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576 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 2006
In plain language, the [mid-1990s] Zairian economy reverted to its precolonial, pre-monetary existence, but with three major differences. First, the precolonial economy was a complex affair in which purely economic matters were intimately mixed with ritual, religion, social prestige, and cultural exchanges. These rich precolonial complexities were by now largely dead. Second, the precolonial economy had served a population of probably fewer than ten million, whereas by 2000 there would be fifty million Congolese. Third, the precolonial economy had operated as a system of pleasant autarky supplemented by limited regional trade mostly made up of nonessentials. By now the people had been taught to expect that they could purchase a number of products and services from a circuit of commercial exchanges; thus the shrinking of the money economy turned what had been a dignified scarcity into humiliating grinding poverty. The social consequences were enormous.
Does the reader at this point want to throw in the towel and give up on the ethnopolitical complexities of the region? I would not blame him, although I can assure him that I am honestly trying to simplify the picture. If we stand back for a moment and try to assess the situation, what do we see?
For what was happening in Kisangani [in 1999] was only a portent of things to come: the disintegration of a 'rational' war into myriad 'privatised', socially and economically motivated subconflicts. But at that stage the international community did not understand the nature of the problem and still believed that it faced a conventional conflict that could be treated by traditional diplomatic methods. So when the various contenders finally agreed to sign on August 31st, the document they agreed upon was outwardly 'normal' but in fact completely unfit for dealing with the reality on the ground.
African wars can only be carried out part time. The 'total war' concept invented by Germany during World War I and since seen to apply to many conflicts worldwide cannot apply in Africa because the means are simply not available. Military action is largely disconnected from the rest of socioeconomic life and cannot be sustained relentlessly. Thus, if war can only be carried out only part time because of financial constraints, the combatants sooner or later tend to privatise their action. And if looting can at times be supervised by the state, as in the case of Rwanda, it is a 'natural' tendency for all the combatants to practice it on a large scale, particularly for those belonging to nonstate militias, who are usually left without pay for long periods of time.
In this respect, as in several others, the Great Lakes or 'Congolese' conflict resembles the European Thirty years' War (1618-1648), in which looting was one of the fundamental activities of the contending armies. [...] Because civilians are the ones from the whom the military can take its means of survival, armed violence is more often directed at civilians (including, at times, those of one's own camp) than at the enemy army. Direct armed confrontation is often avoided, and straightforward military victory is only one of the various options in the field. It is actually this nonstate, decentralised form of violence that makes conflicts so murderous and hard to stop.
Faced with this the international community could only utter truisms, such as the central message of the Brahimi Report: 'The key conditions for the success of future complex operations are political support, rapid deployment with a robust force posture and a sound peace-building strategy.' Who could quarrel with that? But equally truly, who was ready to do it?