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A Glorious Army: Robert E. Lee's Triumph, 1862-1863
From the time Robert E. Lee took command of the Army of Northern Virginia on June 1, 1862, until the Battle of Gettysburg thirteen months later, the Confederate army compiled a record of military achievement almost unparalleled in our nation’s history. How it happened—the relative contributions of Lee, his top command, opposing Union generals, and of course the rebel army itself—is the subject of Civil War historian Jeffry D. Wert’s fascinating and riveting new history.
In the year following Lee’s appointment, his army won four major battles or campaigns and fought Union forces to a draw at the bloody Battle of Antietam. Washington itself was threatened, as a succession of Union commanders failed to stop Lee’s offensive. Until Gettysburg, it looked as if Lee might force the Union to negotiate a peace rather than risk surrendering the capital or even losing the war. Lee’s victories fired southern ambition and emboldened Confederate soldiers everywhere.
Wert shows how the same audacity and aggression that fueled these victories proved disastrous at Gettysburg. But, as Wert explains, Lee had little choice: outnumbered by an opponent with superior resources, he had to take the fight to the enemy in order to win. For a year his superior generalship prevailed against his opponents, but eventually what Lee’s trusted lieutenant General James Longstreet called “headlong combativeness” caused Lee to miscalculate. When an equally combative Union general—Ulysses S. Grant—took command of northern forces in 1864, Lee was defeated. A Glorious Army draws on the latest scholarship, including letters and diaries, to provide a brilliant analysis of Lee’s triumphs. It offers fresh assessments of Lee; his top commanders Longstreet, Jackson, and Stuart; and a shrewd battle strategy that still offers lessons to military commanders today. A Glorious Army is a dramatic account of major battles from Seven Days to Gettysburg that is as gripping as it is convincing, a must-read for anyone interested in the Civil War.
400 pages, Hardcover
First published April 1, 2011
10 people are currently reading
117 people want to read
About the author
Jeffry D. Wert
17 books35 followersAmerican historian and author specializing in the American Civil War. He graduated cum laude with a B.A. from Lock Haven University, and a M.A. from The Pennsylvania State University, both in History. He worked for many years as a history teacher at Penns Valley Area High School in Spring Mills, Pennsylvania.
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
November 21, 2020
This book concentrates on the 'year of glory' from the 7 Days battles of 1862 until after the great defeat at Gettysburg. During that year the Army of Northern Virginia reigned supreme on the battlefield, defeating northern armies time and time again. Under Robert E. Lee's command they earned a remarkable reputation for their hard-driving endurance and 'elan'. Unfortunately, they also sowed the seeds of their eventual defeat through the loss of irreplaceable men and officers. The figures, as quoted by Wert, are staggering. The South was proud of the achievements of the Army of Northern, but as more households lost sons, fathers, and brothers, they could not successfully counter the fighting prowess of their opponents.
In addition, the western theatre of war proved a drain on men and materiel. Even if the eastern theatre of war had continued to be successful for the South, the armies of Grant and Sherman stood poised to carry on the war from the West. Instead, the Army of the Potomac found itself in the bloody, but ultimately victorious Overland Campaign, redeeming itself and ending the Army of Northern Virginia's glory.
In addition, the western theatre of war proved a drain on men and materiel. Even if the eastern theatre of war had continued to be successful for the South, the armies of Grant and Sherman stood poised to carry on the war from the West. Instead, the Army of the Potomac found itself in the bloody, but ultimately victorious Overland Campaign, redeeming itself and ending the Army of Northern Virginia's glory.
December 12, 2011
When I first bought this book I was very enthused about reading it...and then it sat on my shelf for near six months. In my defense I study history at Eastern Michigan University with my specialty being Military History and I don't like being pegged into one particular topic or era, so I read ALOT of books from many varying topics. So I used the excuse of: 'I already have more books bought than I have read...so I'll save this one for later.' When the reality of the situation was that I assumed that I had read all there was to know on this particular topic seeing as how the American Civil War has been one of my five main areas of interest in Military History. (The Napoleonic Wars, WWII, Greek-Roman Military History and Chinese Military history rounding out my main interests.) Lo and behold, I discovered a book that was not just interesting and well written (Wert's books generally are) but also a book that re-stimulated my interest in an iconic figure in American history that I thought I had read all there was to know about him. Turns out this book made me revisit my thoughts on Lee and the Civil War in general.
Wert's book picks up the narrative immediately following the wounding of General Joseph Johnston at the climax of the first day of Battle at Seven Pines. Robert E. Lee, a heretofore unknown in America, is suddenly cast into the limelight of Military History. Lincoln and Winfield Scott had both tried to convince Lee to join the Union cause as commander of all Union forces at the outset of the war, but Virginia's secession following Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers after the bombardment of Fort Sumter forced Lee's hand. (Lee, like most Americans at the time, considered his home State more important than the overall Union.) This offer was made due to Lee's capable performance as an officer on Scott's staff during the march on Mexico City during the Mexican War some sixteen years earlier, which must have truly been extraordinary to be offered command of all US forces at the outset of the war! As it was history would turn out differently and Lee would prove to be a great general, indeed the best the American nation has ever produced. But ironically he fought against his nation, not for it.
Wert does not follow exclusively the story of Lee as general of the Army of Northern Virginia, rather this book is about the army itself and it's desperate battles against a foe that always outnumbered them and outgunned them; and yet more often than not they beat them. Without going into to great of detail on the individual operations and battles, Lee's overall aim was to break the will or fighting spirit of the United States by inflicting both a traumatic physical and psychological blow to their main army (the Army of the Potomac) in a cataclysmic battle of Napoleonic style annihilation. In order to achieve this goal Lee knew that he had no other choice but to take the aggressive approach and to retain the initiative as much as he could and seek battle whenever he could do so advantageously. From the Seven Days to Gettysburg Lee's army would inflict roughly 100,000 casualties on their Union foes and force a strategic stalemate on the Union cause that nearly doomed the North's war effort. However Lee's losses were horrendous; his own army would suffer 91,000 losses during this same time period and many Military Historians have, justifiably, questioned Lee's overly aggressive approach to warfare and have pointed out it's negative impact on the Confederate cause.
However, in making this argument, though it is a valid one, one must bear in mind a couple of items that will help to put history in perspective. First of all Military History as it is written and analyzed in the United States has been dramatically shaped by the US Army's experience fighting the war in Vietnam. The outcome of the Vietnam War produced in the United States Military and the civilian political establishment what British Military Historian and Officer Brian Holden Reid calls 'the Vietnamization effect'. Simply put the outcome of the war in Vietnam has convinced US policymakers and Military officers (and by extension Military Historians) of the futility of offensive minded strategies in favor of defensive ones.This has, of course, shaped the writing and analysis of Military History, particularly the Military History of the Confederacy which does tend to be on the aggressive side. But again; there were sound reasons for the South to be aggressive in terms of their war-fighting. First of all it was common knowledge that the Northern states had a tremendous advantage in both manpower reserves and industrial might over that of the agrarian based Confederacy. (Not to mention it would be rather hard to convince hundreds of thousands of mal-treated slaves to take up arms in the South's defense so the Confederate government could not rely on their huge slave population as a resource pool)The only way to offest this balance was to redress it on the battlefield, and the best way to do so was by taking the offensive. Let me explain.
Both sides were inculcated with the methods of Napoleonic warfare and both sides waged their battles as well as their operations after the Emperor in the hope of emulating either Austerlitz or Friedland. However the tactics used in battle by Napoleonic armies were predicated on weapons technology that was half a century obsolete on the battlefields of the War Between the States. Muskets were rifled now and their effective range was quadrupled (though as Earl J. Hess points out, most soldiers rarely opened fire above 100 yards anyway due to inadequate training) and artillery was virtually light years ahead of that used on the battlefields of Europe in the early 1800's. Also cavalry were all but obsolete as a tactical weapon by this time and their use in massive, headlong charges at bodies of standing infantry meant certain death to the men on horseback who merely made better targets for rifled muskets with far faster reloading times than flintlocks. Due to the deadlock in tactical thought the armies of the American Civil War fought with modern weapons while using outmoded tactics. This explains the hideous losses suffered by both sides but these losses overshadow the fact that often offensive battles were successful as were bayonet charges from time to time (as Brian Holden Reid points out in his book: 'The American Civil War: The Operational Battlefield, 1861-1863.').
It was more than just Napoleon that influenced the Officers of the American Civil War it was also fellow Americans Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor who during the Mexican War fought from a position of being chronically outnumbered by their Mexican adversaries. The only way the relatively minuscule US forces could achieve victory was by offensive action to unbalance their foe at both the operational and tactical level. Bear in mind that all of the major battles in the Mexican War were American victories and these victories, save one, were won by offensive action. The general method of both Taylor and Scott was to turn the Mexican flanks both operationally and tactically. In all occasions this was a success. The only time that US forces stood on the defensive the fight was nearly a disaster and the Mexicans did achieve a strategic deadlock in the north for their heroic efforts at the Battle of Buena Vista. Future Civil War generals Braxton Bragg (CSA) and U.S. Grant (Union) were at Buena Vista and both took home the lesson of the dangers of defensive mindedness. The experiences of the US Army during the Mexican War, the history of Napoleons campaigns and the writings of Jomini inculcated an offensive minded spirit in both sides, but clearly this was demonstrated more clearly in the Confederacy.
Lee understood better than any Southern General the need for offensive action to defeat the Union forces. In early 1862 the Confederates stayed on the defensive with disastrous results. Union forces scored numerous victories which the South would never fully recover from due to allowing their numerically and materially superior foes chose the time and place of their engagements. These early disasters brought home to the Confederate government in Richmond and the Army spread across the South the dangers of passive defensive warfare. One thing many Military Historians forget when writing about the War Between the States is that both sides were Republican-Democracies and as such their political leaders were held accountable to the civilian population. And since a war is simply another (albeit much more drastic) means of achieving a political end then when the civilian population loses faith in the nations chances to win said war then chances are nation will lose said war regardless if whether or not said nations armed forces are actually winning the war on the battlefield (Vietnam). In the case of the Confederacy during the late Winter and Spring of 1862 the civilian population of the South was in despair as their forces retreated in the face of overwhelming Union forces. The only chance the South had to keep their population in the cause was to take the offensive, and this they did all across the South and would continue to do so for the remainder of the war with only a few exceptions.
In order to break the will of the Union civilian population Lee had to inflict as catastrophic of a defeat on the Union Army of the Potomac as he could. Unfortunately for the South, he was unable to. Then again no Civil War general ever came close to destroying their opponents in battle save for Braxton Bragg at the Battle of Murfreesboro TN in the winter of 1862-1863. There Bragg's Confederate Army of Tennessee launched a surprise attack on New Years Day at dawn that smashed the Union Army of the Cumberland and drove it into a 'U' shaped defensive line. Had Bragg had more divisions (some historians claim only one; the one he had given to Johnston to use in Mississippi) then he would most assuredly wrecked the Union Army, as it was the Union Army of the Cumberland refused to give in and the battle ended a draw albeit Bragg had achieved a strategic stalemate in Tennessee that would last for six months following the horrible slaughter of Murfreesboro. Both sides forces were two equal in combat capabilities for either side to destroy the other. If the Union forces were always larger and better equipped, the Confederate forces made up for it with sheer ruthless aggressiveness and determination few armies have possessed in history. Had Lee been able to achieve a battlefield coup like Bragg nearly had, then chances are that the outcome of American history might have been different. As it was in Lee's search for a decisive war ending battle he eroded the offensive capability of his army and forced himself onto the defensive following the defeat at Gettysburg.
As it was the South had no other option but to fight an aggressive war where their forces could call the shots and chose the time and place of battles. And Lee understood better than any other Southern general the need to not just defeat the Union Army in battle but to break the spirit of the Northern people back home. And in this he was damned near successful.
This is a phenomenal book, if it is but an overview of the period in question. Regardless it is a book worth reading and one worth thinking about when one is done.
Wert's book picks up the narrative immediately following the wounding of General Joseph Johnston at the climax of the first day of Battle at Seven Pines. Robert E. Lee, a heretofore unknown in America, is suddenly cast into the limelight of Military History. Lincoln and Winfield Scott had both tried to convince Lee to join the Union cause as commander of all Union forces at the outset of the war, but Virginia's secession following Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers after the bombardment of Fort Sumter forced Lee's hand. (Lee, like most Americans at the time, considered his home State more important than the overall Union.) This offer was made due to Lee's capable performance as an officer on Scott's staff during the march on Mexico City during the Mexican War some sixteen years earlier, which must have truly been extraordinary to be offered command of all US forces at the outset of the war! As it was history would turn out differently and Lee would prove to be a great general, indeed the best the American nation has ever produced. But ironically he fought against his nation, not for it.
Wert does not follow exclusively the story of Lee as general of the Army of Northern Virginia, rather this book is about the army itself and it's desperate battles against a foe that always outnumbered them and outgunned them; and yet more often than not they beat them. Without going into to great of detail on the individual operations and battles, Lee's overall aim was to break the will or fighting spirit of the United States by inflicting both a traumatic physical and psychological blow to their main army (the Army of the Potomac) in a cataclysmic battle of Napoleonic style annihilation. In order to achieve this goal Lee knew that he had no other choice but to take the aggressive approach and to retain the initiative as much as he could and seek battle whenever he could do so advantageously. From the Seven Days to Gettysburg Lee's army would inflict roughly 100,000 casualties on their Union foes and force a strategic stalemate on the Union cause that nearly doomed the North's war effort. However Lee's losses were horrendous; his own army would suffer 91,000 losses during this same time period and many Military Historians have, justifiably, questioned Lee's overly aggressive approach to warfare and have pointed out it's negative impact on the Confederate cause.
However, in making this argument, though it is a valid one, one must bear in mind a couple of items that will help to put history in perspective. First of all Military History as it is written and analyzed in the United States has been dramatically shaped by the US Army's experience fighting the war in Vietnam. The outcome of the Vietnam War produced in the United States Military and the civilian political establishment what British Military Historian and Officer Brian Holden Reid calls 'the Vietnamization effect'. Simply put the outcome of the war in Vietnam has convinced US policymakers and Military officers (and by extension Military Historians) of the futility of offensive minded strategies in favor of defensive ones.This has, of course, shaped the writing and analysis of Military History, particularly the Military History of the Confederacy which does tend to be on the aggressive side. But again; there were sound reasons for the South to be aggressive in terms of their war-fighting. First of all it was common knowledge that the Northern states had a tremendous advantage in both manpower reserves and industrial might over that of the agrarian based Confederacy. (Not to mention it would be rather hard to convince hundreds of thousands of mal-treated slaves to take up arms in the South's defense so the Confederate government could not rely on their huge slave population as a resource pool)The only way to offest this balance was to redress it on the battlefield, and the best way to do so was by taking the offensive. Let me explain.
Both sides were inculcated with the methods of Napoleonic warfare and both sides waged their battles as well as their operations after the Emperor in the hope of emulating either Austerlitz or Friedland. However the tactics used in battle by Napoleonic armies were predicated on weapons technology that was half a century obsolete on the battlefields of the War Between the States. Muskets were rifled now and their effective range was quadrupled (though as Earl J. Hess points out, most soldiers rarely opened fire above 100 yards anyway due to inadequate training) and artillery was virtually light years ahead of that used on the battlefields of Europe in the early 1800's. Also cavalry were all but obsolete as a tactical weapon by this time and their use in massive, headlong charges at bodies of standing infantry meant certain death to the men on horseback who merely made better targets for rifled muskets with far faster reloading times than flintlocks. Due to the deadlock in tactical thought the armies of the American Civil War fought with modern weapons while using outmoded tactics. This explains the hideous losses suffered by both sides but these losses overshadow the fact that often offensive battles were successful as were bayonet charges from time to time (as Brian Holden Reid points out in his book: 'The American Civil War: The Operational Battlefield, 1861-1863.').
It was more than just Napoleon that influenced the Officers of the American Civil War it was also fellow Americans Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor who during the Mexican War fought from a position of being chronically outnumbered by their Mexican adversaries. The only way the relatively minuscule US forces could achieve victory was by offensive action to unbalance their foe at both the operational and tactical level. Bear in mind that all of the major battles in the Mexican War were American victories and these victories, save one, were won by offensive action. The general method of both Taylor and Scott was to turn the Mexican flanks both operationally and tactically. In all occasions this was a success. The only time that US forces stood on the defensive the fight was nearly a disaster and the Mexicans did achieve a strategic deadlock in the north for their heroic efforts at the Battle of Buena Vista. Future Civil War generals Braxton Bragg (CSA) and U.S. Grant (Union) were at Buena Vista and both took home the lesson of the dangers of defensive mindedness. The experiences of the US Army during the Mexican War, the history of Napoleons campaigns and the writings of Jomini inculcated an offensive minded spirit in both sides, but clearly this was demonstrated more clearly in the Confederacy.
Lee understood better than any Southern General the need for offensive action to defeat the Union forces. In early 1862 the Confederates stayed on the defensive with disastrous results. Union forces scored numerous victories which the South would never fully recover from due to allowing their numerically and materially superior foes chose the time and place of their engagements. These early disasters brought home to the Confederate government in Richmond and the Army spread across the South the dangers of passive defensive warfare. One thing many Military Historians forget when writing about the War Between the States is that both sides were Republican-Democracies and as such their political leaders were held accountable to the civilian population. And since a war is simply another (albeit much more drastic) means of achieving a political end then when the civilian population loses faith in the nations chances to win said war then chances are nation will lose said war regardless if whether or not said nations armed forces are actually winning the war on the battlefield (Vietnam). In the case of the Confederacy during the late Winter and Spring of 1862 the civilian population of the South was in despair as their forces retreated in the face of overwhelming Union forces. The only chance the South had to keep their population in the cause was to take the offensive, and this they did all across the South and would continue to do so for the remainder of the war with only a few exceptions.
In order to break the will of the Union civilian population Lee had to inflict as catastrophic of a defeat on the Union Army of the Potomac as he could. Unfortunately for the South, he was unable to. Then again no Civil War general ever came close to destroying their opponents in battle save for Braxton Bragg at the Battle of Murfreesboro TN in the winter of 1862-1863. There Bragg's Confederate Army of Tennessee launched a surprise attack on New Years Day at dawn that smashed the Union Army of the Cumberland and drove it into a 'U' shaped defensive line. Had Bragg had more divisions (some historians claim only one; the one he had given to Johnston to use in Mississippi) then he would most assuredly wrecked the Union Army, as it was the Union Army of the Cumberland refused to give in and the battle ended a draw albeit Bragg had achieved a strategic stalemate in Tennessee that would last for six months following the horrible slaughter of Murfreesboro. Both sides forces were two equal in combat capabilities for either side to destroy the other. If the Union forces were always larger and better equipped, the Confederate forces made up for it with sheer ruthless aggressiveness and determination few armies have possessed in history. Had Lee been able to achieve a battlefield coup like Bragg nearly had, then chances are that the outcome of American history might have been different. As it was in Lee's search for a decisive war ending battle he eroded the offensive capability of his army and forced himself onto the defensive following the defeat at Gettysburg.
As it was the South had no other option but to fight an aggressive war where their forces could call the shots and chose the time and place of battles. And Lee understood better than any other Southern general the need to not just defeat the Union Army in battle but to break the spirit of the Northern people back home. And in this he was damned near successful.
This is a phenomenal book, if it is but an overview of the period in question. Regardless it is a book worth reading and one worth thinking about when one is done.
January 18, 2022
Wert is a good historian and I liked some of his other books. This was an interesting footnote regarding Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee’s tactics required very competent and independent subordinates (Longstreet and Jackson) to work well. He was an aggressive general, but the Rebels had scarce resources (men and materiel) and his tactics squandered them. As a West Point trained officer, who had served the US Army for years, he understood that the rebellion was an uphill struggle from the start, as well as a violation of his oath to the United States. Once Jackson died, Lee reorganized the army poorly. The right commanders were not there to continue his laid back command structure. Gettysburg was a disaster from start to finish. Lee’s reputation was overblown in my opinion.
January 20, 2025
A very good narrative of the 1862-63 campaign of the Army of Northern Virginia. Wert doesn't break much new ground, and he affirms the thesis that Lee's costly tactical and strategic offensives were nonetheless the correct decision, given the COnfederacy's lack of strategic options.
February 18, 2025
From the time Robert E. Lee took command of the Army of Northern Virginia on June 1, 1862, until the Battle of Gettysburg thirteen months later, the Confederate army compiled a record of military achievement almost unparalleled in our nation's history.
July 16, 2022
Loved the format of this book. Book focused on Lee and how his army functions and why.
August 21, 2013
Wert discusses the Army of Northern Virginia from Lee's takeover at Malvern Hill to Gettysburg. Lee's tenacity combined with the chemistry of his best officers took the ANV to great heights against overwhelming odds. This brief history will acclimate the reader with the basic details of this time to help further understanding of why the ANV was so successful in so many campaigns.
I enjoyed this book. While having studied some of the battles in detail, there is so much information and detail that one can lose the thread of the relationships in the ANV. Wert does a great job of explaining the success and the personalities behind it. We see Jackson, Lee and Longstreet at their finest, and understand how this strong leadership overwhelmed the shakiness of the Union generals.
Great introductory read for someone trying to get down the methodology of the ANV.
I enjoyed this book. While having studied some of the battles in detail, there is so much information and detail that one can lose the thread of the relationships in the ANV. Wert does a great job of explaining the success and the personalities behind it. We see Jackson, Lee and Longstreet at their finest, and understand how this strong leadership overwhelmed the shakiness of the Union generals.
Great introductory read for someone trying to get down the methodology of the ANV.
May 11, 2011
Was Lee that good? or did a series of lack-luster Union generals allow him to win victory after victory? Wert, who also wrote a great book on the Army of the Potomac, seeks to answer that question. He comes down on the side of Lee esp in Chapter 10, "A Glorious Army."
A good book to be read along side of Wert's "Sword of Lincoln," on the Army of the Potomac and books on the Union Army of Tennessee.
A good book to be read along side of Wert's "Sword of Lincoln," on the Army of the Potomac and books on the Union Army of Tennessee.
Read
April 4, 2012A good overview of the period for Lee's army between the Seven Days and Gettysburg. Enough factual detail to make the battles real, but not so much tactical that you lose sight of the importance of the strategy. Also a good balance of the views and criticism of historians and contemporary evaluations.
I enjoyed it very much.
I enjoyed it very much.
February 20, 2016
An excellent overview of Robert E. Lee and his 18-month string of success with the Army of Northern Virginia. Just as Wert did a credible job telling the story of the Union's Army of the Potomac in "Sword of Lincoln," he gives an evenhanded recounting of Lee's military prowess from the gates of Richmond to the final charge at Gettysburg.
June 4, 2014
I was hesitant to buy this book, but now I'm glad I did. This is the best book that Jeffrey Wert has written in my opinion. Great book and enjoyed meeting Jeffrey at the Lee Chapel Museum in Lexington, Virginia.
December 16, 2013
A fascinating book about both the genius and flaws of RE Lee. A must read for those interested in the civil war
June 16, 2013
It's fun to read a book by someone you know!
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews