Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy

by Justin Kelly, Mike Brennan

The publication of the 1982 version of Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, introduced to the English-speaking world the idea of an operational level of war which encompassed the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations. It was followed 3 years later by the introduction of the term "operational art" which was, in practice, the skillful management of the operational level of war. This conception of an identifiably separate level of war that defined the jurisdiction of the profession of arms was, for a number of historical and cultural reasons, attractive to U.S. practitioners and plausible to its English-speaking allies. As a result, it and its associated doctrine spread rapidly around the world. This monograph argues that the idea of an operational level of war charged with the planning and conduct of campaigns misconceives the relationship between wars, campaigns, and operations, and is both historically mistaken and wrong in theory. Brigadier Justin Kelly (Australian Army Retired) and Dr. Michael Brennan conclude that its incorporation into U.S. doctrine has had the regrettable impact of separating the conduct of campaigns from the conduct of wars and consequently marginalized the role of politics in the direction of war. In essence, they argue that the idea of the campaign has come to overwhelm that of strategy. This monograph argues that as warfare continues to diffuse across definitional and conceptual boundaries and as the close orchestration of all of the instruments of national power becomes even more important, the current conception of campaigns and operations becomes crippling. To cope with these demands by formulating and prosecuting "national campaigns," the authors propose that the responsibility for campaign design should "actually" return to the political-strategic leadership of nations supported by the entirety of the state bureaucracy. This would mark the return of the campaign to its historical sources. If the United States and its allies fail to make this change, they risk continuing to have a "way of battle" rather than a "way of war."

130 pages, Paperback

First published June 15, 2010

Reviews

[Kenton · Rating 5 out of 5]

Reviewing this book is difficult. This was the first Operations and Strategy book ever handed to me. This copy. I also see this book in the time continuum as the early start of the Awakening of scholarly examination of the military operations construct.

Published in 2008, this monograph tells the history of FM 100-5. And the birth of "operational art" as a distinct concept from an integrated strategic concept. If wanting an into or maybe a crash course in Operations as the Army sees it, read this book and it's extensive references.

[NC · Rating 3 out of 5]

Overall very good points made, and I agree to the idea of setting limits inside large scale operations and strategies. However there seems to be a few essential contradictions in this book.

X The authors rightly point out the growing complexity of a developing and interconnected world. They use elements of complex adaptive systems theory to highlight issues in the strategic environment. However they bypass the component of CAS that would indicate that with growth in the system that additional levels of hierarchy is the expected outcome, which would be contradictory to their underlying premise that there should not be an operational level of war.

X Also related to the acknowledged growth and development of the system that encompasses warfare, they do not address why the strategic level is uniquely suited to guide micro level tactical actions from a macro level. They fail to establish why a meso operational level is not a required management activity to deal with the overwhelming scale of the problem. In other words, if the world is becoming more complex, we should expect more hierarchies.

X The authors are right to highlight the hazards of additional layers of hierarchy when trying to direct purposeful behaviors inside a CAS. However, instead of insinuating that this level be eliminated earlier in their argument, they would be better served to focus on the actual conclusion, which is to limit operational art to a certain scope.

X Expecting elites in the US to be wholly involved in campaign planning across a global security enterprise is unlikely, due to bandwidth, experience, and interest (when balanced with domestic concerns).

X The contention that balancing all elements of national power is a purely strategic exploit is a bit of a straw man argument. What they say is true, that balancing across DIME is a strategic function, however operational and tactical planners must also be prepared to integrate elements of those pillars (say an agriculture or customs team from the Economic pillar) to create successful operations, in addition to their parent organization’s role in strategy.

[Jon Klug · Rating 4 out of 5]

Whilst I do not agree with much of the authors' argument or evidence, this is a great read for military art: strategic art, operational art, and tactical art.