The Marne, 1914: The Opening of World War I and the Battle That Changed the World

by Holger H. Herwig

It is one of the essential events of military history, a cataclysmic encounter that prevented a quick German victory in World War I and changed the course of two wars and the world. Now, for the first time in a generation, here is a bold new account of the Battle of the Marne. A landmark work by a distinguished scholar, The Marne, 1914 gives, for the first time, all sides of the story. In remarkable detail, and with exclusive information based on newly unearthed documents, Holger H. Herwig superbly re-creates the dramatic battle, revealing how the German force was foiled and years of brutal trench warfare were made inevitable.

Herwig brilliantly reinterprets Germany’s aggressive “Schlieffen Plan”–commonly considered militarism run amok–as a carefully crafted, years-in-the-making design to avoid a protracted war against superior coalitions. He also paints a new portrait of the run-up to the Marne: the Battle of the Frontiers, long thought a coherent assault but really a series of haphazard engagements that left “heaps of corpses,” France demoralized, Belgium in ruins, and Germany emboldened to take Paris.

Finally, Herwig puts in dazzling relief the Battle of the Marne itself: the French resolve to win, which included the exodus of 100,000 people from Paris (where even pigeons were placed under state control in case radio communications broke down), the crucial lack of coordination between Germany’s First and Second Armies, and the fateful “day of rest” taken by the Third Army. He provides revelatory new facts about the all-important order of retreat by Germany’s Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch, previously an event hardly documented and here freshly reconstructed from diary excerpts.

Herwig also provides stunning cameos of all the important players: Germany’s Chief of General Staff Helmuth von Moltke, progressively despairing and self-pitying as his plans go awry; his rival, France’s Joseph Joffre, seemingly weak but secretly unflappable and steely; and Commander of the British Expeditionary Force John French, arrogant, combative, and mercurial.

The Marne, 1914 puts into context the battle’s rich historical significance: how it turned the war into a four-year-long fiasco that taught Europe to accept a new form of barbarism and stoked the furnace for the fires of World War II. Revelatory and riveting, this will be the new source on this seminal event.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Military History, World War I, War, Military Fiction, France

416 pages, Kindle Edition

First published December 1, 2009

About the author

Holger Herwig holds a dual position at the University of Calgary as Professor of History and as Canada Research Chair in the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. He received his BA (1965) from the University of British Columbia and his MA (1967) and Ph.D. (1971) from the State University of New York at Stony Brook. Dr. Herwig taught at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, from 1971 until 1989. He served as Head of the Department of History at Calgary from 1991 until 1996. He was a Visiting Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, in 1985-86, and the Andrea and Charles Bronfman Distinguished Visiting Professor of Judaic Studies at The College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia in 1998.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 3 out of 5]

Round about a year ago, I decided it was time for me to read deeply on World War I. For years, I’d mostly ignored the subject. I was put off by its complex beginning, its complex ending, and the staggering wastefulness of all the years in between. However, seeing as I’m a self-respecting history buff, and since World War I may be the most important event of the 20th century, I dove headlong into the subject.

And yes, I realize I might better have spent this time becoming a better person, doing a few more sit-ups, or perfecting a delicious homebrew.

Since embarking on my Great War odyssey, I’ve read several general histories on the war, along with a couple novels. There was also a repeat viewing of Kubrick’s Paths of Glory one night on Turner Classic Movies. Eventually, even though I hadn’t even scratched the surface of the war, I decided to take the next step.

Holger Herwig’s The Marne, 1914 represents my attempt to finally scratch the surface. It is a slim volume that covers – much like The Guns of August – the opening battles of World War I, culminating in the epic clash along the eponymous French river.

In 1914, with war imminent, the German Army followed the dictates of the Schlieffen Plan and invaded Belgium. Their purpose in violating Belgium’s neutrality was to swing around France’s strong frontier fortresses and take her armies from behind. Despite the inevitable delays and holdups, the revised Schlieffen Plan worked remarkably well. The German right wing swung like a gate through Belgium and into France while the German center and left held firm against an ill-advised French offensive.

The German right wing – the mass of men moving through Belgium – ultimately bypassed Paris in an attempt to bag the French armies of General Joffre. (Not to be confused with Evil King Joffrey from Game of Thrones). Joffre held firm. Hard fighting was done. Myths and legends arose. The Germans fell back. History was determined.

This is a cursory, simplistic overview of the First Battle of the Marne. If I attempted anything more, my head would most likely explode (followed, possibly, by your heads). Suffice to say, and excluding the post-Marne “race to the sea,” the Battle of the Marne ended the “war of maneuver” on the Western Front, created the stagnant lines of trenches everyone associates with World War I, and destroyed Germany’s best chance to end the conflict without getting stuck in a two-front war.

Herwig’s account straddles the line between academic history and popular history. He is a respected World War I scholar with impressive credentials in his field. He also has a command of the material that makes you feel like he’s right, all the time. Often during the narrative he will mention one of the many “myths” of the Marne and demolish it with a single, dismissive sentence. No explanation of what the myth entailed; no explanation of why it’s wrong. Just a simple “I’m Holger F---ing Herwig!”

Certainly, Herwig is writing for people who’ve read about the Marne before. He does not set out to give a straightforward battle narrative. To the contrary, he focuses on certain aspects of the battle with special attention paid to the German viewpoint (he relies heavily on heretofore ignored or unappreciated German sources).

This is not to say that a casual reader (who somehow wants to read a critical analysis of the Marne) will get lost. Though he tends towards dryness, Herwig’s writing is certainly penetrable. Moreover, even with space at a premium, he does a nice job explaining Schlieffen’s famous plan (and all the arguments about column strength that go with it) and the exigencies of mobilization. He also pays lip service to the fact that actual human beings were involved in the battles, not just Roman numerals on a map.

Take, for instance, this paragraph, which uncomfortably combines insider-World War I troop dispositions with a real attempt at literary adornment. It doesn’t really work, but it’s an admirable effort:

Without aerial reconnaissance and with the western horizon blocked by a series of wooded hillocks between Saint-Soupplets and Penchard, the safe option was to stay put and await developments. But the wily Gronau threw out the textbook and made a quick decision that most likely would have resulted in failure at most staff colleges. “Lieutenant Colonel, there is no other way,” he informed his chief of staff… “we must attack!” Without delay, Gronau sent 7th RID and 22d RID to occupy the long, wooded ridge around Saint-Mard, Dammartin, and Monthyon. Their orders were simple: Attack any and all forces approaching out of the west. At 11:30 a.m., Gronau’s artillery spotted a mighty host of French infantry and artillery – de Lamaze’s 55th RID and 56th RID as well as Ernest Blondlat’s 1st Moroccan Brigade. They advanced northwest of Iverny, along cobblestone roads lined with shimmering poplars, past gray stone farmhouses with gray slate roofs, and through fields of beets, mustard, wheat, and clover. As soon as they were within range, Gronau opened fire…

As a rule, the best parts of the book are the pages that contain the least numbers. When Herwig starts tossing out troop dispositions, my mind starts to wander. This is facilitated by the poor quality of maps that are included. Most of them are taken from West Point and shrunk to fit these pages, rendering them nearly unreadable. Furthermore, since these are military maps, they lack legends, rendering nearly all symbols on the map utterly meaningless.

Herwig is at his best when he is being professorial. There are several sections in the book where he delivers his opinions as clearly as a lecture, going so far as to number them. This was helpful to me…because I totally dozed off during that part when you were going on about the 55th and 56th RID doing something in Saint-Mard. For example, Herwig pays special attention to the infamous staff visits of Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch. Hentsch was a relatively low-ranking officer tasked to visit the various German armies on the Marne front. He ultimately made the recommendation for the Germans to pull back and retrench, saving France and ushering trench warfare into the lexicon. Herwig does a meticulous job reconstructing Hentsch’s journey and the thought-process that went into the ultimate decision to retreat.

Looking back, I probably wouldn’t have chosen this to be the first book I read about the Battle of the Marne. I don’t know enough about the Marne to realize when and where Herwig is making his slight but important adjustments to the historical record. Still, its relative brevity and learnedness keeps it from being a slog.

And a slog is something that World War I authors, unlike World War I generals, need to avoid.

[Dimitri · Rating 4 out of 5]

Arguably the most famous map concerning the First World War is the one showing the initial German offensive, with a set of giant arrow sweeping through Belgium towards Paris. It looks like the Entente armies stopped a broom dead cold on the Marne. Holger Herwig has taken this sterile image and brought it to life with all the colourful élan and pulsating action of a swashbuckler film. This was a war of movement, fought by opponents schooled in the offensive, who continuously sought to thrust at the flank and parry at the front, drawing blood in turn to a martial soundtrack of bugles and thundering guns. Formations fixed bayonets and charged forward with flying colours, gallantly led by sabre-yielding officers…

…To be cut down by machine-gun fire and artillery like grain before the scythe. This was the swansong of the colourful art of war seen on paintings of Frederick the Great, the Duke of Marlborough and Napoleon.

Basically, the armies of 1914 took to the field like a pair of gunslingers at high noon: whoever could bring all his lethal firepower to bear first, would utterly annihilate his opponent before he had a chance to do the same. Thus, the French Army cultivated the spirit of the offensive à l’outrance, while the German Army spared no effort in order to keep up with the pace set by the Schlieffen Plan. Thus, the protection afforded by the oft-maligned trench was seldom present in the August heat, resulting in casualties on a scale that would not be seen again until the last year of the war.

Herwig takes us through this set-up inconspicuously; most books dealing with any feat of arms anno 1914 will discuss up to a century of evolution within the European armies; most can rely on an enormous body of secondary literature to get the main facts right. His main claim to fame is the German perspective he provides, compared to the Anglo-French focus of many current titles. It would have been real nice of him to provide us with a “further reading” essay to bolster this claim, because we can’t keep relying on Spears and Tyng in reprint*. Nevertheless, he is too modest in his preface: This is nothing less than one of the best overall histories of the 1914 campaign in the West I’ve yet come across. The scope of the book is wider than the Marne 1914 needs to be. We start with the assault on the Position Fortifiée de Liège, with bloody detours into the rugged forests of the Ardennes, where De Bello Gallico makes more than one appearance to illustrate the eternal constraints of the fog-shrouded terrain. For once in the English-language literature is the British Expeditionary Force reduced to its true size amidst the vast continental hosts, as a numerically small (3%) and often (to French eyes) obstinate ally.

Herwig’s greatest gift is to lift the opening round of the war out of the rigid mold of hindsight. There was nothing predetermined about the Allied victory on the Marne. While a textbook Kesselschlacht was never a realistic prospect for the Imperial Army, the successful distortion of the French Plan XVII cost France over 400.000 casualties as well as a significant portion of her industrial capacity, losses that could’ve persuaded the French cabinet to throw in the towel. On the other hand, the German war plan started to unravel fast because Helmuth Von Moltke the Younger had neglected two homegrown maxims: one was Clausewitz’ fog of war, the other a quote by his own uncle: “No plan survives first contact with the enemy”. The retreat of the Belgian field Army towards the national redoubt of Antwerp (as per its pre-war plan of defense) necessitated a detachment which, together with accumulating losses and the transfer of two corps to the Eastern Front, weakened the “hammer” of the right wing from a proportional strength of 7:1 to 3:1. At the same time, the general march direction steadily deviated from south-west to a straight southbound. On the other side of the front, the imperial scions Rupprecht and Crown Prince Wilhelm became ambitious to create their own modest Cannae-style envelopments, overextending the center and left wing armies in the process.

All this came about through a series of flanking maneuvers and exploitation of gabs in the German columns: the most familiar for English readers will be the position of the B.E.F. between the First and Second German Armies. The French, however, were a lot more active in this field, immortalized in the ‘taxis of the Marne’ (whose contribution is mercilessly demythologized here). The increasingly feverish back-and-forth by which history distinguishes the battles grouped under the nomer ‘Battle of the Frontiers’ and ‘the Great Retreat’ is defined by the presence of French armies between German armies, stretching in a loose barrier from Charleroi to the Vosges. The former generally tried to exploit the gaps between columns, which put the latter at risk of losing touch in an age were wireless communication was still not a fully trustworthy alternative to a speedy staff car.

Communication between the Armies and their General Headquarters in 1914 are a symptom of the difference in style of command between the antagonists. The inscrutable Joffre kept his commanders on a tight leash, fully exploiting the speed of the automobile to spur and limoger where needed. Von Moltke by contrast kept to Luxemburg and was often in the dark about the exact situation of his most important formations: the First Army under Von Kluck and the Second Army under Von Bülow. While their eventual route east of Paris was made in accordance with a 1905 staff ride (traditionally seen as pure improvisation), their corps got into each other’s way, which, coupled with the flank attack out of Paris, was instrumental in bringing the German advance to a halt on the Marne.

Above and underneath this waltz of banners, Herwig does not neglect the human factor in war. Anglo-French coalition warfare had its precedents, most recently at the Crimea, but a formally unified command structure was as yet an unknown phenomenon, which would not reach maturity until WWII. The inherent tensions created by divergent war aims were aggravated by mutually poor language skills – we’ve all seen the emotional exchange between Joffre and Sir John French: “Monsieur le Maréchal, c'est la France qui vous supplie.” - “Damn it, I can’t explain! Tell him that all that men can do, our fellows will do.” . Their antagonists knew their share of animosity as well: on several occasions conflicting orders necessitated those ad hoc decisions that keep the ink flowing over the “what if” of the Marne campaign.
By the time the footsore Feltgrau formations reach the riverbank, the voices of the survivors have shown us the burnt-out rubble, bloated animal carcasses and mangled corpses in pantaloons rouges strewn about golden fields like grotesque poppies. Mingled among an endless stream of bleeding wounded in dusty uniforms are the civilian refugees from the furor teutonicus .

* The Campaign of the Marne by Sewell Tyng
Liaison 1914 by Edward Spears

[Mike · Rating 4 out of 5]

4 Stars My only real complaint is the lack of pertinent maps in the right places. Considering how Herwig so closely tracks the movement of forces, anyone not from the area will struggle to understand where the forces were and where they were moving to. I really appreciated seeing the German side so well covered. Herwig disabuses the reader of many of the myths in the opening battles of WWI. There are many fine reviews of this book:

Dimitri
https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...

Jerome
https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...

[Steven Peterson · Rating 4 out of 5]

World War I began with both sides sensing great victory in a short period of time. Germany faced the more delicate strategic situation. Russia was mobilizing to the East and France and Germany to the West; Germany could not divide its forces and hope to triumph along both fronts. Germany made the following calculation: if it used the bulk of its forces against France, using the Schlieffen Plan (invading through Belgium) and achieved a quick victory, it could send spare forces to the East to defeat Russia. France's plan was massive attack against Germany and through boldness achieve a quick victory. Of course, as we know from history, World War I was a slow bloodletting lasting for years. No quick victory happened.

This book is enriched by many German records becoming available from what was once East Germany after reunification. These records add considerable new information to the telling of this story. Another useful feature of this book is the description of key figures, giving a human dimension to the massive battles, involving armies of hundreds of thousands of soldiers each. Generals such as French, Joffre, Moltke, Lanrezac, Bulow, Foch become human rather than just cardboard characters. Given that the human frailty of some of these generals was crucial (lack of nerve, too much aggressiveness, or just the right touch of aggressiveness and caution) was often a key variable in battle, this helps make sense of the action.

The book takes a largely chronological view. It begins by outlining strategic vision of the various actors. For France, the disastrous outcome of the Franco-Prussian War weighed heavily. Germany, aware of the forces that would be arrayed against its armies, developed a plan for rapid mobilization and rapid movement of troops to the offensive (the Schlieffen Plan). As war came closer--and actually began with the aftereffects of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand--the book outlines the moves as they occurred. In the process, some myths are rejected (such as the idea that the war was something of an accident, with people not realizing the consequences of their actions). The nature of the armies by all parties are described, from army to cavalry (I was surprised to see how effective cavalry were during the first part of World War I) to artillery to airplanes.

The development of actual movement of forces and battles quickly began to depart from the careful plans of both the French and the Germans. The book demonstrates that many fights were chance engagements. Others allowed parties to prepare, as airplanes could detect enemy movements (sometimes) far away and provide valuable intelligence. The movement of forces leading to the Battle of the Marne are described in much detail (sometimes I lost track of which army was where), including the massive casualty lists that developed. We see the sometimes testy relationships among generals on both sides.

One wish: better maps. There are maps provided, but many maps are not as clear as they could be; the font is awfully small in some maps (making it hard for someone like me to read). Nonetheless, these do help.

All in all, if one wants to get a detailed sense of this monster battle, this is a good book to look at.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

An engaging and vividly detailed history of the First Battle of the Marne. Herwig does a fine job explaining how the commanders of 1914, like many before them and since, fought a modern war with the inappropriate tactics of a different era. Herwig demonstrates a mastery of all of the little details that bring home the brutality of modern war for the reader. He does a fine job fleshing out the various commanders involved. A central theme of Herwig’s book is how commanders’ determination to win was disproportionate to their knowledge of modern battlefield realities. He clearly shows how people trusted in courage and tradition to the detriment of intelligence and innovation. Herwig provides vivid, balanced portraits of all the important commanders. Like many history books nowadays, the title claims that the book’s subject matter “changed the world,” but, typically, this is never really one of the book’s arguments; it seems this was just a publisher’s ploy.

Much of the book is focused on Germany’s perspective, and Herwig’s primary question is how the Germans lost (rather than how the Entente won). He argues that the primary reason for the Germans’ defeat was a flawed command structure, and Herwig does a fine job arguing this case, although he does not really address any of the competing arguments. His treatment of Joffre is largely favorable, while Moltke comes off as out of touch and irresolute, and was not helped by the fact that Kaiser Wilhelm was present at his headquarters and fancied himself a commander.

Herwig’s writing is clear and precise (if somewhat dry, clinical, meandering and difficult to follow at times) and his research is exhaustive. He includes plenty of maps, but not all of them are particularly helpful; some are plain awful, some are placed in the strangest places, and the font used on them is ridiculously small. Also, it might have been better if Herwig devoted more space to questions of military organization, doctrine, and tactics. Herwig often writes that such and such a skirmish was an important development, then never explains why. And at one point he writes that the Germans had had 144 135mm guns per corps, even though the whole army had only four total.

[Ken · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book was a little more technical than I liked. The writing was very dry and unengaged. It would probably have been more interesting if I was more familiar with World War I history, but I found it difficult to follow.

[Sean McLachlan · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this book right after reading the author's excellent The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918. That book offered a sweeping history of the war trough the experience of the Central Powers with plenty of interesting anecdotes from common people.

I wish Herwig had written his book on the Battle of the Marne the same way. He goes into excruciating detail about troop movements from the opening moves of the war all the way up to the Germans' fateful decision to withdraw and regroup at the Marne in the face of fierce French counterattacks. We're treated to a flurry of facts about what corps marched behind what, who flanked who, all of it quickly becoming confusing thanks in no small part to the insufficient maps.

I'm an avid student of military history, yet I must say this sort of battle study has always bored me. I'm far more interested in the common solder's experience and the sociological and political implications of war than I am in a long list of what units marched where. For people interested in tactical detail, this is one of the best books on the battle, but for those wanting the human side of the war, go elsewhere.

[Charles Inglin · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very readable account of the opening moves of World War I. Detailed enough for a historical account, lively enough to keep you turning pages. Particularly interesting to me was the depiction of the personalities, Joffre, von Moltke, Gallieni, von Kluck, Castelnau, von Bulow, and how their strengths and weakness, assumptions, hubris, and sometimes pettiness affected the outcome of the battle. The German side was particularly interesting and surprising, given their reputation for efficiency. Having developed a plan that relied on coordinating the movements of armies on a wide front, they, incredibly, failed to develop anything like an effective communication system between the armies and the high command far behind the lines, and between the armies themselves. As the author points out, had one sie or the other achieved a clear cut victory at the Marne and ended the war, the entire history ofthe 20th century would have been altered.

[Daniel · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good overview of the first phase of WWI. It tries to correct what it sees has misconceptions in other early WWI books like Guns of August. Mainly with Idea of premeditation and the Shlieffen Plan. While I was not completely convinced with there argument, It was well made . Worth a read if your interested in a counter point to Guns of August or a quick overview of the first stages of the Great War.

[Elyse · Rating 2 out of 5]

I finished this book with an exhausted sigh of relief. Since I did read it I can't say that it was "unreadable" but it sure was close.

Herwig begins by explaining that the Battle of the Marne really includes the entirety of the war up until the fighting on the Marne began in September 1914. But, when he finally gets to what everyone else in the world calls the Battle of the Marne, he also calls it "the Battle of the Marne." Whatever.

After slogging through the first 200 pages of a badly summarized "Guns of August," I figured that he probably just wanted to write about those few weeks in September 1914 but didn't have enough material to do it. That's why he spent 200 pages listing name after name, and corps and divisions and numbers and places and MINUTAE that was completely UNNECESSARY and YES I am using a lot of caps because it was TERRIBLE.

So finally I got to the real Battle of the Marne. And the book instantly became more readable, almost interesting. Almost. And that's just because there were maybe three sentences strung together that didn't include gratuitous details. And still it was what every high school creative writing teacher would call "telling" and not "showing." It was a really super long encyclopedia article. It was a list of facts. It was a dry recitation of who did what and who went where. Most of all, it was a wasted opportunity.

There was no feeling, no sense of enormity, no sense of the weight of the events in the lives of the millions of people involved. This despite Herwig's introduction stating that without the Marne the world would have been completely different, and then an astonishing assertion that there would have been no Lenin. Seriously? No Lenin?

I could mention the confusion in the introduction with defining the first "casualty" of the war, the instances of Herwig contradicting himself, that there were arguments made in the introduction that were never borne out or the tantalizing ideas in the epilogue that Herwig failed to explore. But I won't. Because I'm tired of thinking about this book.

[Elliott · Rating 3 out of 5]

I debate the stark originality that the back cover led to make of this book when I picked it up. Quite clearly Herwig has read Tuchman's The Guns of August and much of this book's pacing and even anecdotal material seems completely ripped from Tuchman's book. There were numerous times when in the text I realized I had read that before in nearly the same words. I also debate the claimed "reinterpretation" of the Schlieffen Plan. Herwig seems to me to repeat the same interpretation it has always had namely: Germany's best chance of winning a war on two fronts against France and Russia was to rapidly knock France out of the war, and deny the British a toehold on the continent then turn against Russia. There is no reinterpretation necessary here, not that Herwig does it of course. The text tended to wander a bit too far into the biographical and anecdotal a little too much: the references to other battles in history was nice enough, but the Marne does not need any historical positioning, it already has all that it needs. Related to this I also felt that it was not necessary to make the case that the Marne was the battle that "changed the world." To me this seems to insinuate a glossing over of the rest of the war-which certainly changed the world as well.
Overall I was unimpressed by this book, but since it's one of the few books yet in print and available in this country about the Battle of the Marne, it provided an excellent narrative of the battle itself.

[Jim Pfluecke · Rating 4 out of 5]

Despite its name, this book is basically an update of the Guns of August, covering the first six weeks of WWI. Herwig threads a narrative history of the events, quotations from participants, and persona's in with commentary on other writers on the subject. For instance, he seeks to provide evidence that there was in fact a Schlieffen/Moltke plan (rebutting Zuker, I believe the authors name is) and hammering on the point that the Germans lost because Moltke refused to lead and his army commanders did not work well together. He points out lots of lost opportunities for the Germans, as well as for the French.

It is a good book, but Tuchman is a better writer.

[Ozgur · Rating 5 out of 5]

Marne Muharebesi Somme, Tanenberg ve Verdun kadar bilinmese de kanımca 1. Dünya Savaşı'nın, belki de 20.yy'ın ilk yarısının en önemli muharebesidir. Marne sonucunda Alman İmparatorluğu nihayetinde kaybedeceği iki cepheli bir savaşa mahkum olmuş; uzayan savaş topyekün karakter kazanarak diğer devlet ve halkları da içine çekmiş ve büyük uzun vadeli politik sonuçlar yaratmıştır. Herwig bu çalışmasında Batı Cephesinin ilk aylarında sınır muharebelerini de anlatarak Marne'nın askeri arkaplanını detaylı bir biçimde açıklıyor. Eserin kendisi neredeyse saatlik detaylarla Marne Muharebesinin nasıl cereyan ettiğini anlatıyor. Bu konularda genel kültür okuması yapanlara kafa karıştırıcı gelebilecek bir anlatımı olsa da meraklısı için mücevher gibi bir araştırma olduğunu söylemeliyim. Konu üzerine yazılmış daha kapsayıcı bir tarih çalışmasına rastlamadım. Bildiğim kadarıyla İş Bankası yayınlarının çevirdiği Osprey Serisi Marne 1914'ten başka da Türkçeye kazandırılmış bir eser bulunmamaktadır.

[Jean · Rating 4 out of 5]

The battle of the Marne is regarded as the most decisive land battle since the allies defeated Napoleon at the Waterloo in 1815. The Marne was the opening battle of World War One. Herwig primarily looks at the battle from the German view point. Once the decisions that led to the war have been dealt with Herwig covers the mobilization of both sides, and the respective war plans. He notes, however, that both French and German war plans were not nearly as well developed as earlier scholarship has argued. Herwig also provides a careful analysis of the strengths and weakness of the British, French, German and Belgian armies. The author then goes in-depth of the conduct of the campaign. Herwig criticism of Helmuth Von Moltke, German Chief of General Staff, conduct of the campaign is not related to any change in the concept of the plan, but rather to Moltke’s failure to exercise any control over the German forces as they went forward. Moltke tended to stay far away from the action and the means of communication available did not allow for close supervision. Conversely, Moltke’s opponent French General Joseph Joffre took a much more hands-on-approach. Joffre’s skill at maintaining command and control improved as the French retreated on Paris. Using material from the East German archives after the end of the Cold War Herwig carefully reconstructs the controversial mission under taken by OHL staff officer Richard Hentsch in September 1914. The end result of which was order issued to German right wing Armies to retreat, marking a failure of the campaign. Using the material from East German archives, he found that Hentsch did not give the order it was General Karl Von Bulow, Commander of the German Second Army, who did have loose authority over General Alexander Von Kluck’s First Army. The German’s retreat a short distance and dug in building trenches and the allies followed and the war changed into a stationary war from a mobile war. Herwig regards the battle of the Marne impact to have been spectacular: Germany was denied victory and hegemony over Europe; France was spared occupation; Britain maintained its foot holds on the continent. Without the Marne, places such as Verdun, the Somme, and Passchendaele would not resonate with us as they do. Without the Marne, no Lenin, no Stalin, No Hitler. The 100th anniversary of the Marne will soon be upon us, we need to remember and honor the 200,000 plus men that died in the Battle of the Marne. General Joseph Joffre, the French Commander said “I don’t know who won the battle of the Marne, but if it would have been lost, I know who would have lost it.” I read this as an audio book downloaded from Audible. Kevin Stillwell did a good job narrating the book.

[Ben · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book got off to a rough start in the early chapters. The author talks a lot about the Schlieffen plan, which is obviously important. He talks about how Schlieffen studied the Carthaginian victory at Cannae but seems to criticize Schlieffen for overlooking the fact that Rome went on to win the war because of naval superiority. This is pointless criticism. If they would've gone through with Schlieffen's plan, they could've won the war within six weeks and Britain's naval superiority would've amounted to nothing. The problem wasn't with Schlieffen's plan, the problem was with Moltke the Younger's flawed carrying out of the plan. Also, Herwig says that Schlieffen came up with the minutiae of the plan, train schedules, troop deployments, etc. From everything I've read from other sources, Schlieffen's plan was little more than an outline and the details were filled in later. There were several missteps like this early on.

After that, the book was unimpressive. In my limited opinion, you probably only need to know the names of the generals of the overall armies. Herwig thought, on the other hand, that you need to know the names of army generals, corps generals, division generals, and further down. If you take out all the extraneous generals, the book would be 50 pages shorter. "Sixth Army now totaled 150,000 men: Victor Boelle's IV Corps, Frederic Vautier's VII Corps, Henri de Lamaze's Fifth Group of 55th RID and 56th RID, Antoine Drude's 45th ID, Charles Ebener's Sixth Group of 61st RID and 62nd RID, and Jean-Francois Sordet's cavalry corps." It made it seem like it was a thesis for grad school.

All in all, skip this book and read The Guns of August instead. Tuchman wrote a much better book.

[Wade · Rating 4 out of 5]

A triumphant romp through the most crucial days of WW1 taking on on the boots of the German armies as it comes to within sight of Paris, and how everything broke down and how France was saved. This is a tremendously interesting story that I've never heard. The book is written well, not amazingly well, but good enough to keep one engaged. The repetition of Army and Corps boggles one's mind and the maps are simply dreadful. A re-release with some GIS imagery would help understand what was going on. The mains story is the German advance, French disasters, and British reluctance to do anything worthwhile. The generals, almost to a man, were a disaster in this phase of the war and the slaughter almost unimaginable as nations begin to understand artillery and machine guns. The author seems to have exhaustive research and counters popular beliefs with data and insight. One stands baffled on how the efficient German war machine underestimated communication, failed to use planes to send messages, and left wireless sets stand idle as order after order was now followed or changed. A an easy and enjoyable read for great perspective on this fascinating month that changed the world.

[Patricrk patrick · Rating 4 out of 5]

The German plan was faulty. The German General Staff did not execute the plan well. The French plan was faulty and played into the Germans hands. Neither side was ready for the firepower that the other side was bringing to the battle. It could have gone either way depending on a few key decisions. The capacity of the French soldiers to fight, retreat and fight again amazed the Germans. The French did a much better job of utilizing their railroads to switch troops to where they were needed.

[Bob Koelle · Rating 3 out of 5]

Nowhere near as moving or engaging as First Day on the Somme or similar books. This is really a daily, sometimes hourly account of the movements and engagements of all the French and German armies lined up in August and early September 1914. This is told from a German point of view, and the lesson driven home is how battle plans fall apart quickly once the enemy is engaged. If you want to know how each of the numbered armies and corps maneuvered for that month, this book is for you. But everyone else will find that level of detail quite tiresome.

[Christopher Szabo · Rating 5 out of 5]

At first I thought the claim that this battle "changed the world" was excessive, but on reading the book, I had to agree, at least in part.

The book was great in giving an insight into the disorganisation of both the Allied and the German armies. It was suprising to read about just how much confusion reigned in the German Army, and which ultimately prevented their capture of Paris in 1914.

I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in military history.

[Joe · Rating 3 out of 5]

I really think it's 3 1/2 stars. The last two chapters and the epilogue really are great discussions about the actual Battle of the Marne. The story of the enigmatic Lt. Colonel Hentsch is concise and explained well. It is a worthy read for that part alone.

[John Mcgee · Rating 2 out of 5]

Heavy going and dry...

[Jim Martin · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a recent and excellent study of the crucial campaign on the western front in August and September, 1914, primarily from the German perspective, by an exceptional scholar of the Central Powers, and in particual Imperial Germany. Herwig goes into great detail not only about the Marne campaign, but the campaigns along the southern part of the front by the Sixth and Seventh German armies, which were mostly composed of troops from kingdoms other than Prussia (particularly Bavaria). The doomed French offensive, Plan XVII, is also reviewed, and Herwig shows how its outcome would affect the other parts of the front.
The author takes time to expose a couple of common myths about the campaign. The famous "taxi cabs of Paris," did not have as major a role in saving the city from a German advance as often portrayed. The intervention of Lt. Col. Richard Hentsch, the roving staff officer sent out by Moltke to communicate with the various armies on the front, was not the factor in halting the forward movement of the northern part of the German forces. Kluck's turn, while not helpful to the overall offensive, was also not the fatal movement for the Germans.
Herwig places most of the responsibility for the failure of the German offensives on Moltke's shoulders. Moltke had planned the offensives, but he had not been prepared for the tempo of the war once it started. Moltke was not a "hands on," commander and refused to inform himself about the true state of the offensives, or the problems that his commanders were encountering. By giving Hentsch the ability to dictate orders at the front Moltke was responsible for the ultimate failure of the offensive. Moltke would retire soon after the battle due to nervous exhaustion.
Herwig praises Joffre for his mastery of the battle situation and his ability to learn from the mistakes of the early portion of the campaign. Joffre was ruthless in removing generals who did not meet his expectations, but such ruthlessness was merited by the results of the campaign. The only area where Joffre failed was in his relationship with the BEF, in particular Sir John French, who showed excessive caution at the critical stage of the counter offensive against the German first and second armies.
The author makes good use of German archival materials and also manuscript sources such as letters and diaries of private soldiers, to show the brutality of the war, even in the early stages of the conflict.
My only complaint about this book is the poor quality of many of the maps. The editors chose to use maps from the West Point atlas series, which while in the public domaine are not of clear enough quality for this book. The maps produced specifically for the book are much higher quality.

[David Allen Hines · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Great War, which began with such great and sudden movement by the Germans in their invasion of France and Belgium, ground to a halt that became the 4 year Western Front trench war stalemate at the Battle of the Marne in the fall of 1914. Unlike many books on World War I which tend to present the war from one side or another, this author goes a long way towards explaining the early war from all the sides--the German, the French, the British, the Belgium and a bit of American reaction. The Germans began the war using their modified Schlieffen Plan which essentially was a quick moving all out war on France to Paris, by simply marching through Belgium neutrality. There has been a century of debate on the merits of this plan, but this book goes a long way towards showing that while the plan was being followed, the German Army did well, and failed as the German leaders deviated from the plan. This book is important in talking about a lot of the smaller battles that led up to the Marne which are often overlooked including important attention to the Battle of the Frontiers that foretold of the mass losses to come. One theme comes through about the Germans-- they had a great deal of internal communications problems, and political leadership problems as the central command tried to appease minor royals in the field as well as the instablity of the Kaiser and Moltke, the top German army leader.

The Belgium people led by their heroic King Albert come across well, doing their best with their small army to do what they can against the invaders. This book provides a great deal of information about the French military, and points out how Joffre's "Plan 17" simply did not work and that he held onto it too long. The British do not come off well in this book, reluctant to enter battle and always dragging behind.

A still unexplained mystery that contributed muchly to the German setback at the Marne receives a good deal of discussion in this book-- how a minor German officer, Lt. Col. Richard Hentsch, convinced Moltke to give up and begin a retreat, which led to the trench war stalemate for the next 4 years. I've read many books on the Great War and heard of this matter briefly in other accounts but the most detail is provided herein even if they "why" and "how" remain unexplained after more than a century.

While focused on military strategy and army movements, this well-read book can be understood and enjoyed by anyone interested in history and the Great War. The Marne because it happened early, is too often given short shrift, but because it led to the 4 year trench war stalemate that was such a horror, an understanding of the Marne is essential to any student of World War I and this book is an important contribution.

[Dana Johnson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Reading this book makes me dislike The Guns of August that much more.

These two books are directly comparable so I will reference GoA a lot. Though this and GoA overlap and cover much of the same events of the Battle of the Frontiers, where GoA spends time setting up the high drama with the personalities of leaders at stops short of the Marne, this book is much more grounded and continues the story to its actual climax at the Battle of the Marne.

I appreciate that this history dispenses with much of the political setup that Tuchman and others get into, and provides only the context needed to get the story of what happened in August and September of 1914 moving. From memory, it spends about the same time on the push through Belgium, maybe a little less on Alcase-Lorraine battles and the Ardennes, but picks up the slack that GoA completely leaves out which is the critical turning point of the Marne. Without this narrative I don't think its possible to understand why the war turned out the way that it did.

This history is also much more grounded. GoA paints dramatic and sometimes overwrought portraits of leaders and generals (in particular toward villainizing caricatures if the Germans, a post Versailles and WW2 slant), at the expense of actual narrative. Here we find realistic assessments of all generals and their backgrounds, with primary source information about them. They are human and Holger shows them as such. He doesn't hide any information about the murder of civilians, and does not praise or criticize either side overly. What's here is a balanced and factual approach to the first two months.

Really the only downside is the scope. There is a lot of corps and division level movement described, and although the information is doubtlessly accurate, it is frequently hard to follow and requires re-reading. The maps are typically army level movements and are only partly helpful.

In all, highly recommend. I would honestly skip the outdated and dubious Guns of August altogether and pair this with a good pre-war political breakdown like Sleepwalkers.

[Brad · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book lacked the necessary maps and supplementary material that it really needed. If you aren't familiar with the personalities/terrain, this might be a difficult read, though worthwhile in other respects. Herwig offers a great overview of the opening of the war but this book is not really about the Battle of the Marne, per se, as much as "the opening of World War I" and how the two sides got to the Marne. Herwig is great at teasing out new information sources (especially German) and synthesizing some of the newer scholarship, so his work is worthwhile from an academic standpoint. However, his narratives do not always make for exciting reads (he tends toward a dry style that can be a slog at times), though unlike some academics, he tends to be brief.

This book is mainly concerned with Herwig's interpretation of the so-called "Schlieffen Plan" and the origins of the war, more than the Marne itself. Herwig does not argue for the older consensus view of the Schlieffen Plan and the origins of the war, but he has also argued against interpretations like that of Terence Zuber, which reject the Schlieffen Plan as a fabrication (see "Germany and the Short War Illusion: Toward a New Interpretation?" Journal of Military History, 66 (July 2002), 683.) Viewed in the context of this (ongoing) debate, this book is best viewed as an attempt at synthesis between some of the new scholarship and reinterpretation, though well ahead of the crop of 2014 books on the beginning of the war that flooded bookshelves in time for the centennial.

[Chuck Leonard · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is not the easiest to read. Herwig is detailed in his reference to units and locations, so some familiarity with the commanders, the towns, and the military units involved is helpful. He moves quickly through his narrative to the point where, it appears to me, if you do not know the nationality of the names referenced you could be confused about which side he is talking about. Herwig's account sheds light on the importance of planning, execution, decisioning and communication in war fighting... even when the war itself made little sense. The well known von Schlieffen plan was at the outset implemented as directed but focus gets lost in a sea of contingencies and in the cloud of war. Rivalries and personalities seem to play a larger role than in previous accounts of the conflict I have read, while the breadth of incompetence seems to be spread equally across both sides in the midst of sporadic but inconsistent proficiency. The failure in communication and execution by the Germans in regard to the ordered, and apparently misunderstood, retreat which led to French (british) success(?), is explained as an agglomeration of errors that is unique and more realistically satisfying than other accounts. The book contains numerous details and relevant anecdotes of which I was not aware and never heard of before... e.g. the shooting of civilians in Belgium accused of firing on German troops, without clear evidence of guilt. An enjoyable read for me... but some knowledge of WWI is recommended.

[Thomas Hansen · Rating 3 out of 5]

Plenty of very detailed information at a macro-level, not as much on the micro level, often to the point of confusion due to the levels of density. Very well-cited work, with a very good critical glance into the opening phase of the Western Front in WW1 in the first campaign. Lots of insights gained. Had an interest in this beginning phase of the western front in WW1 for a long time because of its overall uniqueness and mobility compared to the next three years. However, this may be my bias from reading quite a few Osprey books in my day, but visually the maps did not add too much clarity and could’ve been better formatted-I’m a young guy with 20/15 vision, but even the font on these maps was quite small, a lack of a legend, color coding and other factors made for a lack of clarity on much of the map. Had to consult other sources and online sources to gain a better perspective on the maps. I also have a bias towards seeing more of the view from the micro level because of Stephen E. Ambrose’s Band of Brothers, which there were elements spliced in, but for a war that was infamously noted for having “lions lead by donkeys”, I would like to have seen a little more of a personal view from the infantryman.

[Christopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

In Cathal J Nolan's excellent overview (The Lure of Battle) of the lure of the decisive battle despite its constantly increasing irrelevance in modern war, he mentioned The Marne as the closest the Twentieth Century ever got to one battle (or more like one succession of battles in a single campaign). Naturally, despite my already intense past reading coverage of WWI, this made me want to read a battle book specifically on the Schleiffen Plan/Battles of the Frontiers/Marne campaign.

Herwig's varied interrogation of source material tells the unromantic story of all sides catastrophe that shows once again that the side that more quickly adapts and just happens to make the less mistakes is usually the side that wins. Along with some occasional wry commentary, this is a go to volume on the topic for the critically inclined.

[Katrina Nowak · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a very well-researched book with a logical storyline. It was a little difficult to follow as an audiobook but did keep my attention. Herwig goes into great detail on the personalities and leadership traits of the major military leaders and discusses complex battlefield maneuvers and decision-making. Here the audiobook did not quite do the book justice, as I found myself wanting to be able to reference the locations. This was the most comprehensive book on the Marne that I have read, and thoroughly addresses the strengths, weaknesses and blunders of the German and the French armies at the various stages of the campaign. The epilogue begins to touch on the theme of the subtitle, "the battle that changed the world", and I found myself highly intrigued by the argument and wanting to explore this topic more.

[Gareth Rogers · Rating 4 out of 5]

I’m sure that this book would be more appreciated by an academic historian as opposed to a regular history buff like me. Regardless, buried in the text, beyond the descriptions of the movements of this corps and that corps, was a story of interest. I had never understood why the German plan to encircle the French and British armies failed and now I have a greater appreciation of the situation.

I assume that there are other books out there that tell the same story without all the technical detail of this one and perhaps they would have sufficed for me. Unless of course, the general conclusion of this book that the lack of central command and communication between the five main German armies was the main reason for the failure is unique. This author appears to rely heavily on research into German documentation so maybe he has insight that others do not.