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On the Various Kinds of Distinctions
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76 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 2007
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
May 29, 2019
Suarez, Francisco. On The Various Kinds of Distinctions. Trans. Cyril Vollert, SJ. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2013.
Real distinction: this is the most basic distinction between thing and thing.
Mental distinction: it doesn’t formally intervene between the things designated. It is a distinction that exists in our minds (Suarez 18). We can divide the distinction in two
A distinction of reasoning reason: it arises in our intellect as we reflect on things
A distinction of reasoned reason: this has a stronger foundation in reality. This distinction pre-exists in reality prior to our reflecting on it. The whole reality of the object is not fully represented in our minds (19). This is sort of how we would reflect on God’s essence and attributes.
Scotus on formal distinctions: there is an actual distinction in things that is neither a mental nor a real distinction (24). Scotus is saying something like there are aspects that are distinct from the actual thing by reason of the definition, yet also precede the mental reflection on it (26). Suarez likes what this view is trying to say, but he doesn’t like the name “formal distinction.” For example, in the Trinity “paternity” and “filiation” are not essentially distinct, yet they are formally distinct “in the objective notions of their relations” (27).
Suarez now introduces his “modal distinction.” These modes are positive and modify the entitites (28).Suarez defines mode as “something affecting quantity and, as it were, ultimately determining its state and manner of existing, without adding to it a new proper entity, but merely modifying a pre-existing entity” (28). It obtains between quantity and inherence of quantity in a substance. There is a distinction between six inches and the inherence of six inches in a pen.
When a mode inheres in an entity, it doesn’t add a new entity. Modes are “thinner” distinctions and they are always conjoined to the entity (32).
This is all very technical, but there is a big theological payoff. In the Trinity the divine essence is not separable from the property of “paternity,” yet at the same time they aren’t the same thing nor are they two different things. Further, they aren’t mental distinctions, since they already have a reality prior to my mental reflecting on it.
Real distinction: this is the most basic distinction between thing and thing.
Mental distinction: it doesn’t formally intervene between the things designated. It is a distinction that exists in our minds (Suarez 18). We can divide the distinction in two
A distinction of reasoning reason: it arises in our intellect as we reflect on things
A distinction of reasoned reason: this has a stronger foundation in reality. This distinction pre-exists in reality prior to our reflecting on it. The whole reality of the object is not fully represented in our minds (19). This is sort of how we would reflect on God’s essence and attributes.
Scotus on formal distinctions: there is an actual distinction in things that is neither a mental nor a real distinction (24). Scotus is saying something like there are aspects that are distinct from the actual thing by reason of the definition, yet also precede the mental reflection on it (26). Suarez likes what this view is trying to say, but he doesn’t like the name “formal distinction.” For example, in the Trinity “paternity” and “filiation” are not essentially distinct, yet they are formally distinct “in the objective notions of their relations” (27).
Suarez now introduces his “modal distinction.” These modes are positive and modify the entitites (28).Suarez defines mode as “something affecting quantity and, as it were, ultimately determining its state and manner of existing, without adding to it a new proper entity, but merely modifying a pre-existing entity” (28). It obtains between quantity and inherence of quantity in a substance. There is a distinction between six inches and the inherence of six inches in a pen.
When a mode inheres in an entity, it doesn’t add a new entity. Modes are “thinner” distinctions and they are always conjoined to the entity (32).
This is all very technical, but there is a big theological payoff. In the Trinity the divine essence is not separable from the property of “paternity,” yet at the same time they aren’t the same thing nor are they two different things. Further, they aren’t mental distinctions, since they already have a reality prior to my mental reflecting on it.
January 23, 2024
What Aristotle does to a mf….age 20, you pick up some friedrich Nietzsche because you are feeling disaffected at liberal arts college…next thing you know, you are reading a book from 1597 about making distinctions between distinctions…
January 8, 2025
A very short, yet dense, read. Suarez here is interested in distinctions between beings. In classical scholastic/ Aristotelian fashion, he methodically examines different ideas about distinctions, the problem at hand, and the resolution. In this case, the problem Suarez addresses is if there is a third kind of distinction. Obviously there are real distinctions (X is not Y.) There are mental distinctions - which are distinctions the mind makes that aren't real. Classical theism uses these to talk about God's attributes - divine simplicity holds that God's justice is His mercy but we have to make a mental distinction to talk about His attributes. A third distinction, then, would be what Suarez calls "modal."
Modal distinctions are difficult to express but something along the lines of X in location Y. Location Y has to be fundamental to the X's being but not necessarily so. A good, short definition is supplied by St. Augustine: "mode is that which a measure determines." Interestingly, Suarez oft has to provide a defense of western accounts of the Trinity as his modal distinctions could, in some ways, collapse the Trinity. Suarez concludes the treatise by examining the signs of these distinction (i.e. how to tell if there's a mental, real, or modal distinction.) Such examinations are not very conclusive.
Overall, an interesting account of being and the distinctions of being. Heidegger speaks of the "modal" distinction in his "Basic Problems of Phenomenology" as key to Suarez's account of being, so this is an important section. It's important, however, only in reference to his metaphysics as a whole. His other disputations are made clearer with this short tract but on it's own, it is only ever interesting.
Sadly, the introduction and notes are marred by an obvious Thomistic bias. The Translator is unable to look beyond servile Thomist accounts. Differences between Suraez, Thomas, and Thomists are only ever seen in one light and I believe the translator (who also writes the introduction) is unable to actually take Suarez's account faithfully. There's a footnote where the translator just says Surez never understood the Thomist doctrine of existence and essence which is an absurd thing to say. Likely Suarez understands and disagrees, but the translator (and Thomists in general) is simply incapable of faithfully engaging the opposition as they provide little more than vain regurgitation of the work of better men.
Modal distinctions are difficult to express but something along the lines of X in location Y. Location Y has to be fundamental to the X's being but not necessarily so. A good, short definition is supplied by St. Augustine: "mode is that which a measure determines." Interestingly, Suarez oft has to provide a defense of western accounts of the Trinity as his modal distinctions could, in some ways, collapse the Trinity. Suarez concludes the treatise by examining the signs of these distinction (i.e. how to tell if there's a mental, real, or modal distinction.) Such examinations are not very conclusive.
Overall, an interesting account of being and the distinctions of being. Heidegger speaks of the "modal" distinction in his "Basic Problems of Phenomenology" as key to Suarez's account of being, so this is an important section. It's important, however, only in reference to his metaphysics as a whole. His other disputations are made clearer with this short tract but on it's own, it is only ever interesting.
Sadly, the introduction and notes are marred by an obvious Thomistic bias. The Translator is unable to look beyond servile Thomist accounts. Differences between Suraez, Thomas, and Thomists are only ever seen in one light and I believe the translator (who also writes the introduction) is unable to actually take Suarez's account faithfully. There's a footnote where the translator just says Surez never understood the Thomist doctrine of existence and essence which is an absurd thing to say. Likely Suarez understands and disagrees, but the translator (and Thomists in general) is simply incapable of faithfully engaging the opposition as they provide little more than vain regurgitation of the work of better men.
September 27, 2022
This is a pretty tough read, but worth it anyways for (at least) three reasons:
First, because of the importance of a well-considered theory of distinctions in a complete and systematic ontology. This is something few have done and it is really rare these days. But since everything else one believes stands or falls on one's ontology, it is worth putting forth some effort to attempt to get a handle on essential texts like this and thinking through the issues for oneself. Dallas Willard, when teaching at USC, was known to encourage his Metaphysics class (when faced with the difficulty of this book) by telling them that former students would sometimes return years later and inform him this was the single most important thing they read during grad school.
Second, because of the pervasive influence of Suarez (especially his theory of distinctions) on Early Modern Philosophy (especially Descartes and Leibniz). It has been asserted (by Chris Shields) that one CANNOT understand Descartes's *Meditations* without a firm grasp of Suarez's terminology as deployed in his *Metaphysical Disputations* (of which this present work is the seventh disputation). Descartes employs (though less subtly) a theory of distinctions dependent upon Suarez's, which is enumerated in Descartes's *Principles of Philosophy.*
Third, because Suarez is one of the most technical, thorough, and fair writers you'll ever encounter. The concepts are extremely technical, and presume some familiarity especially with Aristotle and Aquinas (but not only them). His survey of prior opinions on his various topics is encyclopedic - going back to the Greeks and extending to his contemporaries. He takes great pains to explain the various viewpoints, even bolstering them at times, and he presents all known objections (and adds some) before giving his own reasoned opinions and settling the matter. In all of this, he is an excellent model of the philosophical method of investigation.
First, because of the importance of a well-considered theory of distinctions in a complete and systematic ontology. This is something few have done and it is really rare these days. But since everything else one believes stands or falls on one's ontology, it is worth putting forth some effort to attempt to get a handle on essential texts like this and thinking through the issues for oneself. Dallas Willard, when teaching at USC, was known to encourage his Metaphysics class (when faced with the difficulty of this book) by telling them that former students would sometimes return years later and inform him this was the single most important thing they read during grad school.
Second, because of the pervasive influence of Suarez (especially his theory of distinctions) on Early Modern Philosophy (especially Descartes and Leibniz). It has been asserted (by Chris Shields) that one CANNOT understand Descartes's *Meditations* without a firm grasp of Suarez's terminology as deployed in his *Metaphysical Disputations* (of which this present work is the seventh disputation). Descartes employs (though less subtly) a theory of distinctions dependent upon Suarez's, which is enumerated in Descartes's *Principles of Philosophy.*
Third, because Suarez is one of the most technical, thorough, and fair writers you'll ever encounter. The concepts are extremely technical, and presume some familiarity especially with Aristotle and Aquinas (but not only them). His survey of prior opinions on his various topics is encyclopedic - going back to the Greeks and extending to his contemporaries. He takes great pains to explain the various viewpoints, even bolstering them at times, and he presents all known objections (and adds some) before giving his own reasoned opinions and settling the matter. In all of this, he is an excellent model of the philosophical method of investigation.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews