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Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power State and Society in Egypt and Israel
What determines the strategies by which a state mobilizes resources for war? And does war preparation strengthen or weaken the state in relation to society? In looking at these questions, Michael Barnett develops a novel theoretical framework that traces the connection between war preparation and changes in state-society relations, and applies that framework to Egypt from 1952 to 1977 and Israel from 1948 through 1977. Confronting the Costs of War addresses major issues in international relations, comparative politics, and Middle Eastern studies. The author argues that Egyptian and Israeli war preparation strategies were a function of systemic, state, and societal variables, and that leaders in each state attempted to balance the demands imposed by international conflict with their domestic economic and political objectives. Before 1967 the governments' strategies led to the expansion of state control over society. But contrary to the prevailing wisdom that war and war preparation will generally strengthen the state, the increased security pressures after 1967 were central to the decline of state power in both countries. After that year, Israeli and Egyptian officials ventured on a path that bolstered the state's military preparedness, but at the cost of its control over society and economy.
378 pages, Unbound
First published June 25, 1992
32 people want to read
About the author
Michael N. Barnett
16 books2 followersMichael N. Barnett is a Constructivist scholar and professor of international relations at the Elliott School of International Affairs, in Washington, D.C.. His research has been in the areas of international organizations, international relations theory, and Middle Eastern politics.
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November 18, 2016
Michael N. Barnett’s overarching argument in Confronting the Costs of War is that war preparation is not only a matter of foreign policy, but is shaped and constrained by domestic circumstances. In defending the nation, the state must mobilize its resources, which can have a significant and permanent impact on its internal situation, either by enhancing its power over society or losing control. In deciding how best to prepare for a conflict, therefore, a state must balance its internal and external security needs, evaluate its domestic constraints carefully, and decide between three broad strategies: “accommodational, restructural, and international”. Also relevant is the type of resource that it seeks to mobilize: financial, productive, or human. The author uses the case studies of Egypt and Israel in order to demonstrate that, despite their differences, and particularly despite Israel being perceived traditionally as an “exceptional”, both countries engage war preparations in a manner consistent with his theory.
After a broader introductory first chapter, Barnett develops his theoretical framework in detail in chapter two, particularly the nature of the three major strategies. Accommodation is “the reliance on and modest changes in already existing policy instruments”, which is a good strategy to begin with, since it causes minimal domestic disruption, but this usually fails to meet the state’s needs. Restructuring “is observed whenever state managers attempt to restructure the present-state society compact” for war preparation, which is much more effective at extracting resources, but carries substantial political costs, regardless of whether its drives are centralizing or liberalizing. Thus a more suitable middle ground is the international strategy, which “attempts to distribute the costs of war onto foreign actors”, although it is not always available. The author is also interested in the impact of the restructuring process on “state power”, which is defined as the ability to ensure and enduring supply of resources rather than hegemony over coercion in the short term. Measured through fiscal ability, on the basis of the state’s extractive capabilities and its constraints, state power becomes a key theme in evaluating the war preparation strategies of both countries. The third chapter then provides a historical context for both Egypt and Israel, with the key point being that the latter had a closer and more legitimate relationship with its society during the period studied.
Barnett then engages a detailed examination of Egypt’s war preparation strategies between the 1952 Revolution and the 1977 initialization of the peace process. Between 1952 and 1956, when the Free Officers were consolidating their power, he comes to the conclusion that “Nasser’s reliance on accommodational and international strategies was a product of the economic infrastructure, the state’s capacities, Nasser’s populist appeal, and the strength of the capitalist classes and their intended role in Egypt’s development”. Between 1956 and 1967 the state based its rhetoric on conflict with Israel, Pan-Arabism, and the Palestinian question, but due to the socialist ideology that legitimized his power, he was unable to shift the burden of increased defense spending on the Egyptian people completely, and thus he had to continue to rely on international support. After his defeat in the 1967 War, Gamal Abdul Nasser lost much legitimacy in the eyes of the people, which contributed to unbearable social strains that required Egypt to go to war. Victory in 1973 earned new legitimacy for Anwar Sadat, but he knew that he needed to use this to end his socially and economically unviable defense strategy. Thus, strategic concerns gave way to domestic crisis and the pursuit of peace became paramount, as the limits of all three war preparation strategies had been reached.
The author then undertakes a similar analysis of Israel from its founding in 1948 through 1977. Unlike Egypt, the Israeli state had substantial legitimacy in the eyes of society, which was based inherently on the notion of security and thus it had the power to extract substantial financial and human (through universal conscription) resources. Prior to the Suez War of 1956, however, its productive capacity, however, was limited, and thus it still had to rely on international support in this regard. Between 1957 and 1956 there were no domestic or international factors to catalyze a change in strategies, since the economy was expanding and the Arab states were not viewed as a threat, and thus circumstances remained static mostly, although the state did attempt to wean itself off of international reliance for production. Even though they were victorious in the 1967 War, however, the refusal of Arab states to trade land for peace led to concern about an impending military crisis that engendered an expansion of the already substantial defense budget. Accommodational strategies were now insufficient to meet the state’s needs, but domestic crises meant that a restructuring agenda would have had a deleterious effect on internal security. Thus, even as it attempted to become more autonomous in production, Israel grew more reliant on international aid in other areas. It was, therefore, more amenable to Egypt’s overtures for peace by 1977.
In his penultimate chapter, Barnett recapitulates his case studies, but reorganizes the narrative to give the reader a broader perspective of the transformation of state power in both countries. For Egypt, war preparation allowed state power to increase by legitimizing the revolution between 1952 and 1967, but eventually the strains it placed on society (with no payoff due to the 1967 defeat) led to its erosion and an increasing subservience to foreign constraints. Similarly, an already strong Zionist governing system was strengthened by statehood and subsequent war preparations, but the 1967 War placed too heavy a burden on society and thus Israel had to end its isolation and become reliant on international aid, which corroded its state power. The author concludes by restating his argument and the rudiments of his theoretical framework and arguing that prolonged crises tend to result in international strategies due to the limitations of accommodation and restructuring. This in turn leads to a decline in that state’s power following the imposition of foreign constraints.
Obviously a summary of such a complex work such as this cannot do it justice, but Barnett’s signposting and recapitulation are among the best in academia, and thus his ideas come through and the relationship between the international and domestic factors is demonstrated clearly. Overall, Confronting the Costs of War is a rigorous study that should be read by specialists of either nation or of foreign policy, as it provides a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of all of these topics. It remains accessible for non-specialists, of course, although its focused scope may limit its value to such readers.
After a broader introductory first chapter, Barnett develops his theoretical framework in detail in chapter two, particularly the nature of the three major strategies. Accommodation is “the reliance on and modest changes in already existing policy instruments”, which is a good strategy to begin with, since it causes minimal domestic disruption, but this usually fails to meet the state’s needs. Restructuring “is observed whenever state managers attempt to restructure the present-state society compact” for war preparation, which is much more effective at extracting resources, but carries substantial political costs, regardless of whether its drives are centralizing or liberalizing. Thus a more suitable middle ground is the international strategy, which “attempts to distribute the costs of war onto foreign actors”, although it is not always available. The author is also interested in the impact of the restructuring process on “state power”, which is defined as the ability to ensure and enduring supply of resources rather than hegemony over coercion in the short term. Measured through fiscal ability, on the basis of the state’s extractive capabilities and its constraints, state power becomes a key theme in evaluating the war preparation strategies of both countries. The third chapter then provides a historical context for both Egypt and Israel, with the key point being that the latter had a closer and more legitimate relationship with its society during the period studied.
Barnett then engages a detailed examination of Egypt’s war preparation strategies between the 1952 Revolution and the 1977 initialization of the peace process. Between 1952 and 1956, when the Free Officers were consolidating their power, he comes to the conclusion that “Nasser’s reliance on accommodational and international strategies was a product of the economic infrastructure, the state’s capacities, Nasser’s populist appeal, and the strength of the capitalist classes and their intended role in Egypt’s development”. Between 1956 and 1967 the state based its rhetoric on conflict with Israel, Pan-Arabism, and the Palestinian question, but due to the socialist ideology that legitimized his power, he was unable to shift the burden of increased defense spending on the Egyptian people completely, and thus he had to continue to rely on international support. After his defeat in the 1967 War, Gamal Abdul Nasser lost much legitimacy in the eyes of the people, which contributed to unbearable social strains that required Egypt to go to war. Victory in 1973 earned new legitimacy for Anwar Sadat, but he knew that he needed to use this to end his socially and economically unviable defense strategy. Thus, strategic concerns gave way to domestic crisis and the pursuit of peace became paramount, as the limits of all three war preparation strategies had been reached.
The author then undertakes a similar analysis of Israel from its founding in 1948 through 1977. Unlike Egypt, the Israeli state had substantial legitimacy in the eyes of society, which was based inherently on the notion of security and thus it had the power to extract substantial financial and human (through universal conscription) resources. Prior to the Suez War of 1956, however, its productive capacity, however, was limited, and thus it still had to rely on international support in this regard. Between 1957 and 1956 there were no domestic or international factors to catalyze a change in strategies, since the economy was expanding and the Arab states were not viewed as a threat, and thus circumstances remained static mostly, although the state did attempt to wean itself off of international reliance for production. Even though they were victorious in the 1967 War, however, the refusal of Arab states to trade land for peace led to concern about an impending military crisis that engendered an expansion of the already substantial defense budget. Accommodational strategies were now insufficient to meet the state’s needs, but domestic crises meant that a restructuring agenda would have had a deleterious effect on internal security. Thus, even as it attempted to become more autonomous in production, Israel grew more reliant on international aid in other areas. It was, therefore, more amenable to Egypt’s overtures for peace by 1977.
In his penultimate chapter, Barnett recapitulates his case studies, but reorganizes the narrative to give the reader a broader perspective of the transformation of state power in both countries. For Egypt, war preparation allowed state power to increase by legitimizing the revolution between 1952 and 1967, but eventually the strains it placed on society (with no payoff due to the 1967 defeat) led to its erosion and an increasing subservience to foreign constraints. Similarly, an already strong Zionist governing system was strengthened by statehood and subsequent war preparations, but the 1967 War placed too heavy a burden on society and thus Israel had to end its isolation and become reliant on international aid, which corroded its state power. The author concludes by restating his argument and the rudiments of his theoretical framework and arguing that prolonged crises tend to result in international strategies due to the limitations of accommodation and restructuring. This in turn leads to a decline in that state’s power following the imposition of foreign constraints.
Obviously a summary of such a complex work such as this cannot do it justice, but Barnett’s signposting and recapitulation are among the best in academia, and thus his ideas come through and the relationship between the international and domestic factors is demonstrated clearly. Overall, Confronting the Costs of War is a rigorous study that should be read by specialists of either nation or of foreign policy, as it provides a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of all of these topics. It remains accessible for non-specialists, of course, although its focused scope may limit its value to such readers.
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