Existentialism and the Modern Predicament:

by Frederick H. Heineman

Preface
Preface to the 2nd Edition
Preface to the Torchbook Edition
Acknowledgments
The problem
Beyond technology?
The existential Christian
The loneliness of the transcendental ego
The philosophy of commitment
The mysterious empiricist
The mystical anarchist
Alienation & beyond
Whither?
Respondeo, ergo sum

Theologia diaboli
Will-o'-the wisp?
From existence to essence?
Bibliographical Notes
Index

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

229 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1953

Reviews

[Szplug · Rating 3 out of 5]

The problem, 'Heidegger', the sphinx, 'Heidegger', haunts me. I do not want to be unjust to him, certainly not. I have been accustomed to reading philosophy for more than twenty years, but I have never experienced such a case that I had simply to state that here I give up. Kant and Hegel certainly raise many problems, but if one sincerely penetrates their writings, one gets nearer and nearer to them; but as to Heidegger, my God! I am confronted with one great riddle; and I am not alone in this. Up to now, according to what he says in his last publications, all the critics have misjudged his ultimate intentions.

—Peter Wust, 1929.

Heinemann has done an excellent job of positioning Existentialist philosophy—which name he allegedly coined in 1928—within its then postwar environment, a continuation of the theme of alienation originally expounded by Hegel and having shifted from that of Spirit, Nature and creation through an econosocial twist into proletarian production before winding up, at the end of the day, having morphed into estrangement from existence itself—a state of affairs that I can at least attest to, having had the backwash from this unbridgeable gulf routinely scar my robot-grained soul with a spiritual chemical burn over the years—and put together admirably clear encapsulations of the contributions of its major influences and thinkers—Kierkegaard, Husserl, Jaspers, and Heidegger as foundational figures, Berdyaev, Marcel, and Sartre hitting the afterburners—with the author attempting to assay what was alive and what was dead in their thought. The amusing thing is that each of the figures thusly investigated has complained that nobody properly understood their thought or what they intended it to achieve; I wonder whose fault that was? One of these days I am going to get around to Herr Adorno's The Jargon of Authenticity , in which he supposedly rips the Existentialists in general—and Heidegger and Jaspers in particular—a slew o' new assholes for their ultimately shallow thought, all dressed to the nines in obscurantist verbiage and hedgerow arglebargle and, by means of their mopey musings, turning the peeps away from railing at their predicament under the calcifying bonds of leering Capitalism and towards gazing deeply and intently into their navels for no good or meaningful purpose. At the same time, I'm also making the move on William Barrett's presentation of Existentialism (and another tome penned shortly after the termination of the Second World War), the excellence of which I was recently reminded of.

Here's a nice little passage by Heinemann on Søren:

Do not pretend! is Kierkegaard's message to our age, which is filled with pretence. Do not pretend to be a Christian if you are not! Do not pretend to be a man if you are not human! Do not pretend to be religious if you are not! Do not pretend to be a philosopher if you are not! These variations of Kierkegaard's theme are of topical importance. The mere fact that we are born as men does not imply that we are human. On the contrary, it lulls us into pretence. We are in constant danger of becoming inhuman, partly because our position between beasts and angels is somewhat uncertain, and partly because every sort of domination implies the temptation to inhumanity, especially in an age of technology, which invests the master with an almost unlimited power. To be human is not a fact, but a task. We should therefore ask: What does it mean to be human? What is man? What should he be? What is the meaning of humanism in our time?...There is no room here for elaborating the far-reaching and most provocative implications of these questions. It is, moreover, unnecessary, because Kierkegaard concentrates on the problem, how to become a Christian. The other problems are only potentially implied in it. Nevertheless, they are there. All these questions are merely special cases of the general problem, how to go on from unauthentic being to authentic being.

[Luke · Rating 5 out of 5]

To begin, I provide a brief (and selective) summary of Heinemann's work here.
Heinemann provides a helpful introduction to existential philosophers--and those closely correlated with the tradition in all its multiplicity. Not only does Heinemann provide this introduction, but he also provides criticisms of the tradition--introducing both its weaknesses and its strengths. Particularly, Heinemann views existentialism as a helpful response to positivist philosophers, who tend to view questions of linguistics and symbols as ends in themselves in lieu of the existentialist's preference--to start from the human condition.

However, Heinemann concludes that existentialism does not in itself provide an adequate base on which to base systems of ethics, logic, nor the systemization of the human experience--not least because folks such as Heidegger decry traditional forms of logic and others, such as Gabriel Marcel, emphasize an incommensurable subjectivity. Furthermore, Heinemann sees Sartre's nihilism as the end of any sort of morality, and he ultimately calls for a return of the respect of the sacred in the West. Heinemann points out the impossibility of existentialist logic by showing that existentialism and logic as ideas exist as mutually exclusive: "Similarly existential logic is impossible because logic is the science of correct reasoning, and whatever existence may be, it is certainly not the principle of correct reasoning" (176). Thus explains the incommensurability of existentialism and logic, selon Heinemann. Fascinatingly, Heinemann alters Descartes, "Cogito, ergo sum" to "Respondeo, ergo sum"--i.e. "I respond, therefore I am."

Indeed, his beef with Descartes lies in D.'s emphasis on only one aspect of the human--the intellect--whereas Heinemann sees that response includes a far wider human experience, including both intellectual response, emotional, etc. As Heinemann states, "...we have to redefine man as an animal of increased and creative responsiveness, able to respond on different levels to stimuli coming from many dimensions, and to formulate his potentially free answers in a variety of ways" (197). This, H. argues, would accomplish a few different things. Namely, as I already mentioned, it touches more closely upon the diversity of a human's existence. Also, however, it provides both room for the sacred but also a basis for ethics because if the individual's being rests upon his/her response, then a responsibility accompanies this being since "...you exist in and through your answers" (204). This "Respondeo, ergo sum" allows room for the sacred due to the fact that it provides an ontological status to anything that the individual responds to--if the individual responds to the idea of god, then God exists for that individual.

My Analysis:
Heinemann's work here helps me to understand existentialism as a movement far better. Indeed, having personally spoken with some of the major figures in the movement, e.g. Heidegger, he provides an insider knowledge to the movement. Furthermore, his knowledge of French, German, and English aid and abet his criticisms and introduction.
I do wonder, however, how soundly he treats Sartre. My understanding (admittedly weak) of Sartre through Existentialism as a Humanism, indicates that Sartre does not always rejoice in the absurd--as Heinemann points out he does in some of his fictive works. Indeed, here Sartre provides an optimistic view and even an atheistic ethics that, although perhaps not holding inherent meaning, does not result in ethical relativism. Furthermore, Heinemann links Sartre and nihilism closely--I always understood Sartre as opposed to nihilism in that he grants humans the freedom and even responsibility to try to make the world a better place. Finally, Heinemann provides a cursory argument that "The West needs to recover the true sense of sacredness" (214)--ostensibly to recover a lost basis for morality. This seems a rather weak ethical conclusion, especially since Heidegger's anti-logic did not truly dominate arenas of ethics, especially in the Anglo-American world. Does the West really need the sacred, read religion or at least the Transcendent, to retain a code of ethics? I content that the West does not. Can we not, along with Sartre, recognize the need for human action to create a world where there exists less human suffering, based solely on a fraternity for fellow humans? It seems that a multiplicity of better arguments exist against the need of "the sacred," but, at present, I ruminate on this.

In sum: thank you, Heinemann, for a thrilling, challenging read.