that the Bushies deliberately did not seek increased rights for the NSA in Congress because they knew they would be rejected. Instead they ignored Congress and simply did whatever they wanted to do, using the ever-helpful folks in the Attorney General’s office to sculpt legal rationalizations for this assault on the fourth amendment. (p 47) “The Patriot Act has given no new powers to the NSA.”
An interesting observation concerns a shift in CIA focus. P7 –‘”If I had to point to one specific problem that explains why we are doing such a bad job on intelligence, it is this almost single-minded focus on current reporting,” observes Carl Ford, a former CIA analyst and former chief of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department. In the 1970s, Ford adds, “70 percent to 80 percent of CIA analysts spent their time doing basic research on key topics; today, about 90 percent of analysts do nothing but current reporting. Analysts today are looking at intelligence coming in and then writing what they think about it, but they have no depth of knowledge to determine whether the current intelligence is correct. There are very few people left in the intelligence community who even remember how to do basic research.”’
The Final chapter is quite enlightening. Risen describes an intel operation in which a Soviet nuclear scientist defector was used to deliver to the Iranians a flawed blueprint for making an atomic bomb. But the guy was strictly an amateur and in attempting to cover his own ass, he revealed far too much to the Iranians in a note he inserted with the plans. We may never know if the blueprints helped the Iranians or not.
There was an opportunity to cut a deal with Iran in May 2003. Iran had captured many al-Qaeda members who had fled Afghanistan. Iran wanted in return members of the Iraqi based, anti-Iranian MEK terrorist group. Dubya was up for it, reasoning that MEK was a terrorist organization anyway, so what the hell. Rummy and Wolfie killed the deal, looking to use these guys in the future. The result was the loss of some hefty Al-Qaeda personnel, included One of Osama’s kids. Way to go Rummy!
By the time the CIA leadership grew the stones to tell the president the truth, it was too late.
P 220
The CIA was finally speaking up. Yet, no one was listening to the agency or its analysts any more. The CIA had suffered so many spectacular failures in such rapid succession that by late 2005, it had lost its place and standing in Washington. The CIA had been so deeply politicized by the Bush administration that its credibility had vanished.
P 221
The CIA had been the dominant force in the US intelligence community, and that had been by design. When President Harry Truman and Congress crafted the National Security Act of 1947, which established the CIA, one of their goals was to foster a system in which the nation’s intelligence service was independent of the military. That was seen as a crucial check on military power. Otherwise, intelligence would be slanted to support the wishes of the general staff. Rumsfeld’s power grab is in direct opposition to these goals. It creates one of the most lasting and damaging legacies of the Bush administration: the militarization of American intelligence.
I expect Risen is being overoptimistic when he says (p 222) …by late 2005, the neoconservative moment was ending. Wolfowitz and fellow neoconservative Doug Feith, who had served as undersecretary for policy, had both left the Pentagon. John Bolton, a neoconservative at the State Department, was moved out to the United Nations. With polls showing that the majority of Americans were turning against the war in Iraq, the neoconservatives and the right-wing pundits who supported them became more defensive, re-fighting old battles over the war’s rationale.
So long as Cheney remains in the White House and Rummy or equivalent at the head of Defense, their moment is very much alive. What Risen ignores is the fact that bonafide neocons are now filtering out into responsible positions beyond defense. It is not a loss, in my view, but an expansion. Bolton was certainly not less influential at the UN than he was as an undersecretary in DC. Wolfie, as head of the World Bank, although now out of there in disgrace, was in a unique position from which to inflict economic harm on the world to match the military damage.
P 3
The absence of effective management has been the defining characteristic of the Bush administration’s foreign policy and has allowed radical decisions to take effect rapidly with minimal review
Risen’s obvious sympathies cloud his judgment on occasion. In talking about Louis Freeh and his hostility towards Bill Clinton he takes Freeh’s self-justifying word for it that what he (Freeh) saw as Clinton playing down the role of Iran in the felling of the Khobar Towers was “at the heart of his long-running dispute with the White House.” This is blindness of a high order. Freeh was an incompetent and an ideologue, who was after Clinton from the moment he took office. Khobar may have played a role in that antipathy but partisan politics played a much larger role.
On page 3 Risen claims that Clinton showed almost no interest in intelligence matters. “His first CIA director, James Woolsey, felt so isolated from the president and the rest of the administration that he lasted barely two years.” Let’s just say I am a bit skeptical of this and would be very interested to hear from others with an inside view. Risen also seems eager to lay at Clinton’s feet the demise of the CIA, when it was Bush-1 and a very eager Congress who were the primary forces involved in slashing those budgets.
Another shows up on page 17. “Bush decided to resume the daily intelligence briefings that Clinton had abandoned.” He makes no mention here of the likelihood that Bush was not up to reading the PDB’s that Clinton consumed every morning, but instead wanted to have it spoon fed to him by a willing lackey.
Another on page 24, where he writes about the Abu Ghraib revelations. “The Abu Ghraib scandal eventually ebbed, in part because of the lack of proof that the president had ordered the mistreatment of prisoners.” Yet he can find no ink available to point out that a Republican controlled congress was unwilling to pursue the matter and that the White House willfully refused to provide all the materials they should have presented to the weak investigations that did take place.
P 37
…the technical wizards of the National Security Agency have been engaged in a program of domestic data mining that is so vast, and so unprecedented, that it makes a mockery of long-standing privacy rules.
The PROGRAM
Risen details the expansion of NSA domestic intelligence activities. He claims that the Bushies deliberately did not seek increased rights for the NSA in Congress because they knew they would be rejected. Instead they ignored Congress and simply did whatever they wanted to do, using the ever-helpful folks in the Attorney General’s office to sculpt legal rationalizations for this assault on the fourth amendment. (p 47) “The Patriot Act has given no new powers to the NSA.”
An interesting observation concerns a shift in CIA focus. P7 –‘”If I had to point to one specific problem that explains why we are doing such a bad job on intelligence, it is this almost single-minded focus on current reporting,” observes Carl Ford, a former CIA analyst and former chief of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department. In the 1970s, Ford adds, “70 percent to 80 percent of CIA analysts spent their time doing basic research on key topics; today, about 90 percent of analysts do nothing but current reporting. Analysts today are looking at intelligence coming in and then writing what they think about it, but they have no depth of knowledge to determine whether the current intelligence is correct. There are very few people left in the intelligence community who even remember how to do basic research.”’
The Final chapter is quite enlightening. Risen describes an intel operation in which a Soviet nuclear scientist defector was used to deliver to the Iranians a flawed blueprint for making an atomic bomb. But the guy was strictly an amateur and in attempting to cover his own ass, he revealed far too much to the Iranians in a note he inserted with the plans. We may never know if the blueprints helped the Iranians or not.
There was an opportunity to cut a deal with Iran in May 2003. Iran had captured many al-Qaeda members who had fled Afghanistan. Iran wanted in return members of the Iraqi based, anti-Iranian MEK terrorist group. Dubya was up for it, reasoning that MEK was a terrorist organization anyway, so what the hell. Rummy and Wolfie killed the deal, looking to use these guys in the future. The result was the loss of some hefty Al-Qaeda personnel, included One of Osama’s kids. Way to go Rummy!
By the time the CIA leadership grew the stones to tell the president the truth, it was too late.
P 220
The CIA was finally speaking up. Yet, no one was listening to the agency or its analysts any more. The CIA had suffered so many spectacular failures in such rapid succession that by late 2005, it had lost its place and standing in Washington. The CIA had been so deeply politicized by the Bush administration that its credibility had vanished.
P 221
The CIA had been the dominant force in the US intelligence community, and that had been by design. When President Harry Truman and Congress crafted the National Security Act of 1947, which established the CIA, one of their goals was to foster a system in which the nation’s intelligence service was independent of the military. That was seen as a crucial check on military power. Otherwise, intelligence would be slanted to support the wishes of the general staff. Rumsfeld’s power grab is in direct opposition to these goals. It creates one of the most lasting and damaging legacies of the Bush administration: the militarization of American intelligence.
I expect Risen is being overoptimistic when he says (p 222) …by late 2005, the neoconservative moment was ending. Wolfowitz and fellow neoconservative Doug Feith, who had served as undersecretary for policy, had both left the Pentagon. John Bolton, a neoconservative at the State Department, was moved out to the United Nations. With polls showing that the majority of Americans were turning against the war in Iraq, the neoconservatives and the right-wing pundits who supported them became more defensive, re-fighting old battles over the war’s rationale.
So long as Cheney remains in the White House and Rummy or equivalent at the head of Defense, their moment is very much alive. What Risen ignores is the fact that bonafide neocons are now filtering out into responsible positions beyond defense. It is not a loss, in my view, but an expansion. Bolton was certainly not less influential at the UN than he was as an undersecretary in DC. Wolfie, as head of the World Bank, although now out of there in disgrace, was in a unique position from which to inflict economic harm on the world to match the military damage.
February 17, 2018
Twelve years on from its original publication date, much of what Risen writes about here regarding the blatant abuses of power of the Bush administration and the role of the CIA in the lead-up to and during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (including egregious failures on various fronts) has become fairly public knowledge. Yet, these subjects remain very much relevant today and this book very much worth reading.
April 13, 2017
This book goes back to how the Bush Administration acted and reacted to the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq invasion. But the more I read it the more I was sort of perturbed that Congress wasn't involved at all. Congress had no oversight which they are supposed to do, Congress didn't challenge anything about what the administration put forward and they didn't even call for any accountability. They just sort of were hands off said that the Bush administration owned this and let them screw it up.
The administration had huge issues and this gets into a lot of the personalities which caused the train wreck that came forward...
- Condi Rice was a smart woman. But absolutely incompetent as a manager at the head of the NSC. She was railroaded and smacked around every time she tried to even get the council into a meeting.
- Don Rumsfeld trusted no one. He felt he only answered to the President alone and because of this he ran defense as his own little kingdom. He developed his own intelligence units because he felt the CIA was incompetent. He didn't listen to Rice because he felt the NSC was a cluster. And when he faced a revolt by his own retired generals he was really blindsided. He didn't even agree with the President's strategy for either Afghanistan or Iraq and that hampered the response.
- Iraq actually HAD a WMD program which was destroyed by the US during Desert Storm by ACCIDENT. A bomber that had excess bombs after hitting his target dropped his mobs after turning around on a secondary target (a corporate building) which actually did have a WMD program.
Some wild revelations in the book and it was fascinating but the entire time the one thread going through for me was where were the people who were supposed to hold the President accountable?...
The administration had huge issues and this gets into a lot of the personalities which caused the train wreck that came forward...
- Condi Rice was a smart woman. But absolutely incompetent as a manager at the head of the NSC. She was railroaded and smacked around every time she tried to even get the council into a meeting.
- Don Rumsfeld trusted no one. He felt he only answered to the President alone and because of this he ran defense as his own little kingdom. He developed his own intelligence units because he felt the CIA was incompetent. He didn't listen to Rice because he felt the NSC was a cluster. And when he faced a revolt by his own retired generals he was really blindsided. He didn't even agree with the President's strategy for either Afghanistan or Iraq and that hampered the response.
- Iraq actually HAD a WMD program which was destroyed by the US during Desert Storm by ACCIDENT. A bomber that had excess bombs after hitting his target dropped his mobs after turning around on a secondary target (a corporate building) which actually did have a WMD program.
Some wild revelations in the book and it was fascinating but the entire time the one thread going through for me was where were the people who were supposed to hold the President accountable?...
October 22, 2014
Reading this book some 8 years after it was published filled me with anger (again) about what was (and is) done in our country's collective name. Done without oversight; in fact, done with the deliberate intention of avoiding ANY oversight. There are no successes trumpeted by Risen and one can be certain given the egotistical and megalomaniac nature of the Bush Administration that any successes would have been "declassified" and brought forth then - or later. Instead, we remain in 2014 waiting for an authorized government accounting of what exactly was done, by whom, and most importantly why. And Risen? He remains haunted by the specter of prosecution under the Espionage Act by the following administration for having this book published and not naming his source(s). In sum, in State of War, risen gives and uncomfortable and unflattering peek at our deep security state and how easily manipulated it is by those lesser angels of our nature.
January 14, 2012
Beacause I have read so much on this topic, much of it wasn't new, but a worth a read.
One thing you'll conclude is Cheney used the CIA, manipulated the CIA to support his conviction that the US had to invade Iraq. It's this type of warped thinking I find repulsive. Data picking to support a conclusion and not the other way around.
I'm amazed that everyone seems to think it was the CIA's fault. They became the scapegoat. Where they failed was not being more politically savy.
One thing you'll conclude is Cheney used the CIA, manipulated the CIA to support his conviction that the US had to invade Iraq. It's this type of warped thinking I find repulsive. Data picking to support a conclusion and not the other way around.
I'm amazed that everyone seems to think it was the CIA's fault. They became the scapegoat. Where they failed was not being more politically savy.
July 4, 2017
It's a good description about how the war in Iraq started and what a mess the whole thing was. Basically just a cesspool that is playing with people lives. The whole system is rotten to the core.
March 31, 2012
الكتاب يعج بالمعلومات التي ليست قيمة في ذاتها لأنها غير مؤكدة, ولكن لقيمة "إمكانية الفعل" نفسه. أو اختلاف الآليات...
يلقي الكتاب الضوء على الجانب الإنساني في العلاقات, فمثلا إحباط عملاء المخابرات الذين تحولوا إلى "سجانين" لم يكن هذا هو ما تمنوه في حياتهم, وكذا علاقة بوش الأب بابنه... والتي لم يكن ليغفلها الكاتب, في الأخير هو والده ولو كان بوش الصيغر رئيس أكبر دولة في العالم. مشاعر الغيرة و الحقد و الوقيعة في الطبقة الحاكمة في أمريكا... كلها أشياء لا تكتب في كتب التاريخ كأحداث أو وقائع غيرت مجرى الأحداث, ولكنها كذلك. شخصية رامسفيلد و كونداليزا و تنت و محاولات الاستئثار بالرئيس كلها مؤثرات يغفلها الكثير عند تحليل التاريخ عموما.
على سبيل المعلومات و إمكانية الفعل هناك أمثلة و معلومات كثيرة:
خذ مثلا:
1. عمل موظفي السفارات الغير أمريكية مع المخابرات الأمريكية في العراق.
2. طريقة توظيف العراقيين في المخابرات عن طريق الإخوة و الأقارب المهاجرين
3. إنهيار فكرة المؤسسية لإرضاء شخص بعينه. كإرضاء المخابرات لجورج تنت بشأن أسلحة الدمار الشامل
4. توزيع القوى الإرهابية في أنحاء المعمورة و انهيار متابعة المخابرات لهم
ربما لذلك السبب حبذا خلق بيئة مضطربة كالصومال أو أفغانستان
5. في الاختلاف القانوني بين استجواب المساجين في أمريكا نفسها أو في أبو غريب
حيث يتطلب الأول تصاريح عدة, بينما الثاني لا يحتاج أي شيء تقريبا.
6. في إدارة كلينتون كان الاستجواب يتم توكيله ل إف بي أي, بينما في عهد بوش تم الزج بالمخابرات. ومن ثم فإن الآلة القانونية و التصاريح كانت دائما لازمة في عهد كلينتون, بينما في عهد بوش فإن التصاريح لم تكن لازمة بالضرورة, حتى تم خلق معسكر جوانتانامو لتجاوز أمر التصاريح القانونية
7. يتم احتجاز الكثير من المساجين في بلاد مثل مصر بحسب ص 29, لغياب القانون في المقام الأول وكذا المثل في بولندا و رومانيا بالاسم
8.
NSA == 2 CIA
عن وكالة الامن القومي و حجمها و حجم عملائيها الذي هو ضعف المخابرات في الواقع. تم تدشينها في عام 1952 على يد الرئيس هاري ترومان بعد عام 2002 و أحداث سبتمبر سمح لها بوش الابن بمراقبة كل الاتصالات داخل أمريكا.
9.
دعم فكرة الحرب على العراق تمت بدواعي شخصية بالدرجة الأولى, دعمها جيش المخابرات في دول العالم المختلفة, وعارضته بعض الدول مثل هولندا -ص78- على الرغم من فشل المخابرات تماما في العمل داخل العراق و الحصول على معلومات ذات أي قيمة لإثبات أو نفي ادعائات اسلحة الدمار الشامل
10.
في الفترة بين 1998 و حتى 2003 تم استخدام موظفي وكالة الطاقة الذرية انفسهم بشكل مباشر للتخابر لصالح المخابرات الأمريكية. حيث اصبحوا المصدر الرئيسي لمعرفة العلماء العراقيين العالملين على مشاريع الأسلحة أو العلمية اجمالا.
11.
تم أيضا تجنيد عدد من العراقيين, سيعين أحدهم لاحقا وزيرا للداخلية. المسمى إياد علاوي.
بمعنى آخر, أن الاحتلال حتى لو نزع يده فإن القائمين بأعمال الحكومة أنفسهم عملاء لحساب جهاز المخابرات بشكل أو بآخر
راجع ص 89
12.
في 7 يونيو عام 1981 نفذت إسرائيل عملية لقذف مفاعل نووي عراقي تحت الإنشاء. كانت هي الضربة الأولى وتم استخدام اراضي السعودية فيها.
13.
اعتمد العراقيون على مشروع مانهاتن الأمريكي وهو باكورة الأعمال النووية, و ملفاته موجودة ولكن ابرز عيوبه هو الحاجة لمساحة واسعة و طاقة كبيرة للتخصيب. ومع ذلك يتعذر اخفاء العمل. ولكن العراقيين انطلاقا من مبدأ :
الفكرة دي اتهرست قبل كدة!
قاموا بها... مرتين. حتى بعد ضرب المفاعل المرة الاولى.
14.
احتاجت امريكا 11 عالم حامل لنوبل للقيام بمشروع مانهاتن. في حين استعانت العراق بعالم واحد فقط
15.
في عام 1987 بدأ العمل مرة أخرى على مفاعل ثاني, و استمر العمل ل 6 سنوات بدون علم أي جهة, --ارقام غير مؤكدة--
16.
أوكل صدام حسين مشروعه النووي لحسين كامل أحد أزواج بناته. ولم يتفهم الطبيعة العلمية للبحث العلمي. اذ كان يظن انه بالإمكان شراء أي شيء. وهو ما أوقع المشروع في حيص بيص لما تم القبض على 2 من رجاله في مطار هيثرو وهم يحاولون شراء محفزات نووية امريكية
ص 99.
وهو الأمر الذي نبه أمريكا و اصدقائها لنوايا العراق المتجددة.
على القادة أن يتفهموا أن الأبحاث العلمية دائما تأخذ من 8 ل 15 عام لتصل لنتائج مرجوة من العمل في صمت و ثبات.
17.
في عام 1991 كانت طائرة أمريكية في حرب الخليج عائدة لقواعدها محملة بقنبلتين. و قرر الطيار أن يلقي بهما على أكبر المباني الموجودة في أحد المصانع الحربية وقد كان. ولكنه كان المشروع النووي, و تجمع العراقيون بكثافة حول المباني, بينما يتابع اقرانهم الأمريكان الأمر من الأقمار الصناعية.
هذا الزحام و الزخم أجبر الأمريكان على قصف الموقع مجددا حيث تفهموا اهميته للعراقيين.
الدرس المستفاد: لو لديك موقع هام تم قصفه. لا تهرع إليه!
ص100
18.
بعد هذه الواقعة تم الاتصال بعشرات الأسر العراقية لمحاولة الوصول لمعلوات عن النشاط العراقي و اسلحة الدمار الشامل.
19.
يذكر الكتاب "احمد شلبي" احد الساسة العراقيين فيما بعد الغزو والذي انخرط في اعمال سرقات منظمة بعلم من المخابرات الأمريكية
20.
ينهي الكاتب قصة العراق ولم يتطرق تقريبا إلى انتهاكات ابو غريب. و يذكر احيانا كثيرة المقاومين العراقيين على انهم "إرهابيين" وليسوا مدافعين عن ارضهم
21.
في صفحة 155 يبدأ الحديث عن تجارة الأفيون و الهروين في أفغانستان, بمعلومات عامة مثل:
الأفيون 1278 طن مجفف في عام 2002 و سيتضاعف الانتاج عام 2003 و مرة أخرى يتضاعف 2004 حتي يصبح انتاج افغانستان 87% من المنتج العالمي.
و تتحدث التقارير عن تصدير واسع برعاية الأمريكان انفسهم.
22.
ضرب الإنجليز مصنع للأفيون في يناير 2004 وهو ما أدى لأزمة عالمية وارتفاع اسعار الأفيون ب 15% و بالتبعية معدل الجرائم.
23.
أين يذهب مال الأفيون؟
يتم توزيعه بين ساسة أفغان و حركات إرهابية, و بعض المال للقاعدة -بدون تأكيد- و الحركة الإسلامية في أوزبكستان. كانت المخابرات على علم بالأموال و سيرها إلى الحركات الإرهابية إجمالا بحسب زعم الكاتب.
الجزء الأغرب في القصة, هو عدم تعرض القوات الأمريكية للتجارة بشكل جدي. إذ يبدو أن التجارة نفسها تقوم برعاية أمريكا و حمايتها.
-- عن الدولة السعودية و الإرهاب
24.
خمسة عشر رجلام من أصل 19 متهمين في هجوم 11 سبتمبر كانوا سعوديين.
25.
تظن المخابرات أن بن لادن كان ينفق 30 مليون دولار سنويا على القاعدة
26.
هناك خط واضح بزعم الكاتب بين الحكومة السعودية أو الطبقة الحاكمة و بن لادن من أوائل الثمانينات. حتى حين تم القبض على أبو زبيدة و وجد معه كارت بنكي سعودي وقت القبض عليه فإن المخابرات تجاوزت عن تتبع الكارت. يرجح الكاتب أن هناك علاقات أو اتفاقات خفية بين المخابرات و الأسرة الحاكمة, وأو أن المخابرات على استعداد لتجاوز العلاقة السعودية بالقاعدة لأسباب سياسية.
27.
في 189 معلومة في غاية الأهمية:
في كتابه خطة الهجوم ل بوب وودوارد يقول:
أن علاقة الساسة الأمريكان بنظرائهم السعوديين كانت أقوى حتى من علاقتهم بالمخابرات الأمريكية أو بجورج تنت, و يضرب المثل بالهجوم على العراق حيث أخبر جورج بوش الأمير بندر عام 2003 بموعد الحرب قبل أن يعلمه سكرتير الدولة كولن باول نفسه.
28.
في ص 190 جملة مضحكة:
يستحق جورج بوش التقدير على اهتمامه بنشر الديمقراطية في الشرق الأوسط كحجر اساسي في أجندته الرئاسية خلال فترة حكمه
---- إيران
30.
كشف عميل إيراني مزدوج لإيران عن شبكة التجسس الامريكية كاملة داخل إيران. ربما هنا حلقة جديدة من فشل المخابرات الأمريكية
ص 193
ومنذ العام 2004 و بإمكاننا الزعم ان السي آي أيه عمياء داخل إيران.
31.
روسيا ترى في إيران عميل مهم بالدرجة الأولى وعليه فهي على استعداد لمساعدة إيران في مشروعها النووي
32.
مشروع
MERLIN
هو مشروع أمريكي مخابراتي كان الهدف منه هو توصيل معلومات علمية و خرائط و رسومات للعلماء الإيرانيين القائمين على المفاعل و القنبلة النووية الإيرانية. حيت يتم الزج بأخطاء صغيرة داخل التصميمات تعيق عمل الإيرانيين لبضعة سنوات أو تقضي على احلامهم بالأساس.
تم الزج بالمشروع عن طريق عالم روسي بعد عمل بعض مراكز الخبرة و العلم علي المشروع في أمريكا.
تقدم احدهم بالفكرة ل بيل كلنتون ووافق على المشروع
33.
دعم صدام حسين حركة :
MEK
في إيران, و أبقت أمريكا على دعم لنفس الحركة داخل إيران لاستغلالها لاحقا
ص 215.
------------------
أعتقد أني لخصت أهم أفكار الكتاب. و أحسب أن هناك عددا غير محدود من الأفكار و الملاحظات الممكن تجنبها مستقبلا أو التعلم منها تاريخيا:
1. قد تستخدم إسرائيل أرض السعودية في ضربة على إيران
2. قبل البدء في بناء مفاعل نووي يجب بناء البنية العلمية للدولة
وقد يأخذ هذا 20 عاما ولكنه أفضل من البدء مباشرة.
3. يجب مراقبة السفارات الأخرى وموظفيها من باب الحيطة
4. يتم استخدام موظفي الأمم المتحدة في الأعمال الاستخباراتية الأمريكية
5. لا ينزع الاستعمار يده من أي دولة إلا ويترك جيش من العملاء كأذرع خبيثة في الدولة بينما يبقى العقل في الخارج
6.على دعاة حقوق الإنسان ملاحقة مؤسسات و عملاء أمريكا خارج أرض أمريكا كما بولندا و مصر و رومانيا
7. لا يتم توكيل سياسي بأمر علمي. إذ العقلية مختلفة تماما وقت تؤدي بمشاريع قومية للهلاك كما كان في مشروع العراقيين
8. العل��قة الأمريكية بالساسة السعوديين علاقة منفعة بالضرورة. يبقى آل سعود في الحكم في مقابل وجود الأموال و المنافع الاقتصادية لصالح أمريكا.
السعودية دولة محتلة بشكل مختلف.
دمتم.
-- أحمد عبد الحميد
يلقي الكتاب الضوء على الجانب الإنساني في العلاقات, فمثلا إحباط عملاء المخابرات الذين تحولوا إلى "سجانين" لم يكن هذا هو ما تمنوه في حياتهم, وكذا علاقة بوش الأب بابنه... والتي لم يكن ليغفلها الكاتب, في الأخير هو والده ولو كان بوش الصيغر رئيس أكبر دولة في العالم. مشاعر الغيرة و الحقد و الوقيعة في الطبقة الحاكمة في أمريكا... كلها أشياء لا تكتب في كتب التاريخ كأحداث أو وقائع غيرت مجرى الأحداث, ولكنها كذلك. شخصية رامسفيلد و كونداليزا و تنت و محاولات الاستئثار بالرئيس كلها مؤثرات يغفلها الكثير عند تحليل التاريخ عموما.
على سبيل المعلومات و إمكانية الفعل هناك أمثلة و معلومات كثيرة:
خذ مثلا:
1. عمل موظفي السفارات الغير أمريكية مع المخابرات الأمريكية في العراق.
2. طريقة توظيف العراقيين في المخابرات عن طريق الإخوة و الأقارب المهاجرين
3. إنهيار فكرة المؤسسية لإرضاء شخص بعينه. كإرضاء المخابرات لجورج تنت بشأن أسلحة الدمار الشامل
4. توزيع القوى الإرهابية في أنحاء المعمورة و انهيار متابعة المخابرات لهم
ربما لذلك السبب حبذا خلق بيئة مضطربة كالصومال أو أفغانستان
5. في الاختلاف القانوني بين استجواب المساجين في أمريكا نفسها أو في أبو غريب
حيث يتطلب الأول تصاريح عدة, بينما الثاني لا يحتاج أي شيء تقريبا.
6. في إدارة كلينتون كان الاستجواب يتم توكيله ل إف بي أي, بينما في عهد بوش تم الزج بالمخابرات. ومن ثم فإن الآلة القانونية و التصاريح كانت دائما لازمة في عهد كلينتون, بينما في عهد بوش فإن التصاريح لم تكن لازمة بالضرورة, حتى تم خلق معسكر جوانتانامو لتجاوز أمر التصاريح القانونية
7. يتم احتجاز الكثير من المساجين في بلاد مثل مصر بحسب ص 29, لغياب القانون في المقام الأول وكذا المثل في بولندا و رومانيا بالاسم
8.
NSA == 2 CIA
عن وكالة الامن القومي و حجمها و حجم عملائيها الذي هو ضعف المخابرات في الواقع. تم تدشينها في عام 1952 على يد الرئيس هاري ترومان بعد عام 2002 و أحداث سبتمبر سمح لها بوش الابن بمراقبة كل الاتصالات داخل أمريكا.
9.
دعم فكرة الحرب على العراق تمت بدواعي شخصية بالدرجة الأولى, دعمها جيش المخابرات في دول العالم المختلفة, وعارضته بعض الدول مثل هولندا -ص78- على الرغم من فشل المخابرات تماما في العمل داخل العراق و الحصول على معلومات ذات أي قيمة لإثبات أو نفي ادعائات اسلحة الدمار الشامل
10.
في الفترة بين 1998 و حتى 2003 تم استخدام موظفي وكالة الطاقة الذرية انفسهم بشكل مباشر للتخابر لصالح المخابرات الأمريكية. حيث اصبحوا المصدر الرئيسي لمعرفة العلماء العراقيين العالملين على مشاريع الأسلحة أو العلمية اجمالا.
11.
تم أيضا تجنيد عدد من العراقيين, سيعين أحدهم لاحقا وزيرا للداخلية. المسمى إياد علاوي.
بمعنى آخر, أن الاحتلال حتى لو نزع يده فإن القائمين بأعمال الحكومة أنفسهم عملاء لحساب جهاز المخابرات بشكل أو بآخر
راجع ص 89
12.
في 7 يونيو عام 1981 نفذت إسرائيل عملية لقذف مفاعل نووي عراقي تحت الإنشاء. كانت هي الضربة الأولى وتم استخدام اراضي السعودية فيها.
13.
اعتمد العراقيون على مشروع مانهاتن الأمريكي وهو باكورة الأعمال النووية, و ملفاته موجودة ولكن ابرز عيوبه هو الحاجة لمساحة واسعة و طاقة كبيرة للتخصيب. ومع ذلك يتعذر اخفاء العمل. ولكن العراقيين انطلاقا من مبدأ :
الفكرة دي اتهرست قبل كدة!
قاموا بها... مرتين. حتى بعد ضرب المفاعل المرة الاولى.
14.
احتاجت امريكا 11 عالم حامل لنوبل للقيام بمشروع مانهاتن. في حين استعانت العراق بعالم واحد فقط
15.
في عام 1987 بدأ العمل مرة أخرى على مفاعل ثاني, و استمر العمل ل 6 سنوات بدون علم أي جهة, --ارقام غير مؤكدة--
16.
أوكل صدام حسين مشروعه النووي لحسين كامل أحد أزواج بناته. ولم يتفهم الطبيعة العلمية للبحث العلمي. اذ كان يظن انه بالإمكان شراء أي شيء. وهو ما أوقع المشروع في حيص بيص لما تم القبض على 2 من رجاله في مطار هيثرو وهم يحاولون شراء محفزات نووية امريكية
ص 99.
وهو الأمر الذي نبه أمريكا و اصدقائها لنوايا العراق المتجددة.
على القادة أن يتفهموا أن الأبحاث العلمية دائما تأخذ من 8 ل 15 عام لتصل لنتائج مرجوة من العمل في صمت و ثبات.
17.
في عام 1991 كانت طائرة أمريكية في حرب الخليج عائدة لقواعدها محملة بقنبلتين. و قرر الطيار أن يلقي بهما على أكبر المباني الموجودة في أحد المصانع الحربية وقد كان. ولكنه كان المشروع النووي, و تجمع العراقيون بكثافة حول المباني, بينما يتابع اقرانهم الأمريكان الأمر من الأقمار الصناعية.
هذا الزحام و الزخم أجبر الأمريكان على قصف الموقع مجددا حيث تفهموا اهميته للعراقيين.
الدرس المستفاد: لو لديك موقع هام تم قصفه. لا تهرع إليه!
ص100
18.
بعد هذه الواقعة تم الاتصال بعشرات الأسر العراقية لمحاولة الوصول لمعلوات عن النشاط العراقي و اسلحة الدمار الشامل.
19.
يذكر الكتاب "احمد شلبي" احد الساسة العراقيين فيما بعد الغزو والذي انخرط في اعمال سرقات منظمة بعلم من المخابرات الأمريكية
20.
ينهي الكاتب قصة العراق ولم يتطرق تقريبا إلى انتهاكات ابو غريب. و يذكر احيانا كثيرة المقاومين العراقيين على انهم "إرهابيين" وليسوا مدافعين عن ارضهم
21.
في صفحة 155 يبدأ الحديث عن تجارة الأفيون و الهروين في أفغانستان, بمعلومات عامة مثل:
الأفيون 1278 طن مجفف في عام 2002 و سيتضاعف الانتاج عام 2003 و مرة أخرى يتضاعف 2004 حتي يصبح انتاج افغانستان 87% من المنتج العالمي.
و تتحدث التقارير عن تصدير واسع برعاية الأمريكان انفسهم.
22.
ضرب الإنجليز مصنع للأفيون في يناير 2004 وهو ما أدى لأزمة عالمية وارتفاع اسعار الأفيون ب 15% و بالتبعية معدل الجرائم.
23.
أين يذهب مال الأفيون؟
يتم توزيعه بين ساسة أفغان و حركات إرهابية, و بعض المال للقاعدة -بدون تأكيد- و الحركة الإسلامية في أوزبكستان. كانت المخابرات على علم بالأموال و سيرها إلى الحركات الإرهابية إجمالا بحسب زعم الكاتب.
الجزء الأغرب في القصة, هو عدم تعرض القوات الأمريكية للتجارة بشكل جدي. إذ يبدو أن التجارة نفسها تقوم برعاية أمريكا و حمايتها.
-- عن الدولة السعودية و الإرهاب
24.
خمسة عشر رجلام من أصل 19 متهمين في هجوم 11 سبتمبر كانوا سعوديين.
25.
تظن المخابرات أن بن لادن كان ينفق 30 مليون دولار سنويا على القاعدة
26.
هناك خط واضح بزعم الكاتب بين الحكومة السعودية أو الطبقة الحاكمة و بن لادن من أوائل الثمانينات. حتى حين تم القبض على أبو زبيدة و وجد معه كارت بنكي سعودي وقت القبض عليه فإن المخابرات تجاوزت عن تتبع الكارت. يرجح الكاتب أن هناك علاقات أو اتفاقات خفية بين المخابرات و الأسرة الحاكمة, وأو أن المخابرات على استعداد لتجاوز العلاقة السعودية بالقاعدة لأسباب سياسية.
27.
في 189 معلومة في غاية الأهمية:
في كتابه خطة الهجوم ل بوب وودوارد يقول:
أن علاقة الساسة الأمريكان بنظرائهم السعوديين كانت أقوى حتى من علاقتهم بالمخابرات الأمريكية أو بجورج تنت, و يضرب المثل بالهجوم على العراق حيث أخبر جورج بوش الأمير بندر عام 2003 بموعد الحرب قبل أن يعلمه سكرتير الدولة كولن باول نفسه.
28.
في ص 190 جملة مضحكة:
يستحق جورج بوش التقدير على اهتمامه بنشر الديمقراطية في الشرق الأوسط كحجر اساسي في أجندته الرئاسية خلال فترة حكمه
---- إيران
30.
كشف عميل إيراني مزدوج لإيران عن شبكة التجسس الامريكية كاملة داخل إيران. ربما هنا حلقة جديدة من فشل المخابرات الأمريكية
ص 193
ومنذ العام 2004 و بإمكاننا الزعم ان السي آي أيه عمياء داخل إيران.
31.
روسيا ترى في إيران عميل مهم بالدرجة الأولى وعليه فهي على استعداد لمساعدة إيران في مشروعها النووي
32.
مشروع
MERLIN
هو مشروع أمريكي مخابراتي كان الهدف منه هو توصيل معلومات علمية و خرائط و رسومات للعلماء الإيرانيين القائمين على المفاعل و القنبلة النووية الإيرانية. حيت يتم الزج بأخطاء صغيرة داخل التصميمات تعيق عمل الإيرانيين لبضعة سنوات أو تقضي على احلامهم بالأساس.
تم الزج بالمشروع عن طريق عالم روسي بعد عمل بعض مراكز الخبرة و العلم علي المشروع في أمريكا.
تقدم احدهم بالفكرة ل بيل كلنتون ووافق على المشروع
33.
دعم صدام حسين حركة :
MEK
في إيران, و أبقت أمريكا على دعم لنفس الحركة داخل إيران لاستغلالها لاحقا
ص 215.
------------------
أعتقد أني لخصت أهم أفكار الكتاب. و أحسب أن هناك عددا غير محدود من الأفكار و الملاحظات الممكن تجنبها مستقبلا أو التعلم منها تاريخيا:
1. قد تستخدم إسرائيل أرض السعودية في ضربة على إيران
2. قبل البدء في بناء مفاعل نووي يجب بناء البنية العلمية للدولة
وقد يأخذ هذا 20 عاما ولكنه أفضل من البدء مباشرة.
3. يجب مراقبة السفارات الأخرى وموظفيها من باب الحيطة
4. يتم استخدام موظفي الأمم المتحدة في الأعمال الاستخباراتية الأمريكية
5. لا ينزع الاستعمار يده من أي دولة إلا ويترك جيش من العملاء كأذرع خبيثة في الدولة بينما يبقى العقل في الخارج
6.على دعاة حقوق الإنسان ملاحقة مؤسسات و عملاء أمريكا خارج أرض أمريكا كما بولندا و مصر و رومانيا
7. لا يتم توكيل سياسي بأمر علمي. إذ العقلية مختلفة تماما وقت تؤدي بمشاريع قومية للهلاك كما كان في مشروع العراقيين
8. العل��قة الأمريكية بالساسة السعوديين علاقة منفعة بالضرورة. يبقى آل سعود في الحكم في مقابل وجود الأموال و المنافع الاقتصادية لصالح أمريكا.
السعودية دولة محتلة بشكل مختلف.
دمتم.
-- أحمد عبد الحميد
February 6, 2019
Recomended to any liberty minded individual that wants to be enlightened to the corrupt geopolitical machinations that our government commits behind our backs.
May 9, 2009
An excellent even handed analysis of the CIA's role in the fight against Al Qaida, and the war in iraq. Mostly about the role in the Bush Amin. it does not spare the Clinton years.
This is just another confirmation of the lies and the manipulation that the Bush admin, especially Cheney and Rumsfeld, used to channel the CIA into a role of supporting admin policy rather than giving unvarnished intelligence.
It gives a good line of the progression from the initial policy decisions of the Administration to the totally unconstitutional unwarranted and totally destructive policies that ended up screwing up both the Iraq war, and the policy of torture that was instituted.
I like that it in no way paints the principle characters as being evil, just pig headed and part of a culture of arrogance and stupidity. it fills in some important pieces of the puzzle with certain specific events, such as the staffing of incompetent ideologues in Iraq and the CIA. The reliance on "screwball" as the only source of intelligence that there were WMD's in Iraq, and the courageous actions of a few CIA officials who were willing to ruin their careers in order to get accurate information.
reading this makes it clear that Bush Cheney, Rumseld, and a slew of Bush admin officials are guilty of war crimes and corrupting our system of Government. But it also shows they are not evil monsters intent on creating a dictatorship for their own gain. That was a subsidiary concern. As such even though they are technically guilty of treason, and undermining the constitution, I don't believe any of them are deserving of more than life in prison.
An excellent book that gives a insight into how bureauocratic institutions can be curropted to undermine the democratic principles of the country.
This is just another confirmation of the lies and the manipulation that the Bush admin, especially Cheney and Rumsfeld, used to channel the CIA into a role of supporting admin policy rather than giving unvarnished intelligence.
It gives a good line of the progression from the initial policy decisions of the Administration to the totally unconstitutional unwarranted and totally destructive policies that ended up screwing up both the Iraq war, and the policy of torture that was instituted.
I like that it in no way paints the principle characters as being evil, just pig headed and part of a culture of arrogance and stupidity. it fills in some important pieces of the puzzle with certain specific events, such as the staffing of incompetent ideologues in Iraq and the CIA. The reliance on "screwball" as the only source of intelligence that there were WMD's in Iraq, and the courageous actions of a few CIA officials who were willing to ruin their careers in order to get accurate information.
reading this makes it clear that Bush Cheney, Rumseld, and a slew of Bush admin officials are guilty of war crimes and corrupting our system of Government. But it also shows they are not evil monsters intent on creating a dictatorship for their own gain. That was a subsidiary concern. As such even though they are technically guilty of treason, and undermining the constitution, I don't believe any of them are deserving of more than life in prison.
An excellent book that gives a insight into how bureauocratic institutions can be curropted to undermine the democratic principles of the country.
October 6, 2008
Difficult to read and follow because so many sources had to remain anonymous. Continously seeing the phrases "anonymous highly-placed source in the CIA" or "anonymous highly-placed source in the white house" or "anonymous high-level officer in the FBI" made the book clunky and more than a little tedious to read. The material was both enlightening and depressing as the 30 second sound bites from television news reports these last 7 years coalesced into a grand, cohesive web of power plays and deception produced by the current administration.
July 21, 2021
After reading Risen's long piece in NYT about source protection and the political war on anonymous sources, I chose the most interesting-looking of his books to start with.
The book relies heavily on anonymous statements, as expected in an arena like this where losing one's job is would be the minimum consequence for speaking to a reporter about CIA operations in Afghanistan. However, his assertions seem to have met heavy criticism and opposition by other, more well-informed reviewers. I'm not a geopolitics expert, and since I'm not prepared to read heavily on this I'll have to assume the truth is middle-way between his critics and his bold statements.
What (nearly) no one seems to disagree about, though, are the central arguments of the book: that Bush's administration was marked by infighting and deception when it came to Afghanistan and Iraq, that weapons of mass destruction were - in hindsight, very obviously - not present in Iraq in 2002/2003, and that CIA secrecy about prisoners in prisons around the world is distinctly un-American.
Overall a good but rambling read trying to cover too much with quite a few esoteric references.
Interestingly, I knew more than I thought about then-CIA DCI George Tenet, having randomly read his biography ("At The Center of the Storm) in 2007 when I found it at my public library. I don't recall what appealed to 17 year-old me about this book, but for some reason I read it and probably had plenty of strong (positive) opinions about him afterward (I wasn't the most critical of readers at 17). This cast him in a different light, needless to say.
The book relies heavily on anonymous statements, as expected in an arena like this where losing one's job is would be the minimum consequence for speaking to a reporter about CIA operations in Afghanistan. However, his assertions seem to have met heavy criticism and opposition by other, more well-informed reviewers. I'm not a geopolitics expert, and since I'm not prepared to read heavily on this I'll have to assume the truth is middle-way between his critics and his bold statements.
What (nearly) no one seems to disagree about, though, are the central arguments of the book: that Bush's administration was marked by infighting and deception when it came to Afghanistan and Iraq, that weapons of mass destruction were - in hindsight, very obviously - not present in Iraq in 2002/2003, and that CIA secrecy about prisoners in prisons around the world is distinctly un-American.
Overall a good but rambling read trying to cover too much with quite a few esoteric references.
Interestingly, I knew more than I thought about then-CIA DCI George Tenet, having randomly read his biography ("At The Center of the Storm) in 2007 when I found it at my public library. I don't recall what appealed to 17 year-old me about this book, but for some reason I read it and probably had plenty of strong (positive) opinions about him afterward (I wasn't the most critical of readers at 17). This cast him in a different light, needless to say.
May 6, 2025
A very nice read, not too technical and quite easy going. Yet, it is clearly very opinionated about the subject, presenting little nuance about the frank corruption, incompetence and abuses of power within the Bush administration. This is not necessarily a stark condemnation of the work, but it is important to note. Beyond that - while very understandable, especially for the time in which it was written - the constant references to "an anonymous source" got a bit much at times. While I don't doubt many of the conclusions Risen reached, I would have preferred to have a clearer image of where he gets this information from.
In terms of the actual content - it is a good read to understand what may be the most crucial administration in the early 21st century so far. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq undoubtedly shaped both domestic and international politics in ways we cannot even properly come to terms with, and this work showing the many flaws and mistakes made by the Bush administration gives us an understanding of why American efforts there failed so catastrophically. It lays bare the sorry state which the CIA was in during this time, the mix between dangerous and reckless operations it engaged in at times - combined with extreme and undue caution at others. The conflicts between the white house, the pentagon and the intelligence community are underpinned - as well as the lack of clear cooperation between these branches regarding the conflicts and future of the nations invaded. All in all, highly recommend.
In terms of the actual content - it is a good read to understand what may be the most crucial administration in the early 21st century so far. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq undoubtedly shaped both domestic and international politics in ways we cannot even properly come to terms with, and this work showing the many flaws and mistakes made by the Bush administration gives us an understanding of why American efforts there failed so catastrophically. It lays bare the sorry state which the CIA was in during this time, the mix between dangerous and reckless operations it engaged in at times - combined with extreme and undue caution at others. The conflicts between the white house, the pentagon and the intelligence community are underpinned - as well as the lack of clear cooperation between these branches regarding the conflicts and future of the nations invaded. All in all, highly recommend.
June 28, 2017
Good book and important read. Obviously a little dated since the war continued on during the Obama administration and the revalations from Snowden and other leakers. One should also read John Tenat's own account to gain some perspective. Another great book to supplement is Horse Soldiers which discusses the ground offensive in Afganistan and illuminates the CIA role within the broader context of the role in the war.
I do think the author sometimes oversimplifies the CIA role as a mouthpiece to the administration with Bush administration. Which is why it is important to hear from multiple points of view and construct one's own opinion.
It is clear that as a public we allowed our country to take a direction that the majority of americans would not have gone based on the wishes of a relatively few people. Also it is clear that the few who wanted to execute this policy did not take into account the better planning opinions of those more familiar with the region and the senior leadership of the military who would have taken a different approach to solving the problem.
Main take home point is that we as a public need to keep ourselves informed and make our wishes known early and often.
I do think the author sometimes oversimplifies the CIA role as a mouthpiece to the administration with Bush administration. Which is why it is important to hear from multiple points of view and construct one's own opinion.
It is clear that as a public we allowed our country to take a direction that the majority of americans would not have gone based on the wishes of a relatively few people. Also it is clear that the few who wanted to execute this policy did not take into account the better planning opinions of those more familiar with the region and the senior leadership of the military who would have taken a different approach to solving the problem.
Main take home point is that we as a public need to keep ourselves informed and make our wishes known early and often.
March 6, 2021
Risen was Eric Lichtblau’s partner at NYT. Eric focused on the Justice system and law enforcement, Jim on intelligence. They were writing their books nearly at the same time. It seems from Eric’s book that Jim was a bit ahead. Eric’s very good 2007 book is Bush’s Law. This book came out in 2006.
Some of it was outdated in some ways just because he had the beginning of stories but it’s only 2006 so he didn’t know how they turned out yet. Like the stuff about tracking bin Laden and Pakistan. But the last two chapters, about our relationship with Saudi Arabia (so very all too currently critical and relevant) and the insane chapter about CIA program MERLIN about giving the Iranians nuclear weapons plans, were truly relevant and truly frightening. Also, FBI/Mueller didn’t look too good across the board. Like when they just didn’t show up for a big meeting with an Afghanistan drug lord. Just didn’t make the big meeting. What’s up with that? And Bush was interestingly made out to have ruined the Afghanistan war, missing bin Laden and more because he was diverted by the Iraq war. It was an interesting book, if you’re trying to understand the Bush 43 administration.
Some of it was outdated in some ways just because he had the beginning of stories but it’s only 2006 so he didn’t know how they turned out yet. Like the stuff about tracking bin Laden and Pakistan. But the last two chapters, about our relationship with Saudi Arabia (so very all too currently critical and relevant) and the insane chapter about CIA program MERLIN about giving the Iranians nuclear weapons plans, were truly relevant and truly frightening. Also, FBI/Mueller didn’t look too good across the board. Like when they just didn’t show up for a big meeting with an Afghanistan drug lord. Just didn’t make the big meeting. What’s up with that? And Bush was interestingly made out to have ruined the Afghanistan war, missing bin Laden and more because he was diverted by the Iraq war. It was an interesting book, if you’re trying to understand the Bush 43 administration.
June 12, 2019
Extremely concise and with a brisk paced narrative, this book examines the failures of the CIA, the Pentagon and the White House during the war in Iraq. It focuses on the main players in George Bush Jr's presidency with narratives created from unnamed sources from within government circles. Obviously with so much sensitive information, you can understand the lack of names attributed with each piece of the author's story but it's still not ideal. It is however, very fair in its assessments of people's motives and drives, not mentioning Halliburton once throughout the book. Ideology plays a big part with the same old neoconservative attitudes prevailing like they always do. Their disregard for balances and checks and their love of a crazy misinformed plan are really the main points to remember from this debacle. Does a good job of politely reminding you of history repeating itself and of the almighty mess of the Middle East.
August 1, 2025
This had some RICH material and made the stories very easy to follow, however the timeline jumped around A LOT which made it kind of spotty at times. I will say I think the author came across as very one-sided in his writing which made it read a lot more political than historical. Not a bad thing just something to note! I was really interested in many of the operations that weren’t public knowledge at the time and hearing about the control of the intelligence narrative during the Bush administration
June 19, 2023
This was absolutely superb writing! Informative, action packed, and kept an awesome tone.
The search for the WMD’s, the Bush mess, the vicious plots of Tenet, the systematized fake war that was created by the powers that be, it got through it all.
And I didn’t want to put it down!
So important because that time when this was happening in the world, I was alive but not competent. So very important to build my knowledge of it up.
The search for the WMD’s, the Bush mess, the vicious plots of Tenet, the systematized fake war that was created by the powers that be, it got through it all.
And I didn’t want to put it down!
So important because that time when this was happening in the world, I was alive but not competent. So very important to build my knowledge of it up.
January 20, 2018
Not great. I got it to hear more about the mission to give 'fake' nuclear plans to Iran that went wrong in a carry-on fashion. Some interesting anecdotes but not a huge amount of background or detail on the many intelligence failures in the last 20 years
Read
June 19, 2025I read maybe a quarter of the way through. Although Mr Risen is a great writer/reporter, the material here was written a long time ago and is now quite dated. The alarms raised in the book are now firmly established. I commend him for writing the book. I will leave it unrated.
October 3, 2017
A story that is now common knowledge, but with hindsight rings even more true.
January 17, 2018
Unbelivabke facts revelaed in a very shocking manner. If not for the occasional repeats, an amazing read.
May 11, 2018
Dull and dated.
September 24, 2018
I wanted more a history. This book focused only post 9/11.
December 7, 2019
Solid history of the Bush administration
July 14, 2020
A great review of recent history and how President Bush handled his presidency. Not an easy read but very informative!!!
April 21, 2022
Fascinating topic, but too much reliance on unnamed sources. At times it seemed more like a super long newspaper article.
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