An analysis of two heuristic strategies for the development of mechanistic models, illustrated with historical examples from the life sciences. In Discovering Complexity , William Bechtel and Robert Richardson examine two heuristics that guided the development of mechanistic models in the life decomposition and localization. Drawing on historical cases from disciplines including cell biology, cognitive neuroscience, and genetics, they identify a number of "choice points" that life scientists confront in developing mechanistic explanations and show how different choices result in divergent explanatory models. Describing decomposition as the attempt to differentiate functional and structural components of a system and localization as the assignment of responsibility for specific functions to specific structures, Bechtel and Richardson examine the usefulness of these heuristics as well as their fallibility—the sometimes false assumption underlying them that nature is significantly decomposable and hierarchically organized. When Discovering Complexity was originally published in 1993, few philosophers of science perceived the centrality of seeking mechanisms to explain phenomena in biology, relying instead on the model of nomological explanation advanced by the logical positivists (a model Bechtel and Richardson found to be utterly inapplicable to the examples from the life sciences in their study). Since then, mechanism and mechanistic explanation have become widely discussed. In a substantive new introduction to this MIT Press edition of their book, Bechtel and Richardson examine both philosophical and scientific developments in research on mechanistic models since 1993.
Bastante bueno. Casos de estudio chulos, buena estructura, heurísticas interesantes. Tiene sus carencias también, pero se lo recomendaría a cualquier interesado en filosofía de la ciencia.
Though it's about 20 years old now, Bechtel and Richardson's Discovering Complexity is still strikingly relevant to the contemporary discussion in philosophy of science, partly because it hasn't been widely adopted. The discussion of "mechanisms" as an alternative for theory representations helps to shed light on some of the neglect for the biological sciences in the literature during the 90s, and though that part has gotten better, Bechtel and Richardson's points about the history of the biological sciences still remains somewhat lost.
I recommend the book to those who are looking at ways of understanding how we can come to offer substantial and engaging explanations of complex scientific mechanisms; how do we make scientific explanations accessible and comprehensible? This is a problem that is addressed well throughout the book, though many of the answers are (at least for me) unsatisfactory.
There are some interesting choices in the book in terms of case studies, which are no doubt a function of the backgrounds of Bechtel and Richardson. The cases are largely in biology, but even if we restrict ourselves to that domain, some of them seem a bit odd since things like genetics really do have good mathematical modes of explanation that aren't really effectively brought into doubt by the book; the presence of those alternatives seems to suggest that there are moments when Bechtel and Richardson somewhat overplay how much we want the mechanistic account they have in mind to do.
Overall, it is a good read. It is structure and written well, and digestible. I strongly recommend it.