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Modern War Studies
The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940
In the first half of the twentieth century, both czarist Russia and its successor, the Soviet Union, were confronted with the problem of conducting military operations involving mass armies along the broad fronts, a characteristic of modern war. Despite the ideological and technological differences between the two regimes, both strove toward a theory which became known as operational art-that level of warfare that links strategic goals to actual combat engagements.
From the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, through World War I, the civil war, and to the eve of World War II, modern operational art grew from theoretical speculations by a small group of officers to become a critical component of the Soviet art of war. In this first comprehensive treatment of the subject, Richard Harrison shows how this theory emerged and developed to become--despite radically different political settings and levels of technology--essential to the Red Army's victory over Germany in World War II.
Tracking both continuity and divergence between the imperial and Red armies, Harrison analyzes, on the basis of theoretical writings and battlefield performance, the development of such operationally significant phenomena as the "front" (group of armies), consecutive operations, and the deep operation, which relied upon aircraft and mechanized formations to penetrate the kind of intractable defense systems that characterized so much of World War I.
Drawing upon a wide range of sources, including memoirs, theoretical works, and materials from the Russian military archives (many presented here for the first time), Harrison traces the debates within the Russian and Soviet armies that engaged such theorists as Neznamov, Svechin, Triandafillov, and Isserson. The end result is an exemplary military intellectual history that helps illuminate a critical element in the "Russian way of war."
From the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, through World War I, the civil war, and to the eve of World War II, modern operational art grew from theoretical speculations by a small group of officers to become a critical component of the Soviet art of war. In this first comprehensive treatment of the subject, Richard Harrison shows how this theory emerged and developed to become--despite radically different political settings and levels of technology--essential to the Red Army's victory over Germany in World War II.
Tracking both continuity and divergence between the imperial and Red armies, Harrison analyzes, on the basis of theoretical writings and battlefield performance, the development of such operationally significant phenomena as the "front" (group of armies), consecutive operations, and the deep operation, which relied upon aircraft and mechanized formations to penetrate the kind of intractable defense systems that characterized so much of World War I.
Drawing upon a wide range of sources, including memoirs, theoretical works, and materials from the Russian military archives (many presented here for the first time), Harrison traces the debates within the Russian and Soviet armies that engaged such theorists as Neznamov, Svechin, Triandafillov, and Isserson. The end result is an exemplary military intellectual history that helps illuminate a critical element in the "Russian way of war."
- GenresHistoryMilitary Fiction
368 pages, Hardcover
First published April 20, 2001
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
May 10, 2018
Richard Harrison's The Russian Way of War studies the development of Russian/Soviet operational doctrine. It starts with its origins in the Russo-Japanese War. Instead of a single decisive campaign keyed on a climactic battle (for example, the Franco-Prussia War), the Russo-Japanese war had several army-sized units engaged in prolonged fighting in the battles of Liaoyang and Mukden. This led to the germination of the idea that there was a level of control between the strategic and the tactical where multiple-army actions would take place.
Harrison does a good study of the difficulty the Russians had in applying this concept during WWI where the level of control to be exercised over "front" commanders and the level they were supposed to exercise hampered Russian operations. WWI also saw the first example of another feature of Russian operation doctrine with the Brusilov Offensive's plan of hitting along a wide sector of the front to keep the enemy from concentrating his defensive forces.
One factor in the Brusilov offensive also manifested in the Russo-Polish War, the failure to realize when an operation had exhausted itself. The book covers the concept of the operation having a natural time limit based on resources. In short, the growing size of armies had rendered it much harder to end a war with a single campaign, instead necessitating a series of operations. The failure to realize that led to Russian over-extension in the Brusilov offensive and the over-extension of the Soviets when they went for Warsaw in 1920.
The Soviet emphasis on the offensive and on deep penetration also drew from the particular circumstances of the Russian Civil War, with a low force-to-space ratio that was conducive to such penetrations and which made defense harder.
With just under the first half of the book covering the precursors, the rest does a good job in covering the development of the theory, including the many rivalries and the impact of the Stalinist purges. One of the main disputes was the role of defense and the book shows how defensive operations and theory was received a decidedly minority share of the attention. Another key split was the extent to which a slow grinding of the enemy would be a factor relative to a strategy of seeking decisive offensive operations.
A large part of the book covers the mechanization of the Soviet forces and the intensive, and very costly, industrial development that made it possible. The book also covers the doctrine's addressing of the factors of depth as well as breadth; specifically, the increasing depth of an enemy's defensive system and the need for penetrations deep enough to deal with that.
Overall, a very solid overview. I partly would have liked to see how this played out in WWII itself (the book ends its coverage in 1940) but I can understand how that would be perhaps better treated as a separate book.
Harrison does a good study of the difficulty the Russians had in applying this concept during WWI where the level of control to be exercised over "front" commanders and the level they were supposed to exercise hampered Russian operations. WWI also saw the first example of another feature of Russian operation doctrine with the Brusilov Offensive's plan of hitting along a wide sector of the front to keep the enemy from concentrating his defensive forces.
One factor in the Brusilov offensive also manifested in the Russo-Polish War, the failure to realize when an operation had exhausted itself. The book covers the concept of the operation having a natural time limit based on resources. In short, the growing size of armies had rendered it much harder to end a war with a single campaign, instead necessitating a series of operations. The failure to realize that led to Russian over-extension in the Brusilov offensive and the over-extension of the Soviets when they went for Warsaw in 1920.
The Soviet emphasis on the offensive and on deep penetration also drew from the particular circumstances of the Russian Civil War, with a low force-to-space ratio that was conducive to such penetrations and which made defense harder.
With just under the first half of the book covering the precursors, the rest does a good job in covering the development of the theory, including the many rivalries and the impact of the Stalinist purges. One of the main disputes was the role of defense and the book shows how defensive operations and theory was received a decidedly minority share of the attention. Another key split was the extent to which a slow grinding of the enemy would be a factor relative to a strategy of seeking decisive offensive operations.
A large part of the book covers the mechanization of the Soviet forces and the intensive, and very costly, industrial development that made it possible. The book also covers the doctrine's addressing of the factors of depth as well as breadth; specifically, the increasing depth of an enemy's defensive system and the need for penetrations deep enough to deal with that.
Overall, a very solid overview. I partly would have liked to see how this played out in WWII itself (the book ends its coverage in 1940) but I can understand how that would be perhaps better treated as a separate book.
May 3, 2022
Very interesting book about evolution of military thought from Russian Tzarist military to 1940 Soviet military theory about the concept linking the overall strategic goals of war and [actual] tactical [fighting] actions in the field.
Starting from the Russo-Japanese war at the very beginning of 20th century, through WW1, Civil War, Polish War, Russo-Finnish War, second Russo-Japanese war in Mongolia and finally dawn of WW2 author introduces several high ranking officers that created the military approaches to war that would (in the end) help Russians/Soviets to repel the German armies and fully take the initiative. This approach to warfare was there to stay and post-war USSR military further developed the concept (which definitely continued with the Russian military after end of Cold War).
I was mostly impacted by following highlights from the book.
(a) Military legacy from Tzarist regime to Soviet regime - it is very interesting how original military theoreticians paved the way and educated the new Soviet generations of military commanders (although at one point military and its ranks were considered capitalist leftovers by Soviet political bodies). This was essential to building the actual Russian/Soviet military and ensuring consistent evolution of military thought [I would even say concentration of it on a specific subjects and approaches] through decades.
(b) Utter disaster that was Stalin's purge and loss of top commanders and imposing the eternal fear of association that caused loss [to a degree] of military lessons and theory accumulated since 1917. These chapters show how uncontrolled political action combined with terror tactics can cause total destruction of the system such as security/armed forces. Author manages to show how remnants of the "old school" (pre-1917 and new Soviet officers) did ultimately manage to keep the majority of military art safe (which was heroic deed considering the political circumstances) so that it could be applied in time of need during the 1940-1945 period.
(c) How vision can change the entire approach to warfare - Russians in pre-1917 era were aware of the changing nature of the war in terms of forces and politics and were trying to find the best ways to defend themselves and find ground to counter-attach. Far from it that they were the only ones engaged in this, Germans and Western allies did the same, but industrially these countries were on the completely different level. And industry was critical element here because without modern means and technology no military thought can save the day in the field. What is extraordinary here is that within 20 years Russian/Soviet industry finally brought up industry to the level capable to provide the means necessary for military art that was developed and basic concepts taught for decades in military schools. It was not on time (especially with the Stalin's purge) but without it period of 1940-1945 would definitely look very, very different.
(d) War games and expected line of combat and expected opposition - absolutely nothing changed in perception, areas expected to be affected nor hostilities of expected opposition in almost hundred years.
(e) Level of communication between mid-level and high level officers and freedom of exchange of ideas (even immediately after the purges which took lots of guts). Documents that were made available to the author show how vivid and vibrant entire scene was - how theory was put to practice (especially during the Civil War and Polish War) and how hard lessons were learned from it.
Operational art (or deep battle), like all universal truths you might say, can be recognized in almost every step of Western air-land battle (and derivative) of today or German (WW1/2) mobile strike group approach (that reached its peak in German blitzkrieg).
But as everything there are nuances in the way operations are executed and these are reflections of the respective societies. What Russian/Soviet way of war makes very unique is that political and social elements are never put aside, they are part of what they call struggle, where armed struggle represents the most dire aspect of it [but , again, not the only one]. And this is what makes the operational art very important element even today [when some serious security institutions make statements on such ridiculously dilettante level about [dead] serious issues that can have far reaching consequences].
Excellent book, highly recommended.
Starting from the Russo-Japanese war at the very beginning of 20th century, through WW1, Civil War, Polish War, Russo-Finnish War, second Russo-Japanese war in Mongolia and finally dawn of WW2 author introduces several high ranking officers that created the military approaches to war that would (in the end) help Russians/Soviets to repel the German armies and fully take the initiative. This approach to warfare was there to stay and post-war USSR military further developed the concept (which definitely continued with the Russian military after end of Cold War).
I was mostly impacted by following highlights from the book.
(a) Military legacy from Tzarist regime to Soviet regime - it is very interesting how original military theoreticians paved the way and educated the new Soviet generations of military commanders (although at one point military and its ranks were considered capitalist leftovers by Soviet political bodies). This was essential to building the actual Russian/Soviet military and ensuring consistent evolution of military thought [I would even say concentration of it on a specific subjects and approaches] through decades.
(b) Utter disaster that was Stalin's purge and loss of top commanders and imposing the eternal fear of association that caused loss [to a degree] of military lessons and theory accumulated since 1917. These chapters show how uncontrolled political action combined with terror tactics can cause total destruction of the system such as security/armed forces. Author manages to show how remnants of the "old school" (pre-1917 and new Soviet officers) did ultimately manage to keep the majority of military art safe (which was heroic deed considering the political circumstances) so that it could be applied in time of need during the 1940-1945 period.
(c) How vision can change the entire approach to warfare - Russians in pre-1917 era were aware of the changing nature of the war in terms of forces and politics and were trying to find the best ways to defend themselves and find ground to counter-attach. Far from it that they were the only ones engaged in this, Germans and Western allies did the same, but industrially these countries were on the completely different level. And industry was critical element here because without modern means and technology no military thought can save the day in the field. What is extraordinary here is that within 20 years Russian/Soviet industry finally brought up industry to the level capable to provide the means necessary for military art that was developed and basic concepts taught for decades in military schools. It was not on time (especially with the Stalin's purge) but without it period of 1940-1945 would definitely look very, very different.
(d) War games and expected line of combat and expected opposition - absolutely nothing changed in perception, areas expected to be affected nor hostilities of expected opposition in almost hundred years.
(e) Level of communication between mid-level and high level officers and freedom of exchange of ideas (even immediately after the purges which took lots of guts). Documents that were made available to the author show how vivid and vibrant entire scene was - how theory was put to practice (especially during the Civil War and Polish War) and how hard lessons were learned from it.
Operational art (or deep battle), like all universal truths you might say, can be recognized in almost every step of Western air-land battle (and derivative) of today or German (WW1/2) mobile strike group approach (that reached its peak in German blitzkrieg).
But as everything there are nuances in the way operations are executed and these are reflections of the respective societies. What Russian/Soviet way of war makes very unique is that political and social elements are never put aside, they are part of what they call struggle, where armed struggle represents the most dire aspect of it [but , again, not the only one]. And this is what makes the operational art very important element even today [when some serious security institutions make statements on such ridiculously dilettante level about [dead] serious issues that can have far reaching consequences].
Excellent book, highly recommended.
September 27, 2014
Great overview of Russian military thought during this period. Prompted by the massive land area in which she would fight, Russian military thinkers developed a school for operational art in 1931. The US experience didn't evolve toward that way of thinking until the 1980s. Harrison's books is a great primer before reading the Russian thinkers themselves.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews