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The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone
Not since the Roman Empire has any nation had as much economic, cultural, and military power as the United States does today. Yet, as has become all too evident through the terrorist attacks of September 11th and the impending threat of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, that power is not enough to solve global problems--like terrorism, environmental degradation, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--without involving other nations. Here Joseph S. Nye, Jr. focuses on the rise of these and other new challenges and explains clearly why America must adopt a more cooperative engagement with the rest of the world.
240 pages, Paperback
First published December 31, 2001
20 people are currently reading
808 people want to read
About the author
Joseph S. Nye Jr.
77 books298 followersJoseph Samuel Nye Jr. was an American political scientist. He and Robert Keohane co-founded the international relations theory of neoliberalism, which they developed in their 1977 book Power and Interdependence. Together with Keohane, he developed the concepts of asymmetrical and complex interdependence. They also explored transnational relations and world politics in an edited volume in the 1970s. More recently, he pioneered the theory of soft power. His notion of "smart power" ("the ability to combine hard and soft power into a successful strategy") became popular with the use of this phrase by members of the Clinton Administration and the Obama Administration. These theories from Nye are very commonly seen in courses across the U.S., such as I.B. D.P. Global Politics.
Nye was the Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, where he later held the position of University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus. In October 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Nye to the Foreign Affairs Policy Board. He was also a member of the Defense Policy Board. He was a Harvard faculty member since 1964. He was a fellow of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, a foreign fellow of the British Academy, and a member of the American Academy of Diplomacy.
The 2011 Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) survey of over 1,700 international relations scholars ranked Nye as the sixth most influential scholar in the field of international relations in the past 20 years. He was also ranked as one of the most influential figures in American foreign policy. In 2011, Foreign Policy magazine included him on its list of top global thinkers. In September 2014, Foreign Policy reported that international relations scholars and policymakers ranked Nye as one of the field's most influential scholars.
Nye was the Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, where he later held the position of University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus. In October 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Nye to the Foreign Affairs Policy Board. He was also a member of the Defense Policy Board. He was a Harvard faculty member since 1964. He was a fellow of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, a foreign fellow of the British Academy, and a member of the American Academy of Diplomacy.
The 2011 Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) survey of over 1,700 international relations scholars ranked Nye as the sixth most influential scholar in the field of international relations in the past 20 years. He was also ranked as one of the most influential figures in American foreign policy. In 2011, Foreign Policy magazine included him on its list of top global thinkers. In September 2014, Foreign Policy reported that international relations scholars and policymakers ranked Nye as one of the field's most influential scholars.
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Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews
February 4, 2011
The book is unsurprisingly dated having been written not long after 9/11. But much of what he has to say is still worth hearing. He discusses the difference between soft and hard power, when each is called for, and how to balance unilateralism and multilateralism in foreign policy. Many politicians (and citizens) could still learn from his discussion of immigration--a liberal immigration policy is what could save us from the coming fate of other developed countries with declining and aging populations.
Quotes:
“In my view, in a democracy, the national interest is simply what citizens, after proper deliberation, say it is. It is broader than vital strategic interests, though they are a crucial part. It can include values such as human rights and democracy, particularly if the American public feels that those values are so important to our identity or sense of who we are that people are willing to pay a price to promote them. Values are simply an intangible national interest.” 139
“While Congress has been willing to spend 16 percent of the national budget on defense, the percentage devoted to international affairs has shrunk from 4 percent in the 1960s to just 1 percent today. Our military strength is important, but it is not sixteen times more important than our diplomacy. Over a thousand people work on the staff of the smallest regional military command headquarters, far more than the total assigned to the Americas at the Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture. The military rightly plays a role in our diplomacy, but we are investing in our hard power in overly militarized terms.” 143
“A Strategy Based on Global Public Goods
1. Maintain the balance of power in important regions
2. Promote an open international economy
3. Preserve international commons
4. Maintain international rules and institutions
5. Assist economic development
6. Act as convenor of coalitions and mediator of disputes” 147
Quotes:
“In my view, in a democracy, the national interest is simply what citizens, after proper deliberation, say it is. It is broader than vital strategic interests, though they are a crucial part. It can include values such as human rights and democracy, particularly if the American public feels that those values are so important to our identity or sense of who we are that people are willing to pay a price to promote them. Values are simply an intangible national interest.” 139
“While Congress has been willing to spend 16 percent of the national budget on defense, the percentage devoted to international affairs has shrunk from 4 percent in the 1960s to just 1 percent today. Our military strength is important, but it is not sixteen times more important than our diplomacy. Over a thousand people work on the staff of the smallest regional military command headquarters, far more than the total assigned to the Americas at the Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture. The military rightly plays a role in our diplomacy, but we are investing in our hard power in overly militarized terms.” 143
“A Strategy Based on Global Public Goods
1. Maintain the balance of power in important regions
2. Promote an open international economy
3. Preserve international commons
4. Maintain international rules and institutions
5. Assist economic development
6. Act as convenor of coalitions and mediator of disputes” 147
January 26, 2020
Here is the paradox: America is the most powerful nation on Earth, and has the responsibility to use that power, but also must use restraint. It must not just use "hard" power, like military force, but also "soft" power, like media. Nye was an assistant secretary of defense under Bill Clinton, so he has good working knowledge of the pragmatic world of international politics and power, but has that touch of liberalism to temper this pragmatism. (NOTE: I'm a major pragmatist in politics and conservative because of it, though I respect honest idealism of every ilk). What is really interesting about the work, however, is his analysis of the various possible rivals to America's power in the near to mid-term future. REAL rivals, not incessant thorns like terrorist groups, but other nations like Russia, China, and even the EU. Of course, like any political work, it must be read in the context of when it was written, in this case 2002.
February 16, 2009
Slightly outdated in some of the analysis due to 2002 release, but relevant and insightful none the less. For anyone not ridiculously nationalistic, and open to the idea of a waning US supremacy (not to be confused with an overturn of US power), this book is perfect to help realize why and how we should start shaping our governmental policy and interaction with the world to not only create a better life for ourselves (assuming you are American), but a better life for the global community. Would be nice if Nye would update the book to dissect the current situation in Iraq/Afghanistan and the economic crisis.
August 9, 2016
A good working-paper on the case for a multilateral approach for U.S. foreign policy. I would first like to say tht I agree with most, if not all, of what Mr. Nye wrote. The reason why I gave this only four stars though is because he tends to lose his main point of explaining why we need a multilateral approach to foreign policy. He tends to dive into the aspects of our changing world, specifically the Information Revolution and Globalization, which seem important to his overall thesis, but he sometimes seems to forget what it was in favor of gawking at these changes. The other problem with this book is that it is a little dated in that it was published just after th events of 9/11, but before the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Thus, some of the things which he mentions in the book have been overshadowed by recent events in Iraq. Overall, though, his thesis is good, his evidence is sound, and his conclusions undeniable. A good text that would be timeless if it were edited and updated.
August 11, 2015
This is a very good piece of analysis about international affairs issues that is still relevant in 2015. The main argument that the author try to underline throughout the book is that the United States must try to understand the complexities and realities of the world through globalization and transnational issues. The United States, in order to survive and maintain its superpower status must find the correct balance between its hard power, mainly the capacity to project its military forces whenever and wherever it is needed, and its soft power, or the capacity to cultivate influence and hope among friends and foes alike.
The book is also a good introduction to a new concept which is currently discussed among scholars, the idea of smart power.
The book is also a good introduction to a new concept which is currently discussed among scholars, the idea of smart power.
May 16, 2007
This book came about when I was in my International Relations/Affairs phase a few years ago. I went to a lecture regarding working abroad and the speaker suggested this author. It is quite interesting as he explains historically superpowers have been cyclical and how the US is at it's downward part of the cycle. The Author gives reasoning for his belief that China or India are poised to adopt the top position in the next generation and explains how "power" is really made up of a few things.
January 25, 2009
Fed up with so many people talking about 'soft power'? I know what you're talking about. Soft power became such a loose concept in daily political/diplomatic use that it lost much of its credit and explanatory power. Although this book is not the one in which Nye coined the idea of soft power, it is certainly where he applies it best. A great read for anyone who wants to understand why Bush got it wrong.
April 1, 2009
This book is as valid today as it was before we started the current wars. It is basically an application of his Soft Power premise to current events. Clearly, its recommendations were not heeded and I'm sure Mr. Nye has been seething for the past few years, but perhaps this new administration can reestablish diplomatic and economic leadership and return to the multilateralism so desperately needed to solve our global problems--economic, social, and environmental.
April 20, 2013
I found the first three chapters to be tedious but the last two were enjoyable. There are several mentions of how America could squander its' soft power through arrogance, but as the book was written in 2002, before the asinine invasion of Iraq, I was dogged by wondering about the author's thoughts on a seemingly textbook example of unilateral high-handedness. On that note I look forward to reading Mr. Nye's more recent books.
October 2, 2012
Dense, but insightful.
August 17, 2025
Joseph S. Nye Jr.’s The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (2002) feels like a snapshot from a world that has changed dramatically, yet its insights still echo in today’s geopolitical debates.
I first read it some years back, and while parts of it now seem inevitably dated—coming as it did just after 9/11 and at the dawn of the so-called unipolar moment—the book retains a certain clarity about America’s global role that’s hard to ignore. Nye, famous for coining “soft power,” sets out here to explain why raw military might is not enough to secure American interests and why a mix of persuasion, attraction, and multilateral engagement is essential.
The paradox at the heart of his argument is simple: at the beginning of the 21st century, the United States possessed unmatched military, economic, and cultural power, yet the interconnected nature of globalization meant that it could not unilaterally shape outcomes on issues like terrorism, pandemics, climate change, or financial stability.
This tension between overwhelming strength and undeniable dependence is what gives the book its enduring bite.
Nye writes with the ease of someone who has spent decades teaching, and he avoids both academic jargon and simplistic sloganeering. His chapters trace the nature of U.S. dominance, explore the emerging challenges of non-state actors and global networks, and stress the importance of institutions like the UN, NATO, and the WTO—not because they constrain America, but because they amplify its legitimacy.
Reading him in 2015, I was struck by how prescient some of his warnings were. He noted, for instance, that alienating allies or dismissing cooperative frameworks would only weaken U.S. influence, a point later borne out in the Iraq war debacle and, more recently, in debates over America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and its frictions with China.
Of course, looking back now, some sections feel locked in their early-2000s context. The optimism about a “globalised liberal order” surviving without major shocks seems quaint in an age of fractured multipolarity, populist nationalism, and technological disruption.
His treatment of China, while insightful, underestimates the speed with which Beijing would rise as a full-spectrum rival. Yet, even where his projections misfire, the conceptual framework—distinguishing between hard and soft power, warning against overreach, and urging strategic restraint—remains strikingly relevant.
If the book seems dated, it’s only because it captured a fleeting moment when American supremacy looked eternal. Its real value lies in reminding us that even then, thinkers like Nye knew power was more complicated than raw force.
Today, when Washington navigates everything from Ukraine to AI competition, The Paradox of American Power still whispers a warning: even superpowers cannot stand alone.
I first read it some years back, and while parts of it now seem inevitably dated—coming as it did just after 9/11 and at the dawn of the so-called unipolar moment—the book retains a certain clarity about America’s global role that’s hard to ignore. Nye, famous for coining “soft power,” sets out here to explain why raw military might is not enough to secure American interests and why a mix of persuasion, attraction, and multilateral engagement is essential.
The paradox at the heart of his argument is simple: at the beginning of the 21st century, the United States possessed unmatched military, economic, and cultural power, yet the interconnected nature of globalization meant that it could not unilaterally shape outcomes on issues like terrorism, pandemics, climate change, or financial stability.
This tension between overwhelming strength and undeniable dependence is what gives the book its enduring bite.
Nye writes with the ease of someone who has spent decades teaching, and he avoids both academic jargon and simplistic sloganeering. His chapters trace the nature of U.S. dominance, explore the emerging challenges of non-state actors and global networks, and stress the importance of institutions like the UN, NATO, and the WTO—not because they constrain America, but because they amplify its legitimacy.
Reading him in 2015, I was struck by how prescient some of his warnings were. He noted, for instance, that alienating allies or dismissing cooperative frameworks would only weaken U.S. influence, a point later borne out in the Iraq war debacle and, more recently, in debates over America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and its frictions with China.
Of course, looking back now, some sections feel locked in their early-2000s context. The optimism about a “globalised liberal order” surviving without major shocks seems quaint in an age of fractured multipolarity, populist nationalism, and technological disruption.
His treatment of China, while insightful, underestimates the speed with which Beijing would rise as a full-spectrum rival. Yet, even where his projections misfire, the conceptual framework—distinguishing between hard and soft power, warning against overreach, and urging strategic restraint—remains strikingly relevant.
If the book seems dated, it’s only because it captured a fleeting moment when American supremacy looked eternal. Its real value lies in reminding us that even then, thinkers like Nye knew power was more complicated than raw force.
Today, when Washington navigates everything from Ukraine to AI competition, The Paradox of American Power still whispers a warning: even superpowers cannot stand alone.
May 2, 2010
My review from the San Francisco Chronicle in 2002:
The United States' role on the world stage
Nye argues we should use 'soft power' of influence, not just military might
Reviewed by Steve Kettmann
Sunday, March 24, 2002
The Paradox
of American Power
Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone
By Joseph S. Nye Jr.
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS; 222 PAGES; $26
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"The Paradox of American Power" is not a book likely to change many minds. Most people who believe that as the world's only superpower the United States can and probably will go it alone internationally are likely to go on thinking that way.
But for those of us who see perils in, for example, the Bush administration's tendency to run hot and cold on its key European allies, this well-timed little book from Joseph S. Nye Jr., former Clinton administration assistant defense secretary, provides a useful service.
Nye, dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, makes a case that as the nature of international power evolves in the information age, established criteria like military and economic might are in some senses being diluted. He asserts that the United States needs to look outward more than ever, especially in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, which he sees as making Americans more sensitive to the perspectives of people in other countries.
Practically speaking, he argues that even with a military and economic dominance unrivaled to a degree not seen since the Roman Empire, the United States must also pay attention to the power it wields through other forms of influence.
He calls this "soft power," and uses it to invoke such intangibles as the importance of U.S. popular culture worldwide -- from McDonald's to Hollywood movies to the heavy U.S. flavor of the Internet -- to the lure of the U.S. style of government, widely esteemed for its freedoms and for the opportunity it offers immigrants.
If the United States fails to consult allies on important questions, and comes across as too stridently arrogant, Nye argues, it is only harming its own interests because the important influence of this "soft power" will be undercut over the long term. But he makes this argument from the inside looking out, and strives always for a tone of reasonableness bordering on the bland.
"Some unilateralists advocate an assertive damn-the-torpedoes approach to promoting American values," he writes. "They see the danger as a flagging of our internal will and confusion of our goals, which should be to turn a unipolar moment 'into a unipolar era.' In this view, a principal aim of American foreign policy should be to bring about a change of regime in undemocratic countries such as Iraq, North Korea and China. Unilateralists believe that our intentions are good, American hegemony is benevolent, and that should end the discussion."
However, Nye cautions, such a view is incomplete.
"Americans are not immune from hubris, nor do we have all the answers," he continues. "Even if it happened to be true, it would be dangerous to act according to such an idea. . . . The United States should aim to work with other nations on global problems in a multilateral manner whenever possible."
To illustrate this point, Nye repeatedly cites the example of the Kyoto Protocol on reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, which President Bush rejected last year, arousing the ire of key European allies. Nye rightly cites climate change as an issue that can only be dealt with through international efforts, illustrating the limits of national sovereignty in some instances. But as is often the case with this thin primer, important details are left out.
For example, most European experts on the global-warming issue believe that the heavily flawed Kyoto process has no better friend than Bush: By rejecting the accord, say the experts, Bush gave it new life. And last year in Bonn, Germany, a surprise agreement was reached to move the Kyoto process forward even without U.S. participation. None of this is mentioned here.
A similar, surprising lack of intellectual rigor pops up often. Early on, for example, Nye runs through other countries, or collections of countries, that could pose a challenge to the U.S. position of unmatched world power. He devotes two pages to India -- musing on the possibility of it turning hostile to the United States -- without mentioning the India-Pakistan conflict, which any geopolitical analyst worth his or her salt would identify as the most likely lever for any major change in India's relations with America.
One other complaint must be registered. Nye talks about the need for the American people to reflect on such matters as finding a balance between benevolent unilateralism and multilateralism, and many will find this persuasive. But his style seems designed to put off the general reader, often hopping from unilluminating, unidentified quotation to unilluminating, unidentified quotation, demanding that a reader flip to the footnotes at the back. The first chapter alone contains 129 footnotes. This might wow them in Cambridge, but it's never going to land Nye on "Oprah."
Still, Nye has offered an informed and intelligent exploration of such issues as how globalism is unfolding, and what it means for American citizens, and presents workmanlike proposals for defining U.S. vital interests for the future. The need for a public debate on just such issues is acute, especially in the dissent-unfriendly mood of the war on terrorism. Nye moves the debate forward, albeit somewhat ploddingly at times.
"America will continue to be number one, but even so, in this global information age, number one ain't gonna be what it used to be," he concludes. "To succeed in such a world, America must not only maintain its hard power but learn better to understand its soft power and how to continue the two."
Former Chronicle staff writer Steve Kettmann's work has appeared in Salon, the New Republic and the New York Times. He lives in Berlin.
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi...
This article appeared on page RV - 4 of the San Francisco Chronicle
The United States' role on the world stage
Nye argues we should use 'soft power' of influence, not just military might
Reviewed by Steve Kettmann
Sunday, March 24, 2002
The Paradox
of American Power
Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone
By Joseph S. Nye Jr.
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS; 222 PAGES; $26
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"The Paradox of American Power" is not a book likely to change many minds. Most people who believe that as the world's only superpower the United States can and probably will go it alone internationally are likely to go on thinking that way.
But for those of us who see perils in, for example, the Bush administration's tendency to run hot and cold on its key European allies, this well-timed little book from Joseph S. Nye Jr., former Clinton administration assistant defense secretary, provides a useful service.
Nye, dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, makes a case that as the nature of international power evolves in the information age, established criteria like military and economic might are in some senses being diluted. He asserts that the United States needs to look outward more than ever, especially in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, which he sees as making Americans more sensitive to the perspectives of people in other countries.
Practically speaking, he argues that even with a military and economic dominance unrivaled to a degree not seen since the Roman Empire, the United States must also pay attention to the power it wields through other forms of influence.
He calls this "soft power," and uses it to invoke such intangibles as the importance of U.S. popular culture worldwide -- from McDonald's to Hollywood movies to the heavy U.S. flavor of the Internet -- to the lure of the U.S. style of government, widely esteemed for its freedoms and for the opportunity it offers immigrants.
If the United States fails to consult allies on important questions, and comes across as too stridently arrogant, Nye argues, it is only harming its own interests because the important influence of this "soft power" will be undercut over the long term. But he makes this argument from the inside looking out, and strives always for a tone of reasonableness bordering on the bland.
"Some unilateralists advocate an assertive damn-the-torpedoes approach to promoting American values," he writes. "They see the danger as a flagging of our internal will and confusion of our goals, which should be to turn a unipolar moment 'into a unipolar era.' In this view, a principal aim of American foreign policy should be to bring about a change of regime in undemocratic countries such as Iraq, North Korea and China. Unilateralists believe that our intentions are good, American hegemony is benevolent, and that should end the discussion."
However, Nye cautions, such a view is incomplete.
"Americans are not immune from hubris, nor do we have all the answers," he continues. "Even if it happened to be true, it would be dangerous to act according to such an idea. . . . The United States should aim to work with other nations on global problems in a multilateral manner whenever possible."
To illustrate this point, Nye repeatedly cites the example of the Kyoto Protocol on reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, which President Bush rejected last year, arousing the ire of key European allies. Nye rightly cites climate change as an issue that can only be dealt with through international efforts, illustrating the limits of national sovereignty in some instances. But as is often the case with this thin primer, important details are left out.
For example, most European experts on the global-warming issue believe that the heavily flawed Kyoto process has no better friend than Bush: By rejecting the accord, say the experts, Bush gave it new life. And last year in Bonn, Germany, a surprise agreement was reached to move the Kyoto process forward even without U.S. participation. None of this is mentioned here.
A similar, surprising lack of intellectual rigor pops up often. Early on, for example, Nye runs through other countries, or collections of countries, that could pose a challenge to the U.S. position of unmatched world power. He devotes two pages to India -- musing on the possibility of it turning hostile to the United States -- without mentioning the India-Pakistan conflict, which any geopolitical analyst worth his or her salt would identify as the most likely lever for any major change in India's relations with America.
One other complaint must be registered. Nye talks about the need for the American people to reflect on such matters as finding a balance between benevolent unilateralism and multilateralism, and many will find this persuasive. But his style seems designed to put off the general reader, often hopping from unilluminating, unidentified quotation to unilluminating, unidentified quotation, demanding that a reader flip to the footnotes at the back. The first chapter alone contains 129 footnotes. This might wow them in Cambridge, but it's never going to land Nye on "Oprah."
Still, Nye has offered an informed and intelligent exploration of such issues as how globalism is unfolding, and what it means for American citizens, and presents workmanlike proposals for defining U.S. vital interests for the future. The need for a public debate on just such issues is acute, especially in the dissent-unfriendly mood of the war on terrorism. Nye moves the debate forward, albeit somewhat ploddingly at times.
"America will continue to be number one, but even so, in this global information age, number one ain't gonna be what it used to be," he concludes. "To succeed in such a world, America must not only maintain its hard power but learn better to understand its soft power and how to continue the two."
Former Chronicle staff writer Steve Kettmann's work has appeared in Salon, the New Republic and the New York Times. He lives in Berlin.
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi...
This article appeared on page RV - 4 of the San Francisco Chronicle
March 3, 2019
Written in 2002 this is a scholarly read about how the United States has to deal with the rest of the globe as the only reigning Super Power.
Goes through a catalog of reigns, examines possible potential threats. Examines a history of tech advancements and explains that the internet makes countries more free and less able to be controlled by dictators.
Examines the issue of Globalization, ponders if the United States is on the same path as Rome. Occasional insight.
Goes through a catalog of reigns, examines possible potential threats. Examines a history of tech advancements and explains that the internet makes countries more free and less able to be controlled by dictators.
Examines the issue of Globalization, ponders if the United States is on the same path as Rome. Occasional insight.
October 2, 2025
Much of this full-throated defense of neoliberalism and tactical multilateralism seems tragically outdated in a world hellbent on the indiscriminate use of force. Soft power seems anachronistic now, but Nye will be vindicated when this immoderate and illiberal era exhausts itself. Transnational issues defy unilateral action and humble the arrogant.
September 20, 2018
كتاب تحليلي جيد غير انه اصبح قديم بحكم المعلومات التي تتسارع بقوة .
August 29, 2007
yah, yg ini mah mao gk mau harus gw baca, biar lulus semester 5.
to be honest, ini keadaan Amerika sekarang.
kata siapa, negara sebesar AS gk ketar-ketir ngeliat keadaan ky sekarang ??
apalg Indonesia !?? haha. *falsifikasi.
to be honest, ini keadaan Amerika sekarang.
kata siapa, negara sebesar AS gk ketar-ketir ngeliat keadaan ky sekarang ??
apalg Indonesia !?? haha. *falsifikasi.
Read
February 12, 2013A perfect explanation of the current international powers and the international relations of the USA. The book is from 2003, so an actualization is needed,specially after Irak's War and Bush's administration, that changed the international relationships, and also the arab spring.
September 9, 2007
If you've taken an international relations class before reading this book, you'll love it. If you haven't, well then I don't know what to tell you
May 6, 2010
Very good, but I wish I had read it when it first came out in 2002 as most of the impact of the book's claims were lost due to already having been proven true by events.
May 20, 2011
Outdated if you are reading in 2010
October 31, 2012
A book that changed my life!
Read
July 11, 2013One of the best foreign policy book i've read so far. mind-blowing!
Read
May 22, 2017I like read this book
October 22, 2011
zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.
Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews