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Very Little...Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature
The 'death of man', the 'end of history' and even philosophy are strong and troubling currents running through contemporary debates. Yet since Nietzsche's heralding of the 'death of god', philosophy has been unable to explain the question of finitude.
Very Little...Almost Nothing goes to the heart of this problem through an exploration of Blanchot's theory of literature, Stanley Cavell's interpretations of romanticism and the importance of death in the work of Samuel Beckett. Simon Critchley links these themes to the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas to present a powerful new picture of how we must approach the importance of death in philosophy.
A compelling reading of the convergence of literature and philosophy, Very Little...Almost Nothing opens up new ways of understanding finitude, modernity and the nature of the imagination.
Very Little...Almost Nothing goes to the heart of this problem through an exploration of Blanchot's theory of literature, Stanley Cavell's interpretations of romanticism and the importance of death in the work of Samuel Beckett. Simon Critchley links these themes to the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas to present a powerful new picture of how we must approach the importance of death in philosophy.
A compelling reading of the convergence of literature and philosophy, Very Little...Almost Nothing opens up new ways of understanding finitude, modernity and the nature of the imagination.
232 pages, Hardcover
First published May 20, 2004
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443 people want to read
About the author
Simon Critchley
112 books380 followersSimon Critchley (born 27 February 1960 in Hertfordshire) is an English philosopher currently teaching at The New School. He works in continental philosophy. Critchley argues that philosophy commences in disappointment, either religious or political. These two axes may be said largely to inform his published work: religious disappointment raises the question of meaning and has to, as he sees it, deal with the problem of nihilism; political disappointment provokes the question of justice and raises the need for a coherent ethics [...]
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 10 reviews
April 13, 2020
این کتاب دربارهی پیدا کردن معنا در جهان پس از «خدا مرده است» نیچه است. وقتی عنوان کتاب رو دیدم «خیلی کم... تقریباً هیچ. مرگ، فلسفه، ادبیات» احساس کردم وقتی نویسندهاش میدونه چطورعنوانِ جالب انتخاب کنه، قطعاً نوشتهها و تفکرات جالبی هم داره. همینطور هم بود حقیقتاً. اما مشکلی که با کتاب داشتم این بود که جملهها بسیار طولانی و پیچیده بودن، اما این پیچیدگی گاهی بیشتر ظاهری بود. یعنی در واقع حرف خیلی خاصی زده نشده بود. البته البته من اصلاً نمیدونم ترجمه چطور بوده. ممکنه ترجمه هم در این پیچیدگی دخیل بوده باشه. از این مسئله که بگذریم، سایمون کریچلی در این کتاب چهار تا مقاله داره که خوانشش از بلانشو، لویناس، کاول، امرسون و والت ویتمن، بکت و در نهایت والاس استیونس در این باره رو بیان میکنه. تمرکز کریچلی درمواجهه با هیچانگاری معاصر، روی مسئلهی ادبیاته. اما همونطور که تو مقدمه خودش به نقد اندرو بووی هم اشاره کرده، به هیچ وجه به موسیقی نمیپردازه. خیلی جاها همهی حرفایی که میزنه - بهویژه حرفای مربوط به کوچیک بودنِ ظرفیتِ زبان برای انتقال همهی چیزی که تجربه میکنیم - مربوط به موسیقیه، اما کریچلی به این مسئله هیچ اشارهای نکرده.
اگه بخوام در یه جمله بگم این کتاب چی داشت برام باید برگردم به عنوانش. در این جهانِ آکنده از هیچانگاری فقط میشه برگردیم به معنای چیزهای ساده و کوچک زندگی که گرچه خیلی کمان، تقریباً هیچان، اما باز بهتر از هیچیان.
«این جهان را در پیشگاه فرشته بستا، این جهانِ پیدا را، و از جهانِ ناپیدا یا از چیزهای نگفتنی همچون عشق، رنج، ستارگان یا دشواریِ بودن سخن مگو. ما باید از گفتنیها بگوییم، یعنی از چیزها: («به او از چیزها بگو. حیرانتر خواهد شد.»). اما کدام چیزها؟ ریلکه فهرستی احتمالی فراهم میآورد:
شاید اینجا آمدهایم تا بگوییم: خانه، پل
فواره، دروازه، درختِ میوه، پنجره و
در نهایت: ستون، برج....»
August 24, 2007
I'm of two minds about this, really. The book is comprised of three long lectures, which don't cohere nearly as well as SC thinks they do. He tries to be a great writer and sometimes succeeds, but it's hard not to think that his constant resort to paradox comes from an occasional preference for cheap effects over real thought. Worth it though for this one quote from Beckett, which I had never seen: "For why be discouraged, one of the thieves was saved, that is a generous percentage."
December 21, 2024
Not unwillingly, but oddly enough, one did finish reading Critchley's "Very little...almost Nothing." One read this work to satisfy or further enhance one's interest/study of Cavell, Romanticism, Levinas, Beckett and Nihilism. The work in fact met that requirement. However, the difficulty that informs the 'oddly enough' resides, first, in Critchley's left wing orientation, which resembles in its assumptions an ISIS-like devotion to a Grand Narrative (whether inspired by God, Marx or other) of Revolution-Redemption-Things Could Be Otherwise. Now, one ought to accept Critchley's clear renunciation of violence; however, if 'meaninglessness' is the dominate ingredient (in the Grand Narrative) of Nihilism (which by definition trades in Death and Destruction) then what is a reader to make of Critchley's claim that "meaninglessness is an achievement"; moreover, that this achievement describes an "atheist transcendence." These sorts of contradictions, signatures of if not Continental Philosophy in total, then of "Literary Theory", echoes the generic pattern and endless use of the phrase, " x reveals as x conceals." (A fine stand of Horse Weed wouldn't you say? That is to ask, "Does a spurious duck conceal the "real" rabbit?-Reference to Jastrow's ambiguous figure.)
The second difficulty that informs the "oddly enough" is Critchley's discussion of Blancho. Although Critchley confesses his own difficulty with the "thought" of Blancho, his explications or rather interpretations of Blancho, nevertheless, scatter the moss, bitter sweet, and other ivies off of Blancho enough to reveal the rotting shade of a necrophilic crackpot. Even though Crithchley explained the use of phrases such as the "impossibility of death" and the "irremissibility of dying," one grew very weary of the sharp difference between their figurative and ordinary uses...do I dare say, "meanings"?
Finally, while one finds that Critchley's discussion of Beckett helpfully illuminates James Guetti's notion of "grammatical displays" as well as Wittgenstein's claim- from paragraph #527 in the "Philosophical Investigations"- that, "Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one may think." One, nevertheless, does not buy into the idea that "meaninglessness is an achievement" and satisfies the quest for the ordinary.
The second difficulty that informs the "oddly enough" is Critchley's discussion of Blancho. Although Critchley confesses his own difficulty with the "thought" of Blancho, his explications or rather interpretations of Blancho, nevertheless, scatter the moss, bitter sweet, and other ivies off of Blancho enough to reveal the rotting shade of a necrophilic crackpot. Even though Crithchley explained the use of phrases such as the "impossibility of death" and the "irremissibility of dying," one grew very weary of the sharp difference between their figurative and ordinary uses...do I dare say, "meanings"?
Finally, while one finds that Critchley's discussion of Beckett helpfully illuminates James Guetti's notion of "grammatical displays" as well as Wittgenstein's claim- from paragraph #527 in the "Philosophical Investigations"- that, "Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one may think." One, nevertheless, does not buy into the idea that "meaninglessness is an achievement" and satisfies the quest for the ordinary.
February 25, 2015
this book concerns the problem of "meaning" from blanchot to beckett.
i dont know how accurate the translation(لیلا کوچک منش) is but i dare to say it's full of long and ambigouse sentences.
i dont know how accurate the translation(لیلا کوچک منش) is but i dare to say it's full of long and ambigouse sentences.
December 6, 2021
Disorganized collection of quotations lost in exaggerations. No commitment to clarify anything even a Very Little. Word salad beginning with subject of Death, simulating Philosophy, Literature.
January 8, 2025
‘…Almost Nothing’ is still Something
At the outset, I must state that what I appreciate most about this text is the refreshingly non-condescending tone. As such, this book is not as approachable as many other contemporary works on philosophy or intellectual history which is why this book should be approached. The book addresses that small space where philosophy and art (poetry & literature) intersect and as such is a work of philosophy and literary criticism. With my own empathy for the Romantic, I often find myself occupying this space. In this space, Professor Critchley bravely grapples with the nothingness at the center of human existence, the language of emptiness and the necessary broken heart of the Romantic. However, since we cannot have a phenomenology of nothing, we end up with something, the author’s best efforts to get at nothing, notwithstanding. This reminds me of the song by Enigma, ‘Silence Must Be Heard’ that to seem to correspond in music to the insight of Samuel Beckett stated in prose, “nothing is more real than nothing”.
Additional Musings:
Learn How to Die or Learn How to Live?
As stated by the author, this book is an attempt to understand the significance of death for philosophy. The great Cicero, and the perhaps equally great Montaigne, both provide the basis for this perspective with their insight as quoted on p. 29, “That to Philosophie is to Learn How to Die”. Professor Critchley also tells us that ancient philosophy begins with a sense of wonder and that modern philosophy (lose periodization) begins with a sense of disappointment. Disappointment emanating from religion (disappointment that there Is no God) and from politics (disappointment that there is no justice). I agree with characterization of how the philosophical enterprise has changed, but I find the disappointment in a different place than does the author and thus I find the task of philosophy to be somewhat different as well. If I may: (That to Philosophie is to Learn How to Live).
Death is not the same as Dying:
There are only two fully causally deterministic points in life, birth and death. The latter, completely necessary, the former fully contingent. I propose that we spend our philosophical energies on the fully contingent point. I believe that the existential problem facing us is not death, but birth. The challenge of philosophy is not in understanding how to die, but in understanding how to live. I do not by this mean any sort of Pollyannaish or nauseating self-help perspective, or transcendental belief systems with metaphysical crutches. What I mean is that death is rather quotidian, common place and in any case, necessary and not avoidable. The existential problem is in birth, not in death. It is in having to face existence, with our experiences riveted to it, not death, that calls us forth to philosophy, literature and poetry. I believe that the event of birth provides the more engaging task for philosophy than does death because, as Professor Critchley himself states on p. 31, there can be no phenomenology of death since it is “…ungraspable and exceeds both intentionality and the correlative structures of phenomenology.” This is the case because death is quite literally nothing as Epicurus tells us, there is no experience to explore, thus there can be no phenomenology of experience in the case of death. Death is nothing but dying is something. Here I find an inconsistency in the Professor Critchley’s narrative. On p. 85, he states that “There can be no phenomenology of dying…” This is different from saying that there can be no phenomenology of death as on p. 31. I agree with the latter but not with the former. I believe that there is a distinction to be made between dying and death, one apparently not recognized by the author. There can be a phenomenology of dying since the experience of dying is still very much a part of the lived experience of existence in this world. That is, we can take a phenomenological approach to the lived experiences of our existence, including dying. As I mentioned above, birth, not death, is the central experience of human existence. Birth leads to life which includes dying as the quote on p. 35 from ‘Thomas the Obscure’ demonstrates. Even in the act of suicide by hanging the man “…feels only the rope which holds him, held to the end, held more than ever, bound as he had never been bound before to the existence he would like to live.” This supports my point, even in this extreme outpost of existence, he still has an experience within the lived world and thus can have a phenomenology of the experience. I cannot agree the dying, especially by suicide, lacks adequate intention. It is dying, not death, that remains within the bounds of phenomenology. Even if dying belongs to the order of enigmatic or inappaerent as Levinas tells us, the enigmatic and the inapparent are still to be found within the lived experience of existence and can thus be clawed into phenomenological approach. But I can agree that there is no mastering of death and that death is needed to provide context to our existence, to provide life with banisters, not crutches, so to speak. Thus, what Professor Critchley is doing here is approaching the unapproachable. I truly appreciate his efforts as I was ready to settle merely for understanding life.
Real Disappointment:
Disappointment comes from the anxiety, and perhaps even the fear, that we cannot come to an explanation, understanding or phenomenology of birth without finding the whole thing to be simply ridiculous; that we will not be able to come to an explanation of birth other than to find that it was some sort of error, or at least contingent on a host of bizarre causes, not the least of which being the lustful desires of two other people and a random coming together of genetic material. Why am I myself is another part of this existential question. Everything about me is unlikely, yet here I am. So much about what is fundamentally me could have been different and is dependent on the most quotidian casual factors, even mere happenstance and circumstances, such as two particular people meeting, perhaps randomly, when they met, where they met, when they decided to have a sexual union, whether or not they decided to merry, where they decide to reside, what occupations they chose, what religion, if any, they practiced etc. The smallest changes in any of these mundane and even most insignificant causes of me would result in the most fundamental and transformative changes in who turned out to be me. In short, other people rolled the dice without my consent and here I am. Yes, I will die, so what of what? Religious and political disappointment are just particular aspects or examples of this more general disappointment about life. At least in my case, I have found that Fate has not been without a sense of humor and perhaps this just is what makes the whole thing tolerable, the utter humor in existing and being aware of it. This too, the author extracts from his close reading of Beckett. Without the humor, existence is deplorable.
Further musing I best remain silent on.
At the outset, I must state that what I appreciate most about this text is the refreshingly non-condescending tone. As such, this book is not as approachable as many other contemporary works on philosophy or intellectual history which is why this book should be approached. The book addresses that small space where philosophy and art (poetry & literature) intersect and as such is a work of philosophy and literary criticism. With my own empathy for the Romantic, I often find myself occupying this space. In this space, Professor Critchley bravely grapples with the nothingness at the center of human existence, the language of emptiness and the necessary broken heart of the Romantic. However, since we cannot have a phenomenology of nothing, we end up with something, the author’s best efforts to get at nothing, notwithstanding. This reminds me of the song by Enigma, ‘Silence Must Be Heard’ that to seem to correspond in music to the insight of Samuel Beckett stated in prose, “nothing is more real than nothing”.
Additional Musings:
Learn How to Die or Learn How to Live?
As stated by the author, this book is an attempt to understand the significance of death for philosophy. The great Cicero, and the perhaps equally great Montaigne, both provide the basis for this perspective with their insight as quoted on p. 29, “That to Philosophie is to Learn How to Die”. Professor Critchley also tells us that ancient philosophy begins with a sense of wonder and that modern philosophy (lose periodization) begins with a sense of disappointment. Disappointment emanating from religion (disappointment that there Is no God) and from politics (disappointment that there is no justice). I agree with characterization of how the philosophical enterprise has changed, but I find the disappointment in a different place than does the author and thus I find the task of philosophy to be somewhat different as well. If I may: (That to Philosophie is to Learn How to Live).
Death is not the same as Dying:
There are only two fully causally deterministic points in life, birth and death. The latter, completely necessary, the former fully contingent. I propose that we spend our philosophical energies on the fully contingent point. I believe that the existential problem facing us is not death, but birth. The challenge of philosophy is not in understanding how to die, but in understanding how to live. I do not by this mean any sort of Pollyannaish or nauseating self-help perspective, or transcendental belief systems with metaphysical crutches. What I mean is that death is rather quotidian, common place and in any case, necessary and not avoidable. The existential problem is in birth, not in death. It is in having to face existence, with our experiences riveted to it, not death, that calls us forth to philosophy, literature and poetry. I believe that the event of birth provides the more engaging task for philosophy than does death because, as Professor Critchley himself states on p. 31, there can be no phenomenology of death since it is “…ungraspable and exceeds both intentionality and the correlative structures of phenomenology.” This is the case because death is quite literally nothing as Epicurus tells us, there is no experience to explore, thus there can be no phenomenology of experience in the case of death. Death is nothing but dying is something. Here I find an inconsistency in the Professor Critchley’s narrative. On p. 85, he states that “There can be no phenomenology of dying…” This is different from saying that there can be no phenomenology of death as on p. 31. I agree with the latter but not with the former. I believe that there is a distinction to be made between dying and death, one apparently not recognized by the author. There can be a phenomenology of dying since the experience of dying is still very much a part of the lived experience of existence in this world. That is, we can take a phenomenological approach to the lived experiences of our existence, including dying. As I mentioned above, birth, not death, is the central experience of human existence. Birth leads to life which includes dying as the quote on p. 35 from ‘Thomas the Obscure’ demonstrates. Even in the act of suicide by hanging the man “…feels only the rope which holds him, held to the end, held more than ever, bound as he had never been bound before to the existence he would like to live.” This supports my point, even in this extreme outpost of existence, he still has an experience within the lived world and thus can have a phenomenology of the experience. I cannot agree the dying, especially by suicide, lacks adequate intention. It is dying, not death, that remains within the bounds of phenomenology. Even if dying belongs to the order of enigmatic or inappaerent as Levinas tells us, the enigmatic and the inapparent are still to be found within the lived experience of existence and can thus be clawed into phenomenological approach. But I can agree that there is no mastering of death and that death is needed to provide context to our existence, to provide life with banisters, not crutches, so to speak. Thus, what Professor Critchley is doing here is approaching the unapproachable. I truly appreciate his efforts as I was ready to settle merely for understanding life.
Real Disappointment:
Disappointment comes from the anxiety, and perhaps even the fear, that we cannot come to an explanation, understanding or phenomenology of birth without finding the whole thing to be simply ridiculous; that we will not be able to come to an explanation of birth other than to find that it was some sort of error, or at least contingent on a host of bizarre causes, not the least of which being the lustful desires of two other people and a random coming together of genetic material. Why am I myself is another part of this existential question. Everything about me is unlikely, yet here I am. So much about what is fundamentally me could have been different and is dependent on the most quotidian casual factors, even mere happenstance and circumstances, such as two particular people meeting, perhaps randomly, when they met, where they met, when they decided to have a sexual union, whether or not they decided to merry, where they decide to reside, what occupations they chose, what religion, if any, they practiced etc. The smallest changes in any of these mundane and even most insignificant causes of me would result in the most fundamental and transformative changes in who turned out to be me. In short, other people rolled the dice without my consent and here I am. Yes, I will die, so what of what? Religious and political disappointment are just particular aspects or examples of this more general disappointment about life. At least in my case, I have found that Fate has not been without a sense of humor and perhaps this just is what makes the whole thing tolerable, the utter humor in existing and being aware of it. This too, the author extracts from his close reading of Beckett. Without the humor, existence is deplorable.
Further musing I best remain silent on.
January 18, 2024
I turned the last page but I'm just too dumb for this one. Simon meandered through the texts of Blanchot, Schlegel, Cavell and Beckett to illustrate how insignificant daily existence itself is a solution with nihilism (rather than the Nietzschean intense confrontation). Unfortunately, I can understand none of the above four thinkers. The weak Unworked Romanticism is reminiscent of Takeuchi Yoshimi's "sense of powerlessness" in literature. The modernity of the Jena Romantics seems to illustrate a different path from Hegel, just like Takeuchi's substantial Europe vs. resistant Asia. The concept of Atheist transcendence is interesting, but I don’t understand it either. The cross-reference between Beckett and Adorno in Chapter 3 is completely beyond me. To be re-read
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September 10, 2025😒☹️🙁🫤😕
June 8, 2008
resist nihilism!
Displaying 1 - 9 of 10 reviews