... I had purchased this book some years back but did not read it until recently. For me, the book covers one critical area within the history of mid-east conflicts and also resolves some of my own mis-conceptions of the October War.
Firstly, I had thought that the Yom Kippur War was an Israeli defeat, although in the latter days of the war, it was not. The Egyptian and Syrian forces made decisive gains at first, partly from the surprise attack on Yom Kippur, as well as from other preparations such as the Egyptian use of SAMs (surface to air missiles) to blunt the Israeli air forces and various anti-tank weaponry including the Sagger anti-tank missile. The Israelis, for their part, suffered from hubris after the decisive victory in the Six Day War, and some early warning signs of a possible attack were ignored.
In the final days of the conflict, however, Israel had managed to recover from the initial defeats and made significant gains, aided by the US airlift of supplies and weapons. Israeli forces were able to cross the Suez Canal and made incursions into Egyptian territory. This included an ill-fated attempt to take the city of Suez. More successfully, Israeli forces were able to encircle Egypt's badly weakened 3rd Army. The Israelis would later give up the Sinai only after the Camp David Accords in 1978, a few years after the conclusion of the Yom Kippur War of 1973.
The book itself covers the many military, political and diplomatic angles of the war, including a significant portion devoted to the US crews who participated in the airlift to Israel. Special attention was also given to Henry Kissinger, as well as the higher levels of Soviet command. President Richard Nixon himself was not fully involved, as his attention was focused mostly on Watergate. In general, I have found the book to be informative and fairly detailed. The book also includes some maps, and an appendix.