What do you think?
Rate this book
Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel
For many years, Bui Tin was one of Hanoi's most prominent journalists. Until September 1990, when he decided to remain in France though not, as he insists, to defect, he was Deputy Editor of Nhan Dan, the Communist Party daily, the Vietnamese equivalent of Pravda. Before that he worked in a similar capacity on the Vietnam People's Army newspaper and carried out numerous important assignments. In 1973 he was official spokesman for the North Vietnamese delegation which went to Saigon after the Paris Agreements to arrange the return home of US prisoners of war. Two years later, he was one of the first high-ranking Communists to enter Saigon, and witnessed the scene at Independence Palace when the South Vietnamese government formally surrendered on April 30, 1975. He then went on to report, despite official reluctance, the growing tension on the border between Vietnam and Cambodia which prompted Hanoi to overthrow Pol Pot's regime. Once again, on that occasion, Bui Tin was one of the first Vietnamese to enter Phnom Penh. As many foreign journalists have commented, 'He was always in the right place at the right time.'
It was no accident. Bui Tin joined the Revolution and the Communist Party in 1945, which led to his active participation in the war against the French colonial regime. After 1954, he continued to serve as an officer in the People's Army and was promoted colonel following two pioneering treks down what became known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The reports he wrote of his observations during these hazardous journeys obviously impressed the leadership in Hanoi, and he was therefore reassigned as an official journalist.
In this privileged position, Bui Tin came to know many of Hanoi's top leaders, often accompanied them on their trips abroad, and could not help but observe their strengths and weaknesses.
It was no accident. Bui Tin joined the Revolution and the Communist Party in 1945, which led to his active participation in the war against the French colonial regime. After 1954, he continued to serve as an officer in the People's Army and was promoted colonel following two pioneering treks down what became known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The reports he wrote of his observations during these hazardous journeys obviously impressed the leadership in Hanoi, and he was therefore reassigned as an official journalist.
In this privileged position, Bui Tin came to know many of Hanoi's top leaders, often accompanied them on their trips abroad, and could not help but observe their strengths and weaknesses.
224 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1994
4 people are currently reading
102 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
October 4, 2025
https://www.ft.com/content/88e50241-6...
A remarkable book by a senior member of the Vietnamese system who left the country but didn't join the expatriate anti-communist movement - his views seem to be that of a concerned insider who advocates reforms.
The book is a political biography in that it tells of his political life, with hardly any personal detail. So we learn of the war against the French, Americans and SVN, and then the political developments after the war up to the collapse of communism in Europe. The former is very interesting and too brief; the latter has its moments but too much of it is the familiar story of corrupt authoritarianism.
A remarkable book by a senior member of the Vietnamese system who left the country but didn't join the expatriate anti-communist movement - his views seem to be that of a concerned insider who advocates reforms.
The book is a political biography in that it tells of his political life, with hardly any personal detail. So we learn of the war against the French, Americans and SVN, and then the political developments after the war up to the collapse of communism in Europe. The former is very interesting and too brief; the latter has its moments but too much of it is the familiar story of corrupt authoritarianism.
January 30, 2025
3 stars. Bui Tin was the Vietnamese Forrest Gump. First a solider (ultimately a colonel) and later a journalist, the guy just pops up everywhere: He was at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, he interrogated John McCain as a POW in Hanoi, he somehow ended up accepting the surrender (such as there was one) of RVN President Duong Van Minh at the Presidential Palace in Saigon after a tank crashed through the gate, he was there when the Vietnamese overthrew the Khmer Rouge and spent a few years in Cambodia, and he met and mingled with virtually all of the Vietnamese Communist Party leadership, in some cases helping draft their memoirs.
This slim book tries to be three things: a history, a collection of interesting recollections, and an analysis of Vietnam's politics/wars. The anecdotes are quite engaging if you're really into the subject matter, the rest feels cursory.
On Tin himself, even in translation he comes across as quite a sincere and earnest writer, if not one given to lingering on things. Take this brief passage from p.11:
"Several days later during the mid-autumn festival in 1948, when some French paratroopers parachuted into the district and made a sweep through the village, an informant pointed out our house as that of the wife of a high-ranking Viet Minh official, meaning my father. Immediately a legionnaire rushed in and shot my mother in the chest with a round from his sub-machine gun. She died on the kitchen floor. After that it was impossible not to feel vindictive. Whenever I went into battle, behind every opposing gun was the enemy who had killed my mother."
Woah. Also on brand that that's all he has to say about this, you wont hear anymore about his mother or his feelings about the French until he mentions "appreciating" things about France like "the rule of law" when he moves there nearly 50 years later.
Probably one of the great strengths of this book for most interested readers (and let's face it, you're probably pretty into the subject matter if you're reading this book) is Tin's collection of personal anecdotes concerning the big players in Vietnamese politics. Often times the stories come across as endearingly earnest and human. For instance, Tin's account of making small talk with the just-surrendered South Vietnamese officials in the Presidential Palace while they waited for the big guns to arrive was both interesting and heartfelt. Tin's recollections and anecdotes of VCP First Secretary Le Duan (whom Tin obviously hates) were pretty amusing and sometimes juicy:
"Le Duan scarcely ever seemed to write anything down. He just said what he thought on the spur of the moment. He also stammered a lot and was difficult to listen to. That was what everybody felt. They all became weary trying to understand what he was saying because he spoke ungrammatically."
Tin also relates an episode in which Duan and his entourage tried to bring so many personal goods back from Moscow the Soviets forced them to ship it by sea.
I was surprised to see how hard he was on Nguyen Van Linh (the paramount leader during Doi Moi, the reforms beginning in the 80s): "He lacked imagination and was very gullible...he showed himself to be indecisive and hesitant, in other words lacking in the qualities necessary in a leader." Ouch.
Fun anecdotes aside, every now and then Tin has some interesting analysis. His point about American airmen being required to serve 100 missions before they could go home during Vietnam's American War, and therefore seeing very few downed pilots who were on a later mission, but many who were on one of their first was interesting to consider.
Tin wrote this book at a tricky time: the early 90s. At that time it was probably easy to see history's march towards liberal democracy as unstoppable, and to view Vietnam as hopeless. For instance, Tin writes in cynicism and despair: "And who believes that within ten years per capita income will increase by 100 per cent?" - It actually increased by more than 100% in the ten years after Tin wrote that, I wonder how he felt about that. Just generally, the critiques of the Party are well-taken, but Tin's analyses (like the history he provides) tend to be fairly perfunctory (the entire book is less than 200 pages).
This leads to my main critique: Tin clearly has a lot of insider knowledge, it would have been nice if he partnered up with a serious scholar and wrote a lengthier first-hand account focusing entirely on the Party and its people from the inside, rather than a cursory overview of 20th century Vietnam, 90% of which can be found elsewhere - it's kind of a strange way to approach a "memoir" (who ever heard of a memoir that was less than 200 pages!?). So a bit of a missed opportunity there.
On balance, I quite enjoyed this slim value and it coloured my understanding of the period and the Party nicely with some first-hand stories, but I wouldn't recommend this to a casual reader.
This slim book tries to be three things: a history, a collection of interesting recollections, and an analysis of Vietnam's politics/wars. The anecdotes are quite engaging if you're really into the subject matter, the rest feels cursory.
On Tin himself, even in translation he comes across as quite a sincere and earnest writer, if not one given to lingering on things. Take this brief passage from p.11:
"Several days later during the mid-autumn festival in 1948, when some French paratroopers parachuted into the district and made a sweep through the village, an informant pointed out our house as that of the wife of a high-ranking Viet Minh official, meaning my father. Immediately a legionnaire rushed in and shot my mother in the chest with a round from his sub-machine gun. She died on the kitchen floor. After that it was impossible not to feel vindictive. Whenever I went into battle, behind every opposing gun was the enemy who had killed my mother."
Woah. Also on brand that that's all he has to say about this, you wont hear anymore about his mother or his feelings about the French until he mentions "appreciating" things about France like "the rule of law" when he moves there nearly 50 years later.
Probably one of the great strengths of this book for most interested readers (and let's face it, you're probably pretty into the subject matter if you're reading this book) is Tin's collection of personal anecdotes concerning the big players in Vietnamese politics. Often times the stories come across as endearingly earnest and human. For instance, Tin's account of making small talk with the just-surrendered South Vietnamese officials in the Presidential Palace while they waited for the big guns to arrive was both interesting and heartfelt. Tin's recollections and anecdotes of VCP First Secretary Le Duan (whom Tin obviously hates) were pretty amusing and sometimes juicy:
"Le Duan scarcely ever seemed to write anything down. He just said what he thought on the spur of the moment. He also stammered a lot and was difficult to listen to. That was what everybody felt. They all became weary trying to understand what he was saying because he spoke ungrammatically."
Tin also relates an episode in which Duan and his entourage tried to bring so many personal goods back from Moscow the Soviets forced them to ship it by sea.
I was surprised to see how hard he was on Nguyen Van Linh (the paramount leader during Doi Moi, the reforms beginning in the 80s): "He lacked imagination and was very gullible...he showed himself to be indecisive and hesitant, in other words lacking in the qualities necessary in a leader." Ouch.
Fun anecdotes aside, every now and then Tin has some interesting analysis. His point about American airmen being required to serve 100 missions before they could go home during Vietnam's American War, and therefore seeing very few downed pilots who were on a later mission, but many who were on one of their first was interesting to consider.
Tin wrote this book at a tricky time: the early 90s. At that time it was probably easy to see history's march towards liberal democracy as unstoppable, and to view Vietnam as hopeless. For instance, Tin writes in cynicism and despair: "And who believes that within ten years per capita income will increase by 100 per cent?" - It actually increased by more than 100% in the ten years after Tin wrote that, I wonder how he felt about that. Just generally, the critiques of the Party are well-taken, but Tin's analyses (like the history he provides) tend to be fairly perfunctory (the entire book is less than 200 pages).
This leads to my main critique: Tin clearly has a lot of insider knowledge, it would have been nice if he partnered up with a serious scholar and wrote a lengthier first-hand account focusing entirely on the Party and its people from the inside, rather than a cursory overview of 20th century Vietnam, 90% of which can be found elsewhere - it's kind of a strange way to approach a "memoir" (who ever heard of a memoir that was less than 200 pages!?). So a bit of a missed opportunity there.
On balance, I quite enjoyed this slim value and it coloured my understanding of the period and the Party nicely with some first-hand stories, but I wouldn't recommend this to a casual reader.
Read
January 26, 2018This book was very detailed and parts were very interesting. There were so many names that it was hard to keep track of who was who, not to mention that I'm not as familiar with Vietnamese names so they didn't flow naturally for me. Bui Tin has a very interesting expertise and insider information. I enjoyed this book (mostly) and would recommend it to anyone interested in Vietnamese Cold War politics.
March 12, 2014
This is not a great read. The second half (after the fall of Saigon) is all about the ins and outs of Hanoi palace politics, typical Stalinist Bolshevik infighting and doublecrossing in the name of the Revolution. It is enjoyable only for the most dedicated. Nevertheless, the book is worth reading for the inside look at the North Vietnamese conquest of the South. The author joined the Party at the age of 19 to fight the French, rose to the rank of colonel, then moved over to journalism. In that capacity he was in on the surrender in Saigon in 1975. He continued as loyal Party member and journal editor until he finally got fed up with the self-serving hypocrisy of the Communist regime and wangled for himself an educational trip to France, from which he did not return so that from there he could "play a part in rescuing Vietnam from its misery and isolation."
His narrative makes it clear that the antiwar verities one heard in the US in the 60s and 70s were lies. The North Vietnamese Communists were not simple nationalists, they were thoroughgoing Maoists bent on the elimination of class enemies. The secret police hauled off "revisionists," i.e. educated people. Under the guidance of Chinese advisors, all except peasants and Party members were subject to brutal persecution, with the brisk use of firing squads for those condemned by a show of hands at mock trials. Even Party members were condemned if they were landlords--being necessarily class enemies, they were denounced for attempting to infiltrate and betray the Party. Even if they had supported the Revolution and sheltered its fighters, they were shot with the rest. The Government wanted their land. About 10,000 in all were killed in the 1950s, and "among the masses, the rights of freedom and democracy were obliterated." To their credit, the Communists did not repeat this bloodletting after the conquest of the South, satisfying themselves with "re-education camps" that were at least survivable. Perhaps they had mellowed, or perhaps they observed that the masscacre they perpetrated in Hue during the Tet offensive in 1968 did not do them any good. Tin does not seem to be able bring himself to blame Ho Chi Minh for the atrocities. Surely dear Uncle Ho would not have permitted the harsh conditions in the re-ed camps!
Tin relates that the North sent only a few battalions south before 1964; they didn't decide to intervene until after the assassination of Diem in 63. He describes the great losses they suffered in the Tet offensive in 68, whose damage in the South was helpfully exaggerated by the US press. The North did not recover militarily until 1970, but "continued to manipulate public opinion in the United States" to their advantage. The 1975 campaign of conquest was pressed home only after it became clear that the US would not interfere.
Tin seems to bear little animus towards the US (like most Vietnamese, it seems, to their credit). He criticizes the South for relying on American aid, but also notes the great material aid the North received from China. He criticizes the Americans for "destroying old traditional values." It seems to me that the Communists did a pretty thoroughgoing job of destroying them themselves.
In old age, Tin grew disillusioned with the Party. He complains about the corruption, the hypcrisy in presenting the "Communist Line" to the people, and the ignorance and pig-headedness of some high officials without education but with impeccable peasant class origins. One senses that Tin really absorbed a good French education in the colonial period, despite his dedication to the Revolution. Finally, he saw the thickheadedness the Party leaders showed in not understanding the implications of the 1989 revolutions in Europe. Even Tin's own son had fled as a boat person. Finally, Tin could stand it no longer and engineered his own escape.
His narrative makes it clear that the antiwar verities one heard in the US in the 60s and 70s were lies. The North Vietnamese Communists were not simple nationalists, they were thoroughgoing Maoists bent on the elimination of class enemies. The secret police hauled off "revisionists," i.e. educated people. Under the guidance of Chinese advisors, all except peasants and Party members were subject to brutal persecution, with the brisk use of firing squads for those condemned by a show of hands at mock trials. Even Party members were condemned if they were landlords--being necessarily class enemies, they were denounced for attempting to infiltrate and betray the Party. Even if they had supported the Revolution and sheltered its fighters, they were shot with the rest. The Government wanted their land. About 10,000 in all were killed in the 1950s, and "among the masses, the rights of freedom and democracy were obliterated." To their credit, the Communists did not repeat this bloodletting after the conquest of the South, satisfying themselves with "re-education camps" that were at least survivable. Perhaps they had mellowed, or perhaps they observed that the masscacre they perpetrated in Hue during the Tet offensive in 1968 did not do them any good. Tin does not seem to be able bring himself to blame Ho Chi Minh for the atrocities. Surely dear Uncle Ho would not have permitted the harsh conditions in the re-ed camps!
Tin relates that the North sent only a few battalions south before 1964; they didn't decide to intervene until after the assassination of Diem in 63. He describes the great losses they suffered in the Tet offensive in 68, whose damage in the South was helpfully exaggerated by the US press. The North did not recover militarily until 1970, but "continued to manipulate public opinion in the United States" to their advantage. The 1975 campaign of conquest was pressed home only after it became clear that the US would not interfere.
Tin seems to bear little animus towards the US (like most Vietnamese, it seems, to their credit). He criticizes the South for relying on American aid, but also notes the great material aid the North received from China. He criticizes the Americans for "destroying old traditional values." It seems to me that the Communists did a pretty thoroughgoing job of destroying them themselves.
In old age, Tin grew disillusioned with the Party. He complains about the corruption, the hypcrisy in presenting the "Communist Line" to the people, and the ignorance and pig-headedness of some high officials without education but with impeccable peasant class origins. One senses that Tin really absorbed a good French education in the colonial period, despite his dedication to the Revolution. Finally, he saw the thickheadedness the Party leaders showed in not understanding the implications of the 1989 revolutions in Europe. Even Tin's own son had fled as a boat person. Finally, Tin could stand it no longer and engineered his own escape.
March 15, 2016
"Và thế là ở Đại hội lần thứ hai của đảng cộng sản Việt Nam trên căn cứ địa Việt Bắc, trong cuốn Điều lệ đảng, ở ngay phần đầu được ghi rõ: cơ sở lý luận và tư tưởng của Đảng là chủ nghĩa Mác Lê Nin và tư tưởng Mao Trạch Đông. Không một ai nghi ngờ, và tất nhiên không một ai phản đối cả. Nó tự nhiên như ánh sáng, như hơi thở cần cho cuộc sống con người vậy! Cần nói thật rằng những tư duy của chủ tịch Hồ Chí Minh, của các vị Trường Chinh, Lê Duẩn, Phạm Văn Đồng, Lê Đức Thọ, Võ Nguyên Giáp... lúc ấy đều coi tư tưởng Mao là mẫu mực, là chân lý. Thế mới biết khi đánh rơi mất bản thân mình, bản thân dân tộc mình, quyền tư duy tỉnh táo của mình, mọi người đều có thể phạm sai lầm cực lớn vậy! Gần như trên một trang giấy trắng, chúng ta đã đổ lên một lọ mực tầu đen và ngộ ngận đó là ánh sáng."
"Đầy tớ thì đi Vôn-ga
Bố con ông chủ ra ga đợi tàu,
Đầy tớ thì ở nhà lầu,
Bố con ông chủ giấy đầu che mưa
Đầy tớ tiệc rượu sớm trưa,
Bố con ông chủ rau dưa qua ngày."
"Mất mùa là tại thiên tai
Được mùa là tự thiên tài Đảng ta."
"Tôi còn nhớ rất rõ, trong 4 buổi sáng năm 1983 ở nhà nghỉ Quảng Bá Hà Nội, có mặt ông Hoàng Tùng, ông Đống Ngạc, ông Nguyễn Cận, ông Thép Mới và tôi, ông Lê Duẩn đã kể lại trên đại thể quá trình hoạt động của ông. Có ba lần ông cao hứng, tự nói về những đóng góp xuất sắc của mình, và tự so sánh với ông Hồ Chí Minh, ông nói: "Tôi à, tôi hơn bác Hồ chớ. Này nhé bác Hồ mở mồm ra là nói nhân, nghĩa, lễ, trí, tín. Đó là gì? Là phong kiến, là lạc hậu rồi. Tôi à, tôi nói: làm chủ tập thể. Đó là lập trường công nhân, tư tưởng công nhân..."
Một lần khác ông kể: "Sau hiệp định Geneve, bác Hồ còn nghĩ tới tổng tuyển cử. Đó là gì? Là ảo tưởng! Tôi à, tôi hơn bác Hồ chớ. Tôi nghĩ ngay đến bạo lực. Tôi bảo anh em chôn súng. Tôi bàn với anh em để lực lượng ở miền Nam không tập kết hết cả đâu nhé..."
Lại một buổi khác ông thích thú: "Tôi à, tôi hơn bác Hồ chớ!
Bác sang Liên Xô và Trung Quốc, nghe Stalin và Mao bảo gì là vâng vâng hết! Tôi à, tôi dám cãi lại với Krouchev, tôi dám cãi lại với Mao.""
"Đầy tớ thì đi Vôn-ga
Bố con ông chủ ra ga đợi tàu,
Đầy tớ thì ở nhà lầu,
Bố con ông chủ giấy đầu che mưa
Đầy tớ tiệc rượu sớm trưa,
Bố con ông chủ rau dưa qua ngày."
"Mất mùa là tại thiên tai
Được mùa là tự thiên tài Đảng ta."
"Tôi còn nhớ rất rõ, trong 4 buổi sáng năm 1983 ở nhà nghỉ Quảng Bá Hà Nội, có mặt ông Hoàng Tùng, ông Đống Ngạc, ông Nguyễn Cận, ông Thép Mới và tôi, ông Lê Duẩn đã kể lại trên đại thể quá trình hoạt động của ông. Có ba lần ông cao hứng, tự nói về những đóng góp xuất sắc của mình, và tự so sánh với ông Hồ Chí Minh, ông nói: "Tôi à, tôi hơn bác Hồ chớ. Này nhé bác Hồ mở mồm ra là nói nhân, nghĩa, lễ, trí, tín. Đó là gì? Là phong kiến, là lạc hậu rồi. Tôi à, tôi nói: làm chủ tập thể. Đó là lập trường công nhân, tư tưởng công nhân..."
Một lần khác ông kể: "Sau hiệp định Geneve, bác Hồ còn nghĩ tới tổng tuyển cử. Đó là gì? Là ảo tưởng! Tôi à, tôi hơn bác Hồ chớ. Tôi nghĩ ngay đến bạo lực. Tôi bảo anh em chôn súng. Tôi bàn với anh em để lực lượng ở miền Nam không tập kết hết cả đâu nhé..."
Lại một buổi khác ông thích thú: "Tôi à, tôi hơn bác Hồ chớ!
Bác sang Liên Xô và Trung Quốc, nghe Stalin và Mao bảo gì là vâng vâng hết! Tôi à, tôi dám cãi lại với Krouchev, tôi dám cãi lại với Mao.""
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews