The Afghan War is still salvagable. For America, it has been about denying sanctuary to al-Qaeda. For local factions and governments, a traditional fund raiser--heroin--is more important. Only with less smuggling of drugs out and ordnance in, can the insurgency be limited. Both have been broken down into more easily concealable "pieces." All traffic along the 14 entrance highways must be better inspected to curtail their movement. Herein lies the most detailed study in existence of Pakistan's drug and militant madrasa networks. Also discussed is how a lone U.S. squad could--without a single artillery round or drone missile--rely on deception to defend a roadside outpost against hundreds of attacking narco-insurgents.
This was another excellent book by Poole. Some of it seemed a little bit like alphabet soup (HeJ,JeM, etc etc etc) but his basic concepts of CAP's and direct drug interdiction are more than likely the only way to win this version of 4GW.