Written by leading scholars in the field, "Causes of War" provides the first comprehensive analysis of the leading theories relating to the origins of both interstate and civil wars.Utilizes historical examples to illustrate individual theories throughoutIncludes an analysis of theories of civil wars as well as interstate wars -- one of the only texts to do bothWritten by two former International Studies Association Presidents
Savaşın nedenleri üzerine yaklaşık 70 yıllık bir literatürü tarayıp özetleyen bir kitap.
Yazarlar bu özeti yaparken, şimdiye kadarki savaş kuramlarını 4 başlık altında toplamışlar. Bir de henüz hakkında kapsamlı bir literatürün gelişmediği iç savaşlara ilişkin yazılanları özetlemişler. Bu sınıflandırma Waltz'ın 1959'da yazdığı Man, State, War kitabındaki sınıflandırmanın aynısı:
- Savaşlar, uluslararası ilişkilerin kaotik ve hukuksuz niteliğinden doğar. - Savaşlar, kimi devletleri daha savaşmaya hazır kılan iç özelliklerinden kaynaklanır. - Savaşlar devlet yöneticilerinin, devlet kurumlarının içinde bulundukları durumu iyi değerlendirememesi, fırsatları ve tehditleri yanlış yorumlaması nedeniyle çıkar. - Yazarlar bir de ek olarak, savaşların birbirine tarihsel düşmanlıklar besleyen devlet çiftleri arasındaki ilişkilerin sonucu olarak doğduğu teorilerini eklemişler.
Okudukça bu "savaş çalışmaları" literatürünün, emperyalizmin elinde adeta bir silaha dönüştüğünü, silaha dönüştükçe de nasıl sığlaşarak temelleri sorgulayamaz hale geldiğini görüp dehşete düştüm. Bunun için uzun bir eleştiri yazmak gerekir, vakit yok. Mesela kitabı okurken, - 2003-2008 yılları arasında Irak'ta (ABD'nin hiç payının olmadığı) bir iç savaşın yaşandığını; - 1980-88 İran-Irak savaşında emperyalizmin parmağı bulunmayıp, bunun iki devlet arasındaki bir savaş olduğunu; - Bürokratların, ordunun ve politikacıların savaşın çıkmasında rol oynayabilecekleri ama savaşların başlamasında kapitalistlerin, silah ve petrol tüccarlarının rolünün haşa hiç incelenmediğini görerek şaşırabilirsiniz.
Bunun yerine yazarlar size demokratik devletlerin kendi aralarında savaşmadıklarını, barışçıl bir özellik taşıdıklarını söyleyecekler. Savaş kuramını bir silaha dönüştüren de bu: Emperyalizm bu "bilimsel" bulgulara dayanarak, kendisinin demokratik bulmadığı bir ülkeyi dünya barışını bozduğu gerekçesiyle işgal edebilecek.
Yazarlar "demokratik devlet" dediklerinin İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ABD'nin Truman Doktrini'yle kurulmuş NATO bloğu olduğunu, bu yüzden birbirleriyle değil ele geçiremedikleri piyasalara karşı savaştıklarını kesinlikle anmıyorlar. Fikri benimsemeyebilirsin ama üzerine yığınla kitap yazılmış bu literatürü görmezden gelmek de neyin nesi?
Literatür incelemesi açısından 3, bilimsel duruş açısından 1'i bile hak etmeyen bir kitap.
I read this book for supplemental material in one of my Political Science courses. It read more like a discussion than an academic piece which was a nice change, providing great logic and examples behind each main idea. It also felt redundant at times, and inconsistent with some chapters much stronger than others.
The concept of strategic culture is something that I found interesting. The author explained how every country's military has an unspoken identity, or view of itself in global power dynamics, based on historical narratives and cultural experiences. This "culture" alone — more than any other element — helps us predict how a country will respond to a security threat. It has massive implications for a country’s diplomatic relationships and bargaining power with other states.
Back in January, I read The Meaning of Prestige (written in 1937) in which Harold Nicholson writes a cautionary, post-Great War piece on the dangers of the British Empire’s decline for Great Britain and the mounting pressure from foreign counterparts. He makes the case that Britain’s “prestige” or their reputation and self-image as one of the premier global superpowers in modern history, is the true source of Britain's international respect, rather than their actual military force. I think Levy is making a similar argument in Causes of War. A state’s image and culture is built over generations, and no sudden display of force can earn a nation a prestigious identity like hundreds of years of dominance can.
Another perspective Levy explains that I found particularly worthy is ‘Realism’ in War. Realists see the world as an inherently dangerous place where there is a constant search for power. If human nature is flawed, then states run by unstable people will also be flawed. It serves as a reminder of the importance to elect steady and thoughtful leaders to our most powerful posts.
This is a review of the whole modern political theory literature on the topic by two US academics. As such it's more student text than lively read and does not claim originality (though the authors rightly claim original features in their classification of variables, and they cover both inter-state and civil wars). But this is more than compensated by its clarity, balance and sheer range. The conclusions, stressing a need for plurality of approach and a continuing striving to verify and integrate them, are sensible and optimistic. It's especially good on where political science meets history. The more paths to war you identify, the more you need, and the more like history it gets. The authors say historical case studies can inspire theory. But vice versa too. Historians, who are often content to describe not explain, can enlarge their thinking from books like this. Mutual scepticism is no doubt required, but mutual enrichment can occur nonetheless. See for example Snyder's unpromising-sounding theory of "log-rolling coalitions"; it fits the rise and fall of the British Empire like a glove and gives significant new insights. Finally, for a comprehensive literature review it's remarkably short, a tribute to the author's mastery of their field.
What I like the most about this book is that it gives you a broad vision regarding the most important theories of war. Once you're introduced to all of these theories, I highly recommend you to read Stoessinger's "Why Nations Go To War" too.
This is an excellent overview of existing hypotheses behind conflict at multiple levels as well as an examination of strengths and weaknesses of each. Highly recommended for those interested in conflict, and international relations.
A book I would keep on my shelf. It provides a great synopsis of the different theories surrounding conflict. The modern era is fraught with unpredictability surrounding the future of the world, and this book illuminated my understanding in the face of that unpredictability.
an overview of the major theories of causes of war, looked at through system, dyadic,and domestic levels, with a special chapter on civil wars. A solid overview/refresher *nodding kermit*
Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson in Causes of War don’t propose a singular theory of war, but rather outline all the dominant theories of war. There’s no argument such as “War is caused by x, rather these theories may have some relation to war. The text is written in a no nonsense manner discussing the pros and cons of war theories without passing judgment. Causes of War provides a suitable, if no thrills approach to the study of war. This book is most suited for the upper undergraduate or the graduate student seeking to unravel the complex puzzle that is modern warfare.
Causes of War his book provides incredibly broad coverage of the key themes in contemporary international security. I used it repeatedly as a reference in studying undergraduate International Relations Theory, and then International Security modules, and it was potentially the most useful thing I've read during my degree. Levy and Thompson don't push the reader towards any particular conclusions, but rather introduce the most important theories of war and the thinkers credited with them. I can not recommend this book enough to students of international relations/security theory.