Tracing Napoleon's development as both a general and statesman, distinguished historian James Marshall-Cornwall brings to life the career of one of history's greatest military strategists. Focusing on the two decades during which Napoleon achieved his greatest triumphs and suffered his most heartbreaking defeats, this thoroughly researched study keenly analyzes how, like Oliver Cromwell, Napoleon combined strategy and statecraft throughout his career. From his most brilliant campaigns-in particular his conquest of Piedmont and his triumphant invasion of Italy-to the disasters at Trafalgar, in the Iberian Peninsula, in Russia, at Leipzig, and his final downfall at Waterloo, Napoleon as Military Commander tells the story of a general whose defeats were as remarkable as his victories.
It is always nice when the author tells you what the main points of the book will be:
I have based this study on two hypotheses: firstly, as has been indicated above, that Napoleon was no innovator in the art or science of war; secondly, that, to quote Lord Wavell, ‘Good generals, unlike poets, are made rather than born’ (Soldiers and Soldiering). This latter theorem I have tried to prove in the first chapter, which describes Napoleon’s early upbringing and training, and particularly his self-education, for there is no doubt that the varied environment and experiences of his early life exerted a marked influence on the development of his character and abilities.
The second chapter describes the legacy of military doctrine and organization which Napoleon inherited from his fore-runners, and on which he based his conduct of war. The subsequent chapters trace his campaigns in chronological order, in order to analyse his methods of conducting them.
In this 2 Star treatment of Napoleon’s military campaigns, the British General Marshall-Cornwell provides an excellent discussion of Napoleon command thinking in 1813, as he contemplates his options:
Unfortunately this was one of the very few passages in the book that I found enlightening on Napoleon as a military commander. Mostly the book is a recounting of campaigns, movements of forces, raising and losing armies. Not recommended for the Napoleonic expert—too superficial. There have to be better books with good maps of the battles.
This book is for neither beginners nor is it for those with a lot of background on the subject; it is for the intermediate trying to understand Bonaparte. The author does a great job of explaining some campaigns and a poor job explaining others. Overall not a bad book, but there are probably better works on the subject that have better maps. The author is more critical of Napoleon as a general than other historians, which in turn means his judgments of other generals is usually very harsh.
Nice overview of the era of the Napoleonic Wars, and the author had an interesting thesis that the Emperor did not come up with any great theory or application of war; his genius was in applying what was then known. The author had a nice introduction, but almost no conclusion at the end of his work, which makes it a weakness. I would also have liked some mention of the War of 1812 between the US and Britain, which would almost certainly have affected the campaigns on the continent.
Napoleon as Military Commander, by General James Marshall-Cornwall, offers a comprehensive analysis of Napoleon’s military career and the strategies and tactics that made him the most powerful dictator of Europe since Charlemagne. But with so much more to the story of Napoleon than how he won his military battles, it will leave you wanting more.
Napoleon as Military Commander is a fascinating insight into the career of a military genius in an era before rapid technological advances would radically alter the craft. Marshall-Cornwall is clearly enamoured with his subject and gives Napoleon much credit for his victories while not being too reluctant to point out his errors. Without an alternative analysis I cannot judge how defendable his conclusions are but I suspect he is a little too generous to Napoleon at times. I am glad to have the book and to have read it, especially for the insights into some of Napoleon’s lesser remembered campaigns, but it is not without its faults.
The maps provided were enlightening, but their appearances dried up about two-thirds through the book and I found myself frequently wishing for more of them to better understand the unfolding events. The ones that are there could be greatly improved. If you are going to have a book about the career of a commander, I think the maps need to be more instructive as to the positions of the various armies and units at different times and their movement from one stage of the battle to the next. The illustrations within Adrian Goldsworthy’s Cannae set an excellent standard.
There is also an acute detachment from the horrors of the events in this book. By about two-thirds in I found myself overwhelmed by the body count; thousands upon thousands of dead men at every major engagement as well as the considerable hardship while they were alive – forced marches, starvation, disease, extreme weather. For those of us living, or even fighting, in the relative comfort of the present, it is perhaps heartening to know that such losses would not be tolerated by the civilian populations of a 21st century democracy. Marshall-Cornwall barely describes the plight of Napoleon’s soldiers, instead giving estimates for the many dead and suffering with a certain cold detachment.
Central to an understanding of Napoleon as a military commander is the ability to trace his masterly campaigns. In my opinion, the maps provided do not enable me to do this, therefore my dissatisfaction. There's gotta be better out there, especially Chandler (which is, admittedly, big).