This book offers the first political theory of special purpose jurisdictions, including 35,000 special districts and 13,500 school districts, which constitute the most common form of local government in the United States today. Collectively, special purpose governments have more civilian employees than the federal government and spend more than all city governments combined. The proliferation of special purpose jurisdictions has fundamentally altered the nature of representation and taxation in local government. Citizens today are commonly represented by dozens – in some cases hundreds – of local officials in multiple layers of government. As a result, political participation in local elections is low and special interest groups associated with each function exert disproportionate influence. With multiple special-interest governments tapping the same tax base, the local tax base takes on the character of a common-pool resource, leading to familiar problems of overexploitation. Strong political parties can often mitigate the common-pool problem by informally coordinating the policies of multiple overlapping governments.
I felt this book illuminated a lot of issues with special districts; I had no idea how these governments worked before I read this book. I feel much more informed as a voter and citizen, and would like to know more about how my own local governments operate. I will say, as someone who did not take any math courses beyond pre-calculus in high school, I found some parts of the book unreadable, simply because I could not figure out how Berry’s formulas and some charts worked. I could take the time to study it further, but I don’t have said time, though if I need a new hobby I have an interesting option now! I understand though this book was partly meant for lay-people like me, and for professionals in the fields of public policy and economics. I found myself skimming what I could not understand and trusting that his arguments were sound. Clearly though, Berry knows what he is talking about.
Governments in multi-layered political systems don't feel the full ill-effects of their taxation, and therefore tend to over-tax relative to more unitary systems. A powerful claim, elegant theory, and very persuasive empirical analysis.