The Next Decade: Where We've Been . . . and Where We're Going

by George Friedman

The author of the acclaimed New York Times bestseller The Next 100 Years now focuses his geopolitical forecasting acumen on the next decade and the imminent events and challenges that will test America and the world, specifically addressing the skills that will be required by the decade’s leaders.

The next ten years will be a time of massive transition. The wars in the Islamic world will be subsiding, and terrorism will become something we learn to live with. China will be encountering its crisis. We will be moving from a time when financial crises dominate the world to a time when labor shortages will begin to dominate. The new century will be taking shape in the next decade.

In The Next Decade , George Friedman offers readers a pro­vocative and endlessly fascinating prognosis for the immedi­ate future. Using Machiavelli’s The Prince as a model, Friedman focuses on the world’s leaders—particularly the American president—and with his trusted geopolitical insight analyzes the complex chess game they will all have to play. The book also asks how to be a good president in a decade of extraordinary challenge, and puts the world’s leaders under a microscope to explain how they will arrive at the decisions they will make—and the consequences these actions will have for us all.

Genres: Nonfiction, Politics, History, Economics, Futurism, Science, Business

243 pages, Hardcover

First published January 25, 2011

About the author

George Friedman is an internationally recognized geopolitical forecaster and strategist on international affairs and the founder and chairman of Geopolitical Futures.

A New York Times bestselling author, Dr. Friedman's most recent book, THE STORM BEFORE THE CALM: America’s Discord, the Coming Crisis of the 2020s, and the Triumph Beyond, published February 25, describes how “the United States periodically reaches a point of crisis in which it appears to be at war with itself, yet after an extended period it reinvents itself, in a form both faithful to its founding and radically different from what it had been.” The decade 2020-2030 is such a period which will bring dramatic upheaval and reshaping of American government, foreign policy, economics, and culture.



His most popular book, The Next 100 Years, is kept alive by the prescience of its predictions. Other best-selling books include Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, The Next Decade, America’s Secret War, The Future of War and The Intelligence Edge. His books have been translated into more than 20 languages. Dr. Friedman has briefed numerous military and government organizations in the United States and overseas and appears regularly as an expert on international affairs, foreign policy and intelligence in major media.

For almost 20 years before resigning in May 2015, Dr. Friedman was CEO and then chairman of Stratfor, a company he founded in 1996. Friedman received his bachelor’s degree from the City College of the City University of New York and holds a doctorate in government from Cornell University.

Reviews

[Ugh · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is not quite what its cover leads the unsuspecting buyer to believe it will be. The cover underplays the book's US-centricity, and although the whole world does come in for consideration at some point, it's all from a US point of view. Happily I was fine with that; others may not be.

Friedman begins by trying to make the case that the US has an empire, and it's arguable whether he succeeds. I must admit that, being a Brit, I bristled at the suggestion - a reaction that exposes a hitherto unrecognised and rather troubling well of pride somewhere within me at the fact that my national forebears dominated and exploited less well-resourced nations in the not-too-distant past. But questionable nationalism aside, I'm not sure the US should be considered an empire in the same mould as the British or any other from history. Friedman recognises that the US does not have any formal control over its 'empire', but in my opinion he doesn't give this fact due weight. However, it may ultimately be a matter of semantics: Friedman states that 'it is simply impossible for a nation whose economy is so vast to have commercial relations without political entanglements and consequences' and that 'the power of the American economy and the distribution of US military force ... binds countries to the US more tightly than any formal imperial system could hope to accomplish'.

He then goes on to make the case that the President is the sole office that can effectively plan or control this empire, before trying to get to grips with the morality of doing so. And again, I'm not sure he succeeds with the latter task. He describes an idealist-realist dichotomy in US foreign policy, with the idealist position being that the US must act on moral principles, and the realist position being that it must protect its national interest. Friedman thinks that this is a distraction, that both positions have internal contradictions, and that the only genuinely realistic course lies somewhere between the two extremes. But he must not like the idea of giving up on morality because, having abandoned the straightforwardly moral position, he then seeks to reinstate morality from another source, turning to Machiavelli for inspiration: 'conventional virtue ... is unacceptable in a president ... Machiavelli introduces a new definition of virtue, which instead of personal goodness consists of being cunning ...' This unpromising-looking path is indeed soon revealed to be little more than a revival of the realist position, wrapped up in comforting justification: '[The president's] task is to protect the republic from a world full of people who are not virtuous in any conventional sense.' (Italics mine) What comfort here for the Pakistani civilians on the border with Afghanistan who are being indiscriminately killed by America's persistent drone strikes? Doesn't the empire owe those it dominates a degree of justice if it is to be considered moral?

However, once the self-serving justifications are out of the way, The Next Decade switches to a chapter-by-chapter consideration of America's most pressing foreign policy concerns, and it is from here on out that it shines. Again, the book did not deliver what I was expecting. I thought it would be a lot of pie-in-the-sky prediction, but actually much of it consists of summaries of how each situation got to be where it is, and what the main considerations now are. And these I found to be concise, authoritative, and absolutely fascinating.

They're probably not without controversy, even before you get to any strategic suggestions for the future. For example, Friedman states that America invaded Iraq not because it thought Saddam possessed WMDs (they knew this was not the case), and not even for it's oil, but as a show of strength to convince the other states in the region to increase their cooperation with the war on terror. This seems very plausible the way he states it, but I don't think I've come across the idea before, and I wouldn't be surprised if others took issue with it.

I found myself feeling troubled more than once as I read the book, and not only when the fates of nations were being discussed purely in terms of what would be best for the US. The book also raised many questions which, understandably, it did not attempt to answer:

1. To what extent should the elected leader of a democratic state lie to the populace if he/she thinks it's in the nation's best interests?

Friedman says:

'It is the president's job to align with public opinion .. while quietly pursuing his own moral and strategic ends.'

'... he must always convey a sense that the elimination of Islamist terrorism is possible, all the while knowing it is not.'

'To many Americans, these appear to be critical issues ... they must not be told that ... their sense of what is important doesn't matter...'

'... all presidents must in all things hide their true motives and vigorously deny the truth when someone recognises what they are up to.'


This stance is somewhat undermined in the conclusion, where Friedman says:

'... the American people must mature. We are an adolescent lot, expecting solutions to insoluble problems and perfection in our leaders ...'

I would love to receive recommendations for books that deal with this question more fully.


2. To what extent are other nations and their peoples aware of their subservience to the US?

Friedman says: 'Australia has no control whatever over the security of its sea-lanes ... Australia's strategy for dealing with this vulnerability has been to ally itself with the dominant naval power in the Pacific ... [through] participation in their wars.'


3. Finally, did Friedman not expect anyone outside the US to pay attention to his book?

Friedman says:

'The US should ... [make] purposeful moves along with some that seem arbitrary. Everything must be done to lead the Germans and perhaps the French to a sense that the US is unfocused in its actions.'

'To keep Indian naval development below a threshold that could threaten US interests ... [The US should] support a stronger Pakistan, thus keeping India's security planners focused on the land and not the sea.'

Its US-centricity will no doubt make it of no interest to many potential readers, but I greatly appreciated The Next Decade for its clarity, authority, brevity, and fascinating if morally questionable dissection of strategic matters. It has its issues, but it's a damned interesting read.

[S. · Rating 4 out of 5]

STRATFOR is a political think tank that gained prominence after Anonymous hacked its servers and spewed out its exceedingly boring dossiers onto the uncaring public. Its director, George Friedman, also wrote a book called THE NEXT 100 YEARS which contained such fantastic prediction as that in the year 2060, Japanese schoolgirl ninjas and Polish Space Marines would build a giant moon laser and sunburn half of the USA. One tends to wonder a bit how these scenarios get created, although it's probably all clever disinformation. Yeah, actually maybe STRATFOR really does run the world (as the tin foil crowd believes), they're just feigning absurdity.

Apparently Friedman does a little better with ten years of predictions rather than the full hundred. This work comes out of the school of foreign policy that says, hey, we're an empire, let's deal with it (not all FP professionals agree). The result is a outlook that relies extensively on the Westphalian model of states and alliances. Niall Ferguson does a better job of noticing things like the Protestantization of Latin America and growing Christianity of China. Other writers are a bit more subtle in dissecting racial politics and civilizational models. Friedman sees national states as inevitable and then subsequently conflict. On the other hand, other geopolitical thinkers find multiethnic empires the norm. Who knows? (who cares?) I predict fusion power will always be 20 years away and bioengineered superflu will kill off a tenth of humanity. But fine, yeah, it's possible humanity will settle Mars. by that time, VR will be so good Perky Pat will knock all our socks off

If you read this far, I want to say, man, it wasn't that I didn't know enough. It was that I knew too much

[Ammar Hammoudeh · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book learned me how mega trends, technology, demography, resources, wars, and foreign political actions are being observed and analyzed from American politicians perspective.
Although Friedman admits that America has some moral hypothesis that must maintain, but he confess that it must use all imperial power resources it possess to prevent any potential rival from competing its global role in both short and long terms.

As a Moslem-Arabic, i have to highlight two things about this book to two different segments:
1- to the Moslems and Arabs: America is like any other empire, it cares nothing about your own shit, don't expect any moral movement from it's side to help you to solve your own problems, any single action it takes is to strengthen its global power on your expenses, not else. It did the same to Japan, Germany and Russia in last century, and it does that to Russia-Germany now and will do that to Brazil and Turkey in next decades.
2- to the others: many examples in Middle east and terrorism chapters are misleading; the terrorism examples Friedman cites amplify palestinian resistance actions without citing any of uncountable israeli terror actions, or, at least, explaining the things behind palestinian hostility actions to Israel. Moreover, he concluded that America chose to support Israel as a result to the arab hostility to USA, which is precisely counter contrast. USA took strategic decision to support Israel, and that decision lead Arabs and Moslems to hostile American administrations.

In the final analysis, I liked this book, it taught me a bunch of political things I hadn't known before, and i recommend others, who are interested in foreign policy and geopolitics, to read it.

[Kira Simion · Rating 4 out of 5]

I like the way Friedman said something like the leaders of today can be taught yesterday (not his exact words, these are mine.)

From 8,000 BCE to now, from empires to states, from theocracy to democracy, the world has changed again and again, and will continue to change, for better or for worse.

The way we know how to progress and not retrogress is by looking to the past and seeing how we can better the future.

For example (these are my own examples since I don't want to spoil:)

The majority of the empires were taken over or just became too unstable and collapsed because of nomadic tribes, decentralized governments, or revolts that brought down the power by bringing down the economy. We can and have learned from these mistakes and each new decade or century has proved this.

I like his wording and hope to read more of Friedman's work soon.

4/5

See? I can be smart too! :')

His stories are actually quite interesting.

[Nilesh Jasani · Rating 2 out of 5]

If anyone is as "involuntarily" power hungry as the book wants to make the US, it is given that our world will continue to move towards more wars and an eventual doom. The book's main point is exactly opposite - that the best way for world peace is for US to subjugate others, decide everyone's fate and make sure others do not become friends with each other. Of course, the book assumes that despite its open advocation, the US can stealthily implement these policies and the rest of the world will never see through them.

The premise that the US must divide the rest of the world and rule by strengthening itself, making sure others stay behind and keep everyone suspicious of their neighbours etc is wrong. To assume that such strategies will succeed and is the only way not just for the world but the US to lead an ever better life is utter naivety. Great information, as always from the master geo-historian but one simply has to hope that real life power brokers do not think the same way.

[Daniel Simmons · Rating 1 out of 5]

Less bonkers than his "The Next 100 Years", but still abounding with cringe-worthy statements. A choice example: Friedman recommends continuing sending aid to Africa not because it will do anything to help the Africans but because it will burnish the image of the U.S. internationally; he then follows that up with, "It is possible that [aid] will do some harm, as many aid programs have had unintended and negative consequences, but the gesture would redound to America's benefit, and at relatively low cost... One of Machiavelli's points is that good comes out of the ruthless pursuit of power, not out of trying to do good. But if doing some good merely convinces Europe to send more troops to the next U.S. intervention, it will be a worthwhile investment."

!!

The first 40 pages, with its breezy homages to Lincoln, Roosevelt, Reagan, and Clausewitz, should be jettisoned entirely.

[André Morais · Rating 4 out of 5]

It’s always interesting to read a book on global affairs predictions in the aftermath of the predicted period. It allowed to see how certain predictions didn’t occur and other important events were missed by Friedman.
However, I believe Friedman foresaw the bigger picture, namely the challenges posed by a resurgent Russia.
The shortcoming of the book “The Next Decade” is possibly its American-centerness.
Nevertheless, it’s an enjoyable and stimulating book, which allows the reader to form a better understanding of the world’s main hot zones and their complexities.

[Joseph D. Walch · Rating 4 out of 5]

I am glad to have found this author who is a very insightful foreign policy thinker. He looks at foreign policy through Machiavellian spectacles and examines the forces that will shape the world going forward and gives interesting directives for the would-be President of the United States in exerting power around the world while maneuvering through national political discussions.

The book starts with a short history primer and notes the current political realities. It then assesses each geographical region and gives a risk/assessment/plan prescription in much the same way that a physician might make a SOAP (subjective and Objective info, Assessment, Plan) write-up on a patient. For example, He recommends strengthening Poland to be the bone-in-the-throat between a Germany and Russian alliance, strengthening ties with Australia to counterbalance in Asia, doing nothing in Africa because Africa is irrelevant in modern geopolitics, doing nothing about immigration, and nothing to help correct the drug war in Mexico while giving the appearance of working to solve both, etc. There is an interesting discussion about the current financial crisis in the EU countries that raise implications for renewed nationalistic conflagrations (e.g., how Greece benefits from the EU, but is paralyzed economically because they have no sovereign currency to be either closely control monetary policy or suffer the gradual consequences from bad economic policies).

There are little nuggets here about China's political and economic balance and the outlook for their continued growth and instability, how the blocking of the Strait of Hormunz might affect Japan, and the importance of the U.S. Navy even in this modern era of sophisticated satellite and aeronautical power. It was interesting to hear that Great Britain--once the world's preeminent power has just recently retired it's only aircraft carrier, and the role that Latin America (esp. Brazil) will play in the future. It's well worth the read for anybody interested in world geography, economics and politics.

[Owen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Once again, I don't generally give higher reviews than the average. In fact, I'm not sure it's happened apart from George Friedman books. After the acclaim heaped on his book The Next 100 years Friedman, felt compelled to write one that focused more on the short term. This is how he gives us The Next Decade. Again, I'm astonished by Friedman's ability to extract the signal from the noise. He seems to use all the information anyone has available to them it manages to come to different and entirely logical conclusions. For instance, his cogent critique of the Iraq war is the single most effective I've heard to date, an articulate dismantling of the the national security justifications for that war. Effectively he says that what the final result of the Iraq war was to remove the lone Sunni counterbalance to our Shi'ite enemy in the region, allowing Iran to project power. Friedman is no peacenik, he is a tireless advocate of using the military for political purposes. He just failed to find any logic in removing a counterbalance to one of our enemies.

His greatest fear is not of China or Islamism, or even debt. It's of America learning to handle an empire, but losing our republic. I found this fascinating, as clearly Friedman shares my opinion of us as a new Rome, a republic of massive power that stumbled to empire, and learned to control it only to lose the foundations of republic

It was also interesting how he treated the office of the president. His continual reference to Machiavelli's The Prince probably will unnerve people who believe America is the city on a hill (like myself). But the stakes do not get higher. Friedman simply makes the case that the job of the President is to ensure American hegemony for the foreseeable future. That will require actions that no President would ever campaign on, but will promote America.

Another fascinating, readable book from George Friedman.

Owen Gardner Finnegan

[Benedict · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author makes a bold and unshakable declaration: America is an imperial empire and that's a fact. Also America could lose itself as a Republic.

The author is CEO of Stratfor, which does intelligence analysis for the CIA and the multinationals. So the opinions in this book count for something.

He gives the big picture that faces America abroad. It is simple power and balance of power. He states that this country is always striving to set other countries at each other so they cannot combine against the United States. Not pretty, but the alternative is like believing pink horsies with wings bring babies.

I learned from this book why politicians always lie to us and why they will continue to do so. The reason is: We cannot handle the truth (wasn't that in a movie or something?). Politicians always have to dose the public with something it can accept.

I quickly noticed what I read in this book was being mentioned in the news of the day. How we are concerned about Egypt falling could be dangerous because the Israel/Egypt combination is important to us.

The book predicts that Germany and Russia will try to combine and that we will interfere with that. It predicts the rise of Japan, the fall of China and ultimately the fall of Russia (Russia cannot make it in the end because the rivers run the wrong way).

There are other areas of the world the book mentioned and that make this book a must read for anyone getting baptized into real world politik.

As I say, this book helps me to follow along with the news.

The author does not get into a detailed discussion about how we may lose our Republic...So I knocked a star off the rating, because I am so unfair.

[Preetam Chatterjee · Rating 4 out of 5]

#Binge Reviewing all my past Reads:

Inthis tome, geopolitical tactician George Friedman presents a brave and hardheaded analysis of the global political landscape in the 2010s and the challenges the United States must navigate to maintain its dominance. Unlike his previous book, The Next 100 Years, which focused on long-term trends, this work takes a more immediate approach, examining the power struggles, economic shifts, and strategic decisions that will shape the near future. Friedman argues that the U.S., as the world's primary superpower, must adopt a Machiavellian approach to balance global stability while securing its own interests. He critiques past policies and outlines the necessity of realpolitik, often advocating for a well-ordered practice of power rather than idealistic interventions. His predictions about rising powers like China and the geopolitical complexities of the Middle East remain relevant, though some of his assertions are open to debate. While insightful, The Next Decade sometimes oversimplifies intricate global dynamics, and its U.S.-centric perspective may not resonate with all readers. However, for those interested in geopolitics, strategy, and the character of leadership in shaping the future, this book offers a convincing and thought-provoking read. Give it a go.

[Frank Kool · Rating 2 out of 5]

Whereas The Next Decade is written in great style and is an absolute delight to read for those who like to shuffle around their armies and resources in strategy games like Civilization, the nearing end of this decade makes it painfully obvious how difficult it is to predict these trends.

Germany and Russia are certainly not allies at this point, Israel-Iran relations have hardly changed, you might carefully say that the wars in Islamic countries are subsiding (then again, most wars do within a decade), and China has not undergone a major crisis. However, the most grievous oversight is that this book, released in 2011, failed to predict (like most people) what is arguably the most significant geopolitical event of this decade: the Syrian civil war and the international interventions which followed.

[Kent Winward · Rating 4 out of 5]

Intriguing to read almost ten years after it was written. Frightening to think what the next ten will bring based on what Friedman was writing and warning about in 2011. Almost as if we have followed the road map of what not to do. . .

[Sevda Sarp · Rating 3 out of 5]

Less interesting, more repetitive compared to his previous books

[Andrew Barkett · Rating 3 out of 5]

While the work already feels somewhat dated, there are nonetheless lots of useful observations about the near past that can inform us about the near future.

[Dennis Littrell · Rating 4 out of 5]

Definitely worth reading with some reservations

I must confess to not having read George Friedman before taking this volume into hand. He certainly is an engaging and crystal clear writer. His understanding of international relationships is second to none that I have read. I highly recommend this book. However I do have a few reservations that I want to express.

Let’s begin with his analysis of what he calls “the unintended empire.” That would be the United States circa the second millennium of the present era. I like the way he insists on using the term “empire” even though George W. Bush and his neoconservative cohorts had to give it up because of its toxic connotations. Yes, America the Beautiful is an empire, and yes it was largely unintentional. Our empire is supported not by the direct spoils of war as was the Roman Empire, but by our ability to benefit from global resources through trade and technological advantage. Our military might is a mailed fist behind our back of course; but we maintain the empire mainly through the use of what political scientists call “soft power.” Regardless of the value of the spoils of empire, the American Empire is an expensive one to maintain, and in some quarters the perception is that the balance sheet is out of whack.

Now let us move on to Friedman’s justification for the actions of the Bush administration in its effort to deal with the threat to our glorious (well, not so glorious) empire posed by the events of 9/11/2001. Friedman speaking frankly as Machiavelli (indeed Friedman seems delighted to do a modern dress Machiavelli impersonation) sees all actions by nation states as serving their unique national interests. All events on the international stage are rationally arrived at by nation states based on this singular criterion. Thus, Friedman argues (p. 67) that North Korea, fearing that the collapse of the Soviet Union “would lead to its own collapse…launched a nuclear weapons program” and “made statements that appeared quite mad.” “The North Koreans were so successful that they had the great powers negotiating to entice them to negotiate. It was an extraordinary performance.”

However, (1) the leadership of North Korea is quite mad (witness what it does to its people) and (2) its utterances were not the result of some extraordinary psychological ploy that the great powers fell for; in fact the reason that the United States and others have treaded so softly and carefully with North Korea is that its leadership is indeed capable of frighteningly crazy behaviors most specifically the utter destruction of Seoul, South Korea. The fact of the matter is that North Korea holds Seoul in hostage and has for literally generations.

Next let’s move to Friedman’s interpretation of Bush’s reasons for invading Iraq. He writes (p. 62): “The Bush administration tied to craft a strategy that forced the Saudis and Pakistanis to be more aggressive in intelligence gathering and sharing and that placed the United States in a dominate position in the Middle East, from which it could project power.” He immediately adds, “These were the underlying reasons for the invasion of Iraq.”

What? Bush invaded Iraq to get the Saudis and Pakistanis to help with intelligence gathering and sharing? Now that’ what you call EXPENSIVE intelligence, and is about as farfetched a rationale as I’ve heard. No, the reasons that Bush invaded Iraq were several, including a deluded attempt to protect American oil interests in the region; to be a wartime president for the 2004 elections (or a president who had just won a war); to go one up on his dad who George W. believed should have overthrown Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War; to allow the US military to test its abilities and its weapons, etc. Friedman even goes so far as to argue that although at the time of the invasion of Iraq Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda were far from friends, they could become allies in the future and therefore that could serve as a rationale for the invasion.

What Friedman has done here and what he does throughout the book is interpret events in ways that are consistent with his overall message which is one of amoral, rational and Machiavellian nation states acting in accordance with their individual national interests when in fact the actual heads of states and their advisors who do the actual acting often behave in irrational and self-defeating ways, which is what happened to the US during the George W. Bush administration—which is something that Friedman freely acknowledges elsewhere in the book, especially in Chapter 5 appropriately entitled “The Terrorist Trap.” Friedman points out that by waging a misdirected and unwinnable war against “a type of warfare” this became a trap that Bush fell into and one that Friedman is warning Obama not to fall into.

Incidentally, part of what Friedman is about in this book is to give advice from his Machiavellian stage to President Obama and presidents (or princes!) to come and/or to their advisors. In this self-appointed capacity I think George Friedman is eminently qualified as long as one balances his “real politic” view of presidential options and strategies with the realities of each individual situation. Basically what Friedman is saying is that regardless of what a nation state does we must infer that it is acting rationally in its own interests and that presidents must realize that they have to lie to their constituencies and be prepared to do brutal and even horrendous things in the pursuit of the national interest, and in fact any other behavior is dereliction of duty.

As for the rest of the book it is also very interesting, and I wish I had the space to go into it. Bottom line: worth reading and thinking about.

—Dennis Littrell, author of “The World Is Not as We Think It Is”

[Costin Manda · Rating 5 out of 5]

I started reading this book at random, and by random I mean I used a tool to choose it for me. And what a coincidence that, published in 2011, it talks about the geopolitical and economical drivers that would shape the next decade while I read it in 2022, as a conflict between Russian and the U.S. in Ukraine is looming. Was Friedman a sort of Hari Seldon and he predicted it all or was it all just bull? Well, a bit of both.

The Next Decade wants to be a U.S. centric but objective dissection of the world, all pretenses aside, with the goal of predicting what will happen and what Americans should be doing about it. George Friedman starts by explaining why the United States have become an empire, almost by accident, and that while the reality of the fact cannot be denied, the anti-imperial principles upon which the nation was founded as still relevant and even essential to the wellbeing of America (and hence the world). He decides that the most important actor in this story is the American president, the modern embodiment of both the principles of the nation and of a Machiavellian prince. The rest of the book is a continent by continent analysis of what countries are driven by and will do and what this prince has to do to ensure and promote American supremacy over the world. In the author's view, the highest virtue of a good leader is to act in the best interests of his nation, while attempting to follow a moral code as well as possible in the circumstances.

Does it sound arrogant, pompous and presumptuous? Yes, quite. But does it also sound close to how heads of state think and make decisions? A resounding yes. In fact, his talk of the Georgian conflict, where Russians invaded and Americans wrote some stern condemnations in response is terrifyingly close to what happens now in Ukraine, only the U.S. cannot afford to repeat that performance now.

Here's a quote:

In order to understand this office I look at three presidents who defined American greatness. The first is Abraham Lincoln, who saved the republic. The second is Franklin Roosevelt, who gave the United States the world’s oceans. The third is Ronald Reagan, who undermined the Soviet Union and set the stage for empire. Each of them was a profoundly moral man … who was prepared to lie, violate the law, and betray principle in order to achieve those ends. They embodied the paradox of what I call the Machiavellian presidency, an institution that, at its best, reconciles duplicity and righteousness in order to redeem the promise of America.

Friedman thinks, for example, that bin Laden forced the hand of the American president to overextend in the Middle East, a pointless military gesture, but a politically necessary one, which lead to a rise of Iranian influence and distracted from Russia. As in The Next 100 Years, the author is still obsessed with the importance of Mexico, Poland and Turkey, but he adds more stuff related, for example, to Romania, which must be built up militarily so that it defends the Carpathians for the Americans for free. The European Union is a joke, fractured by history, culture, economy, financial systems, laws and held together by a fairy tale ideal of a bureaucratic world where war (inevitable to Friedman) doesn't exist. But even so, Germany must be stopped from joining up with Russia and as best as possible removed from its alliance with France. Africa is a place that the U.S. should just ignore. And so on and so on. Basically, America should make sure that in no place will any power even begin to rise in a region because it would impede its natural right to rule the world.

The scary thing is that every one of these predictions or analyses are propped by well explained and documented arguments. It's not that Americans are assholes for doing that, it would be costly and stupid for them to not do that. As Friedman puts it, the U.S. has become empire without intention and is now forced to act as such for better or worse.

I must warn you that this is not your school history book, where valiant heroes defend their homeland against evil, but a very cynical overview of how foreign policy is done. It describes a world in which every country is at war with every other country and any sense of morals is slave to necessity and only serves to bring a modicum of validation to the inevitable evil nations do.

Bottom line: a very well written book, extremely apropos these days, something that I urge to be taken with a grain of salt, but highly recommended as a read.

[Robert Morris · Rating 1 out of 5]

George Friedman knows how to sell books. Like that snickers bar at the checkout you don't need, his ambitiously entitled books are well calculated to jump into the shopping bags of a certain type of consumer (this one). It is always brave to predict the future. He should get credit for that, but not much else.

This vastly inferior book is a follow up to The Next 100 Years. Please note that I am not saying the other book was objectively good, just that this one was much, much worse. The balance in this one is tipped much further towards batshit crazy than amusingly suprising. He also assumes that you have recently read the predecessor, so his assertions seem to come out of nowhere.

The body of the book holds a bit of interesting thinking. His calls for a settlement with Iran, and to stay out of Africa are worth heeding. There is a lot of nonsense there as well. The body of the book is crowbared into a truly ridiculous framework. He claims that the United States has become an empire and that this is dangerous for a republic. This is true, if not very well supported by his writing. His answer to the problem, for no reason he mentions, or that I can imagine, is more powerful and devious presidents. He seems to think that only better emperors will save us from Empire. There is all manner of gobbledygook about who the great presidents were, and their characteristics, as if a 'great' president was possible without 'great' events. There might have been a salvageable (not a good) book here, without the farcically semi-mystical and ahistorical intro and conclusion. Poorly written. Not worth your time.

[Julie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Have you ever played the board game Risk? The game board is a map of the world partitioned into different colored continents, subdivided into countries. Each player places their armies on different countries, battles their opponents, and conquers territory with the ultimate goal of taking over the entire world. The difficult decisions are where to place your armies and who to engage in battle. Reading George Friedman's The Next Decade reminded of Risk, but instead of being a game, it's real life and the US is one of the biggest players. Friedman analyzes the world with a geopolitical lens, assessing different countries strengths and weaknesses, based on their natural resources, their borders and alliances with their neighbors, and a myriad of other factors. He gives specific recommendations of how the US should approach different countries in order to maintain it's current dominance in the world.

This book was a huge eye opener for me. In the US, we are naive in our beliefs that we engage in wars for democracy, freedom, or other ideals. Friedman is pretty blunt. The goal of America's role in foreign policy is the balance of power. We want other countries to be fighting battles among themselves to keep us in our current position. The amount of information on our past relationships with other countries and his forecast on the power shifts that will occur in the next decade were interesting and filled with surprises. Very informative.

[Lisa Reising · Rating 4 out of 5]

I really enjoy Mr. Friedman's books. His approach in predicting future events is based on historical analysis of all kinds. I learn history and details about every region of the world. There are reasons, backed up by data and sound precedents, why America should stay out of Africa politically and only send humanitarian aid, why we should chill out about border wars with Mexico, why friendly terms with Korea, Singapore and Australia are a good idea, and why we need to keep a sharp eye on Turkey, Russia and Germany. If the author has a political leaning, it's hard to discern - most discussions are based on an honest look at what has happened in the past. Accomplishments and failures have been the story of both American political parties. And I'm coming to the conclusion fast that it is useless to yearn for a forthright President - by definition an American President must be a systematic manipulator, able to cut many backroom deals while lying to the public about it, in order to manage all the subtle and not-so-subtle intricacies of foreign and domestic policy. What a world!

[Chris · Rating 4 out of 5]

Pertinent glimpse into the geopolitical crystal ball. Friedman's premise is that the United States must strike a balance between keeping the rest of the world stable while keeping regional powers constantly on edge to maintain "a balance of power". Chapter after chapter is filled with prose underscoring the need for the US to strengthen some while weakening other countries. While this may be true, the repetitiveness of the call-to-manipulation by the author becomes grating.

Certainly worth a read especially for those who are being spoon fed baby (news) food from network news outlets. Getting a glimpse into the motivations of foreign powers for those who haven't considered such on their own is well worth the time for this reasonably quick read.

[rux · Rating 1 out of 5]

Friedman încercă să găsească răspuns la întrebări îndrăznețe precum: care sunt motivele care vor sta la baza viitoarelor conflicte, care națiuni vor pierde puterea economică și care o vor câștiga, cum vor afecta viitoarele orientări tehnologice și culturale evoluția societății.
Este o lectură captivantă care, deși încearcă să ajute cititorul să înțeleagă lumea așa cum este ea astăzi și modul cum s-a ajuns acolo, nu reușește decât să se plaseze pe raftul lucrărilor propagandistice pro-americane.

[Jeff · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read this book following The Next 100 years by the same author and I'm glad I did - panning out before zooming in is how I tend to view complex scenarios; also the author references in this book geopolitical concepts that are outlined in detail in The Next 100 years. His description of the often conflicting responsibilities of the president of a republic and leader of an empire was intriguing. His foreign policy recommendations per region included mini history lessons and were fascinating. The book is extremely US centric by design.

[Sydney · Rating 1 out of 5]

read this for my international politics class... 'The Post American World' was for the same class and I could actually read and understand it....I just couldn't get into or really understand this one... I was excited when i started this one because i thought i was actually getting a good grasp and understand of politics but after half of chapter one it was a headache... reminder that i'm not that great at politics and have no understanding of them... which is why i took the class...

[George · Rating 3 out of 5]

I go this book at the airport thinking it was by the same guy who wrote "The World is Flat", that was Thomas Friedman. It was a surprisingly interesting book and everything that he predicts over the next decade (well now more like 8 yrs) seems realistic. Now I am reading The Next 100 years which was actually written before this, so it is like seeing Prometheus before Alien (kindof)

[Kuszma · Rating 3 out of 5]

Friedman egy intézmény az USA-ban, STRATFOR alapító, a jósok jósa. Ez egyrészt annak köszönheti, hogy képes közérthető, rövid (ezért szükségszerűen egyszerűsítő) megfogalmazásokra lefordítani olyan komplex folyamatokat, mint amilyen egy gazdasági válság vagy a terrorizmus elleni háború – ebben alighanem ő a világbajnok. (Mondjuk a jósok pont nem szoktak világosan fogalmazni… Nyilván nem véletlenül…) Másfelől (és én ezt nagyon értékeltem) világosan képes definiálni a problémacsoportokat, mielőtt elemezni kezdené őket. Bár ez evidencia kéne legyen, de sajnálatos módon a kortárs társadalomtudomány számos guruja egész egyszerűen elmismásolja ezt, többek között szerintem Huntington is. De Friedman közismertségének alapja elsősorban az a gyakorlatias, egyéni emberi szempontokat figyelmen kívül hagyó megközelítés, ami bátran címkézhető machiavellizmusként.

Abból indul ki, hogy az Egyesült Államok egy birodalom, és ennek megfelelően kell viselkednie. Önmeghatározása szerint ő nem idealista, és nem is realista*: előbbiektől megkülönbözteti az, hogy szerinte egy nemzetnek saját boldogulása érdekében a mocskos dolgoktól sem szabad visszariadnia, utóbbiaktól pedig az, hogy hite szerint ugyanennek a nemzetnek sosem szabad elfelednie, hogy végső soron egy magasabb rendű erkölcsnek tartozik felelősséggel. Ám mivel sajnálatos módon Friedman ezt a magasabb rendű erkölcsöt az amerikai köztársaság eszméjében találja meg, így etikája nem is lehet más, mint szűkített etika, olyan morál, ami kizárólag amerikai. Ettől lesz olyan európaiként olvasni ezt a könyvet, mint valami újraértelmezett Cion bölcseinek jegyzőkönyvé-t, hisz nem lehet kétségünk afelől, hogy ha mondjuk Putyin lerohanná a Baltikumot, ez a pacák csak a vállát vonogatná, mint ahogy mosolyogva végignézné egy diktatúra kialakulását is Közép-Európában, ha ez az amerikai geopolitikát szolgálná. A friedman-i javaslatok egyértelműen azt a célt szolgálják, hogy az USA egyedül maradjon az egypólusú világrend egyetlen hatalma, ennek érdekében pedig simán keresztbe tenne az EU-nak is, ha ezt a dominanciát veszélyeztetné** (***). Tegyük hozzá, Friedman szerint nem veszélyezteti – sőt, igazából egyáltalán nem lát olyan külső erőt, ami az elkövetkezendő 10 évben az USA globális riválisává nőheti ki magát. Regionális szinten jelenthetnek rá veszélyt, de igazán komoly károkat csak az olyan belső folyamatok okozhatnak neki, mint a meghasonlás vagy a bizalomvesztés.

Amik rendkívül tanulságossá teszik ezt a kötetet, azok éppen a hibái. Friedman hihetetlenül izgalmasan, olvasmányosan és tanulságosan fogalmazza meg a régiók múltját, jelenkorát és közeljövőjét, de kihagy két (globális értelemben vett) apróságot: egyrészt úgy fest, nem veszi észre, hogy az ukránoknak is van nemzeti identitásuk, valamit azt, hogy az Al-Kaida és az amerikai hadtestkivonások által hagyott hatalmi űrt valakinek be kell majd töltenie. Ebből következik, hogy sem az ukrán polgárháborút, sem az Iszlám Államot nem látja előre, úgyhogy a könyv fele máris megy a lecsóba. Ami azonban nem azt jelenti, hogy Friedman kutyaütő, és utólag hatályát veszíti minden egyéb meghatározása is. Viszont remekül példázza azt, hogy legyen akármekkora májer valaki, ha jóslásra adja a fejét, akkor biztosan megüti a bokáját. Talán célravezetőbb lett volna, ha tényleg valami nostredamus-i homályossággal prófétál, abból nem lehet baj. Mondjuk: „És a ködök földjén kinő majd egy virág, és a virág vérben gyökerezik majd, nektárja pedig keserű!” Na, ezt tessék megcáfolni.

* Ahogy ő maga megfogalmazza: "Véleményem szerint a realisták és idealisták vitája a világ naiv félreértelmezésén alapul, amely az elmúlt tíz évben túlságosan nagy befolyással bírt. Az ideálok és a valóság egy és ugyanazon dolog két megközelítése: a hatalomé. Ha az Egyesült Államok egyetlen célja a hatalomszerzés, azzal semmi maradandót nem hoz létre, és elkorcsosítja saját uralmát. Az ideálok hatalom nélkül csupán szavak, és kizárólag a cselekvőképesség birtokában kelhetnek életre. Realizmusnak minősül, ha megtanuljuk kezelni az általunk birtokolt hatalmat, ám ez önmagában nem segít megtalálni annak céljait. A realizmus azon vadhajtása, amely nélkülözi a hatalom céljáról alkotott koncepciót, az erőszakos bűnözők sajátja, és így irreális. Hasonlóképpen az idealizmus egy másik kifejezés az önelégültségre, amely kórra a hatalom mélységeinek megértése az egyetlen ellenszer, míg az elvtelen realizmus sokszor nem több keményfejűségnek álcázott inkompetenciánál. A realizmus és az idealizmus egymás kiegészítői, nem pedig alternatívái, ezért önmagukban nem szolgálhatnak a külpolitika vezérlőelveként."
** Ami, hangsúlyozom, nem jelenti azt, hogy keresztbe is tesz. Bár az összeesküvés-elméletek logikája szerint ha egy eseménysor logikailag installálható a saját világképünkbe, akkor rögtön támadhatatlanná is válik, és Friedman valóban sokat segít nekik félelmeik alátámasztásában, de! Itt egyszerűen csak arról van szó, hogy írónknak joga van saját nézeteit kifejteni, és ezek a nézetek meg is jelenhetnek. Ez nem azt bizonyítja, hogy a friedman-i elvek irányítják a politikát, hanem hogy Friedman szerint így kéne működjenek a dolgok. Hogy valóban így működnek-e, azzal kapcsolatban nekünk innen csak hipotéziseink lehetnek.
*** Csak egy példa Friedman machiavellista gondolkodásmódjára: a bevándorlás problémájával k

[Kyriakos Michail · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great for someone who wants to study the geopolitical role of USA and also wants to know some general facts concerning regional or possible regional powers

[Rick · Rating 1 out of 5]

This was awful. Should have been titled *What I want the next decade to look like." Prescription, not prediction.

[Jonathan Lu · Rating 5 out of 5]

A worthy follow up to the next 100 years written in the unbiased, unemotional, data-based, and calculated method that I have come to appreciate from the STRATFOR founder. Very interesting prologue when he describes that predicting a century is much easier than predicting a decade. The short term actions of men are difficult to predict, whether by mistake, stroke of genius, etc... But these actions tend to become averaged out in the long run when considering the larger subtle shifts over time. As Machiavelli, this book is highly focused on power and objective.

Friedman delves deeply into the difference between great presidents and mediocre ones being that those are the ones able to sacrifice morality for the sake of long term strategy while making the public believe that they are acting in an interest consistent with the principles that we all hold nobly high. The 3 most impactful presidents he cites above all are Lincoln, who wove a masterful job of restricting personal freedom while appealing to public sentiment in order to preserve the union; FDR who secretly supported WWII through alliances with European allies in order to maintain the balance of world powers fighting against each other, while appealing to the public to embrace social programs that were needed after the fall from grace of corporations and greed responsible for the depression; and Reagan who reshuffled the balance the opposite way after the failure of Carter, using blame towards the political elite to drive power back to corporations again, and manipulating countries such as Iran/Iraq and Israel/KSA into thinking we were really their allies but making them perpetually at odds/war so as to maintain a balance of power. Friedman attests that it was 9-11 and our knee-jerk reaction to seek out revenge that ended such a long term functioning strategy, as we no longer sought to balance Iraq vs Iran or India vs Pakistan, but to go 1-sided towards those who would help us eradicate terrorism, an obviously impossible and expensive goal. He cites GW Bush and Carter as 2 presidents who failed as they attempted to blatantly tell/force the public towards their 1-sided intentions rather than manipulating them in a Machiavellian manner. You really want to avoid unentangling alliances... But still want international trade as the US is responsible for 25% of global commerce? The art of telling the public what they think they want to hear while doing what you know is right is the key to good presidency.

I especially appreciate the non-partisan view that Friedman offers. He could at any time have hammered away at Bush or told just 1-side of the story to pronounce why right-wingers are bad for democracy, or left wingers are bad for personal freedom... But instead tells both sides as a historian, without bias. A bit uncomfortable for the idealist in me as his writing is quite cold and Vulcan in the tone that we could/should and have treated our allies as pawns in a greater power game to make them think we support them while really playing both sides to make them both continue fighting and overall weaker, but the reality is probably not too far off. And why I think I could never be a politico. Just how do you judge the true intentions of candidates then as a voter? This novel of course has to center around the US as the dominant superpower. Whether you like it or not, it's the reality and we are the 1 country where actions locally have the most dramatic impact felt by the international community... And the president as the most impactful man.

"The president must, as we have said, always soothe the beers of the public, and must always show his commitment to stopping terrorism. At the same time, he must resist the temptation to try the impossible or undertake actions that have disproportionate costs relative to the effect. He can lie to the public, but he must never ever lie to himself. Above all, he must understand the real threats to the country and act against those." Net, Bush got carried away with a war on terrorism and used it to achieve separate goals that were never inline with grand American strategy. As a result, Iran became empowered without balance in the region, endless resources have and will continue to be spent fighting terrorism that will never end, and no balance was paid to Russia's resurgence.
"[...] while you and I are allowed the luxury of our pain, a president isn't. A president must take into account how his citizens feel and he must manage them and lead them, but he must not succumb to personal feelings. His job is to maintain a ruthless sense of proportion while keeping the coldness of his calculation to himself. If he succumbs to sentiment, he will make decisions that run counter to the long-term interest if his country. A president had to accept casualties and move on. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt calls for vengeance but privately decided to focus on Germany and not Japan. He understood that a president could not allow himself to craft strategy out of emotion."

Onto some predictions for the next 10yrs: balance of US political power will shift back towards the political elite away from corporations (FDR to Reagan and back). This is a natural procession following the rage against corporate abuses that led to the greatest recession since the depression.

Not a prediction, but suggestion to decrease the support for Israel and balance more towards the Arab states. Although politically difficult to do domestically, Israel has become too powerful to keep playing the Arab states against them. Freidman contends that the root of our support for Israel was after they lost French support, in order to provide a counterbalance to Syria on the side of Egypt. Our alliance was one of convenience, not ideology and so could just as easily shift the other way. Not to say we abandon Israel altogether, just that we balance more support towards the other side especially since Israel is now a power in their own right and does not need to rely on US aid.

Also a suggestion and not a prediction - making a formal alliance with Iran! Now that the Iran-Iraq balance has been destroyed, the US has to rethink how to accommodate the new shift of power in the region. "In the next decade, the most desirable option with Iran is going to be delivered through a move that now seems inconceivable. It is the option chosen by Roosevelt and Nixon when they faced seemingly impossible strategic situations: the creation of alliances with countries that had previously been regarded as strategic and moral threats. Roosevelt aligned the United States with Stalinist Russia, and Nixon aligned with Maoist China, each to block a third pier that was seen as more dangerous."
"The seemingly impossible strategic situation driving the United States to this gesture is, as we've discussed, the need to maintain the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, and to achieve this at a time when the country must reduce the forces devoted to this part of the world." Within this decade Turkey will continue to rise as a superpower to the point that the Turkey-Iran conflict can be exploited in the next decade as the new balance of power within the region.

On the rise of Russian and resurgence of a kind if USSR btw eastern bloc counties to counteract NATO and EU to the west: "The Russians can play the Americans indefinitely by threatening to ship weapons to anti-American groups and to countries such as Iran and Syria. This locks the United States in place, trying to entice the Russians when in fact the only thing the Russians want the Americans to do is to remain permanently bogged down in the war. This Russian strategy reveals the price of the American over commitment to the war on terror. It also shows that it is imperative for the United States to find an effective response to radical Islam, as well as an effective response to the Russians." Freidman rightly points out that a German-Russian alliance is a natural one of great convenience since the Germans are in need of energy/natural resources, and the Russians are in need of technology; Germany has tried twice already to invade Russia during the 20th century in order to secure such resources. An alliance of this nature would not be beneficial to american interests, as a combined EU/Russian power would have resources/population even that surpasses the USA. Freidman contends that the top European policy should be to prevent such a German/Russian alliance as it would shift the balance of power away from competing states towards a single dominant one. As Friedman contends in "the next 100 years", the rise of Poland is key and will see its rise in this decade. Strategically located right between Germany and Russia, and with a recent memory of brutal occupation by both, they will be apt to American aid to counterbalance these forces. Will require quite some skill from the president to pull this off strategically without alarming the Russians. Turkey is an easy ally that should be no issue to continue supporting.

Story in the east will be that of china vs Japan competing for the world's #2 spot in the economy. As in "the next 100 years" I have a hard time seeing a world in which USA and Japan are not close allies, but the beginnings of it may be coming in this decade. US policy should be based on ensuring the china-Japan rivalry continues and remains balanced. The key 3rd party geopolitical allies that we should maintain with are Korea, Singapore, as Australia in preparation for the Chinese-Japanese conflict to escalate. A-ha for me was Freidman's analysis of Japanese economy based upon their lack of a social safety net in the post war boom: this caused a reliance upon personal savings for retirement and thus not the high level of consumer spending that fueled the American boom. Capital markets were thus flush with cash from personal savings leading to very low interest rates = cheap
Money for investment but minimal growth since profits never increased. Japanese companies had kind of a social contract with the public to keep employment at the expense of margins, causing what we in the west refer to as "the lost decade" although they themselves were just fine due to high employment levels and social equality (lost was just for American investors). Following the theme of great presidents as those who can purposely deceive the public to accomplish longer term strategic objectives while making them believe that their short term shallow desires are being met, FDR blatantly lied about social security being both short term and a social safety net. The main outcome was to encourage public spending vs hoarding and thus avoid the stagflation that hit the Japanese economy seeing the growth model of European economies . I imagine that he intended this to be a 50-100yr venture, but greed of infinite and unending growth led continued spending vs saving to the point of overbalance. This probably would have been a positive consequence of W's push to privatize social security, perhaps intended and perhaps not (he was one of the more transparent world leaders we have seen): likely would have caused a crash in social security coffers and thus spur savings anyways... Which ended up happening after the 2008 crash for different reasons. Are we getting closer to the right level of balance now at last?

Prediction in South Asia will be the deterioration of us-indian relations. The top objective of policy should be to keep a strong India vs strong Pakistan balanced in this region, with the result of war on terror in Afghanistan that Pakistan has lagged badly behind India. This must be reversed and requires greater emphasis on strengthening Pakistan over the next decade... India will likely reach out to another benefactor in the meantime such as russia.

Onto the south of us: Freidman contends correctly that nothing in Latin America had ever caused much interest for the US throughout history, no matter how much caudillos say otherwise in order to augment their own power. With the exception of Mexico and Cuba, there has never been much interest from Americans for resources primarily due to the difficulty in transport and the already fragmented area (different cultures, natural barriers) which never posed a threat. "But neither the Germans nor the Soviets made a serious strategic effort to dominate South America, because they understood the in most senses the continent was irrelevant to U.S. interests. Instead, they efforts were designed merely to irritate Washington and divert American resources." Cuba is the exception due to its strategic location as a threat to potentially disrupt American ports (especially New Orleans), thus "The American interest is simple and has nothing to do with human rights or regime change. It is to have guarantees that regardless of future challenges, Cuba will not become a base for foreign powers. Having achieved that, the United States will have achieved much." Freidman rightly points out also that Venezuela has no significant threat to the US. Bordered by dense Amazonian jungles and Andean mountains to the south/east, a hostile and stable Columbia to the west, water to the north means that the US is the only logical market format its oil. Freidman sees Chavez as no threat to anyone excel his own people and will likely lose power shortly. Whether he does or not is of no importance to the US.

Brazil is the one power that has potential to challenge the US beyond the next decade. They are rich, big, and have a diverse economy balanced evenly well among exports across Asia, LA, and EU through various sectors. Potential threat is in the distant future if they ever develop naval capability to start patrolling the south Atlantic, since a logical partnership with Portuguese speaking Angola could lead to a strong brazil-Africa economic partnership. US policy should thus be to support a rival that exists in Argentina and the south cone neighbors of Uruguay and Paraguay.

Fascinating analysis of Mexico and the drug problem! Foreign exports to the Us account for $130B/yr. assuming even a very high 20% GM, this is $26MM in profits. Illegal drug sales represent around $40B/yr, with margins in the 90% range = $36B/yr profits! No matter how you skew the numbers, this cash flow is huge and thus the Mexican government has an incentive to make it appear as if they are doing all they can to fight the drug trade (image for the US, aid, high number if casualties) but really this is reasonable collateral damage to them since most impact is to the lowly populated areas to the north.

Similar parallel is drawn to illegal immigration within the USA: "the segment of society that benefits from large numbers of low-cost workers is greater and more influential than the segment harmed by it. Therefor, as with the Mexican government and drugs, the best U.S. strategy is to appear to be doing everything possible to stop the movement of immigrants while making certain that these efforts fail." A solution such as traceable national identity cards would never pass due to government distrust and potential for abuse, so we can expect no change in the status quo for a while. Just as the drug problem could be easily solved by legalization, at many unknown costs, it's unlikely to see any change here either. As long as cartel violence does not spread northward, which is unlikely since their incentive is to keep moving drugs unmolested, no change is here either despite efforts to make it look as such.

Africa: not much will happen here. Eventually mass warfare in order to redraw borders in a way that makes more sense is inevitable, as Freidman points out because countries are drawn by blood, not politicians sitting together in a board room. With Africa too fragmented currently to make much of a difference, and already being exploited by a Chinese state with its own internal problems, the prognosis is to use Africa for PR purposes. By donating a few billion per year, a lot of goodwill can be bought on the US side since this region directly affects Europe much more. Our philanthropy will have little impact in the end, but sway public opinion away from the general thought that US cares only about meddling in others' affairs and buy support from European allies for future causes.

Excellent concluding chapter: "During the next decade, the United States must overcome the desire to simplify, because there is no single phrase or formula that solves the problem [...] To reach this point, the American people must mature. We are an adolescent lot, expecting solutions to insoluble problems and perfection in our leaders [...] The demands of an unintended empire and immature expectations of our leaders will bring down the regime long before militarism or corruption might."

"The last decade posed challenges to the united states that it was not prepared for and that it did not manage well [...] but the threat that will arise later in the century will tower over those of the last decade [...] The United States is fortunate to have the next decade in which to make the transition from an obsessive foreign policy to a more balanced and nuanced exercise of power [...] It is important not to fight wars that can't be won and to fight wars in order to win. Fighting wars out of rage is impermissible for a country with such vast power and interests."

[George Siehl · Rating 3 out of 5]

Geopolitical analyst George Friedman's books offers many interesting facts, cogent analysis, and big predictions for the future. I read and enjoyed his The Next Hundred Years. His follow up book a few years later (2011), dealt with a shorter time frame, The Next Decade. Since that decade is now past, one can evaluate his predictive acumen. While his Century projection focuses upon a speculated, detailed series of events, he writes that Decade will depend more on matters of personalities. The person he focuses on here is the president. Specifically, he sets up as the overriding concern of the president during this coming (now past) decade is the challenge of maintaining the United States as a republic at the same time it is functioning as an empire. That empire is not that of the European nations over the past several centuries, essentially taking ownership of other countries for management in the best interests of the owning nation. Rather, the new empire refers to the strong influence the U.S. exerts on most other countries in the world, again in pursuit of its own best interests. It is the strength of America, influence not ownership, on the global scene, the combination in Friedman's reckoning, of economic (25 % of global GDP), political/diplomatic, and military factors that creates the new empire.

As he did in his hundred-year look, Friedman reviews the potential enemies of the United States. In this book his assessment sees Russian as a primary threat, China as a less likely hostile party, Mexico as both a short term and long term concern, the Mideast, primarily Iran, as a bit of business to be worked on, and Japan as a country to be watched. Overall, he sees a focus on the balance of power around the world as a primary concern. The U.S. should ensure that no other country, or combination of countries , becomes more powerful. It should be our geostrategic policy to build blocks of friends for us, and countervailing local coalitions against potential threats.

He is critical of the extent of George W. Bush's reaction to the terrorist attacks of 2001, claiming that terrorism does not pose an existential threat to the country, and the war on terror diverts dollars and attention away from other strategic priorities. He advocates withdrawal from Afghanistan, seeing no compelling national interest in the area.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter is the one on Russia. He views Russia as a powerful antagonist to American interests, militarily and economically. He predicted that Germany would form a closer relationship with Russia with an exchange of energy from Russia and technology from Germany. He anticipated Russian interest in regaining the more secure borders Ukraine would provide. The 2022 actual move to acquire that enhanced border security came a bit after the decade he was addressing, but the political reaction in Germany and the rest of Europe was just the opposite of his expectation. The military prowess of Russia is proving less robust that Friedman anticipated.

This is an interesting world view. The reader may determine their degree of concurrence with the author's perspective, and the impact of events as time has brought them to us. I rated this three stars, largely because his prior book had revealed much of what he repeats here. If this was my first exposure to the ideas, I would give the book four stars.