Nietzsche is one of the most important and controversial thinkers in the history of philosophy. His writings on moral philosophy are amongst the most widely read works, both by philosophers and non-philosophers. Many of the ideas raised are both startling and disturbing, and have been the source of great contention. On the Genealogy of Morality is Nietzsche's most sustained and important contribution to moral philosophy, featuring many of the ideas for which he is best known, including the slave revolt in morals; will to power; genealogy; and perspectivism. The Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Nietzsche on Morality introduces the reader to these and other important Nietzschean themes patiently and clearly. It is the first book to examine the work in such a way, and will be a vital point of reference for any Nietzsche scholar, and essential reading for students coming to Nietzsche for the first time.
Brian Leiter is the Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence and Director, Center for Law, Philosophy, and Human Values at The University of Chicago Law School.
Brian Leiter was a Visiting Professor at the Law School in the fall of 2006 and joined the faculty July 1, 2008, simultaneously founding the Law School’s Center for Law, Philosophy, and Human Values. Prior to that, he taught for more than a dozen years at the University of Texas at Austin, where he was the youngest chairholder in the history of the law school, and also served as professor of philosophy and founder and director of the University of Texas Law and Philosophy Program. He has also been a visiting professor of law at Yale University, of law and philosophy at University College London, and of philosophy at the University of California, San Diego.
Mr. Leiter's teaching and research interests are in general jurisprudence (including its intersection with issues in metaphysics and epistemology), moral and political philosophy (in both Anglophone and Continental traditions), and the law of evidence. His books include Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge 2001) (editor), Nietzsche on Morality (Routledge 2002), The Future for Philosophy (Oxford 2004) (editor), Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (Oxford 2007), and The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy (2007) (co-editor). He is presently writing a book titled Why Tolerate Religion? He gave the 'Or 'Emet Lecture at York University, Toronto, in 2006; the Dunbar Lecture in Law and Philosophy at the University of Mississippi in 2008; and the Fresco Lectures in Jurisprudence at the University of Genoa, also in 2008. He was editor of the journal Legal Theory from 2000 to 2007 and is the founding editor of the Routledge Philosophers book series and of Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law, which will appear annually starting in 2009. Education:
AB, 1984, Princeton University; JD, 1987, PhD (philosophy), 1995, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
12/07/2024 reread Excellent job of interpreting Nietzsche. In academia, there have been two main interpretations of Nietzsche: the postmodern and the naturalistic. The former (done by Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and the like) argues that Nietzsche was a radical critic of truth, the latter (Freud) that Nietzsche grounds his philosophical arguments/claims in the natural sciences (especially psychology). Leiter convincingly argues for the naturalistic interpretation.
Frankly, I would recommend this book before you read anything by Nietzsche himself. Nietzsche uses a lot of aphorisms which makes it difficult to come up with a coherent theory of it all. There's a lot here, but here are the highlights. Nietzsche is a moral anti-realist; moral values have no truth value nor are they given to us from above; instead, morals arise out of a historical process (which is covered in the Genealogy). However, Nietzsche (like the Sophists he admires) is a relationist about values; some values are objectively good, but only for certain types of people. For example: Christianity is great for the herd, but it's terrible for the "great men."
He criticizes Morality in the Pejorative Sense (MPS), like Kantianism, Platonism, Christianity and Buddhism, not necessarily because they are false (although according to Nietzsche they are false) but because they prevent the flourishing of "higher men." These "higher men" (such as Goethe, Beethoven, Nietzsche himself) are largely creative, artistic geniuses, but MPS, which values humility, selflessness, etc., prevents them from achieving their artistic goals, which require selfishness, pride, etc. This is a problem because MPS presents itself as the "universal" morality, and these "higher men" are susceptible to believing MPS, preventing them from flourishing.
This takes a lot of the steam out of Nietzsche's project; despite his often extreme and forceful rhetoric, he doesn't think MPS is bad for all of us, it's just bad for the "higher men." The end goal of Nietzsche's philosophy is to liberate these "higher men," tell them that they don't have to be bound by MPS. Nietzsche's audience is actually quite small; he is basically only writing to wake up these higher men, not for the rest of us.
Is any of this true? Nietzsche's philosophy raises more questions than it answers: are great artists really harmed by the demands of conventional morality? Are morals really created through this naturalistic process? Are the historical claims he makes in the Genealogy true? Leiter ends the book acknowledging that these are open questions; Nietzsche's philosophy leaves a lot of room for philosophers, historians sociologists, and moral psychologists to work with.
Quotes "While for Freud, Nietzsche is the philosopher who anticipates psychoanalysis by trying to discover the deep, hidden facts about human nature which explain who we are and what we believe, for Foucault, Nietzsche is precisely the philosopher who denies that there are any ‘deep facts’ about human nature and who recognizes that all such putative facts are mere interpretations, mere contingent constructs."
"We shall see, in fact, that such a view of objective relational goodness is crucial for Nietzsche as well: for Nietzsche holds that particular moralities can be good for certain types of people, but bad for others"
"Thus, the general applicability of MPS is predicated on an assumption about similarity among persons and their interests: people are essentially similar, and so the MPS that is good for one will be good for all. It is this assumption that Nietzsche denies."
1st read Amazing, one of my all time favorite books actually. Did a really good job of answering a lot of my lingering questions about Nietzsche in a very understandable way. Because he writes in aphorisms, its hard to get a big picture understandings of Nietzsche's philosophy, but this book did a great job of that.
Leiter argues forcefully for a thesis that Nietzsche’s approach to philosophy is governed by an imperative Leiter designates ‘methodological naturalism’, or the principle that philosophical practice should model the natural sciences and be continuous with the truths these sciences discover about the natural world. Leiter’s presentation of Nietzsche as a naturalist philosopher has, by itself, exerted considerable influence in Nietzsche studies. Leiter largely articulates his reading of Nietzsche as a methodological naturalist in critical dialogue with those that Leiter considers exemplars of a broader ‘post-modern’ interpretative style towards Nietzsche, especially Foucault, Nehamas and Derrida. According to Leiter, the basic feature of this interpretative style is its portrayal of Nietzsche as a partisan of a relativistic notion of truth, or rather, the idea that there is no singular truth and merely an infinity of interpretations. However, Leiter’s reductionist assimilation of Foucault, Nehamas, Derrida and others’ distinct readings of Nietzsche into a singular ‘post-modern’ position amounts to the construal of a caricature for easy abuse, rather than careful engagement with plausible opponents. Nonetheless, in the final sections of Leiter’s book, he provides an alternative to Foucault’s account of Nietzschean genealogy. Whereas Foucault’s ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ presents Nietzsche’s practice of genealogy as an anti-metaphysics that aspires to dispel the idea that knowledge is founded upon eternal truth, Leiter insists that Nietzsche’s genealogical practice is continuous with Nietzsche’s methodological naturalism and thus exhibits a commitment to the existence of truths about the world that can be ascertained by the natural sciences. While Leiter unfortunately does not directly elaborate this, his interconnected presentation of Nietzsche’s genealogy as a species of ideology critique conducted for a tiny minority – those that Nietzsche believes incarnate humanity’s potential for great aesthetic achievement – interestingly commits Nietzsche to a political epistemology that Foucault’s political Nietzscheanism, as a categorical refusal of ideology critique in preference of historical inquires into the rituals by which ‘truth’ is produced, aims to escape.
A very clear and insightful analysis of Nietzsche's moral views, a particularly difficult task given Nietzsche's notorious elliptic and ambivalent writing. However, in my opinion, the author's interpretation of Nietzsche's ultimate goal as "just" being the flourishing of higher human types is a bit too restrictive. I believe that at least part of his concerns was the betterment of human spirit in general, that is culture as a whole, rather than purely individualistic considerations. Overall, a very thought provoking and engaging book.
I got interested in this book, and Nietzsche in general, as someone deeply interested in morality who doesn’t subscribe to any religion or specific value system. This is an excellent book attempting to provide a systematic approach to understanding Nietzsche’s ideas throughout his published works, mainly through On the Genealogy of Morality. I feel like a book like this is necessary to understanding Nietzsche given his eccentric, provocative style that defies easy coherent analysis. Leiter does this by understanding Nietzsche’s influences, such as Schopenhauer and Wagner and within philosophical traditions such as materialism. As well as his influences such as Freud. Which is a revelation this book gave me: Nietzsche wasn’t just a philosopher, he was a kind of psychologist trying to understand human behavior as it is shaped by physical and cultural forces beyond individual control.
I don’t necessarily agree with everything Leiter claims about Nietzsche or with what Nietzsche claims for that matter. But certainly his work poses challenges to conventional religious and social institutions as motivated by instincts and desires for domination and power. I am more a fan of Foucauldian uses of Nietzsche, as much as they stray from Nietzsche’s original thought. Leiter makes a persuasive case for Nietzsche as a naturalist who believes in an objective truth, but also surely Nietzsche’s point that our perspective shapes our access to truth and changes its usefulness.
Leiter doesn’t avoid the hard questions about Nietzsche’s work. He gives an unidealized reading of Nietzsche as an elitist whose values were geared towards those he called higher men: creative geniuses and political leaders who transcend master and slave morality.
Among the positions Leiter ascribes to Nietzsche and discusses at length: 1. naturalism: he believes that everything is natural/material, explainable by material causes. 2. deterministic view of human behavior: our behavior and beliefs stem from type-facts about us. 3. slave morality: conventional morality (whether Judeo-Christian or secular) stifles the flourishing of human excellence in a few select men. 4. Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality attempts to explain in psychological terms how the master morality of the Greeks and Romans gave way to the slave morality of Christianity. 5. The problem of suffering: All humans suffer, and the problem is not suffering itself but the lack of meaning to our suffering. We develop religions and moralities to give meaning to that suffering, ascribing blame to gods or ourselves. Rather than escape suffering or try to dull its effects through the fictions of religion, higher men will embrace suffering and rather than look for a metaphysical meaning to it, will create their own values. Suffering will lead to growth and development.
Leiter’s analytical approach to tackling Nietzsche’s poetic declarations really helps me to understand the ideas I saw running through texts I have read such as The Antichrist, Twilight of the Idols, and Ecce Homo. I plan to tackle the Genealogy next, which is central in Leiter’s explanations, though he does quote from various published works.
The last two chapters explore questions about Nietzsche’s cultural, philosophical, and psychological relevance and value. Nietzsche Since 1900: Critical Questions addresses the misreadings of Nietzsche that claim his main project was a postmodern critique of objective truth, or conversely, an endorsement of eugenics and Nazism. Leiter makes it clear that Nietzsche’s philosophy is elitist and illiberal, which goes against our contemporary values. But his aristocratic radicalism emerges from a naturalistic and psychological view centered on great men, a psychological type rather than class, racial, or ethnic types. In his writings, he attacks equality and egalitarianism, democracy and feminism, because he rejects the idea that humans are equal. There are certain types of people and the weaker should not be equal to the strong. Any reading of Nietzsche must admit these aspects, though there seems to be some room for interpretation of what implications these ideas have for how we live our lives, individually and as a society.
His division of humanity into the weak (slaves) and strong (masters) and his challenge to equality are the ideas of Nietzsche I feel the most distance from, and probably most contemporary people do. However, as Leiter points out, Nietzsche was also critical of racial bigotry (especially antisemitism, which had become popular in Germany at the time) and nationalism, being especially critical of German culture, whose Christian orientation he considered steeped in slave morality. It seems hard to have a coherent picture of Nietzsche’s politics, probably because he saw political governance as inevitably steeped in either master or slave morality. His interest was more individualistic; he seemed to believe that the highest potential for humanity was realized by rare individuals who transcended both and dedicated their lives to aesthetic excellence. Politics usually gets in the way of developing such genius, though he did consider Napoleon as an example of genius, along with Beethoven, Goethe, and of course, Nietzsche himself.
Leiter quotes Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations to illustrate his hostility to politics: “that the state is the highest goal of mankind and that a man has no higher duty than to serve the state: in which doctrine I recognize a relapse not into paganism but into stupidity.”
Another important point that Leiter makes is that Nietzsche’s critique of morality is not that people actually act on egalitarianism and altruism too often, for he believes that humans are inherently aggressive, cruel, and driven to domination (whether of a physical or emotional/mental kind). But he believes the proliferation of these ideas may stifle higher men from flourishing, because as more sensitive and self-aware than either masters or slaves, they are more likely to actually practice such values and devote their efforts to helping others rather than themselves (or their creative projects). Leiter claims these pose subtle psychological questions which no one has as yet fully explored (240).
“Postscript: Nietzsche’s Naturalism Revisited” seems to be added to the second edition to address reappraisals of Nietzsche’s naturalism after the publication of the first edition, as well as the implications of his naturalism for contemporary psychology.
Leiter defines Nietzsche’s naturalism as methodological (attempting to make philosophical inquiry continuous with the sciences), speculative (he forms theories about human behavior based on observations but without direct proof), and substantive (all facts are natural facts; thus, he believes humans are types of animals, and should be understood as such, as part of nature and subject to natural laws).
It���s helpful to place these different varieties or positions among other thinkers who held similar beliefs and likely influenced Nietzsche.
Leiter considers Nietzsche’s thoughts about the causes of behavior in light of contemporary science, which he claims validates positions such as that people’s behavior is caused by certain type-facts (supported by behavioral genetics); that consciousness is a surface phenomenon caused by unconscious drives (supported by psychology and neuroscience); that our moral beliefs are post-hoc justifications of unconscious feelings and drives, rather than rationally decided on (supported by social intuitionism); that free will is an illusion due to our will being causally determined by drives.
I don’t know enough about the studies that Lieter cites, but based on my understanding of psychology, I do think Nietzsche has some genuine insights into human behavior. Physiological and cultural facts about us certainly shape and constrain our behavior. He anticipated Freud’s theory of the unconscious mind, an incontrovertible aspect of human psychology. We are often driven by unconscious desires, impulses, and emotions.
Yet I question the idea of consciousness as a surface phenomenon. We are able to direct our behavior, even if our will isn’t exactly free, we do have the faculty of choice. It’s just that physiological factors (such as brain development and chemistry) and environmental factors (such as upbringing, culture, experiences, physical facts about your environment) will influence your choices. But my belief is that while our consciousness is a drive like others (hunger, sex, pleasure-seeking, ego-defense), it is a sort of meta-drive that evolved to understand and choose between drives.
I don’t know if Nietzsche (or Leiter) would accept my theory, but it makes sense to me. In order to foster social communication and manipulate our environment, we evolved more complex brains, using mental abilities since our physical abilities tend to be limited.
I also place a greater stock in environmental impact over genetics. Your genetics can push you in certain directions, but those directions can be reinforced or altered by external circumstances, and one can also alter the direction by deliberate effort—may be difficult process but can be done.
Very helpful guide to Nietzsche’s Genealogy and N’s understanding of morality in general. Two main topics stand out: N’s Naturalism and then Leiter’s construct of MPS (Morality in the Pejorative Sense). There’s a lot in the book to unpack and here are just some quick notes.
Leiter successfully shows that N is a naturalist, in particular that he is an M-Naturalist, or a philosopher who believes in a methodological doctrine of Naturalism. This is a method of “doing” philosophy, a stance which argues that philosophy should be continuous with the hard sciences. For N, this means understanding all the facts about a person (birth, diet, physiognomy, etc) which can then instruct the person on how best to live, or what his/her potential can be. This is, of course, very difficult to pin down. That’s a lot of moving factors and it’s unclear if N really achieves this aim.
Following from N’s Naturalism is the goal of the Genealogy and also of N’s main body of work, mainly the revaluation of all values. Leiter argues that N is talking about two types of morality, one for the plebs (MPS) and one for the great creators (himself, Goethe, a few others). I think this was a helpful construct with which to analyze the main text, but I’m not sure exactly how necessary it was. I don’t see how much value (har har) it added, whereas the discussion of Naturalism was invaluable. The discussion which Leiter brings is terrific, cogent, and clear but N doesn’t use these terms so it feels like a false scaffolding.
General notes: the chapter on N’s Intellectual History and Background was terrific. The three chapters which are commentaries on the Genealogy’s three essays are helpful, but generally summarize the first half of the book. Leiter takes no prisoners and comes off as a bit off an asshole in his comments towards other academics. I would have liked more discussion about the unity between the three essays.
Philosophy is always a tough read for me. This was a fairly deep and dense book but worthwhile by the end. The first half seemed akin to theologians arguing over how many angels can dance on the tip of a pin. A lot of philosophical categories and precise meanings of terms were hashed out. Not knowing much of the debate concerning N. it was a little like walking through a maze. But once I caught on I enjoyed the second half of the book and could see how the application of his beliefs impacts a lot of thinking, both in the past and the present. I find that I heartily disagree with him on almost every level, but there are certainly elitists in our world who buy him hook, line and sinker whether they realize it or not.
For an atheistic Marxist imbecile this author does a surprisingly good job discussing Nietzsche.
The first essay in the Genealogy discusses the rise of slave morality through resentment. This is when the slave morality began to call the masters evil and themselves good. In contrast the master morality called itself good and that which was weak bad.
The second essay of the genealogy discusses how a bad conscience develops with the ascetic ideal causing the feelings of guilt. Before when someone did something wrong the ancients blamed it on a god (he ignores the seemingly obvious fact that the ancients did their best to appease the gods lest the gods smite them). The ascetic ideal internalizes cruelty and makes the doer regret his actions and makes him feel as if he could have done otherwise.
The third essay discusses the role of the will to power in the rise of the ascetic ideal. Which is where people find the environment that is most conducive to the maximal exercise of power. In this section the author also discusses why the ascetic ideal won against the morality of the masters from antiquity. Master morality didn't evoke the feeling of guilt but neither did it answer the fundamental question of "suffering but why?". The masters also were made used to the idea since civilization requires that we no longer dispense with our cruel instincts and the ascetic ideal gives us a reason to redirect them internally that and it gives meaning to the question "suffering but why?".
In this work the author at the end remarks that he hopes Nietzsche's "crackpot will to power metaphysic" statements were just that "crackpot" and nothing more then an exploration and psychological answer to explain the most phenomena (ie instead of the Utilitarian idea of pleasure as the highest good). It is my view that the will to power emerges as a metaphysical theory regardless of ones desires due to the annihilation of all other ideas that could mediate composing views. But I am still unclear how Nietzsche viewed it. In Leiter's newer work he seems much more confident that Nietzsche abandoned the will to power. Maybe he did or maybe Leiter convinced himself he did haha.
I highly recommend this to anyone reading Nietzsche. It attempts to provide a comprehensive overview of Nietzsche as a speculative moral psychologist in the vein of Freud or Hume. Some readers might find that Leiter circumscribes Nietzsche's thought in an attempt to make him more coherent and systematic, often reading passages which seem metaphysical as rhetorical flourishes on an ethical or psychological argument. In this sense, the book limits Nietzsche, and in my opinion it defends its case for doing so very ably. Your mileage may vary on that point. Be that as it may, I think this is an essential text for anyone trying to make sense of Nietzsche, and it's an effective cure to the more out there readings of his work.
The author invented a straw man, the "postmodern skeptic" and then complains that Nietzsche did not conform to that straw man. I have no idea who told him that Foucault was against empiricism, he wasd an historian and his object of study were the social sciences.
A very good book for introducing the great liberator: His majesty Friedrich Nietzsche. Even though the book mainly focuses on ‘Genealogy’, it prepares your ears for his whisper ;)